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List of Sarawakian Glossary 
adat Customary 
bechara Longhouse hearing 
Bumiputera Literally prince of the soil; referring to a status entitled for social 
privileges due to his or her indigeneity  
CBO Community-based organisation 
Datu Patinggi, Datu 
Bandar, Datu 
Temenggong 
Titles bestowed by the Brunei sultan to local Malay aristocrats in 
the 19th century 
Dayak Non-Muslim indigenous groups 
Dewan Rakyat House of Representative 
Dewan Negara Senate 
DUN Dewan Undangan Negeri [State Legislative Assembly] 
Gawai Harvest Festival 
jajahan Sarawak districts during the Brooke era 
Ketua Kaum Village chief by ethnic group 
Ketua Masyarakat Community leaders in general 
Ketuanan Melayu Malay supremacy 
Konsep Baru New Concept (a government agriculture project that invited 
joint-venture from native landowners) 
long The confluence of two rivers 
MA63 Malaysia Agreement 1963 
Majlis Adat Istiadat Council for Customs and Traditions 
maren Kayan’s aristocrat 
NCL Native customary land 
NCR Native customary rights 
Operasi Lalang Literally Weed Operation; referring to a nationwide political 
clampdown in 1987 
Orang Ulu Dayaks who live in the interior of Sarawak 
panyin Kayan’s commoners 
pemakai menoa Territorial domain 
Pemanca High official title given to community leader by District 
Penghulu Headman or chieftains. A title given to Dayak district chiefs 
pulau galau Communal forest, reserved virgin forests 
reformasi Reform 
sumpit Blowpipe 
Temenggong A high official title given to community leader by Division 
temuda Cultivated land 
Tuai Rumah Longhouse chief 
YB Yang Berhormat; a protocol title for elected representatives 





Civil society generally refers to a sphere where individuals exercise their freedom and rights 
through voluntary, independent associations. Spurred by world political events, the discourse 
of civil society shifted to a democratising mission against the tyranny of the state. It was also 
during the 1980s in Malaysia, middle-class non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
blossomed and advocated for human rights issues such as feminism, labour and environment. 
In the late 1990s, the Internet was hailed as the platform to widen the public sphere in the 
oppressive environment of media in Malaysia, especially its broadcasting industry. The 
following two decades witnessed how websites, blogs and social media became the staple 
platform to influence public opinion especially before general elections. 
This thesis explores the relationship between civil society and new media using the study 
of native customary rights (NCR) land community-based organisations (CBOs) in Sarawak, 
Malaysia. Sarawak, the largest state of the Bornean Island, formed the Federation of Malaysia 
with Sabah in 1963 bound by an agreement that secured their oil royalty and native status 
as Bumiputra (prince of the soil). Sarawak is rich with natural resources, flora, fauna and 
cultural heritage with over 27 ethnic groups residing on the land. However, over the years, 
Sarawak lost much of its assets due to illegal deforestation and native land grabbing. Since the 
1970s, environmental groups and activists have fought hard to reinstate the definition of NCR 
against state-given provisional leases (PLs) awarded to logging and palm oil manufacturing 
companies. 
This research uses the analytical framework from Italian social theorist Antonio 
Gramsci’s notion of civil society to understand the potential of new media in expanding the 
NCR land advocacy in Sarawak. Gramsci sees civil society as an arena of struggles between 
ruling and ruled classes to achieve hegemony, referring to cultural domination by shaping 
consent. To Gramsci, this consensus has to be constantly maintained through superstructural 
institutions such as religion, education, media and tourism. Therefore, civil society is the 
complex sphere where the state exerts its authority without having to resort to military forces, 
unless the hegemony is broken.  
The current state of literature suggests that the contribution of new media to Malaysian 
political changes is more to do with instantaneous online activities and rarely related to 
ongoing organising processes. Academic research studies about native customary land in 
Sarawak are largely technical, focused on geological mapping and land laws. By taking on the 
Gramscian framework, this thesis rejects the liberal paradigm that defines civil society as an 
autonomous sphere that unanimously aims for the common good, participated in by rational 
individuals. There is more to explore beyond the celebratory claims of freedom brought about 
by NGOs and new media. Characterising civil society as a complex arena of conflicting interests 
and actors is a more realistic way to understand the CBOs’ empowerment efforts related to 
Sarawakian subalterns and their interests. Interviews with the CBOs personnel and web-based 
analysis of their online platforms showed deep-seated distrust not only toward the state and 
new communication technologies, but among NGOs, indigenous ethnic groups, and churches. 
The Gramscian civil society framework allows the research to synthesise the potentials of new 
media in the CBOs’ organising activities as separate yet interrelated entities against the 
background of the lower status of Sarawak indigenous people. The research further 
contributes insights into the sturdy trenches of civil society that protect the state – officially 
sanctioned media systems, education, religion and national identities. By way of conclusion, 
the research suggests that the CBOs should consolidate their advocacy and venture into the 




Chapter 1: Civil Society and New Media – Introduction  
1.1 Background and Context 
The idea of civil society originated from Western political theory and is associated with 
‘voluntary’ private associations, autonomous from the state and aiming for the ideal life of 
citizens or the common good (Verma, 2002). Following political changes in the 1980s and 
1990s, the concept of civil society is linked with pursuing democratisation, either by causal or 
correlation (Brown, 2004). For Malaysia, the discourse revolving civil society and democracy 
may not have taken place so drastically without the proliferation of advocacy-based non-
government organisations (NGOs) in the 1980s (Rodan, 2014), and national popularisation of 
new media since the 1990s (Weiss, 2013).    
Under the pretext of a developing Asian nation, the post-colonial government had had 
stringent control on media and human rights movement. The multi-racial nature of Malaysian 
society serves as a legitimising tool for authority to limit the influence of Opposition and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs). It is not uncommon that the Barisan Nasional (BN, 
National Front) government perceived them as a hindrance to national development and 
stability, therefore have to be monitored closely (Mohd. Azizuddin1, 2011). For instance, the 
Minister of Home Affairs has full authority in deciding the establishment and activities of any 
association under the Societies Act 1966 (1998). This has seriously impeded the development 
of movements in the areas of labour unions, students and oppositional political parties in the 
country.  
Similarly, expression platforms faced strict legislations in the name of national security. 
Under Emergency rule, the colonial government enacted laws such as the Sedition Ordinance 
of 1948 and the Printing Presses Ordinance of 1948 (Mustafa, 2002). The communist threat 
also helped bring into existence the Internal Security Act (ISA) of 1960 (Zaharom, 2002a). As 
Means elaborates, “[t]he Act empowers the home affairs minister to impose preventive 
detention without trial on anyone acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia” 
(1991; in Zaharom, 2002a: pp. 123-124). New communication technologies were promoted in 
the 1990s as a means to propel Malaysia’s competitiveness in the world economy. The 
government even promised not to censor the Internet in the pursuit of this. Counter-
hegemonic parties thus saw this opportunity and pushed the boundary by setting up websites 
and later blogs to provide alternative information and discussions. NGOs that represented 
marginalised communities like refugees and indigenous people also started to utilise the 
online space to spread their advocacy (Zaharom and Gayathry, 2016). The then ruling 
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government was initially sceptical toward alternative news administrators and independent 
bloggers, intimidating them with arrests and lawsuits (Zaharom, 2007). It was not until the 
12th Malaysia’s general elections results in 2008 where the Federal government lost five states 
to the Opposition coalition that the former acknowledged the influence online activism had 
over citizens’ voting patterns (Mohd. Azizuddin, 2014). 
Although state apparatuses still strictly regulate the nature of NGOs and expression, 
alternative media systems, which sprang from online platforms, played a considerably 
important role in shaping public opinion regarding citizenry issues. In evaluating some seminal 
works regarding civil society in Asia, Weiss (2008) and Salmenkari (2013) pointed out several 
weaknesses – hardly engaged with public sphere, a realm where public opinion can be formed; 
uncritical rehash of Western liberal civil society theories and overall inadequacy in theorising 
civil society (see Chapter 2). Taking these into consideration, this thesis has more to explore 
in the relationship between civil society and new media – is civil society defined by new media 
use? What happens to the ‘old’ media? Which theoretical approach can best provide an 
analytical framework? 
Over time, some Malaysian studies showed how the Internet and social media elevated 
political consciousness among the people, creating a ‘virtual’ civil society (Tan, 2010; Tan and 
Zawawi, 2008). Lee and colleagues (2018, p. 1949) stated the possibility of the Internet and 
new media being a “subaltern public sphere that served the interests of minorities and the 
marginalised”. Public sphere is a German philosopher, Jürgen Habermas’ conception of a 
sphere characterised by rational discourses and the formation of public opinion. Fuchs (2014), 
in his critique of an idealistic Habermas’ public sphere, argued that unless the structural 
limitations to political participation are addressed, social media cannot be a public service 
sphere. Recently the transformative role of new media in the political arena has been 
discussed in a more contextual approach beyond technological determinism, meaning 
technology as the pivotal driver of change. Weiss (2013) and Lister et al (2010) argued that 
‘new’ media may not be entirely new, afterall. ‘Old’ media, especially broadcasting, when 
introduced to developing nations in the 1960s were celebrated as social catalyst or social 
multipliers, which in turn served as a justification of government regulations (Ronny, 1977; 
Glattbach and Ramanujan, 1978). Media, in general, are social constructions and conditioned 
by economic and political contexts. For example, a 2016/17 survey among 2,042 Internet users 
in Malaysia showed that the highest Internet adoption was by those possessing at least 
tertiary education, earning more than RM5000 monthly and residing in urban areas (MCMC, 
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2017). On the other hand, according to this survey, ‘lack of confidence’ and ‘lack of interest’ 
were the main reasons for not using the Internet, followed by ‘having no access to Internet 
connection or device’. In studying the relationship between digital media and Malaysia’s 
electoral reform movement, Lim (2017, p. 214) argued that “[d]igital media does not have an 
intrinsic power to change politics. What has changed are the ways in which people participate 
and engage with and through media.” Lee and colleagues (2018) found that social media use 
in Hong Kong was more associated with political stance previously marginalised in the 
mainstream media than the role of social media in itself.  
The current state of literature showed that the relationship between new media and 
civil society has to be contextualised by cultural, economic and political factors. Lee et al 
(2018) stressed that the effects of social media on offline political participation and social 
movements should also be studied. As Yung and Leung (2014, p. 85) added, “[a]lthough social 
activism is an undeniable part of civil society, it is far from being a complete picture.” Such 
dynamic relationship between media and civil society leads to the research gap where the 
extent to which ‘new media’ have contributed to the processes of sustained civil society 
activity is rarely explored (Keane, 2001). The processes of civil society mean “the formal and 
informal mechanisms or procedures by which interest groups and individuals seek to pursue 
advocacy” (Keane, 2001: p.785). Effective civil society movement takes not only in the online 
contexts, but its contribution in the entire organising processes, which include seeking policy 
impact (Weiss, 2013). While it is convenient to assess the viral user-centric activities of certain 
events or websites as the success of civil society, the latter could be driven more by the ‘safe’ 
feeling of expressing dissent online without real-world participation (Weiss, 2013).  
Figure 1 Map of Malaysia 
 
     Source: Operation World 
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The research gap inspired this research to explore the extent to which the new media 
provide opportunities for expression of alternative discourses to community-based 
organisations (CBOs) in Sarawak, Malaysia. These organisations run on a small scale and 
engage local communities with specific needs (Sundari, 2003). As far as human rights are 
concerned, unlike NGOs in Peninsular Malaysia, Sarawakian CBOs deal directly with the 
dispossession of customary rights land of the indigenous people (SACCESS, 2008). Sarawak is 
the largest state of Malaysia, rich with indigenous cultures and natural resources. Since the 
1970s, Sarawak has been plagued by native land encroachment abetted by the state 
government. CBOs and foreign NGOs that attempted to advocate against land grabbing were 
labelled as anti-development and anti-government. The indigenous people’s scope to sustain 
a share of the public sphere was further circumscribed by illiteracy (Hamdan, 1990) and 
mainstream media portrayal of them as backward (Mustafa, 1994). Placing the research gap 
in the context of Sarawak, studies on the activities of CBOs (e.g. Aeria, 2010; Majid-Cooke, 
2003) hardly touched on their media perspectives, experience or activism. Specific writings on 
the NCR land are mostly technical on geological classification, agriculture, land laws and 
related court hearings (e.g. Sahabat Alam Malaysia, 2019; Majid-Cooke et al, 2017; Aiken and 
Leigh, 2011; Hong, 1987). On the other hand, literature on media in Sarawak focuses on either 
its electoral effect (Mohd. Zuwairi and Normah, 2016; Hah, 2018), ethnographic media 
consumption patterns (Horn and Rennie, 2018) or media production of ethnicity (Postill, 
2002). The literature available indicated a gap between new media activism and the CBOs’ 
organising process in pertaining to Sarawak NCR land issues. This research project investigates 
the extent to which new media offer potential in the processes of ‘grassroots’ NGOs or CBOs 
in Sarawak. It explores the ways CBOs have worked around a controversial topic since the 
1970s to try to empower marginalised communities against oppressive modern interpretation 
of their ancestral land customs.  
1.2 Theoretical Framework and Research Questions 
To address the research gap, Italian scholar and activist Antonio Gramsci’s 
understandings of civil society are utilised as an analytical lens. The Gramscian approach, with 
its Marxist roots, is potentially useful to understand new media and civil society from a critical 
questioning of citizenry political participation. Gramsci argued that civil society is an arena 
where the state is engaged in cementing popular ideas, norms and values as a way of 
domination. Civil society is the site for hegemony where the state sustains power through 
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legitimising tools such as media and education. Gramsci’s approach to civil society is relevant 
in the Southeast Asian context because of strong state influence in blurring the distinction 
between public and private spheres. In this region, the state, Weiss (2008, p. 145) wrote, 
“tends to exert more ideological and programmatic control than in democracies with a 
sturdier tradition of individualism.” Gramsci’s term of subaltern will also be used to shed light 
on how the marginalisation of civil society land rights groups has been naturalised through 
media images. Quoting Alessandro Manzoni’s novel, The Betrothed, Gramsci was especially 
interested in why common people are depicted by Manzoni with ‘a severe gaze’ where “the 
majority of those do not belong to the people”; only in some of the upper classes had ‘noble 
thought’ (2012, Q7§50: p. 292). Therefore, the Gramscian framework (see Chapter 2) is 
perceived suitable to analyse the relationships between new media, subalterns and civil 
society in the Sarawakian context through the following research questions: 
Media, in the Gramscian approach, produce ‘common sense’, which refers to the 
uncritical, traditional perceptions that form our social realities. During the time of Gramsci’s 
writing, he identified the press as “the most dynamic part” that was able to influence public 
opinion, which directly or indirectly shaped how we view other institutions such as education 
and religion (2000, Q3§49, p. 381). It was also against this systematic formation and 
normalisation of ‘ideological structure’ that Gramsci asked “What resources can an innovative 
class set against this formidable complex of trenches and fortifications of the dominant class?” 
(2000, Q3§49, p. 381). Within the context of this research, new media provide a platform for 
user-generated contents (Lister et al, 2009) and Malaysian NGOs have started to utilise new 
media to mobilise their advocacy (Zaharom and Gayathry, 2016). This leads to the first 
research question: 
RQ1) How do NCR land CBOs represent themselves using new media platforms?  
The second research question explores how the CBOs perceive the social role of both 
hegemonic (mainstream) and counter-hegemonic (alternative) media. It refers to the 
expectations that the CBOs have in the Malaysian media systems – the frequency and nature 
of portrayal of their activities and the indigenous people, media regulations and ownership. 
This question is important because in the era of user-generated content from independent 
media practitioners, mainstream media in Malaysia are still the strong actors of the “most 
dynamic” public opinion mechanism. Based on the Reuters Institute Digital News Report 
2019’s findings, 14 out of 16 brands of TV, Radio and Print were mainstream media. On the 
other hand, 3 mainstream media were in the top 5 online platforms. A 2017/2018 nationwide 
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study conducted by a Malaysian university among 2,551 respondents ranked microblogging 
site, Twitter, as the least credible source for news, while television topped the preference list, 
followed by radio (Zurairi, 21 Feb 2018). The latest survey by Reuters Institute for the Study 
of Journalism found that RTM is the most trusted media organisation in Malaysia, ahead of 
other TV, print and radio brands (Bernama, 9 November 2019).  
RQ2) What do the CBOs think of the current media environment in Malaysia pertaining to their 
land rights advocacy? 
CBOs in this research represent the idea of a revolutionary party, by the Gramscian 
framework, the platform in leading and educating the subalterns to rise above their status. 
The role of intellectuals, besides leading the organisation, is to be knowledgeable of and 
passionate about the current situation of the subalterns (Gramsci, 1999). To contextualise the 
CBOs’ internal organising operations, it is crucial to understand that civil society consists of 
the state and other ‘private’, non-state actors. Gramsci perceived civil society as a “very 
complex structure”, like the “trench-systems of modern warfare” (2000, Q13§24, p. 227). This 
means the emphasis on the CBOs’ leadership is not only limited within the organic 
intellectuals, but as organism. It refers to the relations of the parts to the whole – institutions 
like the state, religion, regulatory bodies – that reinforced the hegemonic position of the 
dominant group and conditioned the marginalisation of subalterns. The integral relationship 
between state and civil society, therefore, forms the third research question: 
RQ3) How have the CBOs’ internal and external organising processes improved using the new 
media?  
In adopting the Gramscian notion of civil society, Hall (1987) warned scholars to think in 
the Gramscian way instead of expecting Gramsci to offer solutions to issues beyond the time 
and geography of his writing. As Salmenkari (2013, p. 691) emphasised, “the purpose of 
research is not to dismiss social phenomena that do not fit a theory, but to reject or 
reformulate theories that fail to explain what we find in the physical or social world.” 
Therefore, drawing from the empirical data and literature review, the fourth research 
question asks: 
RQ4. How would the Gramscian framework assist in understanding new media and civil society 
based on the NCR land CBOs’ organising processes? 
The aim of this research is to provide an enriched understanding of Malaysian civil 
society and media activism through an exploration of Sarawak NCR land CBOs. The research 
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outcome contributes to media studies in exploring the extent to which new media offer 
potential to civil society organisations (CSOs)’ processes and advocacy strategies. The research 
places the use of new media by the CBOs within their internal and external factors, which 
include organisational direction, funding, legal restrictions and social status of audiences. The 
research also provides another perspective – media literacy – to the studies of Sarawak’s land 
rights CBOs.  In the Gramscian term, the research links both disciplines in a non-conjunctural 
setting as neither new media nor land rights is entirely new. On the one hand, what is next for 
the CBOs after the hype of new media activism in Malaysia? On the other, where do the 
Sarawak’s CBOs see themselves and the indigenous communities after the peak of land rights 
advocacy in the 1980s and 1990s?  By applying a Gramscian perspective of civil society, the 
contribution of this research is a critical understanding of the contexts that structure both new 
media experiences and organising strategies. 
 
Objectives: 
1. To establish a conceptual understanding of the relationships between new media 
strategies and Sarawakian NCR land CBOs’ activism. 
2. To explore the utilisation of new media platforms by NCR land CBOs in creating 
contents and literacy training to promote their causes. 
3. To establish NCR land CBOs’ perspectives toward Malaysian mainstream and 
alternative media organisations’ performance in representing their advocacy. 
4. To determine the extent to which the NCR land CBOs’ organisational processes 
improved using the new media. 
5. To investigate if the new media enhanced the NCR land CBOs’ networking strategies. 
6. From the empirical data, to provide a systematic understanding of the nature of CBOs’ 
use of new media within the Gramscian framework. 
To achieve the research objectives, this thesis employed semi-structured interviews and 
web-based analysis of the CBOs. Interviews allowed the researcher to gain rich data on how 
the CBOs utilise the new media in their advocacy including their potential and challenges. 
These – were not evident through analysis of their web-based platforms. The latter method 
enables the researcher to analyse the CBOs’ websites, blogs and Facebook pages from the 
perspectives of user interface design and the themes of posts to the sites. The purpose is to 
understand how the CBOs communicate their advocacy to the general public, among 
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themselves and to policymakers. Data from these complementary methods are then drawn 
together and organised through thematic analysis.  
1.3 Scope of the Research 
This thesis agrees with Feldman (1997) and Lang (2012) that NGOs do not define civil 
society per se. Civil society is a realm where different actors have conflicting interests to 
pursue own definition of common good. As will be elaborated in Chapter 2, Gramsci’s notion 
of civil society encompasses the formal (political society) and informal (media, religion, 
education) structures of the state that collectively establishes and naturalises the hegemony 
of ruling groups. Sarawak NCR land CBOs are selected because they have been the sole force 
in organising the indigenous people against violation of land losses and customary rights 
(Aeria, 2010). The CBOs sampled in this research are those whose main agenda is to empower 
the indigenous people of their NCR land rights. The height of NCR land advocacy in the 1980s 
and 1990s drew a division between CBOs as such and the state government (with related 
apparatuses such as police) that promoted economic development through logging, palm oil 
plantations and building dams.  Conceptually, Gramsci would term the CBOs as counter-
hegemonic organisations because they challenged the development status quo by defending 
the indigenous people’s relationships with their lands. The CBOs are assumed to fit Gramsci’s 
emphasis on getting organised in a revolutionary party, provided that “one takes organisation 
and party in a broad and not a formal sense” (Gramsci, 1999: p. 536). For the purpose of this 
thesis, the CBOs refer to the Gramscian term of the ‘Modern Prince’ or revolutionary party 
within his wider conception of civil society. 
Therefore, the Gramscian civil society extends beyond voluntary and private 
organisations such as trade unions, churches, cultural clubs, political parties, and media.  
Nevertheless, the literature on civil society covers the proliferation and advocacy initiatives of 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Malaysia. Regardless of the terminology between 
civil society organisations (CSOs) and NGOs, this thesis adopts Weiss and Saliha (2003, p. 4)’s 
scope of the organisations as “groups of citizens engaged in collective action for self-help or 
issue advocacy outside the aegis of the state”.  
This thesis relied initially on literature reviews and news reports to build the list of CBO 
personnel to be interviewed. The list consisted of personnel who led land rights advocacy in 
the 1980s and 1990s.  These informants are valuable to the research because since they have 
also experienced the ‘old’ media, they could provide comparative insights on media and 
9 
 
organisational strategies. Younger CBO personnel were also interviewed because it is assumed 
that they have different exposures, and hence opinions toward new media uses.  
The BN government elevated the social and economic positions of Bumiputera (literally 
prince of the soil) in Malaysia through affirmative policies. The New Economic Policy in 1971 
aimed to eradicate poverty across ethnic lines; and to reduce and eventually eliminate the 
identification of race with economic function, followed by the National Development Policy in 
1991. Although the term Bumiputera is neither mentioned nor defined in Malaysia’s Federal 
Constitution, Article 153 stipulates the reservation of quotas in respect of services and permits 
for Malays and natives of Sabah and Sarawak. Another indigenous group in Malaysia is the 
Orang Asli (literally Original People) from Peninsular Malaysia, constitutionally referred to as 
‘Aborigine’ (Article 160(2)), and they are excluded from the Bumiputera cluster. The terms 
‘native’ and ‘indigenous people’ in this research refer to those of Sarawak. In Clause (7) of 
Article 161A of the Federal Constitution, the races to be treated for the purposes of the 
definition of “native” in Clause (6) indigenous to Sarawak are the Bukitans, Bisayahs, Dusuns, 
Sea Dayaks, Land Dayaks, Kadayans, Kalabits, Kayans, Kenyahs (including Sabups and Sipengs), 
Kajangs (including Sekapans, Kejamans, Lahanans, Punans, Tanjongs and Kanowits), Lugats, 
Lisums, Malays, Melanos, Muruts, Penans, Sians, Tagals, Tabuns and Ukits.  
Interviews were conducted in the second half of May 2018, a week after Malaysia’s 14th 
general elections. The election results were phenomenal in marking a change of federal 
government for the first time since 1969. Nevertheless, the data and subsequent analysis 
refers to the time when Sarawak was under the Chief Ministers Taib Mahmud (1981-2014) 
and Adenan Satem (2014-2017), while Malaysia’s federal government was the Barisan 
Nasional (National Front) coalition. Studies showed that the peak of land activism took place 
during Taib’s administration where native lands were leased to plantation and logging 
companies (e.g. Straumann, 2015; Suter, 2015).  
Unless otherwise stated, the term ‘broadcasting’ refers to terrestrial transmission. By 
the end of October 2019, Malaysia including Sarawak fully transitioned to digital television 
broadcast following the termination of analogue television broadcasting (The Star, 31 October 
2019). 
Alternative media (AM) are regarded as an alternative source of information to 
mainstream media (MM). UNDP-SAM (2004) and Yung and Leung (2014) differentiated 
alternative media from mainstream media in several characteristics: 1) nature of organisation 
– AM being independently owned while MM ownership is by government or close political 
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associates; 2) character of content, AM advocate specific communities or public interests 
while MM are ‘neutral’, non-critical of government policies; 3) type of production process, AM 
have smaller scale and more participatory staff member, while MM have a more formal, 
bureaucratic organisational board of directors, shareholders and professionals; and 4) 
features of distribution, AM encourage widespread distribution by language and access, 
usually low-priced or free while MM are well-integrated, involving revenues from other 
investments or part of a larger conglomerate. Based on these four suggested characteristics, 
Yung and Leung (2014) categorised AM as counter-hegemonic for prioritising egalitarian 
values in human rights. 
Lister and colleagues (2009) characterised new media as digital, networked and 
interactive. In Malaysia, the framing of new media inevitably was parallel with media activism 
(Weiss, 2013). The government promoted Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) 
in the 1990s through modem dial-up and personal computers (PCs) (see Chapter 4). 
Alternative websites, blogs and online forums were the initial platforms for Internet users to 
seek information and expression amidst distrust toward Malaysian mainstream media, Asian 
economic meltdown and the sentiment of Reformasi (reform) in the late 1990s (Rodan, 2004). 
According to the online survey by the Reuters Institute Digital News Report (2017) for 
Malaysia, the most used device for news was smartphone (65%), through social media site 
and messaging (86%), the most popular being Facebook (58%), followed by WhatsApp (51%).   
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 commences by undertaking a critical analysis of key ideas in the literature of 
debates surrounding the relationship between the state and society. The debates are then 
placed in the characteristics of Southeast Asian civil society – developmentalist (achievement 
by economic means), ascriptive (ethnicity and religion shaped the society) and culturalist (a 
claim that the West is decadent). With the discussions, the chapter explains Antonio Gramsci’s 
perspectives of civil society as the analytical framework. The Gramscian perspective offers a 
holistic approach to locating the new media use of the CBOs in a wider aspect of social identity 
and politics. Through the establishment and justification of the framework, the chapter 
provides a basis to allow the empirical data gathered on the role and position of Sarawakian 
CBOs to be analysed and understood. 
The discussion of Gramsci’s state and civil society led to the writing of Chapter 3 that 
outlines the Malaysian state’s formal structures. Gramsci’s integral state discusses the 
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‘coercive’ side of the state on the one hand, and the ‘consensual’ nature of civil society on the 
other. Chapter 3 introduces the political system in Malaysia to provide an understanding on 
how the NCR land issue has been administered through the state apparatuses – executive, 
legislation and judicial. The chapter also provides insights to Malaysia’s federalism and the 
extent to which it affected the dynamics of Sarawak politics and its pursuit of power 
surrounding the lucrative business of land-related industries. It then outlines the cultural and 
political aspects of Sarawak. The chapter shows how, like Peninsular (West) Malaysia, 
Sarawak’s social and political identification runs along the communal line as a result of the 
colonial government’s divide-and-rule policy. The last part of the chapter touches on the 
controversial land code that places the responsibility to apply for land titles under the 
indigenous people. Illiteracy, community divide, and frustration over the lack of state land 
surveyors led to the indigenous people raising blockades, police arrests and confrontations 
with plantation and logging companies. That is the background within which the CBOs 
advocate for land dispossessed indigenous people through human rights empowerment and 
legal support. Chapter 3 provides contexts to the disputed institutionalisation of the 
indigenous people’s Adat (custom) that resulted in them being entangled in the political and 
economic magnitude of their lands, which had been self-governed for many generations. 
Chapter 4 is a discussion of, in the Gramscian framework, the most dynamic mechanism 
in shaping public opinion or common sense. Common sense here refers to not only how the 
indigenous people have been portrayed in everyday life, but the exclusion of them from the 
dominant culture. Media belong to the Gramscian civil society as a sphere that legitimises 
power through consensual means. The chapter begins with the development of RTM from the 
political, cultural and economic perspectives. It proceeds with the environment of strict 
regulations, the questionable National Cultural Policy and political ownership of media during 
the privatisation policy in the 1980s. Such contexts rendered the government of low credibility 
in shaping the societal role that media could play, which contributed to new media activism 
in the late 1990s. The excitement of new media activism may not carry similar weight for rural 
longhouse indigenous residents who lack basic amenities, have low (digital) literacy level and 
dependency on the government-operated broadcasting (RTM) channels. RTM is the only 
media organisation that has programmes and channels catered to the Sarawakian indigenous 
people. The purpose of the chapter is to outline, besides the transformative role of new media 
in democracy, the big picture of media systems in Malaysia. 
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Chapter 5 justifies the research design based on the Gramscian framework and the 
existing knowledge on new media and community-based organisations (CBOs) in Sarawak. 
Recent literature showed that the relationship between new media and the democratising 
role in shaping civil society has to be contextualised with surrounding factors. Furthermore, 
to be effective in mobilisation, online activities need to be parallel with processes such as 
policy influence, networking and leadership training. Interpretivism was adopted to explore 
this relationship between new media use and the organising processes among the CBOs by 
understanding that each subject matter has different social reality. Semi-structured interviews 
enabled the researcher to gain a rich account from the CBO personnel on their perceptions 
toward new media and their operations, future of land advocacy and external stakeholders. 
The interview data complemented the CBOs’ web-based platforms through the unity of user 
interface experience from content analysis. Thematic analysis was employed to construct 
themes from both the interview and content analysis data to answer the research questions. 
Chapter 5 aims to show the logical processes operationalised in the project to address the 
research gap. 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 present and discuss the empirical data by research objectives. They 
represent the aspects of civil society to be discussed in relation to the role of new media. They 
are discrete yet complementary; they contribute to an integrated discussion of civil society 
shaped by new media use and the CBOs’ organising processes.  
Chapter 6 presents in combination the data that explore how the CBOs created their 
own content using the new media and what they thought of the current media environment 
in Malaysia. For the first part, the purpose is to gauge how the CBOs represented themselves 
through their web-based platforms and if they perceived literacy as significant in their 
grassroots mobilisation. Chapter 6 displays, from the interviews, the extent to which their 
content creation skills and communication methods benefited from new media. This 
complements the empirical data from their official pages’ graphic and navigation design. 
Chapter 6 also discusses the CBOs personnel’s opinion toward the media industry in Malaysia, 
the social role they expected from RTM and the type of media reform they wished to see. This 
chapter, overall, aims to explore the CBOs’ opinions and evidence in the “most dynamic” 
aspect of creating common sense, referring to the media. 
Chapter 7 explores the drive that the CBOs opined new media have in mobilising their 
sustained operations – funding, recruitment and policy influence. This chapter discusses 
evidence provided by CBOs about their organisational structure and their outlook on the 
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future of land rights CBOs. With the focus of CBOs on grassroots empowerment, the 
challenges of their conscientisation efforts among the younger generation and longhouse 
communities are also discussed. The answers are triangulated with evidence from the CBOs’ 
web-based platforms through upward information flow such as calls for volunteers and their 
Facebook posts’ responses. This chapter aims to provide an understanding of the role of CBOs 
from the perspective of Gramsci’s the Modern Prince and organic intellectuals, and the extent 
that new media played a part in this activity and its characterisation.   
Chapter 8 discusses the CBOs’ relations with external stakeholders that influenced their 
internal operations. Civil society is an arena of interrelated – both conflicting and 
complementing – interests from different parties, including the state. This chapter displays 
key civil society actors from the interviews and how the CBOs personnel perceived their roles 
in regards to land advocacy. It also discusses the state of networking among local CBOs and 
international NGOs. This chapter triangulates the interview data through their web-based 
interactivity features and experiences. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the “complex 
trenches” of the NCR land sphere and if new media widened or circumscribed any alliance 
opportunities. 
Chapter 9 draws together the empirical findings and the Gramscian framework for 
analysis. The analytical framework constructed in Chapter 2 discusses the data from concepts 
such as organic intellectual, state, common sense and subaltern. The existing knowledge of 
the subject matter of Chapters 3 and 4 add dimensions to the analysis of the summaries of 
findings from Chapters 6, 7 and 8. The last section discusses the limitations of the Gramscian 
framework in interpreting the data. This chapter aims to provide an informed understanding 
of the CBOs’ advocacy within the contexts of media, indigenous culture and politics. 
Chapter 10 concludes the thesis by reiterating the research questions and explain how 
they have been answered. It then gives suggestions for future research based on the 
research’s limitations and achievements. Some practical recommendations for the CBOs are 
stated. It concludes with some personal reflections on the research.  
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Chapter 2 Civil Society as the Analytical Framework 
2.1 Introduction 
The transformative role that new media can play in expanding civil society for democracy has 
been discussed by many scholars. Malaysia similarly experienced this excitement against a 
stringent media environment and political upheavals in the late 1990s. This research 
contextualises the normative relationship between new media and civil society by asking to 
what extent Sarawak environmental community-based organisations improved their 
empowerment and networking through new media. In doing that, the first section of chapter 
draws together a range of literatures that provide an explanation of the importance of the 
concept, organisation and practices of civil society. It outlines and discusses two major school 
of thoughts of civil society – liberal and Marxist. Since the idea of civil society originated from 
Europe, the second section locates the summary of the debates within the broader context of 
Southeast Asia. The chapter then moves on to explain why the Gramscian notion of civil 
society is perceived to be suitable as the analytical framework for the thesis. This is followed 
by a discussion of Antonio Gramsci’s significant terms such as hegemony, intellectuals and 
subaltern that add totality to civil society. Through the discussion, this chapter aims   
RO1) To establish a conceptual understanding of the relationships between new media 
strategies and Sarawakian NCR land CBOs’ activism. 
2.2 Key Perspectives of Civil Society  
Civil society is a classic social idea from Europe, which extends back into the work of 
nineteenth and twentieth thinkers such as Hobbes and Hegel. The general use of civil society 
is to conceptualise a space that exists between the state and associations in pursuit of the 
common good of society (DeLue and Dale, 2017). The different contexts supply multiple 
connotations to how each scholar envisioned the boundaries between state, society and 
market should be.    
The liberal democratic approach sees civil society as an arena with potential freedom 
outside the state, mediated through a vibrant range of voluntary associations and guaranteed 
by ‘formal democracy’ that has evolved in the West. All citizens are to participate in defining 
the rules and norms, which each will be governed according to, on behalf of the common good 
(DeLue and Dale, 2017). The common good refers to a variety of possible items, including but 
not limited to the provision of basic rights, public safety, education, systems of 
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communication, roads, and national parks. People enter the public as individuals, with their 
own interests and needs. Individuals are free to pursue a variety of life experiences made 
possible by different institutions such as families, religious organisations, trade unions, self-
help groups, charitable associations, neighbourhood organisations, private clubs and 
organisations. Mirsky (1993) described civil society as “a social sphere in which no single locus 
of authority predominates where the groups involved may or may not be engaged in ‘political’ 
activities (in Rodan, 1997 p. 159). Democratic participation in major institutions would help 
develop the greatest potential of deliberating with others on behalf of determining the 
common good. 
Aristotle and Plato’s idea of civil society is one of the first instances of theorising civil 
society in relation to the state (Ncube, 2010). Aristotle (384-322 BC) argued that civil society 
is a realm for human beings to reach the greatest moral height. For Aristotle, civil society was 
the politically constituted community that organised separate spheres of life in the state and 
permitted them to express the full measure of their limited ethical potential (Ncube, 2010). 
Plato’s (428-328 BC) ‘just society’ started from a search for truth with justice and courage, 
emulating Socrates’ dialectical method. He criticised democracies because too often they 
became tyrannies. To achieve the just society, a special class of citizens (the guardians) is 
important where they demonstrate political leadership in mediating different views. The 
guardians ought to guard the society from the dangers of private interest (Brown, 2004). They 
should possess proper education, rational self-command and a moral level to act always and 
only for the common good. They self-regulate, hence finding them will be a society’s greatest 
challenge (DeLue and Dale, 2017). Aristotle criticised Plato for his tendency to impose an 
absolute philosophical conception of truth. To Aristotle, democracy is the ‘most moderate’ 
among the worst regimes and thus the ‘least bad’ among unjust regimes (Ncube, 2010). 
John Locke’s (1632-1704) social contract places authority for making laws in the people 
who elect their representatives to the legislative branch. To secure a civilised society, a 
representative political order was needed (Ncube, 2010). Locke’s Parliament was the main 
source of authority in government while power of both the legislature and the executive are 
limited. To Locke, separation of powers was important where the legislature enacts rules and 
the executive enforces the legal system (Held, 1983). The concept of political authority 
enables the state to make laws that bind the whole of society for the public good (DeLue and 
Dale, 2017). He saw civil society as an alternative to the state of nature, which is a synonym 
of anarchy (Tanvir 2010). 
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Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859) argued that voluntary associations function as 
intermediary links between the state and the people through providing services expected 
from the former (Tanvir, 2010). Tocqueville wrote during the monarchic reaction to the French 
revolution based on the Scottish enlightenment political economy. He looked to American 
democracy as a successful example of strong society represented by robust civic associations 
against a weak state (Ncube, 2010; Brown, 2004). Tocqueville drew from the late 18th century 
Scottish Enlightenment political economists who conceived civil society as a separate sphere 
from centralised administrative state (Tanvir, 2010; Miorelli, 2008). Tocqueville agreed with 
John Locke’s contractualism but he conceived civil society as the result of a contract from 
rational individuals. Tocqueville’s civil society comprised a set of voluntary associations that 
could limit state despotism, allow political participation and also provide services expected 
from the state. This said, such idea of civil society promoted democratic equality among 
individuals and at the same time being autonomous from the state (Miorelli, 2008). 
Wood (1990) pointed out that civil society encompasses a very wide range of institutions 
and relations including the market, indeed the whole capitalist economy. Due to the 
emergence of capitalism and market economy in the late 18th century, Adam Smith (1723-
1790) considered civil society as a self-regulating realm of economic relations and social 
transactions (Tanvir 2010). Smith’s “invisible hand” refers to those free market rules that 
indicate the ways of life individuals must adopt as a condition to succeed in one’s interests. In 
doing so, individuals also need to recognise the existence of constraints toward attaining self-
interests (DeLue and Dale, 2017). Adam Ferguson (1723-1816) conceived of civil society as 
networks of self-governing and self-regulating voluntary associations which help increase 
civility – the basis of social cohesion (Tanvir 2010). 
The 17th and 18th centuries marked an era of Enlightenment in Europe. It was also during 
this era that a more systematic conceptualisation of civil society took place as a response to 
increasingly bureaucratic forms of absolute monarchical rule (Tanvir, 2010). The civil society 
term envisioned a utopian society free from authoritarian and absolutist state. Tanvir (2010) 
added that further evolution of the concept has to be contextualised in the new emerging 
mercantilist and industrial societies in Europe that witnessed a rise of individual pursuit of 
wealth. The classical theorists of the French, Scottish and German Enlightenment attempted 
to resolve the dichotomy “between mutually antagonistic self-seeking individuals and the 
concern for public good and interests” (Tanvir, 2010: p. 151). Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-
1778) was a scholar who despised the French Enlightenment that made the pursuit of wealth 
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and luxury more important than virtues that secure the common good of the whole 
community (DeLue and Dale, 2017). His social contract is a critique of Locke where he looked 
into ways to reduce the corrosive effects of social and political inequality on politics. Rousseau 
believed that Locke put the desire for rights to seek own happiness to the detriment of civic 
virtue. Similarly, Cicero (106-43 BC) proposed a constitutional framework to safeguard the rich 
and the poor. The main purpose was to prevent abuse of state power and to prevent the 
mutation of economic interests and conflicts into political affairs, further referring civil society 
as civilised political society (Ncube, 2010; Tanvir 2010). With the fall of the Greek empire, 
Cicero reinforced Plato and Aristotle’s republican ideals of the rational human being and the 
profanity of self-centred economic gains.  
From the Anglo-Scottish and French traditions, civil society is seen as the opposite of 
despotism and barbarism (Tanvir 2010). As a separate sphere, civil society acts as a buffer 
against the power of the central government and in this role, encourages an atmosphere that 
allows various groups’ interests to flourish without fear of government intervention (DeLue 
and Dale, 2017). Baron de Montesquieu (1689-1755) and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) opined 
that civil society can be a watchdog to curb state absolutism. Kantian and utilitarian views of 
liberalism have maintained that humans are universal beings. Such individuality means nation 
and nationalism had no place in liberal theory (Knapman 2006). De Montesquieu viewed civil 
society as a site for negotiation of the absolute power of the monarch (Tanvir, 2010: p. 150). 
In contrast, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1674) called for an absolute monarchy based upon 
citizen consent, which was important to fend off ‘civil war’ (Held, 1983). Hobbes’ Leviathan, 
an all-powerful state establishes a social contract the sake of protecting personal freedom and 
obligations, the basis for liberalism. For Hobbes, civil society cannot exist without the state 
(Tanvir 2010). Hobbes’ civil society protects freedom by maintaining justice, gratitude and 
rights for all, where the state will have a central role in promoting those virtues. He favoured 
monarchy for several reasons. First, the monarch is more likely to empathise and to work 
toward the realisation of the public interest. Second, the monarch has only to listen to experts 
and make the best decision possible. Third, the monarch can maintain consistency of policy 
directions over time (DeLue and Dale, 2017). 
Georg W. F. Hegel (1770-1831) offered an interesting view where civil society includes 
“intermediate institutions between the familial and the political relations of the state” (Tanvir, 
2010: p. 153). The institutions, which include executive, bureaucracy, and state assemblies, 
are higher than individual but lower than the state. Although the state and society are 
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interdependent, the relationship is conflictual and needs to be balanced out (Tanvir, 2010: p. 
154). The state is the highest form of ethical life that monitors private interests from becoming 
the root cause of poverty. Hegel equated civil society with the bourgeois society because the 
emergence of a new class could guarantee both individual freedom and the ‘universality’ of 
the state, hence a distinct and autonomous ‘economy’ (Ncube, 2010; Wood, 1990). The term 
bourgeoisie refers to “the economically dominant class which also controls the state 
apparatus and cultural production” (Bottomore, 2001: p. 56). 
Karl Marx (1818-1883) agreed with Hegel that civil society is a ‘system of needs’ that is 
separate from the state (Ncube, 2010). However, he criticised Hegel for including bureaucracy 
or executive in the state (Tanvir, 2010). According to Marx, it was not the state which 
conditions and regulates civil society, but civil society which conditions and regulates the 
state. To Marx, those were mechanisms to promote the interest of the ruling class, not private 
(individual) interests. Employing an historical material analysis, the state could not be 
theorised independent of civil society because the latter is an illusion of individual freedom 
that masks conflicts, class exploitations and alienation (Ncube, 2010). Marx rejected the 
argument that civil servants in the state bureaucracy were a universal class in civil society. To 
abolish class exploitation, both civil society and the state have to be abolished by the 
proletariat revolution (Ncube, 2010). In Marx’s class analysis, bourgeoisie and proletariat (the 
working class with manual skills and low wages) are two conflicting classes. Marx transformed 
Hegel’s distinction between the state and civil society by denying the universality of the state 
and insisting that the state expressed the particularities of ‘civil society’ and its class relations 
(Wood, 1990 p. 62).  
Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) aligned with Hegel and Marx in arguing that civil society is 
equivalent to political society and highlighted its inequalities rather than its harmony. He 
embraced Hegel on the importance of intermediary bodies in mediating between civil society 
and the state; and Marx that civil society existed in relation to the state. Gramsci defined civil 
society as a realm of the private citizen and individual consent, and placed civil society 
between the coercive relations of the state and the economic sphere of production, referring 
to industrial capitalism (Tanvir, 2010). However, Gramsci opposed Hegel’s idea that state was 
the realm that could supersede inequalities in civil society. He also disagreed with Marx that 
a revolution would inevitably emerge from the development of the economic structure and 
thus put an end to those inequalities. He opposed the location of civil society in the economic 
base, as compared to the superstructure as a site of contestation for hegemony. For Gramsci, 
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civil society was an arena in which the state constructs, via a variety of institutions, the 
hegemony that sustains state power (Miorelli, 2008).  
Gramsci was much influenced by Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) whose main concern 
was how to get and to keep power. Men, to Machiavelli, are apt to behave toward one another 
worse than beasts. In one of his works, The Prince, a leader should address his subjects by 
appearing what he is not, but must be flexible enough to change directions. He should serve 
well the vital interests of the citizens to sustain the importance of civic virtue. However, if a 
prince cannot be loved, it is best for him to be feared (DeLue and Dale, 2017). Gramsci thus 
appropriated the concept of civil society to demonstrate how domination is maintained not 
only through coercion but also through consent in the form of everyday life’s cultural and 
ideological roots. Civil society is a terrain intertwined with the state and political society and 
at the same time, is both the space of domination and the space of potential emancipation 
(Wood, 1990). 
At this point, the concept generally connotes society distinct from the state’s authority 
in either supportive or opposing ways between the bureaucratic state and the voluntarily 
organised realm of civil society (Wood, 1990). A civil society can be characterised by a “tension 
between an individualist viewpoint that is guaranteed by the provision of basic rights and the 
communal dimension of society that reflects a need to respect the civic virtue requirements” 
(DeLue and Dale, 2017: pp. 3-4). This section has discussed the key perspectives of civil society 
with the purpose to place their main arguments in the context of Southeast Asia. With that, 
the next section aims to shed light on the perspective that could best be adopted as the 
explanatory framework to understand new media and CBOs in Sarawak.  
2.3 Conceptualising Civil Society in Southeast Asia 
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of various authoritarian regimes in Eastern 
Europe, Latin America and East Asia in the late 1980s had led to academic arguments for 
neoliberal ideas about reducing the state's role in social service provision (Salmenkari, 2013).  
Dramatic economic development in much of East and Southeast Asia since the 1960s has given 
rise to new middle classes2 seeking transparency in government and the curtailment of 
corruption. The emergence of a differential mix of organisations representing labour, women, 
environmentalists, and human rights is seen as crucial ingredient in ‘democratisation’ (Rodan, 
1997). This projection and the theoretical sources which underlie it, however, are open to 
contest from a variety of perspectives. For example, Weiss (2008, p. 145) questioned the 
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applicability of the liberal definition of civil society by Larry Diamond (1996) in Southeast Asian 
countries: 
Civil society … is the realm of organised social life that is voluntary, self-generating, 
(largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order 
or set of shared rules. It is distinct from “society” in general in that it involves 
citizens acting collectively in a public sphere … Civil society is an intermediary 
entity, standing between the private sphere and the state. Thus it excludes 
individual and family life, inward-looking group activity …, the profit-making 
enterprise of individual business firms, and political efforts to take control of the 
state … [C]ivil society not only restricts state power but legitimates state authority 
when that authority is based on the rule of law. 
While studies of civil society in Asia were abundant in the empirical sense, most were 
inadequate in wider theoretical debates or have rehashed the liberal perspective without 
contextual deliberation (Weiss, 2008; Salmenkari, 2013). Weiss and Saliha (2003) pointed out 
that the more relevant area of concern is civil society’s place in non-democratic or semi-
democratic politics. The composition of civil society in its ideal form is hardly what is found in 
most developing states, or for that matter, in developed states (Weiss and Saliha 2003; 
Salmenkari, 2013). As Sudipta and Sunil (2001) argued, “Actual processes in the Third World 
are mostly very different from political life in the West; yet strangely, the language used to 
describe, evaluate, and express the experiences of politics are the same everywhere” (in 
Weiss, 2008: p. 145).  
The liberal tradition in associating civil society with democracy draws criticism where 
‘uncivil’ behaviour within a set of shared rules goes unaddressed. As Whitehead (1997) noted, 
religious fundamentalists and mafia organisations could form the arena of ‘uncivil interstices’ 
(in Brown, 2004). In reality, civil society is a fragmented and divided realm, with internal 
conflicts and uncivil features. Normative expectations often replaced analyses of the 
complexities of actual civil societies, nor do their internal organisational structures 
demonstrate democratic or egalitarian principles (Salmenkari, 2013; Rodan, 1997). Therefore, 
since civil society can both expand and contract democratic space, a strong civil society is not 
automatically a democratic one (Salmenkari, 2013: p. 689). As Weiss and Saliha (2003; in 
Azeem Fazwan, 2011: p. 93) added,  
Civil society in Malaysia does not fit the theoretical ideal of democratic, grassroots-
oriented, politically transformative organisations for building social capital and 
keeping the government in line. Too few of them are truly independent, self-
financing, and racially and linguistically inclusive.  
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Another criticism of the liberal perspective lies in the supposition of civil society’s 
autonomy from the state. It is more useful to recognise that neither contemporary society nor 
the state is a simple entity—both are complex, heterogeneous, and fragmented (Salmenkari, 
2013). It is unrealistic to expect a clear-cut, zero-sum game demarcation of seeing the state 
as coercive on the other hand and civil society as a realm of freedom on the other (Rodan, 
1997). Good relationships with the state bring resources in the form of recognition, 
information, funding and policy influence opportunities. Hence, associations may well be 
seeking co-option with the state. Likewise, the relationship with the state depends on how 
beneficial or threatening the associations are where the government controls associations 
flexibly and selectively, where scholars termed such relationships as ‘governed 
interdependence’ (Kitley, 2003; Weiss, 2008; Salmenkari, 2013).  
Instead of focusing on the state, various social institutions such as churches and donors 
can limit civil society actors' independence. The civil society approach is suitable for examining 
relations not only between associations and the state, but also between associations’ relations 
to each other, the media, the legal system, and other social forces (Salmenkari, 2013). Hence 
the state, private (corporate and non-corporate) sectors in modern, complex economies is 
typically interpenetrated and to some extent dependent on other sectors. The private family 
sphere, for example, is linked closely to the state through health, education and welfare 
programmes which in many instances are managed by the corporate sector (Kitley 2003). This 
thesis agrees with Salmenkari (2013) to perceive the idea of civil society in a more dynamic 
way. Rather than as a fixed set of structures, civil society should be seen as actors, processes, 
interactions, and negotiations that blurred the distinction between public and private spheres 
(Salmenkari, 2013).  
Generally, civil society in Southeast Asia is weaker by the Western standard because 
they operate within the boundaries set by the state, not grown out organically (J. 
Saravanamuttu, 1997; Rodan, 2014). Voluntary and private organisations from golf clubs, 
trade unions, churches, cultural clubs, political parties, and media serve as a mechanism to 
perform civil societal roles (Mitlin, Hickey and Bebbington, 2007). They are “institutions and 
associations operating at an intermediate level between the economic structure, on the one 
hand, and the state apparatus, on the other” to debate and contest ideas of social life (Girling, 
1984: p. 385). As of 2007, civil society organisations (CSOs) in Malaysia, between national and 
state levels, ranged over 10 categories, amounting to 109,266 organisations (New Straits 




Table 1 Categories of Civil Society Organisation in Malaysia (2007) 
 National State Total 
Religious 7,203 1,400 8,603 
Social welfare 5,629 1,533 7,162 
Social/recreational 6,158 567 6,725 
Women 372 1,142 1,514 
Culture 1,716 1,428 3,144 
Mutual benefit 2,121 8 2,129 
Trade 3,360 767 4,127 
Sport 3,226 379 3,605 
Youth 3,157 6,421 9,578 
Educational 367 171 538 
Political 46 51,129 51,175 
Employment 1,104 515 1,619 
General 7,100 2,247 9,347 
Total 41,559 67,707 109,266 
Source: New Straits Times (26 September 2007) 
 
Only from the late 1980s that advocacy-based non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
focusing on human rights in Malaysia gained momentum following the economic and political 
crises (Weiss, 2004). This thesis focuses on Sarawakian community-based organisations 
(CBOs) that advocate for native customary land rights. They fall under the category of 
advocacy-oriented or political NGOs, which are defined by Saliha (1998) as “those that engage 
in public debates and dissemination of information relating to civil liberties, democratic rights, 
good governance, accountability of the government to the people, people oriented leadership 
– all of which relate to the central issue of democratic participation” (in Weiss, 2004: p. 18). 
Malaysian NGOs’ relationship with the government ranges from collaborative to 
confrontational. NGOs that focused on welfare or recreation complement the government by 
providing social services (Weiss and Saliha, 2004). NGOs generally are monitored for fear that 
they may become overly politicised (Miles and Croucher, 2013). Associations and societies are 
heavily regulated by the Registrar of Societies (RoS) which is responsible for monitoring the 
activities of voluntary associations (Azeem Fazwan, 2011). Any organisation with seven or 
more members, regardless of business or social nature, are required to register with the state 
via the RoS, which is empowered to approve or reject the application. The government even 
attempted to pass the Societies Act 1981 amendment that would categorise NGOs as either 
“political” or “friendly” (Azeem Fazwan, 2011). After facing opposition from NGOs, the 
government dropped the intent and amended the Official Secrets Act (OSA) in 1983 to include 
mandatory jail sentence for journalists or officers that gained and leaked materials from 
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government sources (Azeem Fazwan, 2011).  In 1988, the Printing Presses and Publications 
Act was amended “to disallow judicial review and the Home Minister’s decision was final if 
the Minister revoked or suspended a publishing permit on the grounds that the publication 
was prejudicial to public order” (Mustafa, 2004: p. 41). The Sedition Act prohibits acts with a 
‘seditious tendency’ that could be committed in any of the following ways: “inciting 
disaffection against any Ruler or government; inciting unlawful changes to any lawful matter; 
inciting contempt for the administration of justice; raising discontent amongst the people; 
promoting ill-will between races or classes; questioning any ‘sensitive issue’ i.e. citizenship, 
the national language, special privileges of Malays and natives of Sabah and Sarawak and the 
status of the Malay Rulers” (Shad Saleem and Ramanathan, 1998: pp. 5-6). The Malaysian 
mainstream media have been under the ownership of ruling political elites who, Zaharom 
(2000) wrote, wished to benefit from cultural control on the one hand, and corporate gains 
from the other. It is not uncommon for Malaysian government to regard national interests as 
public interests especially through state-run media (Kitley, 2003; Umi, 2006; Weiss, 2008). 
Another common pitfall of conceptualising Southeast Asian civil society comes in the 
form of arguments about the existence of an ‘Asian alternative’ to ‘Western liberalism’ 
(Rodan, 1997). The Western ideal of liberalism is deemed inappropriate because the ‘West’ is 
too culturally decadent for ‘Asian values’. This argument has been criticised for its culturalism 
– for “using culture as an explanation rather than as something to be explained” (Sim, 2006: 
p. 147). Nevertheless, the government assigns to itself the role of protecting local values, 
traditions and norms. The Malaysian and Singaporean regimes led by Mahathir Mohamed and 
Lee Kuan Yew respectively in the 1990s discredited initiatives from civil society particularly 
those of human rights advocacy, by alleging that local NGOs are aping ‘The West’ and being 
used by western agents jealous of the nation’s success (Khoo, 2002; Weiss and Saliha, 2003: 
p. 11). In this definition of a post-colonial relationship, “the Asian subject is seen … as the 
victim of Westernization, and the West become a space of which Asia is not, morally and 
culturally” (Yao, 1994; in Tai, 1997: p. 487). 
Such culturalist approach has been widely criticised as a disguise to legitimising state 
hegemony and as a hindrance to greater democracy (Khoo, 2002). The structures of political 
economy and the inequalities they bore were smoke screened using ‘perceived’ ethnic 
differences (Rodan, 2014). As a consequence, in this perspective Malay NGOs focus on 
religious teachings while the Chinese and Indian focus on bonding cultural and educational 
rights (Azeem Fazwan, 2011). The ascriptive nature of Malaysian NGOs such as religion and 
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ethnicity is deemed a polarising force that does not bode well for addressing inequality 
(Azeem Fazwan, 2011). Those that tried to cut across ethnicity to address class problems are 
more often than not are perceived as pro-Opposition. It is also because of the resistance 
against the 60-year Barisan Nasional (BN) hegemony that NGOs and the Opposition find 
support in each other (Fann, 2018). The communitarian nature of Malaysian civil society has 
impeded genuine nation-building, where Azeem Fazwan (2011, p. 103) said it is indeed beset 
by a great deal of “mistrust”. Khoo (2005) wrote that from the colonial to the post-colonial 
period, Malaysian political economy was “Janus-like: its ethnic aspect constantly exposed 
while its class aspect was hidden. As Weiss and Saliha (2004, p. 10) elaborated: 
“The failure of these alternative constructs really to take root suggests the 
structural and ideational similarities between Malaysian associational life and that 
elsewhere. While comprised also of elements from ‘peripheral’ groups, the old 
middle class and communities defined by ascriptive characteristics, Malaysian 
social movements, like new social movements in other states, are rooted in the 
new middle class and imbued with a sense of their own agency to bring about 
socio-political change. The politics of this class fragment ‘is typically a politics of a 
class but not on behalf of a class’ (Offe 1985: 833, emphasis in original). While 
issues of redistribution and economic justice may be significant, the demands 
expressed are not class-specific and activism involves broad, cross-class alliances.” 
Azeem Fazwan (2011) also noted that since independence, the government effectively 
blocked NGOs from providing direct services to the masses especially those of rural areas. For 
example, the dominant ruling party UMNO provided assistance to the rural poor and peasants 
and self-portrayed as the protector of the Malays.  In addition, despite offering constructive 
criticisms rooting for more socially and environmentally sustainable economic development, 
NGOs as such did not manage to exert great pressure in policymaking (Weiss and Saliha, 2004). 
For the state to exert such ideological control is through “one of [liberal] civil societies’ 
most definitive contemporary ideals and institutions – that of media freedom” (Rodan, 2003: 
p. 455). In many developing countries, regulations of broadcast media are stricter than that of 
print media (Glattbach and Ramanujan, 1978). Malaysia’s national broadcaster, Radio 
Televisyen Malaysia (RTM) was established in 1963 and regulated directly by the government 
until present day. The rationale is premised on fears that an uncontrolled media environment 
will be detrimental to public interest, which are synonymous with nation building goals (Umi, 
2006). This may explain why in the era of more open media markets and advancing electronic 
technologies, Asian states still claim ownership and control over broadcasting media (Kitley, 
2003: p. 11): “While the regulation of television can be understood as a technical and legal 
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discourse, it can also be understood as a discursive form of domination of cultural and thinking 
practices. We see regulation very much in terms of its cultural dynamic as a sphere of 
governance and cultural normalisation.” Zaharom (2000) termed the situation as ‘regulated 
deregulation’ where private media in Malaysia, like TV3, were controlled by the ruling elites 
through political ownership, legislation and Malay-Muslim cultural normalisation. This is the 
environment of mainstream media where the Sarawak NCR land CBOs operate – limited room 
for alternative expressions or legitimate dissents over modernization from the indigenous 
people’s point of view.  
Mahathir Mohamad’s premiership since 1981 witnessed the occurrence of volatile 
economic transformation, leadership crises, financial scandals and the extensive use of 
security legislation. Political disputes arose within and between political parties over 
‘sensitive’ issues pertaining to the banking scandal of the Bumiputra Malaysia Finance (BMF), 
Chinese education, and government award of highway tender (Means, 1991; Mustafa, 2004). 
These developments led to Operasi Lalang [Weed Operation], the 1987 political clampdown 
where more than 100 individuals were detained under the Internal Security Act (ISA). Local 
and international press critical to the events were suspended. Although the operation 
temporarily stunted the expansion of public interest NGOs, they proliferated by the 1990s 
(Rodan, 2014).  The government’s control over the media in the 1980s and 1990s was both for 
political and economic reasons (Zaharom, 1991). Amidst the political scandals, Mahathir also 
introduced a number of economic transformation policies that would propel Malaysia to 
greater successes such as the Look East Policy and heavy industrialisation. As in other 
developing states, the privatisation of education and communication systems as well as the 
increasingly secure middle-class status in Malaysia have fostered a rise in critical engagement 
with the state (Weiss and Saliha 2003). Beginning in the 1980s, middle-class NGOs based in 
Kuala Lumpur and Penang emerged to play distinct political role that championed human 
rights, social justice, environmental, feminist, and governance, among other causes (Rodan, 
2014). Middle-class NGOs cut across ethnic categories, centred in major cities and usually led 
by English-speaking, if not highly educated activists (Rodan, 2014; Weiss, 2004).  
Rodan (2014), however, warned that the role of middle-class NGOs should not be 
overstated. Annual growth rates for Malaysia topped 8 per cent from 1987 to 1996 as 
compared to 5.4 per cent per year between 1980 and 1985 (Zaharom, 2000). The economic 
growth had also encouraged consumerist habits and political stability, which means the 
Malaysian middle class is by no means homogenous – some are highly supportive of the state 
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while some are more advocational of social changes (Azeem Fazwan, 2011). Furthermore, 
middle-class activists appeared not to be engaging enough with aspirations and needs of the 
masses beyond the middle class (Rodan, 2014: p. 838): “Conspicuously absent are 
intermediary organizations linking working and middle classes in social democratic and other 
reform agendas – historically important to earlier liberal democracies… [The latter] relied 
heavily on the power of argument and maintained a sense of entitlement to shape reform.” 
The development of Internet consumption in the late 1990s marked a major 
breakthrough in the state-civil society relationship. During the Asian economic and political 
crises, the Internet has allowed explicit political use by NGOs as a crucial organising tool 
especially in Indonesia and Malaysia (Rodan 2003). By the end of 2011, domestic Internet 
users made up 61.7% of the total population in Malaysia (Liu, 2014 p. 388). Political impacts 
of the Internet contributed to the 2008 general elections in which the ruling coalition, Barisan 
Nasional (BN) lost for the first time since 1969, its two-thirds majority in parliament, while 
four state governments fell into the opposition’s hands (Liu, 2014). Both former Malaysian 
Prime Ministers, Abdullah Badawi and Najib Razak, highlighted how influential the Internet 
and social media in swinging votes in the 2008 and 2013 general elections, calling them social 
media elections (Mohd Azizuddin, 2014). The politicisation of Malaysian cyberspace became 
more intense with counter-offensive actions taken by the authorities with Internet-related 
laws and the demonization and harassment (through deployment of legal powers) of political 
bloggers (Zaharom, 2007). Nevertheless, politically concerned activists and NGOs were able 
to find ‘work arounds’ in the context of the Mahathir administration promising leeway in 
regulating the Internet as part of investor attraction efforts. The urban population, many of 
whom are technologically adept; were exposed to the reformasi movement in 1998 and 
alternative websites grew in number (Miles and Croucher, 2013). With the use of new media 
technologies that coincided with social movements, alternative media once became 
synonymous with the new media (including the internet, social media) (Rodan, 2004; Yung 
and Leung, 2014). However, it should be pointed out that mainstream media is also utilising 
the Internet for greater reach of audiences. Furthermore, authoritarian regimes have also 
responded by turning to the Internet for official propaganda and ideological dissemination 
purposes (Rodan, 2003).    
It is against this background that M. Alagappa (2004; in Weiss, 2008: p. 150) pointed 
out, it may be more useful to “consider all sociological change ‘in the direction of open, 
participatory, and accountable politics’ thus sidestepping the issue whether the states are, or 
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are becoming, democratic”. Weiss (2008, p. 144) futher argued that despite the difference in 
Southeast Asian state-society relations by the Western standard, civil society posed such 
characteristics even in the ‘Asian democratic’: 
1. civil society may be implicated in all sorts of political change, not just democratisation; 
2. organisations based on ascriptive identities (by religion or ethnicity) may constitute a 
core part of civil society; 
3. civil society is viable in a range of regimes, not just in liberal democracies; and 
4. civil society activism may transcend the borders of any given nation, even if it is the 
state that largely constitute civil society. 
Of no less significance than formal politics, civil society is an important sphere despite 
the diverse meanings attached to it, to pursue political engagement and transformation 
(Rodan, 1997).  Rodan (1997, p. 157) added that “[t]he greatest potential of civil society to act 
as a force for political liberalisation rests in its potential to institutionalise the rights of 
interested parties – those affected by policy decisions – to influence the decision-making 
process.” 
From the discussion above, Southeast Asian civil society is different from the liberal 
Western variety and approach. Liberal theorists put emphasis on rational, co-operative and 
moral interactions both among the members of a society and between them and their 
government (DeLue, 1997; in Weiss and Saliha, 2004). Civil society is seen as a rein on the 
excesses of state power; a vibrant civil society leads to an accountable state. From the 
literature, three main characteristics of Southeast Asian civil society are evident: a) there is no 
absolute autonomy in civil society from the state; b) the division that demonises the state on 
the one hand and idealised civil society on the other is flawed; and c) just like civil society, the 
state is a fragmented and complex entity. These features inspire a quest to find an appropriate 
framework for analysis to understand better the role and position of CBOs in Sarawakian land 
rights debates. 
Given the above features, Gramsci’s understandings of civil society – despite having 
been deployed in a very different place at a very different historical time – are attractive for 
four reasons. First, Gramsci identifies contradictions in the liberal civil society ideals – market 
liberalisation, curbing of state absolutism, achieving the highest moral level and equal 
opportunity in participating in voluntary associations. The Gramscian account of civil society 
as an arena of contestation is thus simply more sophisticated and convincing than the liberal 
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account. Gramsci recognised that civil society is not a level playing field of free choice that 
leads to voluntary and rational participation in political activities autonomous from the state. 
This leads to the second point; these contradictions are analysed in the totality of society in 
focus on mass media, education, intellectuals, culture, politics and language. These diverse 
institutions manufactured our everyday consent that builds the inner protection level of the 
state. To Gramsci, civil society is the sphere of hegemony that depends on consent where the 
ruling class extends and reinforces it power through non-violent means. Hegemony is thus 
contrasted from ‘direct domination’ exercised from the state’s military and judicial 
apparatuses (Gramsci, 1999). Third, Gramsci is contextually more grounded and he humbly 
admitted the relativity of his political observation in different historical contexts. Gramsci 
characterises hegemony as a moving equilibrium – fragmented, contradictory and never rigid 
(Ransome, 1992). Such vitality provides an understanding of consent beyond classical 
Marxism’ false consciousness as spread by state ideological apparatuses such as religion (Sim, 
2006 p. 148): “The question of hegemony is then the question of whose version of reality is 
being universalised and which alternatives are rendered unthinkable.”  This then enables 
understanding of how certain regimes can be immensely popular among the masses, including 
socially underprivileged masses (Girling, 1984). It relates to Gramsci’s term of common sense, 
the traditional popular conception of the world, often unreflective and uncritical sense. 
Common sense is neither rigid nor a singular noun, for it is a product and process of history 
(Gramsci, 1999). Religion, for example, is an element of fragmented common sense. By 
referring to civil society as a terrain of struggles over meaning and common sense, Gramsci 
makes the term contextually viable to be applied regardless if a country has ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ 
civil society (Sim, 2006).  Fourth, Gramsci, like the Russian revolutionist Vladimir Lenin and 
Marx, offers solutions to achieve his ideals within contradictions. In studying Malaysian civil 
society and social movement, Brown (2004) too agreed that the Gramscian approach is in 
many ways less concerned with definitions and classifications of civil society. Unlike dominant 
theories that place national political regimes into dichotomised and moralised categories, 
Gramsci's theory offers us theoretical flexibility that can be utilised equally to understand and 
criticise authoritarian tendencies (Sim, 2006). 
The next section discusses more on Gramsci’s ideas on state and civil society before 
moving on to constructing an analytical framework for the data collected.  
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2.4 Gramsci’s notion of civil society 
Antonio Gramsci was an Italian socialist who was intrigued or rather surprised by the 
rise of fascism in the 1920s. He was banished by Benito Mussolini to the prison who infamously 
declared the need to stop his brain from working for 20 years. During the hardship of being 
incarcerated, Gramsci wrote on his reflections on how power could best be sustained and why 
certain revolution failed. In his bid of doing so, his social and theoretical outlook covered a 
number of interrelated key themes that each contributed to the totality of Gramsci’s concern. 
Gramsci’s notions of the state and civil society were some of his most original ideas in the 
Prison Notebooks (Schwarzmantel, 2015).  
To fully appreciate Gramsci’s concepts in the Prison Notebooks, one has to start from 
understandings of the State (Sassoon, 1980; in Mercer, 1980: p. 31):  “The nature of the state 
determines the form of the political struggle, the modes of organisation necessary for its 
transformation, and the breadth and extent of ideological struggle depending on the relative 
strength or weakness of 'civil society' or the 'apparatuses of hegemony'”. 
Gramsci extended the traditional definition of the State from a mechanistic and coercive 
role to one that includes hegemony and civil society. The State plays an educative and 
formative role to inculcate a sense of belongingness among the masses and even to define 
civilisation (Gramsci, 1999: p. 502). The role of a State exceeds that of the night-watchman 
State that relies on military force to gain authority. The State legitimises and publicises law 
enforcement in differentiating its definition of civilisation from otherwise. Only when 
“legality” is in danger that the military, as “the permanent reserves of order and conservation, 
comes into action publicly” (Gramsci, 1999: p. 457). That explains why Gramsci differentiates 
the school’s positive educative role from the courts as a repressive and negative educative 
function (1999, p. 526). To Gramsci, both functions are complementary with each other to 
keep hegemony in equilibrium. Those ‘private’ initiatives and activities lead to the same end, 
which is to “form the apparatus of the political and cultural hegemony of the ruling classes” 
(Gramsci, 1999: pp. 526-527). The target is to achieve the ethical or cultural State; one that 
leads in forming popular perceptions of and moral leadership by the State. In this image, all 
men are equal, rational and able to accept laws freely not through coercion imposed by 
another class without coercion (Gramsci, 1999: p. 532).  An ethical state also transcends the 
purely economic-corporate stage, which means pursuing its own economic interests (Gramsci, 
1999: p. 532). ‘Economic-corporate’ interest refers to “the collective interest of a particular 
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economic category: for instances merchants, or engineering workers” (Forgacs, 2000: p. 421). 
Gramsci emphasised that any ruling groups cannot retain their power through blatant pursuit 
of own economic gains. Hegemonic leadership is essential to portray how they are with the 
masses and their sentiments. The site of hegemony, therefore, is civil society. 
This means the State is much broader than governmental institutions that exercise 
coercion because civil society that elicits consent is also part of the State. To identify State and 
government as the same is a form of confusion between civil society and political society. 
Gramsci (1999, p. 532) emphasised that the State is constituted broadly as = political society 
+ civil society, an organic relationship that forms the integral state. In fact, Gramsci identified 
the State and civil society as one and the same: “hegemony over its historical development 
belongs to private forces, to civil society—which is “State” too, indeed is the State itself” 
(1999, p. 531). 
Although the coercive side of political society is the most visible aspect of the state, civil 
society is its most resilient constitutive element (Katz, 2010). As noted earlier, Gramsci placed 
civil society at the superstructural level, the ensemble of organisms commonly called ‘private’, 
and that of ‘political society’ or ‘the State’. On the one hand, civil society corresponds to the 
function of ‘hegemony’ that belongs to the dominant group.  Hegemony is executed by 
intellectuals who are the dominant group’s “deputies” to gain subalterns’ ‘spontaneous’ 
consent through everyday activities in social life. On the other side of the superstructural level 
is ‘direct domination’ exercised through the State and ‘juridical’ government. This coercive 
power “‘legally’ enforces discipline on those groups who do not “consent” either actively or 
passively” (Gramsci, 1999: p. 145). 
The ‘State’ therefore should also be understood as the “‘private’ apparatus of 
‘hegemony’ or civil society” (Gramsci, 1999: p. 530). Gramsci argued that to establish 
hegemony over society, the consensual function of civil society is necessary. Consent must 
make large parts of subalterns’ own worldview. As Sim (2006, p. 148) put it: “The difference 
between authoritarian and democratic polities is not the absence of coercion but the presence 
of consensus. The distinction between domination and hegemony then is a question of 
whether the state's ‘outer ditch’ or ‘armor of coercion’ was buttressed by an ‘inner ditch’ 
(1971, pp. 124, 238, 363) of consensus that legitimises state coercion...” 
Hegemony is based on the rich conceptualisation of power – a combination of coercion 
and consent – where Gramsci drew upon Machiavelli’s metaphor of the ruler as a centaur, 
‘‘semi-animal, semi-man,’’ (O’Shannassy, 2008).  To exercise power and to maintain it, one 
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“must know well how to imitate beasts as well as employing properly human means” 
(O’Shannassy, 2008: p. 90). This dual nature represents for Gramsci ‘‘the levels of force and 
consent, authority and hegemony, violence and civilization, of the individual moment and the 
universal moment (‘Church’ and ‘State’), of agitation and propaganda, of tactics and strategy’’ 
(Gramsci, 1999: p. 634). 
This is a contrast to more functionalist approaches that see the state as natural, rational, 
coherent and beneficial to society (Sim, 2006: p. 148). Hegemony is a system of values, 
attitudes and leadership that naturalise the status quo in power relations.  The state, when it 
wants to initiate any unpopular policy, creates in advance appropriate public opinion through 
mobilising mass media and other ideological instruments (Mushi, 2011).  
Benedetto Croce (1866-1952), an Italian idealist philosopher, is one of the sources of 
Gramsci’s hegemony besides Marxist and other leftist activists. Giovanni Gentile (1875-1944) 
was the Minister of Education under the first fascist government in 1922.  They worked 
together in developing a wide-ranging critique toward the existing education system as 
‘instruction’ and ‘narrow’ (Hoare and Smith, 1999). However, they had conflicting 
philosophical positions toward the State:   
“For Gentile history is entirely State history, while for Croce, it is “ethico-political.” 
In other words, Croce wants to maintain a distinction between civil society and 
political society, between hegemony and dictatorship; the great intellectuals 
exercise hegemony, which presupposes a certain collaboration, that is, an active 
and voluntary (free) consent; in other words, a liberal-democratic regime. Gentile 
posits the economic-corporative phase as an ethical phase within the historical 
act: hegemony and dictatorship are indistinguishable, force is no different from 
consent; it is impossible to distinguish political society from civil society; only the 
state exists and, of course, the state as government, etc.” (Gramsci 2011c, Q6§10: 
pp. 9-10). 
Croce “functioned for Gramsci rather like Hegel did for Marx” (Boothman, 2008: p. 208) 
where Gramsci drew Croce’s discourse of ‘ethico-political’ and reinterpreted it to describe the 
State as an integral state between political society and civil society. Croce contributed to 
Gramsci’s set of dynamic antinomies as compared to Gentile’s neo-Hegelian positive phase of 
the State. In fact, Gramsci cautioned us to distinguish civil society from Hegel’s understanding 
of the term. Hegel understood it from the sense given by Catholicism where civil society is 
instead political society. For Catholicism, ‘civil society’ is not necessary because “the state is 
just the church, and it is a universal and supernatural state: the medieval conception is fully 
preserved in theory” (Gramsci 2011c, Q6§24: pp. 20-21). Gramsci further criticised Hegel’s 
32 
 
universality where all mankind will be bourgeois. For Gramsci, society is unequal. Only through 
putting an end to the State can end “the internal divisions of the ruled” and create a 
technically and morally unitary social organism”, hence an ethical State (Gramsci, 1999: pp. 
526-527). 
Hegemony, however, is not rigid. It requires constant renewal to win consent from 
subordinates and to ward off challenges from opponents (Ransome, 1992). A “crisis of 
authority” or organic crisis is the crisis of hegemony or general crisis of the State. According 
to Gramsci, it occurs when “the ruling class has lost its consensus, i.e. is no longer “leading” 
but only “dominant” (Gramsci, 1999: p. 556). When the state uses repressive law as the last 
instant to cement its authority, “this means precisely that the great masses have become 
detached from their traditional ideologies, and no longer believe what they used to believe 
previously” (Gramsci, 1999: p. 556; Wilkes 2017). The ruling class has its hegemonic crisis 
during some failed political undertaking like war or the masses have transited from certain 
passivity to activity. This may or may not lead to revolution, which Gramsci branded it as a 
dangerous period of power vacuum “since the various strata of the population are not all 
capable of orienting themselves equally swiftly, or of reorganizing with the same rhythm” 
(Gramsci, 1999: pp. 450-451). Any absence of alternative ideas for a new society would be 
disastrous in response to the organic crisis (Gramsci, 1999: pp. 450-451). 
Gramsci therefore differentiated organic crisis from conjunctural ones where the latter 
consists of much less significant political conflicts that do not threaten or challenge the status 
quo. It is a grave mistake to confuse conjunctural crisis with organic one, which is a serious 
underestimation of the resilience of the established order. One has to scrutinise any crisis to 
be alert to the conditions permissible to challenge status quo without jumping to the 
conclusion that any particular fluctuation in the political and ideological sphere will lead to 
drastic structural transformation (Gramsci, 1999). The traditional ruling class with State 
organism, for example military, mass media, judiciary, has greater capacity and speed to 
restore their hegemony from conjunctural crisis. 
This dangerous period links to Caesarism, a term Gramsci referred to as a situation of 
power vacuum that leads to a series of events culminating “in a great ‘heroic personality’ to 
seize control of the state such as Mussolini and Hitler” (Gramsci, 1999: p. 464). Fascism, in 
Gramsci’s observation, is different from classic Caesarism. Fascism achieved power through 
parties and mass organisations through exploitation of the weaknesses and inadequacy of the 
socialist and communist parties. Fascism is a form of reactionary Caesarism when the 
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achievement of power is through the complex organisations of civil society. On the contrary, 
progressive Caesarism utilises straightforward military force to triumph, which is outdated 
(Gramsci, 1999). It no longer had any applicability with modern societies as different 
techniques of political action are needed in an age of mass organisations and complex civil 
society due to “the expansion of parliamentarism and of the associative systems of union and 
party, and the growth in the formation of vast State and ‘private’ bureaucracies (i.e. politico-
private, belonging to parties and trade unions)” (Gramsci, 1999: p. 466). 
This is the moment where Gramsci pondered upon the failure of revolutionary upsurge 
that in many ways led to the rise of fascism. Reflecting on this question, Gramsci formulated 
how subaltern groups could come to power by conquering civil society (Gramsci, 1999). In the 
case of modern societies, civil society has become resistant to immediate economic crises 
because the superstructures are similar to “the trench systems of modern warfare” (Gramsci, 
1999: p. 489). War could only destroy the outer perimeter of the defensive system whereas a 
line of defence, which is civil society, was still effective (Gramsci, 1999). Therefore, for 
Gramsci, the real defence system of a state lies in its civil society:  
In the East the State was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in 
the West, there was a proper relation between State and civil society, and when 
the State trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed. The 
State was only an outer ditch, behind which there stood a powerful system of 
fortresses and earthworks: more or less numerous from one State to the next, it 
goes without saying—but this precisely necessitated an accurate reconnaissance 
of each individual country (Gramsci, 1999: p. 494) 
Because of the complexity of civil society that contributed to the strength of the State, 
Gramsci opined that counter-strategy from the subalterns too has to be subtle, well-planned 
and appears natural as well to conquer new hegemony. Gramsci criticised Rosa Luxemburg 
(1871-1919) for emphasising strikes as the strategy to bring down social inequality. Luxemburg 
was a Polish Marxist revolutionist who argued that proletariat mass movement was the 
revolutionary source to end class exploitation by the bourgeoisie (Geras, 2001). In The Prince, 
Machiavelli wrote that ‘taking the initiative in introducing a new form of government is very 
difficult and dangerous, and unlikely to succeed’. The reasons for this were that “all those who 
profit from the old order will be opposed to the innovator, whereas all those who might 
benefit from the new order are, at best, tepid supporters of him” (Machiavelli, 1988: pp. 20-
21). Gramsci insisted that it was through processual actions and political organisations that 
the project of a new political order could be attempted. Despite being inspired by the 
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Bolsheviks in Russia in 1917, Gramsci classified their strategy as war of movement, which has 
to be different from war of position (Gramsci, 1999: p. 481; Wilkes, 2017). 
To launch a war of position needs leadership that connects well with the masses. 
Inspired by Machiavelli’s Modern Prince, Gramsci metaphorised the Prince as the political 
party that can pull together a “universal and total” collective will through concrete form: “The 
modern prince, the myth-prince, cannot be a real person, a concrete individual. It can only be 
an organism, a complex element of society… which balances the various interests struggling 
against the predominant (but not absolutely exclusivistic) interest—is precisely the ‘political 
party’” (Gramsci, 1999: p. 323, 517). 
This is not an ordinary party but one that has a revolutionary role. Gramsci was 
particularly interested in formulating the conditions that allow the nature and role of the party 
to develop creative political leadership and inspire the masses (Gramsci, 1999: p. 555).  
Gramsci was far from envisioning a political party living in its own myth or utopia. He 
used the idea of the myth in the sense developed by the French thinker Georges Sorel (1847-
1922). Sorel’s myth was that of a constellation of images that do not necessarily embody truth 
but were able to evoke emotions and to stimulate social movement (Gramsci, 1999). However, 
Gramsci criticised Sorel for dismissing the importance of mass organisation (Gramsci, 1999). 
To Gramsci, “Sorel never advanced from his conception of ideology-as-myth to an 
understanding of the political party, but stopped short at the idea of the trade union” (1999, 
p. 319). Although through a trade union’s activity, such as a general strike, that collective will 
is achievable, Gramsci thinks that it is a “passive activity…an activity which does not envisage 
an ‘active and constructive’ phase of its own” (1999, p. 320). To Gramsci, strikes are not 
sufficient to change the status quo and to replace it with new politics without proper political 
preparation of the masses. 
Gramsci adapted the concept ‘myth’ from Sorel, which refers to “a creation of concrete 
phantasy which acts on a dispersed and shattered people to arouse and organise its collective 
will” (1999, p. 318). Gramsci extended the meaning to characterising the Modern Prince as “a 
symbol of the leader and ideal condottiere” (1999, pp. 318-319). During the time of Gramsci’s 
writing, condottiere referred to the Modern Prince in the form of an organism. Such reference 
was based on Mussolini’s charismatic leadership that filled the void in the already weak Italian 
civil society, which led to the rise of fascism (reactionary Caesarism). However, since “a 
Caesarist solution” for Gramsci (1999, p. 464) can take place even without any great, heroic 
personality, Gramsci turned his attention to the Prince in the form of a revolutionary political 
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party. To lead the people in founding a new State, the Prince must “[merge] with the people, 
becomes the people” where they share the same level of expression and identification 
(Gramsci, 1999: p. 319). Thus, Gramsci credited Machiavelli for pragmatically combining myth 
and mass-friendly demeanour through a Modern Prince.   
The core feature of the concept of the Prince is that it is a “live” work, in which political 
ideology and political science are fused in the dramatic form of a “myth” (Gramsci, 2000: 
Q13§1, p. 238). Politics is inevitable because life is politics (Gramsci, 1999). Gramsci’s 
expansion concept of politics encompasses life, where politics surrounds us all of life. This 
provides the underlying reason for philosophy of praxis, not only conditioned by the economic 
structure of society: “In what sense can one identify politics with history, and hence all of life 
with politics? How then could the whole system of superstructures be understood as 
distinctions within politics, and the introduction of the concept of distinction into a philosophy 
of praxis hence be justified?” (Gramsci, 1999: p. 337). Gramsci’s interpretation of philosophy 
of praxis is influenced by Marx, whom he credited as the founder (Forgacs, 2000). Philosophy 
of praxis (theory and action) refers to a situation where one achieves his or her self-awareness 
above common sense and become critical of the world to change it (Gramsci, 1999). Hence, 
the outcome is a new common sense in the form of moral and intellectual reform.  
What sets Gramsci apart from traditional Marxism is his critique of the latter that 
reduces politics to mere derivative of economic forces (Schwarzmantel, 2015). Gramsci asked 
if modern theory can be in opposition to the ‘spontaneous’ feelings of the masses. By modern 
theory he meant Marxism and the ‘spontaneous’ feelings refer to “those which ‘have been 
formed through everyday experience illuminated by ‘common sense’, i.e. by the traditional 
popular conception of the world” (Gramsci, 1999: p 735). Gramsci criticised Marxism for not 
being able to address common sense (2001, Q3§48: pp. 330-31). Gramsci raised concern that 
to trigger spontaneous movements, conscious leadership and organisation are important for 
subaltern classes to achieve hegemony. The platform to achieve this is through institutions of 
civil society. Here Gramsci saw civil society as a point for social change where he emphasises 
the importance of nurturing critical everyday conception of the world to the masses (through 
mass media, education, language) instead of launching offensive attack on the hegemonic 
class. Gramsci admitted that it is a long, painstaking process.  
The key idea of Gramsci’s preoccupation with Machiavelli lies in the creative role of 
political leadership instead of politics as the mere expression of economic forces. Gramsci 
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again compared Machiavelli with the philosophy of praxis or Marxism as he is very scornful of 
‘economistic superstition’: 
“In pure Marxism, men taken as a mass obey economic necessity and not their 
own emotions. Politics is emotion; patriotism is emotion; these two imperious 
goddesses merely act as a façade in history. In reality, the history of peoples 
throughout the centuries is to be explained by a changing, constantly renewed 
interplay of material causes. Everything is economics… In its most widespread 
form as economistic superstition, the philosophy of praxis loses a great part of its 
capacity for cultural expansion among the top layer of intellectuals, however much 
it may gain among the popular masses and the second-rate intellectuals, who do 
not intend to overtax their brains but still wish to appear to know everything, etc.” 
(Gramsci, 1999: pp. 377-378). 
Nevertheless, Gramsci recognised that to counter against traditional ruling class, the 
economic factor of production has to be taken into consideration: “Classes produce parties, 
and parties form the personnel of State and government, the leaders of civil and political 
society” (Gramsci, 1999: p. 477). For Gramsci, the concepts of State and of class are 
interrelated in the context of revolution. One has to be able to make sense of both regardless 
of the attempt to defend or attack the State because to have “little understanding of the State 
means little class consciousness” (Gramsci, 1999: p. 555). Furthermore, one cannot realise a 
new political party and leader without a theoretical, “systematic attempt to discover and 
study the causes which govern the nature of the class represented and the way in which it has 
developed” (Gramsci, 1999: p. 477). For example, Gramsci wrote that the bourgeois class 
operates as an organism “in continuous movement, capable of absorbing the entire society, 
assimilating it to its own cultural and economic level” (Gramsci, 1999: p. 529). This 
transformed the entire function of the State to become an “educator”.  
Although Gramsci's conception of the State is an extended one, it is not universal but 
always refers to particular historical events and contexts (Mercer, 1980; Schwarzmantel, 
2015). During his time of writing, Gramsci provided not a general theory of the capitalist state, 
but an analysis of the weakness of the Italian liberal state and an 'incomplete' bourgeois 
revolution (the Risorgimento) that led to the rise of fascism (Mercer, 1980: p. 32). 
This is where Gramsci emphasised the importance of being in organisations. He wrote 
that in any society, nobody should be disorganised and without a party (Gramsci, 1999).  Even 
in a multiplicity of private associations, Gramsci acknowledged they are not all equal as some 
will dominate hegemonic situations more than others. Gramsci therefore criticised Hegel’s 
universal parallelism of the State with the bourgeois class, ignoring the unequal economic 
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makeup of society (Gramsci, 1999: p. 527). Gramsci then attacked Hegel’s conception of the 
State – (a) formal parties and parliamentary components as the ‘private’ warp of the State; 
and (b) people’s consent toward the State was derived from election results. In Gramsci’s 
view, such conception is ‘vague and primitive’ for two related reasons – first, ‘private’ 
organisations that strengthen the hegemonic position of ruling social groups also refer to 
those ‘natural’, informal type (for instance, schools, social clubs) and thus, second, it ignores 
the power of the State in manufacturing, and more importantly, ‘educating’ consent of the 
governed to remain in power (Gramsci, 1999: p. 527). Gramsci also criticised Marx for being 
unable to extend his concept of organisation beyond journalistic and secret agitational 
activities to the masses (Gramsci, 1999: p. 527). 
Therefore, it is important to have strong leadership to convince the masses of 
oppositional ideas and to get them actively involved to pursue progressive political change. 
Gramsci developed ‘war of position’ as a strategy to win hegemony by the subalterns. Gramsci 
used the term ‘subaltern’ when referring to subordinate social groups like slaves, peasants, 
women, minority races and proletariat. Gramsci wrote how “subaltern classes are subject to 
the initiatives of the dominant class, even when they rebel; they are in a state of anxious 
defense” (Green, 2002: p. 2). To understand Gramsci’s concept of subaltern, Green (2002, p. 
3) stressed that one must understand how Gramsci studies it in totality with “his political, 
social, intellectual, literary, cultural, philosophical, religious and economic analyses”. In many 
ways, Gramsci links subaltern with hegemony and the integral state. To counter and rise from 
subordination, institutions that mediate it on the level of civil society must first be conquered 
(Maglaras, 2013). It is an ideological struggle to win the hegemony through influencing 
consciousness (Maglaras, 2013). Gramsci therefore deploys hegemony not only to understand 
the bourgeois in different historical contexts, but also to analyse how subaltern hegemony can 
be achieved through creating new relations in the integral state (Whitehead, 2015).  Not all 
changes can be defined as resistance because ruling hegemony still allows space to feel elated 
from so-called democratic amendments. Only changes that produce real improved outcomes 
for subaltern classes and class fractions are counter-hegemonic (Whitehead, 2015). 
In the formation of a national-popular collective will, the modern Prince must be the 
active organiser of intellectual and moral reform, one that structures the entire work. The 
plans should result from discussion with the members (Gramsci, 1999: p. 329).  
Gramsci’s analysis of intellectuals begins from a question of who is in the group: “Are 
intellectuals an autonomous and independent social group, or does every social group have 
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its own particular specialised category of intellectuals?” (Gramsci, 1999 p. 134). The answer 
lies in the “real historical process of formation of the different categories of intellectuals” 
(Gramsci, 1999 p. 134). Every social group exists in specific economic production where one 
or more strata of intellectuals are aware of their own function in the economic, social and 
political fields. For example, “[t]he capitalist entrepreneur creates alongside himself the 
industrial technician, the specialist in political economy, the organisers of a new culture, of a 
new legal system, etc.” (Gramsci, 1999: pp. 134-135). Intellectuals who are middle-ranking 
and have tremendous influence toward rural bourgeoisie reinforce their dislike toward the 
peasantry, which in turn reinforce non-coercive authority of the state and dominant groups:   
From Giulio Marzot’s review of the novel Le catene (Milan, Mondadori, 193, 320 
pp., L12) by Pietravalle: “To those who ask her about her feelings when she 
participates in the life of the peasants, Felicia responds: ‘I love them as I love the 
soil, but I would not mix the soil with my bread’. There is, then, the awareness of 
a separation: she admits that the peasant, too, may have his own human dignity, 
but she keeps the peasant within boundaries of his social position.”…In Italy, the 
“naturalist” element was grafted onto a pre-existing ideological position, as one 
can see in Manzoni’s The Betrothed, where there is the same “detachment” from 
the people – a detachment barely concealed by a benevolent smile that is ironic 
and has the quality of caricature. (Gramsci, 2011c: Q6§9, p. 6). 
Gramsci’s distinction of intellectuals from non-intellectuals does not lie in their specific 
professional category, but their social functions (1999, p. 140). Strictly speaking, non-
intellectuals do not exist because all men are intellectuals. Gramsci instead divided 
intellectuals into two types. Organic intellectuals must have a critical consciousness of the 
world and have a sense of collectivism to engage the masses to restructure society. Gramsci 
put high expectation toward organic intellectuals where they must have the capacity to be an 
organiser of society “to create the conditions most favourable to the expansion of their own 
class” and bring them into prominence (Gramsci, 1999: p. 135). 
On the other hand, traditional intellectuals directly or indirectly legitimise the power of 
the prevailing institutions (Landy, 1986).  They have been assimilated to dominant ideas 
through extensive and complex elaboration quicker and more efficacious than organic 
intellectuals (Gramsci, 1999 p. 142). The traditional intellectuals detach themselves from the 
social grouping, which embodies the most extensive and perfect consciousness of the State 
(Gramsci, 1999 pp. 547-548).   
Gramsci bemoaned that Italian intellectuals dissociate themselves with their mission to 
free people from their ‘humble’ and ‘wretched’ positions (Green, 2002). He likened the 
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cosmopolitan function of Italian intellectuals as the bourgeoisie in the Middle Ages never 
moving beyond the economic-corporative phase, which hindered successive attempts to 
create a national-popular collective will (Gramsci, 2011c: Q6§7, p. 5). Gramsci admitted that 
it is an uphill task, “unless the great mass of peasant farmers bursts simultaneously into 
political life” (Gramsci, 1999: p. 327). Again, Gramsci made reference to Machiavelli in 
explaining how the collective will can be achieved through an artistic yet realistic imagination 
of the given political objective because political passions need to have a concrete form. To 
achieve that, Machiavelli represented the process “in terms of the qualities, characteristics, 
duties and requirements of a concrete individual” (Gramsci, 2000: Q13§1, p. 239).  
Gramsci then warned against syndicalism where subalterns pursue their own economic 
gains instead of developing a long term or organic movement to end their underprivileged 
positions. Syndicalism, an aspect of free-trade liberalism, refers to the idea that trade union 
activity is sufficient to challenge the existing order. Syndicalism prevents the subaltern class 
to rise above the economic-corporate phase to achieve ethical-political hegemony in civil 
society and domination in the state (Schwarzmantel, 2015 p. 164). Syndicalism is not limited 
to only trade union or party but of social movements with such idea, which can be applied to 
analysing the direction and strategy by organisations that advocate for marginalised 
communities’ interests.  
Despite Gramsci’s warning against committing economism, it is a mistake to presume 
that Gramsci cuts social movements from their economic contexts. Economism is a Gramscian 
critique towards the idea that the economic base determines directly the political and 
ideological superstructure. Gramsci wrote that we should not view Marxism as a crude 
materialism that reduces all political processes to economic means. In fact, Marxism does give 
due place to the ideological forms and ideas through which human beings see political activity 
(Gramsci, 1999: p. 373). Gramsci added that any articulation of the dominant group’s interests 
and values is not an entirely ‘ethical-political’ expression because “[hegemony] must also be 
economic, must necessarily be based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group 
in the decisive nucleus of economic activity” (1999, p. 373). Those seeking to establish 
hegemony must achieve equilibrium between economic necessity and moral leadership 
(Gramsci, 1999). 
Hence, the educative role of the political party as an institution could develop 
consciousness of the working class from the economic-corporative level to the higher stage of 
achieving hegemony. It involves the masses to be aware of their subalternity, the 
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manufactured consent surrounding it and a clear idea on what to replace the existing social 
system with. 
Gramsci’s approach to civil society has been credited for focusing on the superstructure 
and completes Marx’s project as he demonstrates the dynamic relationship between 
subaltern and the dominant political and economic power structure (Girling, 1984; Tok, 2003). 
Such dynamism is reflected in Gramsci paralleling civil society with “the mode of economic 
behaviour”:  
“Every social form has its homo oeconomicus, i.e. its own economic 
activity…Between the economic structure and the State with its legislation and its 
coercion stands civil society, and the latter must be radically transformed, in a 
concrete sense and not simply on the statutebook or in scientific books. The State 
is the instrument for conforming civil society to the economic structure, but it is 
necessary for the State to ‘be willing’ to do this; i.e. for the representatives of the 
change that has taken place in the economic structure to be in control of the 
State… Here civil society is in effect equated with “the mode of economic 
behaviour” (MS, in Hoare and Smith, 1999: pp. 448-449). 
Corresponding to the struggle for economic and cultural liberalisation is the 
development from common sense (a subordinate conception of the world imposed by 
dominant social groups) to good sense (a critical awareness of society that gives a "conscious 
direction" to one's activity). Political parties, by recruiting potential leaders from the "working 
mass" are tasked with leading this cultural battle, a movement from the purely economic to 
the ethical-political called catharsis (Girling, 1984: pp. 391-392): 
The term “catharsis” can be employed to indicate the passage from the purely 
economic (or egoistic-passional) to the ethico-political moment, that is the 
superior elaboration of the structure into superstructure in the minds of men. This 
also means the passage from “objective to subjective” and from “necessity to 
freedom” (Gramsci, 1999: p. 691). 
Gramsci bemoaned the passivity of the general masses, which in his time of writing, 
referred to peasants and soldiers. However, Gramsci admitted that passivity ought to be 
analysed differently by case and by country (Gramsci, 1999: p. 458). Machiavelli, in Gramsci’s 
view, wanted to enlighten the mass of the citizenry through political practice so that they 
could become active citizens rather than subaltern subjects (Gramsci, 1999: p. 458). Gramsci 
called the political enlightenment “collective will”, asking a crucial question, “When can the 
conditions for awakening and developing a national-popular collective will be said to exist?”. 
Therefore, an historical (economic) analysis of the social structure of the given country is 
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needed to awaken the will as well as an analysis of successes and failures (Gramsci, 1999: pp. 
325-326).  
One of the key elements of any hegemony strategy to acquire national-popular 
collective will is through culture (O’Shannassy, 2008). To be national-popular, culture has to 
reflect the real development of the people instead of being a culture of caste like Italian 
literature, in Gramsci’s time and perspective (Gramsci, 2011c: Q6§44, p. 35). Gramsci’s 
concept of culture is far more complex than Raymond Williams’ ‘whole ways of life’ and 
initially not associated with popular culture at the time of his writing (Merli, 2013a). Gramsci 
stressed that culture has a political function and has to be understood in the context of 
hegemony and integral state:  
“Culture is defined here as ‘a coherent, integral and nationwide ‘conception of life 
and man’, a ‘lay religion’, a philosophy that has become ‘culture’, that is, one that 
has generated an ethic, a life-style and an individual and civil pattern of behaviour” 
(CW 92, Q23, 1, 2185-2186; in Merli, 2013c, p. 441). 
“Culture was seen as a tool of self-transformation through a discipline of one’s 
inner self which would lead to the attainment of a higher awareness and 
understanding of one’s role, rights and obligations.” (Merli, 2013b: p. 434) 
Gramsci’s stand on culture invites us to ponder upon the changing, legitimating or 
oppositional role intellectuals have played in hegemony (Landy, 2008). The diverse character 
of intellectuals is neither fixed nor isolated from existing social relations of production (Landy, 
2008). To be culturally prepared, intellectuals need to break the dominant hegemony by 
creating subaltern consciousness through non-violent means (Buttigieg, 1995). Gramsci again 
emphasised that his approach to cultural reform is indeed parallel with economic reform:  
“Can there be cultural reform, and can the position of the depressed strata of 
society be improved culturally, without a previous economic reform and a change 
in their position in the social and economic fields? Intellectual and moral reform 
has to be linked with a programme of economic reform—indeed the programme 
of economic reform is precisely the concrete form in which every intellectual and 
moral reform presents itself” (Gramsci, 1999: pp. 329-330). 
A political party’s function in civil society is as important as that of the State in political 
society, only on a different scale (Gramsci, 1999: p. 150). Political party, as a term, for all 
groups, holds together any form of intellectuals. It is possible to make a mockery out of the 
presumption that all members of a political party should be regarded as intellectuals. But for 
Gramsci, he emphasised that it is the function that matters, “which is directive and 
organisational, i.e. educative, i.e. intellectual” (Gramsci, 1999: p. 151). 
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Gramsci made it clear that his envisioning of political party is not of the fascist type, 
“which mobilise the masses not in a democratic way but precisely through ‘messianic myths 
of an awaited golden age’” (Schwarzmantel, 2015: p. 169). Gramsci (2000, pp. 154-164) 
formulated three fundamental elements that have to converge – mass membership, 
leadership and ‘an intermediate element, which articulates the first element with the second 
and maintains contact between them’. Among these three elements, for Gramsci, it is the 
leadership element that is the most important. Leadership has to be “‘endowed with great 
cohesive, centralising and disciplinary powers’, and also ‘with the power of innovation’, which 
presumably means innovation of a political or policy-making kind, to innovate in deciding 
strategy and tactics of the party” (Gramsci, 2000: pp. 154-164). Gramsci’s expectation toward 
the Modern Prince is in a progressive totalitarian function where it becomes a bearer of a new 
culture, in the sense of diffusing and propagating a ‘total’ or all-embracing view of the world 
(Gramsci, 2011c: Q6§136, p. 108). This new culture may not be literally new, but in the sense 
that it has been previously denied by orthodox bourgeois channels of education and culture 
(Schwarzmantel, 2015). Gramsci harboured hope in educating the masses to govern, which 
indicates democracy. Political democracy is essential to ensure each non-ruler “a free training 
in the skills and general technical preparation necessary to that end” (Gramsci, 2000: p. 146). 
Gramsci warned against a danger in political parties, that is, bureaucracy. Once 
bureaucracy is in full force, the party ends up constituting a compact body, detached from the 
members and becomes anachronist (Gramsci, 1999). Gramsci was fully aware of a party 
becoming an organisation ruled by elites who are then more reluctant to challenge the wider 
society. Gramsci, through his writing, addressed Robert Michels’ book of 1911, Political Parties 
about bureaucracy (Schwarzmantel, 2015). Gramsci distinguished bureaucratic centralism 
from genuinely organic centralism. He described the latter as “a centralism in movement – i.e. 
a continual adaptation of the organisation to the real movement, a matching of thrusts from 
below with orders from above” (Gramsci, 1999: p. 364). In fact, the division between rulers 
and ruled is one of the fundamental, primordial elements of the entire science and art of 
politics (Gramsci, 1999 p. 347). A healthy form of centralism requires an organic unity between 
theory and practice, between intellectual strata and popular masses, between rulers and 
ruled. It creates ‘a united front’, which Gramsci (1999, p. 768) termed crucially as the 
‘historical bloc’. 
For Gramsci, the state’s strength is a dialectical unity between government power and 
civil society (Katz, 2010). So, drawing on this idea in the context of the current research focus, 
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it is less important to ask if the state is less authoritarian in the new media era, and more 
relevant to explore ‘what now’ questions for the Sarawakian CBOs in terms of resources or 
allies. Any particular crisis or event needs to be understood not only in terms of the immediate 
economic and/or political concerns but also hegemony making as an “incessant and 
persistent” process (O’Shannassy, 2008). How do the CBOs in Sarawak establish their presence 
in Malaysia’s ‘virtual’ civil society? Has new media any role in the CBOs’ organisational process 
and relations with other actors? CBOs are known to be small scale and to work closely with 
their communities. How much of a revolutionary role can CBOs play to lead the masses in 
economic and cultural reform? 
This research neither aims to vehemently search for a genuine Southeast Asian 
definition of civil society that fits the Sarawakian CBOs nor to claim that Gramsci could unlock 
all these research questions. The task here is more to think of the situation of Sarawak 
indigenous people as a whole “in a Gramscian way” to support an intellectual framework for 
understanding empirical evidence gathered in this project around their use of media. As Hall 
(1987, p. 16) put it: 
We can’t pluck up this ‘Sardinian’ from his specific and unique political formation, 
beam him down at the end of the 20th century, and ask him to solve our problems 
for us: especially since the whole thrust of his thinking was to refuse this easy 
transfer of generalisations from one conjuncture, nation or epoch to another.   
Nevertheless, it is posited that the Gramscian totality of civil society, hegemony and 




This chapter started off by outlining the classical approaches to civil society, 
predominantly in liberal and Marxist perspectives. Their explanatory insufficiencies were then 
illustrated by the nature of ‘strong’ Southeast Asia post-colonial states. The discussion moved 
to explaining how Antonio Gramsci’s civil society could offer a richer means of 
conceptualisation and understanding of Sarawakian community-based organisations’ (CBOs) 
advocacy for native ancestral land amidst the official rhetoric of modernisation. Susan Leong 
(2014) in her book, New Media and the Nation in Malaysia, wrote that the broader 
implications of the Internet for civil society in East Malaysia remain an area yet to be explored, 
a significant gap in knowledge which this research seeks to contribute to closing.  The 
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advancement in communication technologies has prompted scholars to argue that the sphere 
for common participation in political life has widened and shaped public opinion, paving way 
for new civil society in Malaysia (e.g. Tan and Zawawi, 2008). Yet this claim is open to question. 
It is argued that the following framework for analysis, based on the analysis of Gramsci’s ideas 
in this chapter, can assist in providing a contribution to understanding Malaysian civil society 
and media activism through a specific exploration of Sarawak NCR land CBOs. The specifics of 
this are set out below. 
Table 2 Explanatory Framework 
1.  Media Media are part of the civil society (superstructure) that produces common 
sense – dogma about our reality and how we make sense of the daily 
happenings without questioning them. This process is consensual where the 
subalterns willingly accept their own subordination as natural.  
Within a heavily regulated media environment in Malaysia, the new media 
provides certain leeway by pushing the gatekeeping boundaries for alternative 
user-generated contents. The research explores the extent to which the CBOs 
utilise these technological affordances in their day-to-day operations and to 
what extent they strategise to win the cultural front as what might be 
understood as war of position. The perspectives of the CBOs toward how the 
Malaysian media (mainstream and alternative) have been supportive to their 
advocacy will be discussed. It is the overall media mechanism that produces or 
excludes the indigenous people that, in the Gramscian term, shaped the 
common sense of their subalternity.   
2.  Revolutionary 
party 
This research applies Gramsci’s idea of the Modern Prince to the land 
community-based organisations (CBOs) instead of political parties. Based on 
the literature review (see Chapter 3), CBOs have fought against native land 
injustice since the 1970s. The research asks if the new media platforms provide 
more ability to execute operations such as recruitment, training and 
engagement. Organic intellectuals for Gramsci should have a clear idea of what 
to replace the oppressive system with. Creative and conscientious leadership 
is important to prevent elitism and mythic visions. To what extent are ‘idea 
contributors’ in alternative media and CBOs engaging the masses as well as 
their own circles? 
3. The state and 
civil society 
Gramsci explains the state-society relationship where the state plays cultural 
and formative roles in private organisations to retain authority. Instead of 
relying heavily on military means or force, state intervention in the media, 
religion, education and associations in totality define civilisation and which 
culture is national-popular. In Malaysia, the Sarawak indigenous people are 
constitutionally recognised as Bumiputera (prince of soil) and eligible for social 
privileges through the state’s affirmative policies. However, based on evidence 
from numerous scholarly works (see Chapter 3), the indigenous people are 
either labelled as backward or in need of being assimilated to the 
Malay/Islamic culture. Nevertheless, as Gramsci asserted, hegemony is never 
rigid. Sarawak’s dissatisfaction over the encroachment of the Federal 
government has stirred state nationalism sentiments. Can CBOs reach class 
consciousness (instead of communal) through their use of media and await the 




The discussions and analytical framework in this chapter aimed: 
RO1) To establish a conceptual understanding of the relationships between new media 
strategies and Sarawakian NCR land CBOs’ activism. 
Gramsci’s integral state explains that the state comprises political society and civil 
society. The next chapter elaborates on the former – Malaysia’s political system, the 
legalisation of the Malay-Muslim culture, and the contested term of indigeneity, Bumiputera, 
which has much bearing on the cultural dissatisfaction of non-Muslim Sarawak indigenous 
people, especially pertaining to their ancestral land.  
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Chapter 3: The Federation of Malaysia and Sarawak Indigenous 
People’s Adat (Custom) 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the political system of the Federation of Malaysia and how its 
centralised federalism evoked the sentiment of Sarawak state nationalism despite being one 
of the Federation’s equal partners. The purpose is to show that Native Customary Rights (NCR) 
on land in Sarawak is more than the question of the environment as it also concerns cultural 
identity, politics and economy. The first section is a general view of the governance of 
Malaysia as a post-colonial country in Southeast Asia that now runs as a constitutional 
monarchy and parliamentary democracy. The formation of Malaysia in 1963 with Sabah and 
Sarawak as equal partners culminated in an agreement over several areas of autonomy such 
as language, religion and land. The placement of the Malay ethnicity and Islam in the 
Malaysian Constitution resulted in much controversy over the categorisation of Bumiputera 
(prince of the soil) and the special rights afforded to Sabah and Sarawak indigenous people. 
Despite sharing the Bumiputera status with Muslim Malays, the indigenous people of Sabah 
and Sarawak have expressed feelings of marginalisation in economic and cultural positions, 
leading to strong state nationalism from their quarters. The second section of the chapter 
focuses on the ethnic population in Sarawak and how disputes among its people have 
occurred regarding land issues. The disputes stemmed from the institutionalisation of the 
indigenous people’s Adat (custom) through land laws and regulatory bodies that changed the 
primordial interpretation of land use and territory. The chapter shows that the understanding 
of what land means to the natives clashed with the contemporary understanding of rights, 
development and government. The last section discusses the efforts of independent 
community-based organisations’ (CBOs) in highlighting the plights of the indigenous people 
being displaced from their lands in the process. Overall, this chapter provides an 
understanding of the political contexts of the federally and in Sarawak province to illustrate 
the context within which the NCR land CBOs operate.  
3.2 The Formation of Malaysia 
Malaysia is a member of the Commonwealth of Nations and a former component of the 
British Empire. Independent Malaysia is now a constitutional monarchy and a parliamentary, 
Westminster-style democracy although Malaysian democracy has been contested given post-
colonial authoritarian government (Case, 2002; in Whiting et al, 2014). Malaysia has territory 
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on both the mainland and insular regions of Southeast Asia. West Malaysia, also known as 
Peninsular Malaysia, has an area of 131,313 sq. km, comprises 11 states and the federal 
territories of Kuala Lumpur and Putrajaya (Abdul Rashid, 2013). East Malaysia, with an area of 
201,320 sq. km, consists of the states of Sabah and Sarawak, and the Federal Territory of 
Labuan (Abdul Rashid, 2013). 
The Federation of Malaya achieved independence on August 31, 1957. Tunku Abdul 
Rahman, the first Malayan Prime Minister, suggested that Singapore, North Borneo and 
Sarawak unite with Malaya to form a federation.  On September 16, 1963, the Federation of 
Malaysia emerged, composed of 11 states in Peninsular Malaysia (formerly the Federation of 
Malaya) and Singapore, together with Sabah and Sarawak in the East. Singapore, however, 
seceded from the Federation on August 9, 1965 and became a sovereign city-state (Abdul 
Rashid, 2013). 
Mass immigration during the colonial era resulted in the creation of a multiracial 
country and the development of race-based political parties – fostered by both colonial and 
post-colonial administrations (Whiting et al, 2014). As industrialisation in Europe gained 
momentum in the late nineteenth century, British dominance over the peninsula grew, 
beginning with their control in 1874 of the tin-rich state of Perak (Gomez, 1999). Although 
Malays had been involved in tin mining, the Malay rulers did not have effective control over a 
large labour force (Jomo, 1990). In addition, most indigenous Malays preferred to remain as 
peasants rather than to work as poorly paid wage labourers (Jomo, 1990). The colonial 
government and employers turned to China and India for their source of labour (Gomez, 
1999).  
Figure 2 Map of Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak 
 
Source: Peace and Tranquillity Blogspot 
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As of 2010, the estimated population of Malaysia is 23.8 million, consisting of Malays 
(50%), other Bumiputeras (12%), Chinese (22%), Indians (7.3%), Others (0.7%) and non-
Malaysians (8%) (Department of Statistics Malaysia, in Chi, 2014). Bumiputera literally means 
‘sons’ or ‘princes of the soil’, a large proportion of whom are Malays. Under Article 160 
(Interpretation) of the Federal Constitution, Malay means “a person who professes the 
religion of Islam, habitually speaks the Malay language, conforms to Malay custom”.  Article 
153 and Article 161A differentiates bumiputera comprising Malays and natives of Sabah and 
Sarawak from non-bumiputera (ethnic Chinese, Indians and other non-indigenous peoples) 
(Vejai, 2007). In fact, the purpose of forming Malaysia with Sabah and Sarawak was to ensure 
the total number of Bumiputera exceeded that of non-Bumiputera (Chin, 2015: p. 83).  
The special position of natives of Sabah and Sarawak is enshrined in Article 161A of 
Federal Constitution (Malaysia, 2011). In relation to Sarawak, ‘native’ means “a person who is 
a citizen and either belongs to one of the races specified in Clause (7) as indigenous to the 
State or is of mixed blood deriving exclusively from those races” (Clause (6), Article 161A). 
Colonial protective measures for Malays and the natives of Sabah and Sarawak allows 
the government to establish affirmative policies that offer them privileges to employment in 
the civil service, educational scholarships, land reservations and business licences. Despite 
sharing the Bumiputera status, it has been made known that Malays are the original 
inhabitants and rightful leaders of the country, hence the rhetoric of Ketuanan Melayu or 
Malay supremacy (Puthucheary, 2008; in Whiting et al, 2014: p.3). Inevitably, it included 
Islamic supremacy as constitutionally, a Malay is Muslim by birth (Chin, 2015). 
In terms of religion, Islam is the largest religious grouping (61.3%), followed by 
Buddhism (19.8%), Christianity (9.2%), Hinduism (6.3%) and ‘other Chinese religions’ (1.3%). 
More than half of the 2.3 million non-citizen population are Muslims (Department of Statistics, 
Malaysia 2010; in Whiting et al, 2014: p.3). Article 11(1) in the Federal Constitution stipulates 
that “Every person has the right to profess and practise his religion…” but Islam has a special 
position as the ‘religion of the Federation’ (Article 3). The institutionalisation of Islam through 
judiciary system and official bodies in Malaysia, however, has been increasingly challenged by 
Muslims and non-Muslims in recent years.3 
In attempt to negotiate and achieve Malayan independence from the British, a coalition 
of political parties were formed in 1953, comprising the United Malays National Organisation 
(UMNO), Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) – called the 
Alliance. Each political party claims to represent the interests of own community – the Malays, 
49 
 
the Chinese and the Indians. The lead members were from the upper classes of society - 
aristocrats, businessmen, politicians, westernised in education; where scholars argued that 
the coalition brought about private interests more than those of race-based community 
(Means, 1991). As Stenson put it (1976, p. 4): 
Of more importance is the symbiotic relationship between Chinese capital and 
Malay political power which underlay the Alliance. Chinese merchants and miners 
had collaborated with Malay rajas and sultans in the exploitation of peninsula 
resources since the fifteenth century. An awareness of common interests and a 
history of mutual cooperation provided the foundation or joint electoral activity 
with the object of gaining power in an independent Malaya. It should be 
appreciated, however, that the Alliance was an arrangement of convenience 
rather than affection. The relationship was therefore accommodatory or 
contractual as befits the association of two separate races and quite separate 
classes. The essence of the contract between the Malay aristocratic and 
administrative elite and Chinese capital is to be found in the accommodatory 
bargain which was enshrined in the independence constitution of 1957.  
After the racial riot on 13 May 1969, the Alliance was dissolved in 1973, replaced by a 
wider coalition of political parties called the Barisan Nasional (BN, National Front), which 
governed Malaysia until 2018. From the results of Malaysia’s 12th general election in 2008, 
also popularly known as ‘political tsunami’, the BN coalition lost its majority in 5 of 12 state 
legislatures under stake, while the seats won in the federal parliament dropped to 63 per cent 
as compared to that of 91 per cent in the 2004 election. Not only did BN failed to re-secure 
the two-thirds majority in 2013 (or 148 out of the 222 seats in the House of Representatives), 
but the number of seats won dropped from 140 to 133 (Kessler, 2013).  What has not been 
the attention of scholars is the contribution of Sarawak to the results that secured BN narrow 
win to form a government (Chin, 2015). Sarawak BN contributed 25 seats out of 47 seats from 
East Malaysia in the 2013 general election (Chin, 2015). In 2008, East Malaysia provided 55 BN 
seats from a total of 140 seats, despite losing the two-thirds majority in the 222-seat 
Malaysian parliament (Chin, 2015). 
A stark controversy arose from Malaysia’s 13th General Election (GE13) results is that BN 
failed to gain the popular vote with only 47 per cent as compared to the opposition coalition 
at 51 per cent, yet the former garnered 60 per cent of the parliamentary seats – a 
phenomenon similar to the elections in 1969 (Johan, 2013). Other issues that cloud GE13 
include gerrymandering, electoral fraud, washable indelible ink, alleged swapped ballot boxes, 
immigrant voters with Malaysian identity cards, ‘ungrateful’4 Chinese voters and pro-BN 
coverage by mainstream media. These led to dissatisfaction from concerned members of the 
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public which was expressed through viral circulation of posts on social networking sites and 
more remarkably, through rallies organized by the Pakatan (opposition) coalition.  
The 14th general elections of Malaysia in May 2018 saw a change of government for the 
first time in 60 years after Independence. The new government (Alliance of Hope, PH) vowed 
to clean the country from corruption and transformed the infamous race-based legacy of BN. 
Chin (2018) contended that the issues that led to changes in voting behaviour differed 
between Peninsular and East Malaysia. For Sarawak, the dissatisfaction from voters came 
from the unfulfilled promises to treat Sarawak as an equal partner of the Federation culturally 
and economically (Chin, 2018).   
3.3 The Malaysian Political System 
Malaysia is headed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, a Malay title translated as “Supreme 
Head” or “Paramount Ruler”, also referred to as the King. Paramount Ruler and Deputy 
Paramount Ruler are elected by the “Conference of Rulers” for 5-year terms from among the 
nine Sultans of the Peninsular Malaysian states. The Conference of Rulers is established by the 
Constitution, consists of Malay rulers and Governors of Pulau Pinang, Melaka, Sabah and 
Sarawak. A King is required to seek election to hold office for a fixed period of five years. Since 
Malaysia is a constitutional monarchy, the role of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is largely 
ceremonial. Malaysia has adopted the parliamentary democracy system since independence. 
The government is formed after an election process, consisting of ministers who enjoy the 




Figure 3 The Malaysian Government System 
 
Source: Mardiana and Hasnah (2014) 
This Constitution is the supreme law of the Federation, as stipulated by Article 4(1). The 
Constitution empowers Parliament at the federal level and State Legislative Assemblies at the 
state level to make laws. Likewise, the executive and judiciary have been assigned powers by 
the Constitution. These bodies must exercise powers within the confines of the Constitution 
(Abdul Rashid, 2013: p. 109). 
Article 43(3) of the Federal Constitutions states that the King must appoints a Prime 
Minister who won the general election and is normally the head of the winning political party. 
The Prime Minister must be a citizen, born in Malaysia, a member of the House of 
Representatives (Dewan Rakyat) and who commands the confidence of the majority of the 
House. The King also appoints other ministers based on the advice of the Prime Minister “from 
among the members of either House of Parliament” (Art. 43(2)(b)). As the Head of the 
government and the Cabinet, the Prime Minister is responsible to the King for all government 
matters.  
  



























Figure 4 The Malaysian Constitution 
 
Source: Mardiana and Hasnah (2014, p. 221) 
The cabinet is collectively responsible to the Parliament for its policies and a minister 
can be removed from office for his or her individual indiscretion based on the discretion of the 
King as advised by the Prime Minister (Art 42(3)). The Parliament has two chambers. The lower 
house, as of the 2018 general election, consists of 222 members, all elected by popular vote 
in single-member districts (Malaysia, 2020). Elections for the lower house of its Parliament are 
held at the interval of not more than five years. 
Figure 5 Structure of the Malaysian Parliament 
 
The Election Commission of Malaysia (EC) is a commission that supervises, holds and is 
responsible for elections matters in Malaysia. Article 114 of the Federal Constitution of 
Malaysia empowers the commission to hold general elections for the House of 
Representatives and the State Legislative Assemblies as well as by-elections should a vacancy 
arise (Mardiana and Hasnah 2014, p. 195).5 Malaysia does not hold elections for the upper 
house (Dewan Negara or the Senate). Most of the 70 members are appointed by the 
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government for three-year terms, while the rest are elected by the states’ legislative 
assemblies. 
Figure 6 Malaysian Cabinet (2018) 
 
Source: Borneo Post Online (2 July 2018)  
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 The states in the federation have unicameral legislature, referring to a legislature that 
consists of only one chamber or house. Dewan Undangan Negeri or State Legislative Assembly 
holds elections together with Dewan Rakyat (Tunku Mohar, 2013). Sarawak’s Cabinet is 
headed by the Chief Minister. Where there is no hereditary ruler in Sarawak, a governor or 
the Yang di-Pertua Negeri is appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agung to be the state’s 
ceremonial head. Likewise, the state cabinet is the highest coordinating body on all matters 
of interest in the state (Ahi, 2013). 
Executive powers in Malaysia are structured into federal-level administration, state 
governments and local governments. At the federal level, led by the Council of Ministers, the 
Cabinet and ministers play important roles in governing and administering the country. The 
main duties of the Cabinet involve drafting and executing the country’s highest policies 
(Mardiana and Hasnah, 2014: p. 131).  
The Chief Minister of Sarawak is the head of the executive branch of the State 
Government in Sarawak. The Sarawak State is headed by the Yang di-Pertua Negeri (State 
Governor), who is appointed by the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong (the King). He is appointed for four 
years. The Yang di-Pertua Negeri is constitutionally obliged to act on the advice of the State 
Executive Council especially the Chief Minister.  Members of the Executive Council are called 
State Ministers. Section 1(2) of the Constitution of the Federation allows the State Governor 
to act upon his own discretion in carrying out the following duties (Mardiana and Hasnah, 
2014: pp. 172-173): 
(a) Appoint the state Menteri Besar/Chief Minister 
(b) Consent to or declining a request to dissolve the State Assembly 
(c) Approve the appointment of Menteri Besar/Chief Minister among those who led the 
party that won majority votes in the state-level elections 
(d) Approve the appointment of State Government Meeting Council (EXCO) 
members/Council of Ministers upon advice by the Minister Besar/Chief Minister  
For states in Peninsular Malaysia, administration at district level is led by a District 
Officer, assisted by several deputy district officers. Several areas in the district are governed 
by chieftains (penghulu). Sarawak, the largest Malaysia’s state, posed great challenge to the 




In 1873, Sarawak was divided into three administrative divisions (Rawlins, 1969). In the 
1980s, Sarawak had nine Divisions. Within each Division, there are a number of Districts (Hong, 
1987). Sarawak is divided into divisions which are of higher status than districts (Samuel, 12 
April 2015). Each Division is under the charge of a Resident who is assisted by a District Officer 
in each of the Districts. The District Officer assisted by his subordinate Administrative Officers, 
implements the policy of the government, plans and organises development of the areas (Lim, 
16 September 2011). The Administrative Officers manage the day-to-day affairs within the 
District and the sub-Districts. Districts Officers in Sarawak also sit as Magistrates and preside 
over court cases on matters pertaining to civil, criminal and customary law in the District (Lim, 
16 September 2011). Similarly, Sarawak Administrative Officers are empowered to hear cases 
at the level of the Native Officer’s or Chief’s Court and the Penghulu’s (Chieftain) Superior 
Court.  
Figure 7 Map of Sarawak’s 12 Divisions (2018) 
 













Sources: SCORE, Sarawak Government (2018) 
Before Western colonialism, the states in the Malay Peninsular practised the Malay 
Customs Laws while in Sabah and Sarawak, the Bumiputera Customs Laws were practised. 
Today, Parliament is Malaysia’s legislative body. The distribution of legislative powers 
between the Federal and State government is enumerated in the Ninth Schedule of the 
Federal Constitution under the Federal List, State List and a Concurrent List. In case of 
inconsistency between federal and state laws, federal law supersedes state law (Abdul Rashid, 





Table 3 Brief contents of the Federal Constitution 
List Matters 
Federal Covers issues regarding foreign affairs, defence, internal security, criminal and 
civil laws, citizenship. 
Shared Covers aspects which enable the state legislative body to enact laws as long as 
they do not conflict with the Federal laws. Examples include wildlife protection, 
study grants, children protection, town and rural planning, public health. 
State Entails matters handed to the state like the Shari’ah laws, individual and family 
Muslim laws, state holidays, state government machinery. 
Source: Mardiana and Hasnah (2014, p. 233) 
Under the terms of the Malaysian Federation Agreement, the East Malaysian states of 
Sabah and Sarawak were accorded certain rights not accorded to the peninsular states 
including, most importantly, control over their own immigration matters. Any Peninsular-born 
Malaysian requires a permit if to work or study in the states, and those who are on short visit 
will have to fill an immigration form for a 90-day visit pass (The Star, 16 September 2018). The 
Concurrent List contains powers such as social welfare, scholarships, protection of wildlife and 
town and country planning. Both Federal and State Governments are competent to legislate 
on these subjects. Article 161E of the Constitution provides that with regard to the application 
of the Constitution to the Borneo States an amendment of the Constitution would require a 
two-thirds majority in both Houses of Parliament and in a number of specified cases would 
require the concurrence of the Governors of the Borneo States or the concurrence of the 
legislature of each of the Borneo States concerned. Article 161(E) stipulates that “Some 
matters which are important to Sabah and Sarawak can be amended by a two-thirds absolute 
majority in each House of Parliament but only if the Governors of these states concur” (Abdul 
Rashid, 2013: p. 109). 
Sarawak’s State Legislative Assembly is the oldest in Malaysia, established after its first 
inaugural meeting in 1897. Its first 21-member Sarawak General Council was headed by Rajah 
Charles Brooke (CPA, 2019). Currently with 82 seats from single-member constituencies 
through the state, it is the largest state legislature in Malaysia (CPA, 2019). The members of 
the state legislature are elected no more than five years apart.  The state legislature has the 
autonomy to pass any law so long as it is within the State List as underlined by the Ninth 




Figure 8 Sarawak State Legislative Assembly Building in Kuching 
 
Photo: Royer Wan 
Malaysia’s judiciary inherited the British Common Law traditions of an independent 
judiciary operating within the principle of parliamentary supremacy (Means, 1991). However, 
unlike Britain, Malaysia’s Constitution was assumed to be supreme where judges would be 
required to examine both statues and acts of government for their jurisdiction. The powers 
for judiciary bodies are allocated in Article 121 of the Federal Constitutional of Malaysia 
(Mardiana and Hasnah, 2014).  
Figure 9 Court structure in Malaysia 
 
Source: Mardiana and Hasnah (2014, p. 184) 
In the 1980s, critics of the Mahathir regime took to the court to keep executive powers 
in check. Disputes within the UMNO, financial scandals and foreign investigative journalism 
were deemed disadvantages to the newly minted Prime Minister. Mahathir was keen to 
introduce economic policies that would propel Malaysia to greater heights – Privatisation, 
Look East, Vision 2020, heavy industrialisation and Malaysia Inc. In 1986, Mahathir openly 












the work permit of two Asian Wall Street Journal correspondents (Means, 1991). On several 
occasions, Mahathir warned the judiciary about encroaching on executive powers (Means, 
1991). In 1988, the Lord President of the Supreme Court of Malaysia, Tun Mohamed Salleh 
Abas was suspended for alleged misbehaviour by the King, on the recommendation of the 
Prime Minister (see Lee, 1995). Two other senior judges were also removed from office. 
The Judiciary in Sarawak comprises the High, Session & Juvenile Courts, the Sarawak 
Syariah Judicial Department, and the Native Court. Sarawak’s Judiciary is headed by the Chief 
Judge of Sabah and Sarawak. He oversees the administration and working of all the various 
courts (Sarawak State Government, 2018).  
Figure 10 The Appellate Structure of Native Courts  
 
 Source: Empeni (1998, p. 113) 
The Native Court administers the Native Courts System and enforces Native Customs 
(Adat). The Native Courts including the District Native Court are statutory courts established 
not by the Federal Law but by Sarawak State law (Empeni, 1998). The jurisdiction of Native 
Courts is regulated by the Native Courts Ordinance 1992 which defines its powers. A Chief 
Registrar who is the Chief administrator of Native Courts supervises all Registrars, who are 
District Officers and Sarawak Administrative Officers in charge of sub-districts (Sarawak State 
Government, 2018). The only appeal cases that are brought to District Native Courts and other 
higher appellate courts are ones that involve land disputes (Empeni, 1998). 
















3.4 Ethnic Groups in Sarawak  
Sarawak is the largest state of Malaysia and second largest state of Borneo, comprising 
about 16% of the island. The ancestors of many of today’s indigenous people only settled in 
Borneo about 4,500 years ago (Bowden, 2011). Borneo’s flora and fauna are amongst the 
world’s richest; it impressed the great naturalist Charles Darwin that he called it “one great 
luxuriant hothouse made by nature for itself” (Bowden, 2011: p. 3). Sarawak is also rich with 
resources such as oil, gas, mineral, and timber. With almost 30 indigenous groups that speak 
more than 40 different languages and dialects, Sarawak is culturally diverse and unique 
(Sarawak Tourism Board, 2015). The indigenous peoples have close relationships with rivers, 
lands, and forest that they relate in order to define their indigenous identities and territories. 
This predates modern identification of them by ethnic grouping and is an important issue. 
The indigenous peoples can be broadly classified into two groups; those who live on the 
coastal areas (the Malay and Melanau) and the interior peoples or Dayak (Hong, 1987). The 
term Dayak refers loosely to the non-Muslim indigenous groups, with the largest being Iban 
and Bidayuh; it refers to all ethnic groups in Sarawak who are largely non-Muslim. The largest 
indigenous group is the Ibans (30.3%), followed by Malays with 24.3%, then the Chinese 
comprising 24.2% (see Table 4). In the first quarter of 2013, the Malays surpassed the Chinese 
as the second largest ethnic group in 2012 by 5,000 people (Borneo Post Online, 8 February 
2014). Other major groups include Bidayuh, Melanau, and Orang Ulu (Kayan, Kenyah, Kelabit, 
Penan). During the 1947 Census of Population, a list was made of the indigenous peoples of 
Sarawak and 181 different tribes or groups were recorded (Rawlins, 1969). 
Table 4 Sarawak’s Populations (1960 and 2013) 
1960 2013 
Sea Dayak 237,741 (31.9%) Ibans 745,400 (30.3%) 
Chinese 229,154 (30.8%) Malays 599,600 (24.3%) 
Malay 129,300 (17.4%) Chinese 596,100 (24.2%) 
Land Dayak 57,619 (7.7%) Bidayuhs 205,900 (8.4%) 
Melanau 44,661 (6.0%) Orang Ulus 167,000 (6.8%) 
Other indigenous 37,931 (5.1%) Melanaus 132,600 (5.4%) 
Others 8,123 (1.1%) Indians 7,800 (0.3%) 
  Others 8,200 (0.3%) 
 744,529 (100%)  2,464,600 (100%) 
Source: Rawlins (1969, p. 198) Source: Borneo Post Online (8 February 2014) 
 
Sarawak’s population as of 2017 is 2.7676 million, with a 10% increase from that of 2010 
(Sarawak State Government, 2018). According to the 2010 census, most of the population is 
located in cities and towns, such as Kuching the capital at 707,546 people. Miri and Sibu came 
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in second and third although respectively, with about half the Kuching population (Sarawak 
State Government, 2018).  
Milne (1967) once wrote that Sarawak’s ethnic composition was “almost terrifying in its 
complexity”; a statement that holds true until the current day (in Karolina, 2016: p. 43). The 
currently most common tripartite division is of Muslim indigenous-non-Muslim indigenous-
Chinese (Roff, 1974). Due to the synonymous identification of Muslims and Malays, Muslim 
indigenous groups are also largely referred to as Malays. Non-Muslim indigenous refers to the 
vernacular meaning of Dayak (Karolina, 2016). However, all Malays and indigenous people of 
Sabah and Sarawak are constitutionally Bumiputera and subsequently eligible to a wide range 
of social privileges through affirmative policies.  
Table 5 Ethnic Groups in Sarawak, 1970 (%) 
The native peoples 
Malay 18.7 
Melanau 5.4        ‘Malay’ 24.9% 
Kedayan 0.8 
Iban (Sea Dayak) 31.0 
Land Dayak 8.5                        ‘Dayak’ 44.2% 






Source: Leigh (1974, pp. 1-2) 
Ethnographically, the tripartite Muslim indigenous-non-Muslim indigenous-Chinese is much 
more complex, as categorised by Karolina (2016, p. 28), although this is not an exhaustive list. 
Table 6 Dimensions of Ethnic Categories in Sarawak 
Dimension Example 
Indigeneity Bumiputera (prince of the soil), Chinese, Indian 
Religious Muslims, non-Muslims, Christians, Buddhists 
Race Malays, Chinese, Dayaks 
Tribal Iban, Bidayuh, Orang Ulu 
Linguistic Malay, Melanau, Hakka 
Regional Rajang Iban, Bau-Lundu Bidayuh, Saribas Iban 
 
3.4.1 Orang Ulu’s Cultural and Economic Position  
While the scope of this thesis is not race exclusive, an introduction to Orang Ulu is 
necessary. Penan is part of Orang Ulu and in the 1980s, Penan blockades of logging roads 
gained international attention because of Swiss activist Bruno Manser’s publicity effort. 
Unintentionally, Penan became the face of environmental activism in Sarawak (Majid-Cooke, 
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2006). The Malaysian government launched a defensive front by labelling the international 
pressure as post-colonial imperialism (Brosius, 1999). 
Figure 11 Nomadic Penan 
 
Source: Bruno Manser Fonds 
In interior central Borneo, there exist two broad classes of people: longhouse-dwelling 
swidden agriculturalists and hunting and gathering forest nomads such as the Penan. Swidden 
systems, once popular in Southeast Asia before the advent of larger scale agricultural 
practices, consist of temporarily cultivated land (Schmidt-Vogt et al, 2009). Swidden activities 
are hard to be quantified by government authorities due to their small scale. Therefore, 
swidden fields often do not appear on land use maps or often categorised as ‘unclassified’ or 
‘degraded’ land (Van Vliet et al, 2013). Penan and other hunter-gatherers are found in interior 
headwaters. Penan is the only tribe to remain nomadic in Sarawak. Unlike their head-hunting 
neighbours such as the Kayan, Kenyah and Ibans, Penans have no history of head-hunting and 
are relatively shy and would rather retreat when attacked (Chen, 1990). The Penans of 
Sarawak are divided into two distinct populations, Eastern and Western Penan (Needham 
1972; in Brosius, 1999). Although generally they are very similar, there are significant 
differences between these two groups with regard to subsistence technology, settlement 
patterns, and social organisation (Brosius, 1999). For instance, the Eastern Penans are gentler 
and timider compared to the Western Penans who have a more aggressive disposition (Chen, 
1990).  
Orang Ulu, prior to their active participation in politics, used to be referred to as “other 
indigenous” people. The characteristic of “Orang Ulu” is chiefly geographical – people who 
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originate from upstream, far interior areas of Sarawak, mostly along the Indonesian border 
(Karolina, 2016: p. 47). There are about 167,00 Orang Ulus in Malaysia as at the third quarter 
of 2013 (Borneo Post Online, 8 February 2014).  
Figure 12 Sarawak’s Population by Ethnic Group (2013) 
 
Source: Borneo Post Online (8 February 2014) 
The term Orang Ulu is neither legal nor listed in the Malaysian constitution; it categorises 27 
very small but ethnically diverse groups (Lian, 2003). The Kayan and Kenyah are the largest 
Orang Ulu groups. The term ‘Orang Ulu’ is usually used in cities and suburban Sarawak for 
collective identification because the names of the smaller sub-groups are hardly known (Tan, 
1997). 
Table 7 Sub-Groups of Orang Ulu 
Orang Ulu Ethnic Group Sub-category by ethnic group/geography 
Kayan Uma Peliau, Uma Belor, Uma Pu, Uma Bawang 
Kenyah Badeng, Lebu’ Kulit, Uma Bakah, Sambop, Urea Pawa, Long 
Bangan, Bakong, Sipeng. 
Kelabit Ba’kelalan 





Smaller groups – Bhuket, Sihan, Seping, Punan Busang, Punan Bah, Punan Bintulu-Niah, Ukit 
Sources: Chen (1990); Tan (1997); Roselind et al (2015); Sarawak State Government (2018) 
Orang Ulus themselves do not use such terms because they identify each other either 
through district, division or river (Tan, 1997; Karolina, 2016). For example, Kayan Belaga is 




















Figure 13 Faces of Orang Ulu 
 
(L) Kelabit elderly at Bario Highland; (R) Bride and groom in Kayan traditional outfit accompanied by dancers 
Photos: Private Collection 
The Orang Ulus faced social and economic marginalisation; despite being categorised as 
Bumiputera. The population largely resided in remote areas only accessible via four-wheel 
drive, boat or airstrips, which posed access difficulty to electricity, clean water, clinics and 
schools (Chen, 1990). For example, an NGO called Helping Hands (n.d.) sponsored Ms Lonnie 
Jalong, a Penan, to go to university. During her schooldays, going to school would take 3 hours 
by boat and another 3 to return home; while walking through jungle took 6 hours such that 
sometimes she and brother slept in the jungle (Helping Hands Penan, n.d.). Ms Lonnie’s case 
exemplified transportation limitation to education, which Lian (2003) wrote as one of the 
reasons contributing to high school drop-outs and subsequent unemployment rate among 
Orang Ulus.  
Since the 1980s, due to rapid development (logging, palm oil plantation, dams) 
encroaching into Orang Ulus’ habitat, many have migrated to cities and towns in search for 
employment and education (Roselind et al, 2015; Faridah, 2014; Lian, 2003). High 
transportation cost, low commodity prices and weak networking did not spur agricultural 
interest from the Orang Ulus (Lian, 2003). They were also accused of neglecting the NCR Land 
Development Projects initiated by the federal government although the payback and 
resettlement was not worth their relationship to their land (Lian, 2003). Lian (2003) further 
wrote that the Orang Ulus, despite being categorised as princes, are in reality more like 
paupers because they do not even have the right to the most basic human possession in 
nature, namely their own land. The Dayaks lamented that they are only the second class 
Bumiputera (Chin, 2014). 
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Until 1987, Orang Ulus were well represented in the Federal cabinet by a deputy 
minister. The number of Orang Ulu representation in the federal government declined to 
three members of parliament and one senator (Lian, 2003). The negative attention that 
Malaysia received at the international level due to massive native protests against logging and 
dam constructions in Sarawak might have alluded to this declined Cabinet representation. In 
2018, Baru Bian, from the Lun Bawang sub group, became the first Orang Ulu to be appointed 
as a Cabinet minister (currently serving as Malaysia’s Works Minister). He is a lawyer who 
achieved prominence for his involvement in many court cases involving NCR land (The Star, 3 
May 2018). Dayak professionals and civil servants complained that the Malays have always 
been given recruitment and promotion preferences in federal civil service (Davidson, 30 
November 2014). Malaysia Human Development and Public Service Department statistics 
showed that from 1970 until 2012, an average of 80% civil service positions, including top 
government posts, were held by the Malays (Davidson, 30 November 2014). 
The ethnic categories of Malay, Chinese, and Indian were portrayed as the main parties 
and term ‘Others’ was legitimised in many official government forms and by the Malaysian 
media. On 30 October 2015, the Cabinet approved the term ‘Dayak’ (the majority ethnic group 
from Sarawak) to be added in all official government forms instead of being categorised as 
‘Others’ (Malaysiakini, 31 October 2015). On 16 April 2016, Deputy Prime Minister cum Home 
Minister, Ahmad Zahid announced that the ‘Others’ category under ethnic group would be 
removed with immediate effect. However, a Chinese-language daily, China Press reported that 
there had been no follow up since Ahmad’s announcement (China Press, 18 April 2016). They 
visited the National Registration Department in Kuching, Sarawak and found that the ‘Others’ 
category was still in the MyKad (Malaysia identity card) application form (China Press, 18 April 
2016). As of February 2020, this research found no news articles reporting on the issue. 
Mainstream media representation of ethnic minority and indigenous groups are less 
than friendly (Mustafa, 1994; Ponmalar et al, 2010). Besides being the faces of tourism 
promotional materials, the indigenous people are portrayed from a developmental point of 
view (Lian, 2003). In news reporting blockades against illegal logging, the indigenous people 
are branded as ‘anti-development’, ‘anti-government’ and demanding (Lian, 5 November 
2016).  As Postill (2002, p. 107) wrote, both tourism-friendly and development-centric images 
rarely appear together; “scant allowance is made for various ways in which actual Dayak 
agents may be making and remaking their social worlds.” 
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Although Orang Ulu was initially coined to identify the community who live in the ulu or 
upper reaches of the rivers of Sarawak, this term is often associated with ‘backwardness’ 
(Malaysiakini, 28 January 2009). Many people in West (Peninsular) Malaysia would not even 
know about the existence of Orang Ulu (Lian, 2003).  
3.5 Sarawak’s Political History 
After an understanding of Sarawak’s present administrative system and the complexity of its 
ethnic groups, this section illuminates Sarawak’s sentiments in ethnic politics, nationalism and 
land rights. It discusses how the pre-colonial divide-and-rule policy shaped land regulations 
and political division among the Dayaks, which the Federal government saw as an opportunity 
to exert the Malay-Muslim influence in Sarawak. 
3.5.1 Pre-colonial ‘Old Sarawak’ under the Brunei Sultanate (1476-1841) 
The Old Sarawak was an area roughly the size of present-day Division of Kuching before 
the rule of the Brunei sultans became effective with its first ruler, Sultan Muhammad Shah in 
1476 (Jayum, 2006; Faisal, 2013). Under the Brunei Sultanate’s administration system, the Old 
Sarawak is part of its vastly divided areas called jajahan (districts). 
As one of the appendages called kerajaan, the administration of Sarawak was delegated 
to local Malay aristocrats whose titles bestowed by the sultan – Datu Patinggi, Datu Bandar 
and Datu Temenggong. They were responsible to maintain law and order and to collect taxes. 
With Sarawak being the farthest district from the Brunei Sultanate, the Datus were arguably 
the most powerful persons at high level of independence (Faisal, 2013). Outside the areas, the 
Sultanate did not have much control as each came under independent local chiefs (Jayum, 
2006). In the early nineteenth century, the Sultan of Brunei despatched Pangiran Mahkota to 
administer the kerajaan, which was at the time prospering with antimony trade. Such move 
was not well received by the local Datus who felt their independence being threatened.  
During the mid-1830s, the local Datus, along with their Malay and Dayak followers 
rebelled against the Brunei authority (Faisal, 2013). The Sultan sent Crown Prince Hashim to 
put down the revolt, of which he failed before turning to ask for help from James Brooke. In 
return, Hashim promised Brooke the countries of Sarawak and Seniawan (Jayum, 2006). 
Brooke succeeded in doing so and on 24 September 1841, Hashim reluctantly made James 
Brooke the first Rajah of Sarawak. The Sultan gave Sarawak to James Brooke unconditionally 
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in 1846, allowing the Rajah to stop paying annual tribute and that he was free to leave Sarawak 
to whomever he pleased (Rawlins, 1969; Faisal, 2013). 
3.5.2 ‘Expansionary’ Sarawak under the White Rajahs (1841-1941) 
The Brooke rule began in 1841 and lasted for 100 years. In that period, three White Rajahs 
expanded the Sarawak into the present-day size (Jayum, 2006).6 
Figure 14 British Borneo 1941 
 
Source:  Antiquemapsandprints.com 
The first Rajah James Brooke (1841-1868) brought about changes in law and order. His 
immediate action was to issue code of law, relieve the Land Dayaks of oppression, suppressed 
piracy and stopped headhunting (Jayum, 2006). Although he encouraged native participation 
in the government, their positions were only symbolic or subordinate (Faisal, 2013). With no 
financial backing from major European power and experience in running a government, the 
natives primarily were useful to Brooke in administering the local residents of Sarawak (Faisal, 
2013). He also felt that native customs should be respected but had to conform to the British 
parameters of justice (Faisal, 2013). As part of the strategy to colonise Sarawak, Brooke 
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effectively weakened the Datus yet maintained them as a mediation point with the locals 
(Faisal, 2013). 
During the rule of second Rajah Charles Johnson Brooke (1868-1917), the focus of 
governance shifted towards administrative matters and economic development. The second 
Rajah introduced the Council Negeri (General Council) where local chiefs and heads of the 
various communities were appointed. During this period, Britain officially recognised Sarawak 
and the personal rule of the Brooke family, as stipulated by the Anglo-Sarawak Treaty of 1888: 
Table 8 Some Terms of Anglo-Sarawak Treaty of 1888 
Security Britain was to provide protection for Sarawak 
Government Britain will have no right to interfere in the internal government 
Foreign 
Relations 
Britain was to control foreign relations 
Succession Sarawak cannot be seceded without the concurrence agreement of 
Britain 
Source: Jayum (2006, p. 18) 
To bring about development, the Brooke government encouraged the importation of 
Chinese labourers for plantation-based agriculture such as rubber. This was done because the 
Brooke perceived that the Malays were not interested in this venture and better off being 
junior government officers. The Brooke also found the Dayaks’ headhunting useful in raising 
armies (Jayum, 2006). 
A notable achievement during the Third Rajah, Charles Vyner Brooke period was the 
introduction of the Sarawak Constitution of 1941 to transfer the power of governance from 
the Rajah to the Council. Before the Constitution could be operative, however, Sarawak was 
overrun by the Japanese. The government officials destroyed key government documents to 
prevent them from falling into Japanese hands (Jayum, 2006). 
3.5.3 The Japanese Occupation (1941-1945) 
In September 1941, people all over in Sarawak celebrated Brookes’ centenary rule. The 
Heads of the Malay, Dayak and Chinese communities made speeches renewing their pledges 
of loyalty (Rawlins, 1969). By the end of the year, Sarawak fell into the hands of the Japanese 
without much resistance as the state did not have much military capability (Jayum, 2006; 
Rawlins, 1969). 
As far as possible, the Japanese maintained the pre-war administrative system where 
Governor remained as the top position while prefectures were subdivided into smaller 
districts under the control of chief Japanese officers or native officers. In pre-war days, this 
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post was the equivalent of a District Officer. Due to the shortage of personnel, the Japanese 
appointed local Malay and Dayak leaders for administrative service (Faisal, 2013). 
The Japanese were inclined to be nervous and executed people on the slightest 
suspicion. At the beginning of 1945, a movement was begun to organise resistance to the 
Japanese where the Kelabits and Muruts were trained in guerrilla warfare (Rawlins, 1969). 
Australian forces arrived and the Japanese found themselves attacked from the interior and 
from the sea (Rawlins, 1969). The Japanese finally surrendered on 10 September 1945 and the 
Australian forces temporarily took control of Sarawak, which was handed back to Rajah Vyner 
in 1946. By then, negotiations were already underway for the ceding of Sarawak to the British 
Crown (Faisal, 2013). 
3.5.4 The British Colony (1946-1963) 
Rajah Vyner returned to Sarawak in 1946 to explain to the people his decision to cede 
Sarawak to Great Britain and to secure approval. He decided so because Sarawak needed a 
huge amount of capital to re-build after the war besides already lagging behind world 
development. Furthermore, the Rajah had no son as heir and he did not wish his nephew, 
Anthony Brooke to rule Sarawak. From an initial survey, the Datus and most of the Supreme 
Council and Council Negeri members supported the cession. Generally, the Chinese favoured 
the hand over economic prosperity ground. The Malays were against it for fear they would 
lose the privileged position they had enjoyed under the Brookes. The Dayaks and other races 
were more ambiguous but would do whatever their Rajah wanted. Although there had been 
debates in the Council Negeri, the Bill was passed. On 1 July 1946, Sarawak became a Crown 
Colony (Rawlins, 1969). 
As a British colony, Sarawak was administered by a Governor who was assisted by a State 
Secretary. The British enacted a new constitution in 1956 to replace the 1949 constitution. 
One of the provisions was to prepare the people of Sarawak for independence such as the 
introduction of indirect elections of the Council Negeri and the promotion of party formation. 
The power of the Malay aristocrats was further eroded during the British rule. The colonial 
government re-structured the administrative service by removing ethnic and class privileges 
when appointing Native Officers. This paved the way for ordinary Malays, Muslim Melanau 
and to a lesser extent Ibans to participate in Sarawak politics. Under the British government, 
the state bureaucracy was enlarged and better equipped to penetrate the population, thus 
bypassing the traditional Malay aristocrats as the dominant force in society (Faisal, 2013). 
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The Malay community was divided over being ceded to the British. A number of groups 
opposed it while some Malay civil servants signed loyalty oaths toward the colonial 
government. The dispute was violently closed in 1949 when members of a secret anti-cession 
movement, the Pergerakan Pemuda Melayu (Malay Youth Movement) fatally stabbed Duncan 
Stewart, the second British Governor, on his first visit to Sibu. From Singapore, Anthony 
Brooke condemned the act and urged the Malays of Sarawak to accept the reality of cession 
and subsequently ended the movement (Roff, 1974). 
Relative to West Malaysia, the formation of political parties was a particularly late 
development in Sarawak, and the process did not start until 1959.7 Before that, local political 
activity was almost exclusively confined to Islamic and Chinese groups (Leigh, 1974). For 
Muslims, the central question at issue was the Cession of Sarawak from the Brooke Rajah to 
the British Crown in 1946, which was abruptly ended in 1949. For the Chinese in Sarawak, a 
conflict erupted between the wealthy and the Left due to political influence from mainland 
China (Leigh, 1974). In the 1960s and 1970s, non-Muslim indigenous politics was equivalent 
to “Iban politics” because of political inactivity among other non-Muslim indigenous people 
until the 1980s. However, the term Dayak was activated to unite all non-Muslim indigenous 
people under its umbrella (Leigh, 1974; Karolina 2016). Inter-communal rivalries then shifted 
to internal ones among the political activity of each of the three major racial groups: Chinese, 
Malay-Melanau Muslim, Dayak (Christian Iban) (Leigh, 1974; Chin, 2015). 
3.6 Post-colonial Sarawak: Federalism, Separation of Powers and State nationalism 
Federalism assumes that there exist diverse and separate communities who want to 
unite yet wish to maintain own autonomy. Central and state governments are maintained 
through constitutional provisions on the distribution of power that also outlines the authority 
of the courts to resolve federalism disputes (Muhammad Yusuf, 2013). Malaysia is also a 
strongly centralised federation, with most of the significant legislative and executive power in 
the hands of the national government. Apart from control over Islamic law, there is indeed 
very little legislative power left to the states (Ang and Whiting, 2012; in Whiting et al, 2014). 
Loh (2010, pp.132-133) provided three reasons for Malaysia’s centralised federalism. First, the 
Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitution clearly favours the federal over state governments. 
The Tenth Schedule of the Federal Constitution elaborates on revenue assignment based on 
the division of jurisdiction spelled out in the Ninth Schedule. While resources-rich states 
received much less royalty, for example for petroleum production, the federal government 
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can at its full discretion deny any development funds to state governments. Second, the 
control of a single political party, the BN (or UMNO in specific) for over 50 years facilitated 
centralised federalism through blurred separation of powers. Since independence under the 
BN government, over 1000 amendments have been made to the Malaysian Constitution, 
among which are detrimental to human rights such as the Internal Security Act (1960), the 
Sedition Act (1948) and the Printing Presses and Publications Act (1984) (Lim, 1986; in Means, 
1991). Not only the BN government abolished local authority elections, but the federal 
Executive may also invoke party discipline to remove Chief Ministers of constituent states 
whenever they challenge the prerogatives of the centre. Third, the implementation of the NEP 
(1971-1990) contributed to the expansion of the federal government through affirmative 
policies that paved way for Bumiputera (Malay) privileged access to wealth accumulation and 
social mobility.   
Chin (2015) has put it crudely that West and East Malaysia have nothing in common 
by history, culture and demography except for being former British colonies. When Sabah and 
Sarawak agreed to form the federation of Malaysia in 1963, it was grounded on both a written 
and unwritten pact that the Borneo states are equal partners. Thus, Sabah and Sarawak have 
a greater degree of financial and political autonomy as compared to other individual states in 
the Peninsula. The Malaysia Agreement, better known as MA63 safeguards the rights and 
autonomy of the East Malaysian states in twenty points with some incorporated into the 
Constitution of Malaysia (Bong and Wilfred, 16 September 2011): 




4. Head of the Federation 
5. Name of the Federation 
6. Immigration 
7. Right to secession 
8. Borneanisation 
9. British Officers 
10. Citizenship 
11. Tariffs and Finance 
12. Special position of indigenous races 
13. State government 
14. Transitional period 
15. Education 
16. Constitutional safeguards 
17. Representation in Federal Parliament 
18. Name of Head of State 
19. Name of State 
20. Land, Forestry, Local Government and 
Miscellaneous  
Source: Office of Malaysia Prime Minister (2019) portal 
MA63 was signed in London on 9 July 1963 between Great Britain, the Federation of 
Malaya, North Borneo (Sabah) and Sarawak (SG Resources, 2014). Being an international 
agreement, the Malaysian Parliament has no authority to amend the terms of MA63 
(AskLegal, 2017).   
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Sarawak has at present no established state religion and it would not be required to 
accept Islam as such. Sabah and Sarawak have the right not to use Bahasa Malaysia (national 
language of Malaysia) in official functions. The Bornean states also have their own immigration 
law. Despite MA63 being a significant piece of covenant, the peoples of East Malaysia feel that 
they have been short-changed and marginalised by the federal government, which 
contributed to their ‘historical grievances’ (Chin, 2019). It is a popular saying that Sarawak’s 
oil and gas resources contributed a lot to Malaysia’s development, yet many parts of the 
interior of Sarawak are underdeveloped. The East Malaysians also feel unhappy over the 
popularisation of Malaysia’s Independence Day that falls on 31 August instead of Malaysia’s 
Day on 16 September. Furthermore, the official school history textbook magnifies the role of 
UMNO in gaining Malaysia’s independence instead of the processes of forming the Federation 
(Chin, 2019).   
The following three key events exemplified federal intrusion into Sarawak political 
affairs, which had much bearing on the administration of native customary land. 
3.6.1 The 1966 constitutional crisis  
When the idea of a Malaysian federation was mooted in 1961, the inter-Malay rivalry 
continued to intensify. The Iban took advantage of the situation by pressuring the federal 
government to appoint Stephen Ningkan Kalong as Sarawak first Chief Minister (1963-1966) 
and Temenggong Jugah as the first Governor. Although Kalong Ningkan was made Sarawak 
Chief Minister, the federal government appointed a Malay leader, Abang Openg, as Sarawak’s 
first governor (Faisal, 2013). From 1963 to 1970, both Sarawak’s chief ministers were Iban 
Christians, a period that Chin (2015) calls as ‘the Iban era’.  
Ningkan, from SNAP, was removed as the Chief Minister as the result of direct federal 
intervention. Ningkan had earlier allowed non-natives (Chinese) to buy land, which upset the 
local Muslims. Despite not required constitutionally, Ningkan refused to use the Malay 
language in the state’s official functions. Furthermore, he did not promote the natives enough 
to replace expatriates in the civil service (Chin, 2015).  
On 16 June 1966, Abang Openg, acting on behalf of the majority of members in the 
Council Negeri requested Ningkan to resign. Ningkan urged a reconvening of the Council 
Negeri but the Governor, on 17 June 1966, deliberately dismissed Ningkan together with other 
members of the Supreme Council (or State Cabinet). Ningkan resorted to the High Court at 
Kuching to have his dismissal declared void, and to restrain Tawi Sli, an Iban politician from 
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acting as Chief Minister (Lee, 1995). The High Court later ruled that the governor did not have 
the power to unseat a Chief Minister unless a proper no-confidence motion had been passed 
in the Legislature. Before Ningkan could be reinstated, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong proclaimed 
a state of emergency in Sarawak. During that period, the federal and Sarawak constitutions 
were amended to empower the Governor of Sarawak to convene the Council Negeri at his 
absolute discretion, and to dismiss the Chief Minister should the latter fails to resign after a 
vote of no-confidence had been passed against him in the Council Negeri. Subsequently 
Ningkan was dismissed (Lee, 1995). Although Tawi Sli was reappointed, his term was cut short 
due to the federal government’s interference after the 1970 election. The real power lied in 
two Melanau Muslim politicians with strong connection with UMNO – Abdul Rahman Yakub 
and his nephew, Abdul Taib Mahmud (Faisal, 2013; Chin, 2015).  
3.6.2 The 1970 Election 
The 1970 election was the first direct election held in Sarawak after its independence 
from the British in 1963. BARJASA and PANAS merged in 1966 to form the Bumiputera party 
while the SCA was dissolved in 1974 to pave way for SUPP as the sole Chinese party (Stanley, 
2013). After the 1970 election, PESAKA negotiated a coalition with SUPP and SNAP but it failed. 
Both SNAP and SUPP feared that the Muslim-dominated Bumiputera party would dominate 
the new government. Despite that, SUPP decided to form a coalition government with the 
Bumiputera party (Chin, 2015). The new coalition government resembled the federal coalition 
where the United Malay National Organisation’s (UMNO) role as the dominant party was 
replicated by the Bumiputera party while the Malaysian Chinese Association’s (MCA) 
supporting role was replicated by SUPP (Stanley, 2013). The then deputy prime minister of 
Malaysia, Abdul Razak, insisted that Sarawak would remain under emergency unless Parti 
Bumiputera was part of the state government (Chin, 2015).  
Abdul Rahman Yakub from Parti Bumiputera was appointed Sarawak’s third Chief 
Minister, replacing Tawi Sli from PESAKA. Besides direct federal government’s intervention, 
the Melanau-Muslim rule (1970-2013) was made possible through patronage and promise of 
economic development projects (Means, 1991). Rahman Yakub’s appointment on 7 July 1970 
coincided with the introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP) that was designed to 
Malaysianise the economy and eliminate job positioning by race (Leigh, 1991; in Faisal, 2013). 
Rahman’s government also had advantages over the previous Iban-led governments with 
dissemination of state propaganda through the civil service and mass media (Faisal, 2013). 
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Rahman further built his family and cronies’ fortunes through timber patronage and 
privatisation of state companies, besides pitting SNAP against SUPP over native land issues 
(Faisal, 2013). Another reason that strengthened Rahman’s position was the merger of the 
Bumiputera party and PESAKA, which led to the formation of Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu 
(PBB) in May 1973. Through PBB, Rahman’s control extended from the Muslim Bumiputera to 
the Dayaks. In 1981, Rahman was replaced by his hand-picked successor, Taib Mahmud who 
was then the Deputy President of PBB (Faisal, 2013). 
3.6.3 Sarawak under Taib and Mahathir in the 1980s 
Taib went on to be the longest serving Sarawak Chief Minister from 1981 to 2013, 
solidifying the single Melanau-Muslim rule over Sarawak since 1970, a reminiscence of the 
Brooke family dynasty (Faisal, 2013; Chin, 2015). In the early 1980s, an internal split in SNAP 
occurred where the Dayak leaders rejected the election of a wealthy Chinese as the party 
president. For Daniel Tajem, Edmund Langgu and Leo Moggie, SNAP’s president must be 
Dayak, or more precisely an Iban (Chin, 2014). The split witnessed the birth of Parti Bansa 
Dayak Sarawak (PBDS) in 1983, which had support at both the federal and state levels – from 
UMNO and PBB (Chin, 2014). In 1987, Yakub at the time the Governor, had a fallout with Taib 
over Sarawak’s natural resources, among other issues. PBDS saw the opportunity and tried to 
unseat Taib, vowing to revive the heyday of an Iban being the Chief Minister. Yakub formed a 
new political party, Parti Persatuan Rakyat Malaysia Sarawak (PERMAS) and together with 
PBDS, attempted to gain no-confidence vote from the Council Negeri to push for Taib’s 
resignation. Before anything, Taib dissolved the Council Negeri and called for a snap election. 
Although PBDS gained massive support from the Dayaks, the Muslims and Chinese backed 
Taib for fear of Dayak nationalism (or Dayakism). The Sarawak BN under Taib narrowly beat 
the PERMAS-PBDS alliance 28-20 out of 48 seats (Chin, 2015). After the 1987 fiasco, Dayak 
political unity was further dislocated and stretched thinner over a number of new political 
parties that claimed to fight for Dayak rights. PBDS was subsequently readmitted to BN in 1994 
after spending several years as an opposition party (Chin, 2014). Besides Dayak weak political 
organisation, Chin (2015, p. 88) lists three reasons for Taib’s successful control over Sarawak: 
“his massive wealth, his keeping UMNO out of Sarawak politics and consolidation of the 
Muslim vote”. 
These three reasons magnified Taib’s political autonomy during Mahathir’s reign (Chin, 
2004). For personal and political reasons, SUPP’s then president managed to influence 
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Mahathir to back Taib during Yakub’s coup d’état plan against Taib in 1987. SUPP at the time 
was increasingly dissatisfied with Yakub for allowing DAP to establish a branch in Sarawak, 
effectively ending SUPP’s position as the sole party that represented Chinese interests. 
Furthermore, with Taib from the Bumiputera coalition that formed the state government, 
delivered a promise of Dayak votes, which Mahathir couldn’t ignore as they constitute the 
largest ethnic group in Sarawak. Despite complaints from the Sarawak Malays over the 
Melanau-Muslim rule, Mahathir found Taib acceptable as the Chief Minister because Taib is 
Muslim, therefore he qualified as Malay (Chin, 2004). The Malays and Melanaus were both of 
minority ethnic groups. In Malaysia, it is a popular (yet real) practice that to be Muslim is 
parallel to becoming a Malay. As Chin (2015, p. 90) put it: 
“…when one converts to Islam…the convert will have to ditch his or her cultural 
heritage and adopt Malay culture. Muslim converts can actually become ‘Malay’ 
in official documents and access the extensive government benefits given to the 
Malay community. It is a bureaucratic norm to register the children of Muslim 
converts as Malays at birth. One of the biggest fears among…the Dayak in Sarawak 
is the loss of their cultural heritage as more and more indigenous peoples convert 
to Islam.” 
The BN/UMNO’s hegemony of Malay-Muslim supremacy is to extend their political 
prowess to East Malaysia (Chin, 2015). Their tactics include backing a Muslim as chief minister 
and interfering in the Christian affairs of most non-Muslim indigenous people. In the 1980s, 
the federal government banned the use of the ‘Allah’ word, among other Islamic terms by 
non-Muslims in Malaysia. This caused strong reaction from Christian indigenous people in 
Sarawak because they have been using Allah in church service delivered in the Malay and 
Dayak language. 
Sarawak’s rich resources were a guarantee of great contribution to the federal funds, 
which in turn delivered lucrative federal-supported development projects for Taib’s family 
members and close business associates. This win-win relationship was so tight that Mahathir 
was willing to seal a no-UMNO deal with Taib, promising that his Bumiputera coalition was the 
only dominating (Muslim) party in Sarawak (Chin, 2004). Such an unwritten pact had caused 
ordinary Dayaks their customary rights over heritage lands. With weak Dayak political power 
and unity in Sarawak politics, it benefitted Taib and his family and close associates to 
accumulate more wealth (Chin, 2014). An investigative website, Sarawak Report, 
systematically listed land grabs by Taib as the Chief Minister by surveying and classified lands, 
many of them under NCR claim and without titles – as state lands.  Then the lands were sold 
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to investors at its true value while the compensation paid to the Dayaks is ridiculously below 
market value (Chin, 2014). 
The NCR land issue is serious in Sarawak as compared to Sabah because of the 
systematic way lands are taken away from the indigenous people (Chin, 2014).  
3.7 Native Customary Rights of Land   
3.7.1 Adat and the 1958 Land Code 
Prior to the Brooke and colonial rule, the Dayak indigenous groups have their 
respective adat, literally custom (Dimbab, 2005). There were already well-established systems 
of unwritten native customary laws (Empeni, 1998). Adat to Dayaks encompasses not only 
rites and rituals, but almost everything concerning human lives from judiciary, marriage, 
religion, moral, community harmony, spirituality and, most importantly, land (SACCESS, 2008). 
The indigenous people also did not define their social identities based on contemporary 
‘ethnicity’ but defined themselves by their geographical space such as river, hill/mountain or 
watershed areas (SACCESS, 2008). 
The Rajahs relied tremendously on native customary laws got local support to 
strengthen the Brooke regime (Empeni, 1998). After the Brooke administration took over 
Sarawak, adat was institutionalised and constituted as ‘customary law’ (Empeni, 1998). For 
instance, the Iban tunggu (fines) were systemised and assigned monetary values. Also, the 
administration introduced courts to replace the Iban bechara (hearing) that was usually 
carried out in a longhouse ruai (verandah) and witnessed by the longhouse inhabitants. These 
new colonial practices then became institutionalised. The adat at the local level is 
administered by the Penghulu or chiefs who receive a salary from the state. Important 
elements from the adat such as death penalty for incest, forcible seizure of property, slavery 
and headhunting were removed. It is now administered by the Majlis Adat Istiadat (Council 
for Customs and Traditions), established in 1974 under the umbrella of the Sarawak Chief 
Minister (Empeni, 1998; SACCESS, 2008). 
Alteration of the adat inevitably affected the land use system as well. The Land Order 
in Sarawak was first introduced in 1863, changed in 1920, and amended to today’s Sarawak 
Land Code 1958 (SACCESS, 2008). During the Crown Colony period, the Brookes faced pressure 
to maintain the state’s economic viability without much colonial support. Therefore, forests 
became a convenient source of revenue.  By declaring all land as state land, the 19th and early 
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20th century Brooke Land Codes enabled the state to grant lands to a few individuals and 
foreign companies for economic purposes (Majid-Cooke, 1999). 
Following the Forest Reservation Order of 1920 and the passing of the 1924 Forest 
Ordinance, the work of exploring, demarcation and constitution of forest reserves began. 
Scientifically, Brooke administrators viewed forest reserves as an essential first step in forest 
management. On the contrary, the Dayaks feared that their customary access to land would 
be infringed upon, therefore resisted forest reserves to the extent of culminating in consistent 
conflict with the state. Although state power is evident in exercising control over material and 
cultural aspects of economic and political development, it is not always effective (Majid-Cooke 
1999).   
In some discourses, official or otherwise, Native Customary Land is also referred to as 
‘Native Customary Rights Land’ (Majid-Cooke, 2006). Native Customary Right (NCR) is not 
defined in the present Sarawak Land Code 1958. Despite that, all orders dating from the era 
of Rajah Brooke to current legislation have consistently recognised and honoured NCR 
pertaining to the right of a native to clear virgin jungle, access the land surrounding the 
longhouse for cultivation, fishing, hunting and collection of jungle produce (Baru, n.d.). 
Nevertheless, Native Customary Land (NCL) is in the Sarawak Land Code 1958. Section 
2 of the Code defines NCL as: 
(a) land in which native customary rights, whether communal or otherwise, have lawfully 
been created prior to the 1st day of January 1958 and still subsist as such; 
(b) land from time to time comprised in a reserve to which section 6 applies; and 
(c) Interior Area Land upon which native customary rights have been lawfully created 
pursuant to a permit under section 10.  
What has become a hotly debated issue through the years is the definition under (a) 
in Section 2. Section 5, of the Code states six methods by which NCL can be created after 1 
January 1958: 
(a) The felling of virgin jungle and the occupation of the land thereby created; 
(b) The planting of land with fruit trees; 
(c) The occupation or cultivation of land; 
(d) The use of land for a burial ground or shrine;  
(e) The use of land of any class for rights of way; or 
(d) Any other lawful method.  
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Under definition (a) above, the area of land claimed as NCL usually has no title. A native 
can still apply for a title from the Lands and Surveys under section 18(1) of the Code if he can 
satisfy the Superintendent that he has occupied the said land in accordance with rights 
acquired by customary tenure (Baru, n.d.). If a title is not issued out yet to a native in such a 
case, his position is referred to in law as a “licensee” but his right is equivalent to having a 
title. He has legal rights which cannot be taken away summarily without express provision of 
the law and that compensation must first be paid in the event his NCL is taken away.  
Although the law recognises NCR claim by customary tenure, the burden is on the 
natives to prove their claim. The difficulty arises when large tracts of the NCL in Sarawak are 
not issued with titles. Ironically, one of the main reasons given by the government for not 
being able to issue titles is lack of funds to survey these lands. Therefore, crucially the natives 
are at a disadvantage when faced with loggers and planters as the natives have no document 
to prove their claim of NCR (Baru, n.d.). 
Since the mid-1990s, Konsep Baru (New Concept) was introduced as the large-scale 
redesign of rural life through plantation agriculture (Majid-Cooke, 2006). Konsep Baru targets 
land claimed under native customary rights where native peoples can become shareholders 
in palm oil companies working on their land on a joint venture basis (Majid-Cooke, 2006). The 
current attempt in providing economic value to Native Customary Land through a form of land 
certification arises from a misinterpretation of unoccupied land as ‘idle’ or ‘waste’ land, 
originating during the Brooke period in the 19th century and continuing into colonial times 
between 1945 and 1963 (Majid-Cooke, 2006). In 2000, amendments were passed by the 
Sarawak State Legislative Assembly, among which, “any other lawful method” to create and 
acquire native customary land rights was deleted. This one administrative act removed the 
use of adat to create and acquire native customary rights over land (SACCESS, 2008). Although 
the Malaysian courts have ruled that the native customary land rights survived all the Land 
Orders, Ordinances and Land Code, the Sarawak state government continued to ignore this 
judicial enunciation (SACCESS, 2008). 
Native opposition to logging is not from their conservatism or alleged mystical 
attachment to the land but from conflicting interpretations of ‘right’ between their practice 
and the modern law (Majid-Cooke, 1999; 2003). The government’s definition and/or 
understanding of NCL claim is only restricted to cultivated area or farmed area locally referred 
to as temuda which must have been cultivated or farmed before 1 January 1958. The natives, 
however, believe that their NCL claim goes beyond their temuda. It includes their communal 
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lands or territorial domain locally referred to as pemakai menua and the “reserved virgin 
forests” locally referred to as pulau. Pulau is an area abundant with resources preserved or 
reserved specifically to meet the domestic needs of the natives (Baru, n.d.). Because of such 
difference in understanding of what constitutes NCL or NCR, land without titles are claimed to 
be state land. With logging licensees and provisional leases (PLs) issued by the state that 
covered pemakai menua and pulau, the natives have sought court intervention (Baru, n.d.; 
Lian, 2003). Since the 1980s, both indigenous individuals and communities sought redress in 
courts through legal NCR land challenges against logging companies, palm oil schemes, state 
government and other corporate entities (Aeria, 2010; Aiken and Leigh, 2011). These cases 
are usually handled by community lawyers, almost always on minimum cost basis (Aeria, 
2010). 
The availability of human rights instruments, national or international, have not 
effectively addressed the problems associated with the elimination of indigenous peoples’ 
customary rights to land. In fact, the traditional rights or adat conflicted with the 
contemporary definition of rights, state and citizenship (SACCESS, 2008). Consequently, the 
absence of adat leaves the indigenous people vulnerable to social problems such as 
unemployment, illiteracy, sexual abuse, landlessness and alienation (SACCESS, 2008). In fact, 
the rights of the indigenous people have been framed from the economic point of view, which 
more than often leaves out civil or political rights, for example deciding on ‘how’ to develop 
(Majid-Cooke, 1997). 
Sarawak state law does not recognise Penan principles of land tenure. Sarawak land law 
which stipulates that communities can only claim land that they cultivated before 1958, many 
Penan claims to land are void because they settled after that (Brosius, 1999). Furthermore, 
according to Baru (n.d.), many people believe that since the nomadic Penans do not farm and 
cultivate for a living, they cannot claim NCR under the Land Code. Baru (n.d.) argues that the 
nomadic Penans can claim NCR under the laws of Sarawak if they can prove “occupation” of 
an area, since time immemorial.  Although the Penans express overwhelming frustration over 
their unheard voices, state officials attribute this to the fact that they have been instigated by 
foreign environmentalists (Brosius, 1999). In fact, the Penan way of life was deemed a 
‘problem’ to be fixed at best, and as an obstacle to development at worst. The then Prime 
Minister, Mahathir Mohamed was quoted saying: 
“If you look at their plight, you will understand what will happen to the Penan if 
they are kept in the forests…to eat monkeys and maggots and caterpillars…We 
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believe that the Penan are humans like everyone else…So what’s wrong with 
us…feeding them with the kind of culture and will make them like any of us” (8 
October 1991; in Majid-Cooke, 1999: p. 108). 
Figure 15 Affected Penans Protesting against Murum Dam in 2012 
 
Source: SAVE Rivers 
 
Government policy toward Penan and other indigenous communities in Sarawak is 
driven by a modernist development (Brosius, 1999; Majid-Cooke, 2006). According to Scott 
(1998), “developmentalist states assume a direct role in promoting and guiding economic 
expansion and growth. High modernist ideology generally favours rational engineering of 
entire social orders in creating ‘realisable utopias’, pervasive planning and rationalised 
production (in Majid-Cooke, 2006; pp. 27-28). This is evident in consistent official responses 
about the Penan way of life and the benevolent role of the government in addressing their 
“plight” as forest dwellers (Scott, 1998; in Majid-Cooke, 2006). Logging has a dramatic effect 
on the lives of Penan, as Brosius (1999; p. 39) described: 
Sago palms, which form the basis of traditional subsistence, are uprooted by 
bulldozers; fruit trees and rattan are destroyed; game disappears; severe river 
siltation occurs; and graves are obliterated. Logging not only undermines the basis 
of Penan subsistence but, by transforming sites with biographical, social, and 
historical significance, also destroys those things that are iconic of their existence 
as a society.  
Although Penans are almost uniformly opposed to logging, they responded differently. While 
Western Penan consented to logging, Eastern Penan responded with the erection of blockades 
(Brosius, 1999).   
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Police force was used to arrest indigenous communities who launched blockades to 
protest against mega-dam constructors (NECF, 2013). Police also stopped humanitarian aid 
from reaching the blockade sites where indigenous families set up camps (NECF, 2013). 
Affected indigenous communities who were relocated, although not at their own will, feel no 
more secure about their future. For example, the Bakun dam affected lands where 
approximately 50 per cent is claimed under customary rights and many of whose residents 
are Orang Ulu (Sovacool & Valentine, 2011; in Majid-Cooke et al, 2017). The relocated 
indigenous communities are given a three-acre land per family as compensation (Majid-Cooke 
et al, 2017). The land, however, is much smaller than their pre-settlement land and infertile 
even to plant vegetables for their subsistence (Majid-Cooke et al, 2017). 
3.7.2 Land CBOs in Sarawak 
Dedicated community-based organisations have fought for native land rights for over 30 
years (Aeria, 2010). Such groups – whose focus is on land, environmental issues and livelihood 
– work closely with village groups. Many of their activities are, by and large, linked to 
grassroots concerns with two major activities – leadership training and awareness raising 
(Majid-Cooke, 2003).  
Communal associations formed as early as before the Second World War and more 
during the logging decades of the 1970s and 1980s (Tan, 1997). Some are patronised by 
political elites; some are often internally divided. In the 1980s among the Kayan, the groups 
of maren (aristocrat) and panyin (commoners) were opposed to each other in their 
approaches to logging and in their dealings with the state and logging companies (Tan, 1997). 
The panyin saw the maren as selling out the Kayan interest and monopolising the 
compensation paid by logging companies (Tan, 1997). 
CBOs’ efforts range from peaceful methods such as providing paralegal training, 
organising press conferences, holding dialogues with logging and plantation companies to 
defensive blockades and logging demonstrations. According to Mr Peter Kallang, the chairman 
of Save Sarawak Rivers Network (SAVE Rivers), their involvement with Baram natives is 
through advocacy – provide the natives legal advice, prepare draft letters, and help lodge 
police report (Lian, 5 November 2016). 
In the 1980s and 1990s, some NGO-linked individuals tried to scale up their advocacy by 
aligning themselves with opposition political parties (Majid Cooke, 2004). This tactic, however, 
81 
 
did not work when the political parties returned to the government fold after being 
threatened with withdrawal of state sources of patronage (Tan, 1997; in Majid-Cooke, 2004). 
Figure 16 Bruno Manser with a Penan leader 
 
Source: Cilisos 
CBOs that developed cooperation with international bodies are more often than not 
labelled ‘traitors’ to the nation or even ‘communists’ (Majid Cooke, 2004). Swiss activist Bruno 
Manser, who brought the Penan rights to both national and international attention, was 
indirectly warned by the then Chief Minister, Taib Mahmud, not to interfere in Sarawak affairs. 
Since the Sarawak state government has liberty over state entry, it is not uncommon that NCR 
land activists were barred from entering Sarawak.   
More drastic state actions against native land activists and NGOs are organisation de-
registration, arrest and criminal charges. Institut Pengajian Komuniti (Institute of Community 
Studies, IPK), established in 1988, was de-registered by the government in 1995 (Aeria, 2010). 
Along the 7 years, IPK mainly provided literacy programmes to the grassroots while 
maintaining excellent links with international bodies alike (Aeria, 2010). A Kelabit activist, 
Anderson Mutang Urud, was charged for running an unlawful society – the Sarawak 
Indigenous People’s Alliance (SIPA), which was forced to stop operating after Anderson’s 
arrest (Majid Cooke, 1997; Brosius, 1997). Harrison Ngau Laing was a former Member of the 
Parliament and a native land rights lawyer activist. In 1987, he was arrested during Operasi 
Lalang. He was detained without trial for 60 days (Harrison, 3 September 2009). From 1987 to 
1994, a total 478 individuals from various Dayak groups were arrested or imprisoned, 229 of 
them in 1989 (Manser, 1996; in Majid-Cooke 1999). 
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The 1987 arrests were followed by amendments to forest and land legislation that made 
it difficult for native peoples to register protest (Majid-Cooke 1999; 2003). The 1987 
amendment (90B) to the Sarawak Forest Ordinance made blockading of logging roads illegal 
and entitled the state to use police power against such activity.  A further amendment in 1993 
presumed guilty anyone found or arrested in an area where barricades have been set up, even 
if he or she did not participate in the blockade (Majid-Cooke, 2003). Another form of risk that 
activists face now would be assassination. Bill Kayong was a native rights activist and secretary 
for the oppositional Peoples Justice Party (PKR) in Miri, Sarawak. Bill was very vocal in helping 
the Sungai Bekelit community in defending their land against a palm oil plantation company 
(Pearce, 7 March 2017). On the morning of 21 June 2016 while waiting at a traffic light 
junction, Bill was struck by 2 bullets and killed instantly (Press Release, 22 June 2016).    
Due to the challenges, it is a long battle ahead for the NGO movement in Sarawak. Most 
Sarawak NGOs run on a shoestring budget and have only low number of staff or they take on 
contract staff (Majid-Cooke, 2003). NGOs provided the technical assistance required in 
community-mapping through the use of the Geographic Positioning System (GPS) to contest 
official ones. Although Sarawak NGOs had limited influence on state policy making, they made 
a significant impact in terms of awareness raising and grassroots capacity building (Majid-
Cooke, 2003). 
3.7.3 International Pressures and the Malaysian Government’s Response in the 1990s 
According to the International Tropical Timber Organisation (ITTO) (1990), by the year 
2001 most old growth forest in Sarawak would have been logged (Majid-Cooke, 2003). From 
being a major supplier of tropical hardwoods on the international market in the 1980s, 
Sarawak now experienced one of the highest rates of deforestation in the world (Brosius, 
1999). Today as timber is much depleted, timber companies from Sarawak have moved to 
Papua New Guinea, Surinam, Guiana, among others. According to Brosius (1999), timber 
licences are often used to lure party hopping to achieve a majority in the state assembly and 
thus continue to hold power. The system of political patronage and cronyism in granting 
timber concessions through the network of former Sarawak Chief Minister Taib Mahmud is 
well documented in Straumann (2015).  
The Sarawak campaign began in 1987 when Eastern Penan hunter-gatherers in the 
Baram and Limbang Districts of Sarawak erected a series of over a dozen of blockades against 
logging companies that were encroaching on their lands (Brosius, 1999). The charismatic 
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figure of Swiss environmentalist Bruno Manser contributed to the Penan becoming icons of 
resistance for environmentalists worldwide, although briefly (Brosius, 1999). The campaign 
gained wide support among Northern environmentalists and numerous public figures like Al 
Gore, and Prince Charles; as well as wide coverage on CNN and The Wall Street Journal 
(Brosius, 1999). At the same time, longhouse indigenous communities were divided. 
Traditional longhouses in Sabah and Sarawak are made from simple wooden tress, with stilts 
on it, divided into different sections and can house up to 100 families (Sarawak Borneo Tour, 
18 December 2012). There were pro and anti-logging factions within the same long house 
(Harding 1996; in Majid-Cooke 1999). Although most Penan groups opposed logging, many 
did not want to take part in resistance action (Brosius 1997; in Majid-Cooke, 1999). In fact, a 
number of Eastern Penan negotiated compensation packages with timber companies, and 
some even to work with them, which led to tension between the groups of Eastern Penan 
(Brosius, 1999).  
Although Sarawak’s land policy is established entirely at the state level, the federal 
government was forced to intervene because of the negative international attention raised by 
the environmentalists. Despite the apparent differences between the state and federal 
governments, they displayed a unified, ‘haphazard’ defensive front by claiming that foreign 
critics were a form of eco-imperialism toward Malaysia (Brosius, 1999). Among criticisms 
vehemently expressed in editorials in mainstream press were that foreign environmentalists 
were more dangerous than the communists, they should clean up its own backyard (Brosius, 
1999). The Malaysian Timber Industry Development Council (MTIDC) – later shortened to the 
Malaysian Timber Council (MTC) – was founded as the primary agent to display its 
international public relations capabilities (Brosius, 1999). 
Increasingly through the 1990s, Malaysia began to deploy the “sustainable forest 
management” rhetoric although it was unclear what that meant (Brosius, 1999). When NGOs 
raised a concern if the government was including the welfare of indigenous communities in 
its certification scheme, an official responded, “Remember, this is a green dot, not a pink 
heart” (Brosius, 1999: p. 47). With concerns of native rights overpowered by the issue of 
sustainability, the agenda of forest destruction and cultural diversity began to lose momentum 
overseas (Brosius, 1999). As of February 2020, news search regarding the NCR land CBOs 
found the topics revolved around petitions to amend the Sarawak Land Code and the use of 




This chapter discusses civil society more specifically within the context of NCR land in 
Sarawak, Malaysia. It started off by examining the formal structures of Malaysian government, 
or in the Gramscian sense, the political society of the state. Understanding of the apparatuses 
of both federal and state governments of Malaysia (executive, legislative, and judiciary) 
illuminates the political and cultural aspects of the case study.  
Sarawak agreed to unite to form Malaysia in 1963, after Malaya’s independence in 1957. 
As it is for Sabah, Sarawak was able to negotiate the terms of its entry into Malaysia and 
therefore, has a considerable autonomy over its internal affairs. Although Malaysia became 
one of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) 
signatories in 2007, the notion of protecting indigenous rights can be blurred. Sarawak 
indigenous people have strong Dayakism because they feel politically and culturally 
disadvantaged despite being having special status as Bumiputera as stipulated in Article 161A 
of the Federal Constitution.  
The historical background of the formation of Malaya as a post-colonial country and 
subsequently the federation of Malaysia indicates, although indirectly, that the concept of a 
civil society is heavily based on ‘national development’. This strong theme in shaping the 
nation and its people has had great impact on the indigenous interpretation of custom, 
including their relationships with ancestral lands. The indigenous people were urged to adapt 
to the official rhetoric of national development as the common good. 
Against this background, the movement of NCR land community-based organisations 
(CBOs) was discussed. In the context of such controversial issue, the liberal paradigm of civil 
society might conclude that the CBOs have the same aim – to advocate justice for affected 
natives and to keep government abuse in check. However, as discussed in this chapter, the 
fragmented and conflicting nature of civil society is reflected not only in the Sarawak political 
parties but also among the natives and their communal organisations.  
The understanding of this conflicting arena is incomplete without discussing the media 
aspect of it. Communication is the heart of any social movement (Weiss, 2013) or in the 
Gramscian sense, a systematic creation of a common sense of the indigenous people. To 
better understand the nature of NCR media portrayal or the lack of it, the following chapter 




Chapter 4: Broadcasting and Civil Society in Malaysia 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the contexts within which Malaysian media – both mainstream and 
alternative – operate. It provides a larger picture of the expectations toward television 
broadcasting and new media in shaping the common good. The first section discusses the 
history of Malaysia’s national broadcaster RTM as a nation-building tool from the 1960s. 
Analysis of the significance of broadcasting in Malaysian national agendas is complemented 
by evidence from Malaysia’s eleven National Plans (1966-2020). The chapter then discusses 
RTM in Sarawak and their development in Sarawak through terrestrial and digital platforms. 
The final section discusses new media activism in Malaysia. It places the ‘online’ civil society 
argument beyond purely technological means and argues that the media arena is fragmented 
and can be ‘uncivil’.   
 
4.2 A Brief History of Broadcasting 
4.2.1. Communist, racial riot and national culture (1920s-1970s) 
This section outlines three key traits of Malaysia’s government broadcasting from its 
inception, which had had their effect to the present – ethnically-based, concerned about 
national development and, thirdly, political ownership. Because broadcasting was deemed an 
important national development tool, radio and television broadcasting had stricter 
regulations for fear that audience behaviour did not turn out as desired by policymakers and 
rulers (Glattbach and Ramanujan, 1978). The government justified its control over the 
televisual public sphere without much invitation to partnership with other civil society actors 
(Umi, 2006). The overseeing of television broadcasting in Malaya was direct under 
government Ministerial body with no query from the Malaysian Parliament, including the 
Opposition (R. Karthigesu, 1991, in Zaharom, 1996). It was established with the help of 
technical assistance from Canada. However, the Canadian public service mandate in ensuring 
diversity of views and editorial independence was not emulated by the Malayan broadcasting 
(Zaharom and Mustafa, 2000). 
The first radio in Malaya began transmission in 1921 through the Johor Wireless Society 
(WS) (Media Planning Guide Malaysia, 2012). In 1930, the Malayan WS started broadcasting 
three times a week from Kuala Lumpur while the Penang WS had its broadcast in four 
languages – Malay, Chinese, Tamil and English. The 1940s to 1950s witnessed the tightened 
control of radio broadcasting during war time and communist threat where the Emergency 
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(1948-1960) was declared. It marked the beginning of the use of broadcasting to counter anti-
establishment influences in Malaya.  
On 1 January 1962, commercial radio broadcasting was introduced (Glattbach and 
Ramanujan, 1978). Political factor continued to influence the development of Malayan radio 
when Suara Malaysia (Voice of Malaysia) was developed in 1963 partly to offset Indonesian 
propaganda (Glattbach and Ramanujan, 1978). On 28 December 1963, the first free-to-air 
(FTA) television network was launched under the name Radio dan Televisyen Malaysia 1 
(RTM1). Like many developing countries, RTM1 faced teething issues such as insufficient 
production of local material to fill airtime (Wang and Zaharom, 2001). Besides that, language 
became a point of contention as the Indian community was left out from the Malay: Chinese: 
English programme ratio at 45:30:25 (R. Karthigesu, 1994; in Zaharom and Mustafa, 2000). 
After an outcry, the ratio changed twice to 45:30:20:5 and 39:26:26:9 with the lowest 
percentage allocated for Tamil language in both (R. Karthigesu, 1994; in Zaharom and Mustafa, 
2000).8  
The agenda of modernisation and national development is evident in the First Malaysia 
Plan (1MP) (1966-1970). Economically, broadcasting and information were not deemed as 
necessity because first, they were already well-established and second, more focus was put 
on “economically productive projects” such as rubber and tin due to their decreasing market 
value (Chapter 1, p. 11). Nevertheless, expenditure for information and broadcasting was 
expected to increase from $27.1 million in 1961-1965 to $53.1 million in 1966-1970, with a 
majority allocated for the Malaya Peninsula.  
According to the Plan, three key sources funded the various development projects of 
transport and communications – the internal resources of the agencies concerned, the 
revenues and other resources of Federal and State Governments and external assistance 
(Chapter IX, p. 150-151). While the government made effort to increase the first two sources, 
international funding was deemed important for telecommunication and broadcasting 
electronic equipment due to high foreign exchange rate.  
The 1969 racial riot was a watershed incident that changed many aspects of the 
Malaysian landscape, including broadcasting. The King, on the advice of the government, 
declared a state of second emergency (Umi, 2006). National policies thereafter have had 
implications for media ownership structure and cultural contents in Malaysian media.  
The direction of the Second Malaysia Plan (2MP) (1971-1975) is formulated based on 
the New Economic Policy (NEP) “to correct racial economic imbalance, in the context of an 
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expanding economy, leading towards the creation of a dynamic and just society” (Chapter 1, 
p. 1). Besides addressing poverty and restructuring the society, greater emphasis continued 
to be put on nation building and national identity – through “education policies; services of all 
kinds; national language and literature, art and music; and truly national symbols and 
institutions” (2MP, p. 3).  
A National Operations Council (NOC) was set up and established a Department of 
National Unity, which later formulated a national ideology called Rukunegara9 (Zaharom and 
Mustafa, 2000). Rukunegara as the underlying set of principles toward national unity was 
reinstated in the Third Malaysia Plan (3MP) (1976-1980). The NOC strongly recommended 
substantial amendment to the Sedition Ordinance in that prohibits the questioning of 
‘sensitive issues’: 
1. The special position of the Malays and other indigenous groups; 
2. Malay as the national language; 
3. The citizenship rights of any ethnic group; and 
4. The rights and sovereignty of the Malay rulers (Ronny, 1977; in Tai, 1997: p. 484). 
The Government participated more in the private sector to help create a Malay 
commercial and industrial community to uplift their economic status. This strategy paved way 
to political party ownership of the media and has created more Malay professional middle 
classes (Kahn, 1996; Torii, 2003). Subsequently, there is increasing portrayal of Malay middle 
classes in Malay television dramas (Zaharom and Mustafa, 2000).  
The tragedy of 1969 also entailed into restriction of expression to preserve social order 
and to prevent the outbreak of racial tragedy as such. This was the context of the 
commencement of the second RTM network, called Channel Two, introduced in 1969. The 
first and second channels were under the same control body, Department of Broadcasting, 
and guided by the same directives (Ministry of Information, 1983; in Zaharom, 2000, p. 142): 
1. To explain in depth and with the widest possible coverage the policies and the 
programmes of the government in order to ensure maximum understanding by 
the public; 
2. To stimulate public interest and opinion in order to achieve changes in line with 
the requirement of the government; 
3. To assist in promoting civic consciousness and fostering the development of 
Malaysian arts and culture; 
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4. To provide suitable elements of popular education and fostering the 
development of Malaysian arts and culture; 
5. To aid national integration efforts in a multi-ethnic society through the use of 
the national language. 
Like many newly independent nations concerned with the idea of its national identity, 
the nation-building role conferred to Malaysian television constantly involved issues regarding 
ethnicity, language, religion, the ratio of local to foreign programmes and local/Asian values 
(Juliana, 2006; Zaharom & Mustafa, 2000). This is exemplified by complaints from the Indian 
community in 1962 over the minority airtime given to programmes in their mother tongue as 
compared to the Malay, Chinese and English fares (Khartigesu, 1994; in Juliana, 2006). 
The financing of broadcasting in the 1970s was through annual licensing fee of $10 for a 
joint radio-TV ownership, credited directly to government revenue (Glattbach and 
Ramanujan, 1978). Advertising and programme sponsorship were another source of revenue. 
RTM sourced from two government agencies for local programming materials – Filem Negara 
(National Film) and Bernama (National News Agency). Despite prioritising Malaysian 
production and the Malay language, RTM relied highly on imported programmes, especially 
English-language products because they were easily marketable to fill the airtime (Juliana, 
2006). 
Another post-1969 event that influenced how culture is constructed in Malaysia is the 
National Culture Policy (NCP). It was formulated from a congress with over 1000 delegates 
and 60 working papers debated on Malaysia’s cultural identity (The Straits Times, 16 August 
1971; in Kua, 1990). The outcome was institutionalised under the Ministry of Culture, Youth 
and Sports (Kementerian Kebudayaan, Belia dan Sukan, 1973). There are three major 
principles where the national culture should be based on (Zaharom and Mustafa, 2000: p. 
158): 
1. The indigenous (Malay) culture in the region; 
2. The relevant and appropriate cultures of other ethnic groups; and 
3. Islam as a major influence in its development. 
A group of Chinese cultural associations responded to the policy by calling for a congress for 
fear that Chinese cultural values especially in Chinese festive celebrations would be 
threatened (Wan Norhasniah, 2012).  The situation grew most intense when the then Home 
Affairs Minister, Ghazalie Shafie, proposed the Chinese lion dance to be converted to tiger 
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dance (tiger has negative connotation to the Chinese) and to incorporate the Malay musical 
instruments (Tan, 1992). Any attempt to question the NCP is considered politicising culture 
and provoking sensitive issue (Kua, 1990). 
Amidst the cultural issues, the Government was aware of the need to meet growing 
demand for broadcasting reception and transmission. In April 1970, Malaysia’s satellite earth 
station at Kuantan was commissioned for service with the global satellite communication 
system (2MP, p. 187). The penetration of television is higher in West Malaysia, with 70 percent 
of the population is able to receive clear television and radio broadcasts (2MP, p. 188).  
4.2.2 Privatisation and Asian values (1980s-1990s) 
This section highlights the changes to Malaysian broadcasting at the national and 
international levels. Regulations were amended to adjust to cable and satellite broadcasting 
by private companies while maintaining the control of content and reception. The wave of 
privatisation from around the world led to media ownership by allies close to the ruling elites. 
Internal political fractions and financial scandals further explained the harsh treatment toward 
both national and foreign media personnel involved with investigative journalism. Zaharom 
(1991) lists two reasons of the increasing controls on the Malaysian mass media in the 1980s. 
First, Malaysia needed to project a positive image in view of the industrialising strategies that 
were dependent on foreign investment. Second, a series of events symptomatic of leadership 
crises took place, including clashes between the judiciary, the Malay Rulers and the Executive 
(see Means, 1991). 
The Fourth Malaysia Plan (4MP) (1981-1985) marks the first decade after the 
implementation of the New Economic Policy in 1971. Besides restructuring society, the Fifth 
Malaysia Plan (5MP) (1986-1990) puts priority on reemphasising values for development – 
national unity, work ethics, entrepreneurship, spiritual values, and concern for the 
environment (Chapter I, pp. 28-30). This is coincidental with the premiership of Mahathir 
where he strongly promoted Asian values and work ethic through the Look East policy. 
Mahathir Mohamad was Malaysia’s fourth Prime Minister in 1981; the longest serving for 22 
years.  
Asian values were strongly propagated to differentiate Us from the West (Khoo, 2002). 
As such, three key assumptions were made against Western media (Yao, 1994; in Tai, 1997: p. 
488): 
1. Western media are powerful and immoral; 
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2. The truth about Asia has been distorted by the Western mass media to create friction 
and instability…so [foreign countries] can compete with [Malaysia]; and  
3. Western media is threatening to the traditions and culture of Asian societies. 
The Broadcasting Act 1988 replaced the Telecommunications Act 1950 that previously 
regulated broadcast services (McDaniel, 1994; in Tai, 1997). Scholars observed that the Act’s 
purpose is clearly to regulate especially television broadcasting in times of privatisation and 
as response to technological changes (Tai, 1997; Zaharom, 2002a). Applicable to both public 
and private broadcasters, the Act outlines the Minister of Information’s scope of authority, 
general framework with respect to licences and penalties for licence violations (Tai, 1997). 
Part III, Section 10, Subsection (1) of the Act states that “It shall be the duty of the licensee to 
ensure that the broadcasting matter by him complies with the direction given, from time to 
time, by the minister” (in Zaharom, 2002a: p. 129). The Code of Ethics of Broadcasting was not 
found in legal documents but is rather subject to the interpretations and actions by the 
Ministry, something not made available to the public (McDaniel, 1994; in Tai, 1997). 
‘Broadcast matter’ is defined in Part I as (p. 477): 
any sign or signal transmitted by a broadcasting station whether for aural or visual 
reception or both, and includes any music, theatrical or other entertainment, 
concert, lecture, speech, address, news, and information of any kind so 
transmitted for reception by the general public. 
The section then was amended in 1997 to include films and documentary advertisements. 
Amendments were proposed to legalise the use of satellite dishes that will enable viewers to 
receive at least 22 foreign television channels. The definition of ‘broadcasting station’ was 
further widened to include “satellite transmissions and attaching to the Act, a new schedule 
of broadcasting services which includes satellite and cable television services” (McDaniel, 
1994; in Tai, 1997: p. 478). 
In 1991, Mahathir unveiled his Vision 2020 that envisaged Malaysia to be a fully 
developed, industrialised country by the year 2020. As stated in the Sixth Malaysia Plan (6MP) 
(1991-1995) (p. 371), Malaysian broadcasting was expected “to contribute to the 
development of a well-informed society imbued with positive, strong moral and ethical values 
receptive to modernization. Broadcast media and face-to-face communication have been the 
most effective instruments for disseminating information on Government development 
policies, programmes and strategies, to ensure social and political stability.”  
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Modernisation and privatisation, from the government’s perspective, is crucial for 
national development. According to the Seventh Malaysia Plan (7MP) (1996-2000), “[t]o 
ensure higher productivity and product quality, efforts will be made to corporatise Berita 
Nasional Malaysia (Bernama) and privatise Jabatan Filem Negara dan Perbadanan Kemajuan 
Filem Nasional (FINAS, National Film Development Corporation)” (p. 580). The percentage of 
expenditures for information and broadcasting from 1985-1990 to 1991-1995 increased 4-
fold.  
Table 10 Federal Government Development Allocation and Expenditure for Information and Broadcasting (1986-2000) ($ 
million) 









II. Social 8764 13555 19803 
a. Information and Broadcasting 20 108 238 
% of Social Expenditures 0.23 0.80 1.20 
Source: 
Table 2-3 Federal Government Development Allocation and Expenditure by Sector, 1986-95 ($ million), p. 62, RMK6 
Table 6-3 Federal Government Development Allocation and Expenditure by Sector, 1991-2000 ($ million), p. 177, RMK7 
 
Greater technological advancement in the 1990s had prompted more services besides 
terrestrial broadcasting with private satellite and cable services. The Malaysian television 
industry continued to introduce more private players into the scene yet they were politically 
connected to ruling parties.10 
Table 11 Malaysian Terrestrial, Cable and Satellite Television Stations from 1994 to 1999 
Year 
established 
Station Type Availability Language Frequency Hours 
(Daily) 
1994 MetroVision Free-to-air 
(Terrestrial) 
Klang Valley Malay/English Daily 16.50 
1996 Astro11 Satellite Subscription English Daily 24.00 
1998 NTV7 Free-to-air 
(Terrestrial) 
Nationwide Malay/English Daily 15.25 
1999 Mega TV Cable Subscription English Daily 24.00 
Source: Zaharom (2002a) 
The launch of satellite broadcasting had been mistaken as a form of liberation in the form of 
an ‘open sky policy’ (Zaharom, 2002a). Specifically, Tai (1997, p. 473) notes that the content 
on satellite television is controlled in two ways: 
First, Astro’s satellite dishes are only capable of receiving signals from the Measat 
satellites, ruling out the possibility of accessing unauthorized broadcasts. Second, 
like other broadcasts, all satellite transmissions are delayed for 90 minutes for 
editing and dubbing, allowing for some degree of censorship. 
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Under the 1996 amendments to the Broadcasting Act 1988 to allow satellite operation,  
…only 0.6 metre parabolic dishes can be used by consumers to receive signals … it 
is an offence for anyone to use bigger parabolic dishes. And the penalty for such 
an offence is certainly a hefty one – a fine of RM100,000 and/or a three-month jail 
sentence (Zaharom, 2002a: p. 122). 
In 1996, Mahathir launched the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) “to provide a 
comprehensive world-class ICT-enabled working and living environment to catalyse the 
development of a knowledge-based economy” (8MP, p. 369). The MSC is a high-tech zone of 
approximately 15x50km2 stretching southwards from Kuala Lumpur that included Putrajaya 
and Cyberjaya, an “intelligent city”, for both local and foreign high technology companies 
(Bunnell, 2002).  
The significance of IT is manifested through an exclusive chapter in the Seventh Malaysia 
Plan (7MP) (1996-2000). A council was established to assist the IT policy nationwide, named 
the National Information Technology Council (NITC) comprising members from the public and 
private sectors (p. 451). One of the job scopes was “to review laws and regulations that 
restrain the development of IT” including the Contracts Act 1950, the Evidence Act 1950, the 
Telecommunications Act 1950, the Copyright Act 1987 and the Broadcasting Act 1988. While 
heading toward an information-rich society, the review also aimed “to ensure that national 
and personal security and interests are safeguarded” (7MP, p. 466). The Communications and 
Multimedia Act 1998 is enacted to provide a regulatory framework to cater for the 
convergence of the telecommunications, broadcasting and computing industries. With this, 
the Telecommunications Act 1950 and Broadcasting Act 1988 were repealed.  
The number of personal computers (PC) installed records a dramatic increase from 
610,000 in 1995 to 2.2 million in 2000; while the number of Internet subscribers increased 
from 13,000 in 1995 to about 1.2 million in 2000 (8MP, p. 367). As per 1,000 populations, 
Kuala Lumpur and Selangor had the highest internet subscribers at 103.9 and 84.9 
respectively. Yet, Sabah and Kelantan had the lowest, with 16.6 and 12.5 internet subscribers 
per 1,000 populations (8MP, p. 367).    
IT, now Information and Communications Technology (ICT), was given a full chapter in 
the Eighth Malaysia Plan (8MP) (2001-2005). Besides promoting knowledge economy (k-
economy) and electronic commerce (e-commerce), the Plan highlights the National Vision 
Policy that aimed towards Bangsa Malaysia (The Malaysian Race).12 Within a span of five years 
between 1995 and 2000, the home sector recorded the highest growth rate of 44.1 per cent 
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per annum in expenditure (8MP). A number of reasons could be attributed to the drastic 
increase of IT use by home consumers. Following the post-Reformasi era, people opted for 
websites for alternative news and growing affluence of consumer market in electronic 
products such as mobile telephones, car stereos and televisions. The government has also 
encouraged ICT usage through special incentives such as the abolition of sales tax on 
computers; PC Ownership Campaign starting year 2000 with the aim of ‘one home, one PC’; 
and to bridge the digital gap through the Internet Desa (Rural Internet) programme. To 
enhance ministerial efficiency in the age of media convergence, Ministry of Energy, 
Telecommunications and Posts was restructured to the Ministry of Energy, Communications 
and Multimedia in November 1998.  
4.2.3 Digitisation and MCMC (2000s-2010s) 
In July 1998, after the sacking of Anwar Ibrahim and in the dawn of economic crisis, a 
director of TV3 and the editors of two major Malay-language dailies – Utusan Malaysia and 
Berita Harian – resigned (Zaharom, 2002b). They were known to be close with Anwar 
(Funston, 1999). In the post-financial crisis and reformasi years, the 1999 general elections 
saw another win for the Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition. The BN secured their two-third 
majority in parliament but lost Kelantan and Terengganu to the Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) 
(Lin, 2002).  
In 2003, Mahathir stepped down from the post of Prime Minister and his successor 
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi was hand-picked. From a highly centralised approach during 
Mahathir’s tenure (1981-2003), Badawi as the fifth Malaysian Prime Minister adopted a more 
open style of government in addressing corruption and police misconduct. Abdullah also 
pledged to eradicate poverty by promoting agriculture and focusing on the rural poor (Gomez, 
2006), which contributed to his landslide victory in the 2004 general elections (Brown, Siti 
Hawa and Wan Manan, 2004). Another key feature is Badawi’s universal principles of Islam 
Hadhari.13  
Despite Abdullah’s ‘populist agenda’, his administration lost popularity due to 
undelivered promises, a series of political scandals and ethno-religious controversies (Gomez, 
2006; Lee H. G., 2008; Johan, 2008). Critics wrote that legal controls and ownership structures 
of the media indeed were no different than those under the Mahathir administration 
(Mustafa, 2005; Wong, 2006). A spate of ethnic tensions occurred with the increase of legal 
disputes over religious matter. Following this, the Human Rights Sub-Committee of the Bar 
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Council mooted the idea of an Inter-Faith Commission (IFC) (Johan, 2006). In April 2005, a 
conference was held with about 200 participants from all major faith-based groups and civil 
society organisations (Johan, 2006). A coalition of 13 Muslim groups calling itself the Allied 
Coordinating Committee of Islamic NGOs (ACCIN) called for the government to stop the IFC; 
and the government obliged (Johan, 2006). Besides that, Badawi faced interference and 
criticisms from Mahathir relating to the scrapping of the Johor-Singapore bridge project, 
approved permits for cars and the exit of the former Proton chief executive officer (see Tan, 
2007). 
Badawi was forced to step down after BN’s poor performance in the 2008 general 
elections (see 3.2), succeeded by Najib Razak in 2009. The general elections outcome was 
popularly called the ‘political tsunami’ by a prominent Opposition leader, Lim Kit Siang. BN 
lost five states to the Opposition coalition, which Badawi attributed the losses to BN neglecting 
online campaigning (Leong, 2014; see 4.6). 
The development of political Internet activities in Malaysia needs to be analysed within 
the larger context of Malaysia’s national agenda toward ICT excellence. According to the Ninth 
Malaysia Plan (9MP) (2006-2010), the National Broadband Plan (NBP) aimed to provide for 
planned operationalisation of broadband nationwide (9MP, p. 134). Under the initiative, the 
Government targeted to achieve 50 per cent household broadband penetration by the end of 
2010 (MCMC, 2015a). As of Q1 2014, Malaysian household broadband penetration reached 
67.4 per cent, as compared to 11 per cent in 2006 and 31.7 per cent in 2009 (Muhammad 
Razali Anuar, 2014). The Malaysian Information, Communications and Multimedia Services 
(MyICMS) Blueprint was completed in 2005 to propose guidelines for the convergence of the 
three key sectors in the ICT industry namely cellular telephony, Internet and broadcasting. 
RTM, the national broadcaster, since the inception of two television channels in the 
1960s, aimed to promote government policies to the public (see 4.2.1). With the first private 
broadcaster TV3 in the marketplace in 1984, RTM television channels faced stiff competition 
for advertising share and had to introduce more commercial programmes (Zaharom, 1996). 
Years later with more and more private players (see Figure 17), TV1 and TV2 went through 
aggressive re-branding in August 2004 to discard the misperception of outdated channels 
from audiences and advertisers alike (M. Hafidz, 17 September 2005). TV1 and TV2 were re-
branded with new logos and new slogans, respectively Your Infotainment Channel and Your 
Family Channel (M. Hafidz, 17 September 2005).  
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The Malaysian mainstream broadcasting industry witnessed more industry players and 
merger with Media Prima Berhad (MPB)14 as the largest media conglomerate in Malaysia.  
Figure 17 Television Industry Segmentation in Malaysia (2014) 
 
Source: Media Planning Guide (2014, p. 202) 
*Ministry of Information, Communications and Multimedia changed to Communications and Multimedia Ministry since 2013, 
with the cultural portfolio assigned to the Tourism Ministry (Ding et al, 2013: p. 104). 
** Al Hijrah Media Corporation is a government-owned company (Media Planning Guide, 2014). 
***Another player in the market was Worldview Broadcasting Channel (WBC), the first FTA TV news channel; it ceased 
operations in 2013 (Media Planning Guide, 2014). 
**** Hypp TV, the IPTV was launched by Telekom Malaysia in 2011. 
Despite being the oldest broadcaster in Malaysia, RTM television channels (TV1, TV2 and 
Al Hijrah) had the lowest audience share in 2013, as compared to other private competitors. 
Astro that offered 89 (satellite) channels (including High-Definition and Packages) had the 
biggest audience share at 45%. All private FTA channels (TV3, TV9, 8TV, NTV7) under Media 
Prima were at the second spot with 43%. 
Figure 18 Audience Share by Malaysian TV Channels (2013) 
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Although Indians, East Malaysian Bumiputera and non-Malaysians constituted 27% of 
23.8 million Malaysia’s population (2010), Figure 19 shows that they are the minority as far as 
audience share is concerned.  
Figure 19 Malaysia: Channel Profile by Race (2014) 
 
Source: TAM Nielsen, from Media Planning Guide (2014, p. 204) 
As communication technologies advanced, the term broadcasting revolved around 
digitisation. The regulatory body, Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission 
(MCMC) set forth ten national policy objectives15 as the basis of its regulatory framework. The 
telecommunication, broadcasting and information technology industries are now replaced by 
terms like communications and multimedia industry (Hussein, 2000; in Lee A., 2001: pp. 682-
684).  ‘Communications’ is widely defined as “any communication, whether between persons 
and persons, things and things, or persons and things, in the form of sound, data, text, visual 
images, signals or any other form or any combination of those forms” (Section 6, the 
Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission Act 1998).  
 Information and Communications Technology is one of the National Key Economic 
Areas (NKEAs) in 10MP and is expected to contribute to the GDP from 9.8 per cent in 2009 to 
10.2 per cent by 2015. Media in general are part of the creative industries,16 a theme which 
was to flourish under the National Creative Industry Policy and National Digital Terrestrial 
Broadcasting (DTTB) (10MP, p. 152). The television industry is now part of creative content by 
the Malaysian Creative Content Industry Guild (CCIG, 2015).17 The subject in the 
Communications and Multimedia Act was addressed as end-users and consumers, without the 



















society by accordance to technology and commodification is not new (Garnham, 2005). Kitley 
and Zaharom (2003) noted that the discourse of subject in the Acts concerning Multimedia 
has removed the race and ‘old media’ boundaries. The rationale of such converged legislative 
framework has not been given attention by academics and civil society organisations due to 
centralised authority in the state (Lee A., 2001; Kitley, 2003). Malik’s (2010) research on the 
shift from PSB policy to creative industry in the United Kingdom found that “diversity is ripped 
from the experience of living with ethnic and racial difference … where issues of 
discrimination, exclusion, and social justice are marginalised in favour of a raceless, 
commodified version of (multi)cultural difference” (in Hesmondhalgh and Saha, 2013: p. 193). 
As of 2015, RTM’s organisational directions has since this point adopted a more 
technologically intensive approach through emphasis on terms such as information society 
and the creative content industry (RTM, 2015, translation).  
Table 12 The Vision, Mission and Objective of RTM (2015) 
 
The change of premiership from Abdullah Badawi to Najib Abdul Razak was reflected in 
the Tenth Malaysia Plan (10MP) (2011-2015). Within a year or so in office, Najib came up with 
extensive ‘reform’ policies towards Vision 2020, known as the four pillars of national 
transformation – 1Malaysia, the Government Transformation Programme (GTP), the New 
Economic Model (NEM), and, lastly, the first policy operationalisation through the 10th 
Malaysia Plan 2011-2015 (NEAC, 2010). Overall, those initiatives pledged to ‘prioritise the 
people’ and to promote Malaysia through the transformation of government and economic 
performance. According to a poll by Merdeka Centre, Najib’s popularity rose gradually from 
41 per cent in February 2009 to 45 per cent by June and his approval rating reached 56 per 
cent in October (Surin, 3 April 2009). On the eve of Malaysia Day 2011, Najib announced 
Vision
•To win the hearts and 
minds of the people 
through radio, TV and new 
media.
Missions
•To build information 
society through radio, TV 
and new media.
•To ensure RTM is trusted 
and is the ultimate choice.
•To develop quality, 
creative and innovative 
content.
•To utilise broadcasting 
infrastructure 






•To catalyse the 
development of creative 
content industry.
•To support heritage and 
culture of Malaysia.
•To expand the network of 
cooperation and strategic 





several ‘gifts’ to the nation in conjunction with the administration’s pledge for freer expression 
– the repeal of the Internal Security Act (ISA) 1960 and the three Emergency declaractions 
(Teoh, 2011). Also in the announcement, the annual license renewal as required by the 
infamous Printing Presses and Publications Act (PPPA) 1984 was replaced by one-off permit; 
while Section 27 of the Police Act 1967 was reviewed to allow more freedom to assemble 
(Hemananthani, 2011). These changes, however, were made within the contexts where Najib 
needed to regain popularity and political control over middle Malaysia (Teoh, 2011).18 
The Eleventh Malaysia Plan (11MP) (2016-2020) reflects the Najib administration’s goal 
to be ‘people-centric and result-driven’ with the motto People First, Performance Now.  The 
Plan expected analogue television broadcasting to migrate fully to Digital Terrestrial Television 
(DTT) by the end of 2020 with gradual penetration of High-Speed Broadband (HSBB) and 
Broadband for General Population (BBGP) by states (11MP, pp. 7.8-7.9). The Eleventh Plan 
also stated that the Government encouraged the liberalisation of services subsectors including 
telecommunications to boost investor confidence. In 2017, the Ministry of Communications 
and Multimedia Malaysia and the MCMC launched a digital terrestrial TV broadcast system, 
branded as myFreeview. According to the official website, the DTT project offers higher quality 
sound and visuals with multiple interactive services. Myfreeview features all FTA channels at 
zero cost.  
This section has tried to show the development of Malaysia’s television broadcasting 
industry within the political, cultural, economic and technological contexts. RTM’s audience 
share in 2013 showed that it was still struggling between its identity as a national broadcaster 
and commercialisation, with stiff competition from private players. Audience segmentation 
by race reflected an imbalanced proportion by the FTA and Astro channels. On the other hand, 
as mentioned earlier, the conceptualisation of audiences by race has largely diminished in the 
discourse of multimedia and the creative industries. Against this background, the extent to 
which RTM caters to the indigenous population in Sarawak is open to question, which will be 
discussed in the following section.  
4.2.4 RTM and Sarawak 
As one of the newly independent countries in the 1950s and 1960s that emphasised 
modernisation19 and development20, Malaysia believed mass media would play significant 
roles in nation building. This paradigm was popularised by scholars such as Wilbur Schramm 
and Daniel Lerner; which received wide support from the United Nations Educational, 
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Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) (Thussu, 2006). Malaysian policy makers 
insisted that the media could serve the public interest by helping to promote government 
policies and at the same time practice self-regulation (Loh and Mustafa, 1996). A basic 
assumption of this approach is that the government is a key agent in determining 
development policy for public good (Romano, 2005), hence government policy has been used 
interchangeably as public policy (Umi, 2006).  
From the First Malaysia Plan (1MP, 1966-1970), the government aimed to extend and 
improve information and broadcasting services especially to rural areas and Borneo states of 
Sabah and Sarawak. Table 13 shows that the allocation for Sarawak was the lowest. This could 
be attributed to the remoteness of Sarawak that hindered the deployment of costly 
broadcasting electronic equipment at the time (1MP). Populations in Sarawak were 
commercially less viable for the advertising industry due to their lower literacy level and rural 
lifestyles (Hamdan, 1990).  
Table 13 Public Development Expenditure and Allocation for Broadcasting in Malaysia (1961-1970) ($ million) 





Communications 129.8 205.5 
Broadcasting   
• Malaya 23.0 42.3 
• Sabah 2.8 6.0 
• Sarawak 1.3 4.8 
Malaysia 27.1 53.1 
% of Communications 
Expenditure /Allocation 
20.9 25.8 
Source: Table 4-1 Malaysia: Sectoral Allocation of Public Development Expenditure in 1966-70 as compared with 1961-65 ($ 
million), p. 70 
 
The movement toward extending mass media penetration in rural areas was based on 
the communication-for-development principle (Samsudin and Fuziah, 1993). Rural areas were 
identified as ‘the Malay heartland’ where television and radio broadcasting were their major 
source of information and entertainment (Zaharom, 2017; Samsudin and Fuziah, 1993). The 
Bornean states of Sabah and Sarawak attempted to establish an autonomous television 
channel in the 1970s but thwarted in the name of ‘national unity’ (Postil, 2002). Postil (2002) 
argued that television in Sarawak was a product of ‘double Westernisation’ (first imported 
from the West, mainly the USA, then recycled in West Malaysia and exported to Sarawak) and 
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a reliable propaganda tool for the ruling federal government due to programme 
centralisation.   
In 1956, radio broadcasting operations in Malaya moved from its temporary studio to 
the Federal House in Kuala Lumpur (RTM, 2016). It was here that broadcasting in Malaysia 
flourished with more stations that expanded throughout the country including Sabah and 
Sarawak. Today, East Malaysians get to tune in to radio channels in their respective native 
languages. Blue Channel RTM Kuching uses Bidayuh, a popular dialect used by Sarawakians. 
Iban and Kayan/Kenyah are dialects used in the Green Channel of the station.  
Figure 20 Screenshot of RTM website listing the radio services across the country (2018) 
 
 RTM’s website was launched at the end of 1995 by the then Prime Minister, Mahathir 
Mohamed. This service enabled listeners to tune to the television and radio stations via the 
Internet. 
 In 2011, the Federal Government and the state governments of Sabah and Sarawak 
launched a new digital television channel for the two states called TVi (TV Interaktif) 
(Bernama, 7 April 2011). The Information, Communications, Arts and Culture Minister said TVi 
would help especially Peninsular Malaysians understand the Sabahan and Sarawakian cultures 
better, which would further promote the 1Malaysia concept (Bernama, 7 April 2011). TVi was 
branded as a channel of “arts, cultural and ethnic programmes that highlight life in Sabah and 
Sarawak” (Streema, 2015). TVi was also available through satellite broadcaster Astro on 
channel 180. During the launch of TVi, the Minister further pledged to make a village, 
Kampung Lintang to be equipped with Wi-Fi. He urged the residents “to appreciate the 
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contributions of the state and Federal governments and not be influenced by empty promises 
made by the Opposition” (Bernama, 7 April 2011). 
This research conducted a brief review on the TVi programmes on 14 September 2015. 
The review revealed that a) TVi was commercial-free; (b) the main medium was Malay 
language; (c) only 30 minutes in a 24-hour run was allocated for indigenous languages – 15-
minute news in Iban (main Sarawak dialect) followed by another 15 minutes in Kadazan-Dusun 
(main Sabah dialect); (d) the programmes were Malaysian produced (except for Animation); 
(e) two most frequent genres were magazine talk shows (35.4 per cent) and music clips (20.8 
per cent) – both within urban setting; and (f) the hosts or locations were from Sabah and 
Sarawak.21 
Figure 21 TVi: Percentage of Programme Genre Breakdown (14 September 2015, Monday) 
 
As with RTM’s other television channels, the establishment and purpose of TVi was not 
made open for public enquiry. The programming staple, language provision, funding, target 
audience and access mode of TVi raised serious questions for the purpose of a minority 
channel.   
In 2016, this research conducted a preliminary online questionnaire survey among 268 
respondents from Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak. Astro channels were the most 
watched by the respondents at 52.1%, while the 4 Media Prima channels (TV3, Ntv7, 8TV, TV9) 
took the second place at 31.5%. The least watched were RTM channels (TV1, TV2, TVi) with 















4% Anthem / Religious clips
2%
Percentage Of Genre On Tvi For 14 Sept 2015
102 
 
The lifespan of TVi was cut short by TV Okey (Opportunity, Knowledge, Experience, 
Yours). Two months before Malaysia’s 14th general elections, the then Prime Minister Najib 
Razak launched TV Okey to boost the creative industry for both Sabah and Sarawak, besides 
promoting home grown talent (Zam, 21 March 2018). The channel could be viewed on the 
Astro 109 and MyFreeview 110 platforms as well as the RTM Mobile app. By featuring more 
dialects, TV Okey was targeted to showcase the unique cultures of both states. The Federal 
Communications and Multimedia Minister Salleh Said Keruak was cited saying that “the 
channel’s branding uses a bottom-up approach, which involves the people, including those at 
the grassroots”. The name Okey was chosen to present a positive image “in spite of all the 
accusations by certain quarters, who are envious of the nation’s success” (Zam, 21 March 
2018).  
As far back as 1998, a workshop was organised by Sarawak’s Majlis Adat Istiadat (Council 
for Customary Law) to discuss the prospects of Iban-language broadcasting and the problems 
with RTM Sarawak, among which were (1) no clear aims or objectives; (2) insufficient audience 
research; (3) poor infrastructure and facilities; and (4) low command of Iban among 
broadcasters (Postill, 2002, pp. 102-103). The development of TVi and TV Okey showed the 
lack of a genuine and open research to cater programmes to the minority populations in Sabah 
and Sarawak. While TVi was not well known or heard of by the survey’s respondents, the 
establishment of TV Okey in March 2018 seemed to be a hasty effort to attract more votes 
from the East Malaysia in preparation for the 14th general elections two months later.  
4.6 New Media Activism in Malaysia  
Malaysian politics has experienced major changes since the late 1990s with increasing 
challenges and resistance towards the status quo from a variety of civil society actors. 
Activists, journalists, academics, artists, students and lawyers raised issues regarding judicial 
independence, electoral system reform, governance transparency, the environment, and 
ethnic minority welfare. These changes were assisted by newer media technology such as the 
Internet and social media, which became popular forms of expression as an alternative to the 
tightly controlled government-run and privately owned media (Weiss, 2013). 
Mainstream mass media in Malaysia are more known as government service platform 
than providing a public service (Zaharom, 1996). The press, television and radio broadcasting 
practised self-regulation that skirted, rather than debated, ‘sensitive’ issues under the pretext 
of maintaining social harmony (Loh and Mustafa, 1996). The New Economic Policy (NEP) 
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implemented in 1971 paved way for media ownership by ruling political parties, besides other 
businesses (Gomez, 1994). Malaysian mainstream media were restricted by economic, legal 
and political means to a substantial extent that marginalised diverse opinions and legal 
dissents (Mustafa, 1994; 2014). Besides being denied fair media coverage, civil society 
organisations in Malaysia faced structural obstacles such as political clampdown, association 
law amendments, rejected publishing licence, weakened trade unions, and laws prohibiting 
students from political involvement (Azeem Fazwan, 2011; see 2.3).  
The Malaysian media arena experienced an important turning point when Information 
and Communication Technology (ICT) was introduced to Malaysians in the early 1990s and 
heavily promoted as a crucial tool toward achieving developed nation status by 2020. 
Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) was a national mega project launched in 1996 by the then 
Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamed. The Bill of Guarantee stipulates that the government will 
not censor the Internet to boost investor attraction to the MSC. 
Figure 22 Anwar addressing the crowd in support of his Reformasi with wife Wan Azizah in 1998 
 
Source: Free Malaysia Today 
The use of the Internet intensified in the late 1990s for two main reasons. Mahathir’s 
deputy, Anwar Ibrahim, was sacked in 1998 for allegedly committing sodomy against his aide. 
Salacious news coverage by mainstream press and television of a respectable figure left many 
disillusioned.  Besides participating in demonstrations, the Internet became an alternative for 
creating supportive websites and to seek diverse details of the incident. During the period of 
his arrest and subsequent dismissal of his official duties, internet service provider TMNet 
recorded 14,000 new subscribers, more than double its average number of 6,000 (Rodan, 
2004; in Weiss, 2013). Ratings of politically owned private television channel TV3 and Malay-
language newspaper Utusan plummeted while the sale of oppositional party bulletins soared 
(Funston, 1999).   
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It was also within that same period of Asian economic crises where people faced 
retrenchment and business losses and began to question government bail-outs of 
government-linked corporations (GLCs). Local and foreign journalists alike were slammed with 
lawsuits to silence criticisms (Rodan, 2004). Former mainstream journalists established 
Malaysia’s first fully online and independent news portal in 1999, Malaysiakini. Capitalising on 
the technology and increasing demand for alternative news and expression, techno-savvy 
Malaysians also dabbled into writing blogs (Tan and Zawawi, 2008).  
In 2007, three rallies were organised by different civil society organisations. They were 
promoted through the social media platform, Facebook, and reported ‘live’ by ordinary 
citizens who attended.  
The first and perhaps the most popular is the Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections 
(BERSIH; literally clean), made up of non-governmental organisations formed in 2006. It seeks 
to campaign for free, clean and fair elections in Malaysia. Its first rally was held on 10 
November 2007; second (BERSIH 2.0) on 9 July 2011; third (BERSIH 3.0) on 28 April 2012 and 
the fourth (BERSIH 4.0) on 30 and 31 August 2015 (BERSIH, 1 September 2015). BERSIH 4.0 
was declared illegal by the police for failing to comply with the Peaceful Assembly Act 2012 
(Farik and Natasha, 26 August 2015). The organisers went on with the rally with the emphasis 
on demanding the then prime minister Najib Razak to resign due to money laundering 
allegations (Höller-Fam, 16 December 2015). At the time of writing in September 2015, 
BERSIH’s official website (www.bersih.org) was blocked from access “as it violate(s) the 
National law(s)”. 






Hindu Rights Action Force (Hindraf) rally was held on 25 November 2007 to highlight the 
plight of Malaysian Indians – against the background of socially and economically 
disadvantaged working classes especially plantation workers, demolition of temples, legal 
religious cases, and poor education system (Subramaniam, 2007). Hindraf chairman P. 
Waythamoorthy filed suit against the British Government for negligence toward workers 
brought to Malaya during colonial times and continuation of marginalisation by the Malaysian 
government (Fernandez, 29 March 2015). 
On 26 September 2007, more than 2,000 lawyers and activists went on a “Walk for 
Justice” to Prime Minister’s office in Putrajaya (P. Ramakrishnan, 2007). The key agenda is to 
call for a clean-up in the judicial system, particularly with the establishment of an independent 
Commission of Inquiry, following the revelation of a video clip that showed political meddling 
in the appointment of judges (P. Ramakrishnan, 2007). 
In the 2008 general elections, the ruling elites finally recognised the power of the 
Internet and its generation. The ruling coalition was denied its two-thirds majority in 
parliament for the first time since 1969 after losing 5 states to Opposition parties (Kessler, 
2013; see 3.2). The then Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi admitted that his ‘biggest mistake’ 
was to neglect online campaigning (Malaysiakini, 25 March 2008; in Leong, 2014). Alternative 
media, initially identified as the new media, inevitably were a critical component in the 
Malaysian civil society since the late 1990s (Weiss, 2009; Liu, 2014). 
As technology continued to evolve, the over-the-top (OTT) feature makes possible on-
demand video streaming through many platforms and devices. Due to the availability of 
affordable mobile data plans and applications (apps), issues go viral via sharing among social 
networking and micro-blogging sites. Globally, WhatsApp was the most popular social 
platform for Malaysian’s news consumption at 51%, according to Digital News Report 2017 by 
Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism at Oxford University (The Star Online, 10 
September 2017). Comparatively, only 3% in the United States used the popular messaging 
platform for the same purpose in the same period.  
Civil society organisations (CSOs), old and new, commonly own a Facebook page, 
followers, Twitter account, website and videos embedded in YouTube with ‘live’ reports to 
promote their causes and to organize movements (Zaharom and Gayathry, 13 October 2016; 
Liu, 2014). With social media, organising activities by non-profit and non-government 
organisations have become more widespread and more effective (Waters, 2007). According 
106 
 
to the 2018 Global NGO Technology Report conducted by Nonprofit Tech for Good, out of 
5,352 NGOs from 164 countries, 92% have a website, 93% have a Facebook account, 72% 
accept online donations on website and 64% use WhatsApp. Cyber-volunteering has also 
become popular where the volunteers accomplish their tasks remotely via the Internet (Raja 
Jamilah, Azah Anir and Siti Soraya et al, 2016).  
4.7 Conclusion 
Media freedom is, as Rodan (2003, p. 455) put it, “one of civil societies’ most definitive 
contemporary ideals and institutions”. For Sotharith (2012, p. 33), media play four major roles 
in complementing civil society - as checks and balances for the government; in capacity 
building; as a force of reform; and in economic development. Democracy, freedom, and social 
justice, Sotharith (2012) added, are unthinkable without an independent media.  
However, is it true that civil society is vibrant only because of alternative media? Weiss 
(2017, p. 376) rightly asked, “In an age of social media, online platforms and intensified 
economic globalization, what resources or allies are most pivotal or influential for activists?” 
It should be pointed out that associations regardless of political orientation have been utilising 
the new media for own purposes. Ruling elites too retaliated by similarly turning to the 
platform to re-shape public opinion (Rodan, 2003). 
Besides the Reformasi era and ‘social media’ general elections in 2008, 2014 and 2018 
(see 4.6), the development of the Malaysian media industries has also shown another side of 
the relationship between new media and social activism.  As Wang and Zaharom (2004) wrote, 
it is ‘business as usual’ for the industry players. After the late 1990s Reformasi, a significant 
merger and acquisition took place in 2004, resulting in Media Prima as the largest media 
conglomerate in Malaysia. Several changes in the Media Prima leadership posts followed the 
appointment of a new prime minister, Abdullah Badawi (Wang and Zaharom, 2004). On the 
other hand, this research argues that RTM was still struggling between its nation-building role 
and commercialisation, with stiff competition from private players. In the context of Malaysia, 
private does not necessarily mean free from political ownership (see Note 8). The government 
has also shifted its focus to the creative industries, leaning toward commercialisation and 
contributions to the economy.  
The nationwide transition of all broadcasting from analogue to digital was completed in 
October 2019. Despite that, the extent to which RTM, after more than 60 years in 
establishment, have fulfilled both contentious and non-contentious cultural needs, is open to 
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question. In the case of Sarawak’s native customary right to land, community-based 
organisations (CBOs) had long fought for decades before ‘online civil society’ emerged. Both 
Chapters 3 and 4 have drawn attention to the wider structures within which the Sarawak 
CBOs’ operated and where Malaysia’s online activism took place. The following chapter shows 
how the research was designed to address the gap in conceptualising civil society for the CBOs 




Chapter 5: Research Methodology and Design 
5.1 Research Questions, Civil Society and the Research Strategy 
This research aims to provide an enriched understanding of the relationship between 
changes in media platforms and counter-hegemonic strategies by NCR land community-based 
organisations (CBOs).  
Bryman (2016) asserted that social research and its associated methods do not take 
place in vacuum; they are underpinned by theories of and existing knowledge about the 
area(s) to be studied. This research’s epistemological consideration, strategy, design and 
methods are influenced by the literature reviews on Southeast Asian civil society and the 
Gramscian perspective, which have been discussed in detail from Chapter 1 to 4. 
Civil society should be seen as actors and processes rather than a set of fixed set of 
structures (Salmenkari, 2013). Civil society is a fragmented and divided realm with internal 
conflicts. Civil society is an arena that neither has absolute autonomy from the state nor 
exclusively associated with democratisation.  
This research applies Gramsci’s concept of civil society to analyse the use of new media 
by Sarawak land rights community-based organisations (CBOs). The CBOs and activists have 
advocated for native land rights since the 1970s. For the following two decades, the 
movement waned especially after the Swiss activist Bruno Manser mysteriously disappeared 
and Taib Mahmud the Chief Minister stepped down. Taib was associated with land grabbing 
by the state through leasing native lands to logging and plantation companies (Suter, 2015). 
With Sarawak now experiencing deforestation due to extensive logging, timber companies 
started to venture into new forests abroad.  
The research gap is two-pronged (see Chapter 1). First, the extent to which ‘new media’ 
have contributed to the processes of sustained civil society activity is rarely explored (Keane, 
2001). The claim that new media have created a ‘virtual civil society’, is questionable. To be 
effective, both online and offline activities have to be run consistently and coherently (Weiss, 
2013; Liu, 2014). Second, the available works on Sarawak NCR land showed a void in 
connecting it with the systematic legitimisation of the indigenous people as disadvantaged 
through media representation.   
This research asks if new media offer potential to the CBOs, in the Gramscian term, to 
create their ‘common sense’ online and raise the subaltern status of the indigenous people. 
Since subalterns need to be studied in totality, this thesis also investigates CBOs’ internal 
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operations, external relations and their perception of the Malaysian media in general. The 
research questions are as follow: 
 
RQ1) How do NCR land CBOs represent themselves using new media platforms?  
RQ2) What do the CBOs think of the current media environment in Malaysia pertaining to their 
land rights advocacy? 
RQ3) How have the CBOs’ internal and external organising processes improved using the new 
media?  
RQ4) How would the Gramscian framework assist in understanding new media and civil society 
based on the NCR land CBOs’ organising processes? 
According to Schramm (1971), a research strategy aims to explain “why […decisions] 
were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result” to achieve the objectives of 
a research (in Yin, 2003: p. 12). Bryman (2016, p. 32) defined research strategy as “a general 
orientation to the conduct of social research”. There have been extensive works discussing 
and debating the justifications of research directions in communication and society (e.g. 
Berelson, 1959; Hall, 1989). From the positivist to the interpretative approach, such 
demarcation can be a false one for two reasons (Blaikie, 2000). First, technically, no research 
is totally made of figures without words and vice versa. Second, hard data will be of little use 
unless interpreted against the social contexts they are collected from. Golding and Murdock 
(1978) argued that the refinement of empirical techniques and statistical constructs will be 
aimless if they lose sight of their social and theoretical significance. Similarly, soft data need 
to be backed by statistics or quantitative findings. A holistic research should have both ‘hard’ 
(quantitative) and ‘soft’ (interpretative) approaches. Therefore, the epistemological approach 
of this research is interpretivism. The subject matter of this research – the CBOs’ personnel 
and their web-based platforms – differ in their social realities that the researcher has to 
respect and understand using the Gramscian perspective of civil society.  
This thesis employed two methods to collect data – semi-structured interviews 
(qualitative) and web content analysis (quantitative). To understand and interpret the way 
CBOs operate in a new media environment, semi-structured interviews allowed respondents 
to give their own detailed accounts. The organisational and institutional determinants in the 
CBOs’ advocacy were also explored through the interviews to understand their struggles and 
perspectives. Their accounts were then triangulated with data from online content analysis to 
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assess the CBOs’ efforts at creating common sense through official websites, blogs and 
Facebook pages. The online content analysis complemented the Gramscian view that new 
media, although often promoted as utopian and epochal (Lister et al, 2009), should be 
contextualised with the economic and cultural questions of reach and literacy. The data 
triangulation contributed rich and complex conceptualisations of hegemony, intellectuals, 
subalterns and common sense in the context of the research subject matter. 
The purpose of this chapter is to show the logical process in designing the research. This 
section has explained how the relationship between new media, CBOs, and civil society 
shaped the research questions and methods. Based on that explanation, the next section 
justifies why semi-structured interview and web content analysis were employed to answer 
the research questions. It then explains how each method was designed to collect data. The 
chapter identifies the themes generated from the data through thematic analysis. The chapter 
concludes by discussing the triangulation of data from both methods to address the identified 
research gap.   
5.2 Semi-Structured Interview 
Semi-structured interview is selected to understand and interpret the way community-
based organisations (CBOs) operate in a new media environment.  It is employed to address 
the following objectives: 
RO2) To explore the utilisation of new media platforms by NCR land CBOs in creating contents 
and literacy training to promote their causes. 
RO3) To establish NCR land CBOs’ perspectives toward Malaysian mainstream and alternative 
media organisations’ performance in representing their advocacy. 
RO4) To determine the extent to which the NCR land CBOs’ organisational processes improved 
using the new media. 
RO5) To investigate if the new media enhanced the NCR land CBOs’ networking strategies. 
The advantage of semi-structured interviews is the flexibility in posing the questions 
where they can be pre-determined then modified, re-worded, explained or omitted as when 
the situation is deemed appropriate (Ncube, 2010). From the interviewees’ replies, new 
questions can be asked to add depth to the data (Bryman, 2016). Semi-structured interview 
also lets the social actors speak from their social reality. This research conducted the 
interviews face-to-face for three reasons. First, the researcher had the advantage of having an 
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indigenous informant to explain certain indigenous terms during interviews. Second, not all 
CBOs have email addresses for email interviews. The researcher also had to take into 
consideration that since the CBOs run on small-scale operations, they might be understaffed 
to reply emails in details. Third, due to the location of certain CBOs, Skype or phone interview 
might pose risk of losing parts of the messages in the event of technological glitches.   
5.2.1 Purposive and Snowball Sampling 
The researcher built the list of interviewees from related books, news articles, reports 
and search engine results to identify the high and visible profile of Sarawak land rights 
community-based organisations (CBOs). Chapter 3 showed that the indigenous people in 
Sarawak are culturally and economically disadvantaged, which Gramsci would have identified 
as them being ‘subalterns’. Their struggles to defend their lands from the state’s re-definition 
of native rights were advocated and mobilised by the CBOs through paralegal training, court 
cases, press conferences and blockades (Aeria, 2010; Aiken and Leigh, 2011). The direction of 
such CBOs, in the context of this research, was counter-hegemonic – which differed from the 
official-sanctioned ideas of modernisation and development disseminated by mainstream 
media. Although in the Gramscian view that civil society is the arena of hegemonic activities 
to manufacture popular consent, for the purpose of this research, only counter-hegemonic 
land rights CBOs were sampled. Therefore, associations that conducted mainstream cultural 
activities – such as dancing, beauty pageants and basket weaving – were excluded from the 
sampling. Several alternative media organisations were also identified in hope to gauge their 
perspectives toward the NCR land issue and Malaysian media from a professional point of 
view. Only Aliran (National Consciousness Movement Society) responded and agreed to be 
interviewed. Aliran was established in 1977 and has been a strong advocate in human rights 
reform movement. They published their first periodical (English-language) in 1980; they 
ceased publication in 2004 to go fully online (ALIRAN, n.d.). 
Snowball sampling is useful here due to the close connection among CBOs in Sarawak. 
The researcher was flexible to add respondents from their acquaintances. The finalised list of 
interviewees included those who were active in the advocacy during the 1980s and 1990s 
when land rights advocacy garnered international attention – Mr Thomas Jalong, Mr Peter 
Kallang, Mr Jok Jau Evong and Mr Wong Meng Chuo.  A total of 16 interviews were conducted 
in May and June 2018 in three different states, as illustrated in Figure 24 and Table 14.  
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5.2.2 Interviewing Ethics 
The first step in securing interviews was to get approval from the University of Salford Ethics 
Panel. Next, all three interview documents – participant invitation letter, consent form and 
information sheet (see Appendix 1) – were presented to interviewees before or during 
interview. Upon their permission, their background (see Appendix 2) and identities were 
revealed in this thesis. All of them have read, understood and signed the ethical documents. 
Figure 24 Locations of 16 interviews 
 
Table 14 List of 16 interviews with CBOs in Sarawak, Setapak and Penang 
 Date Interviewee Organisation Duration 
1 14 May 2018 Mr Mark Bujang Borneo Resources Institute (BRIMAS) 1.5 hours 
2 14 May 2018 Mr Peter Kallang SAVE Rivers 1.5 hours 
3 15 May 2018 Mr Thomas Jalong Jaringan Orang Asal SeMalaysia [The Indigenous 
Peoples Network of Malaysia] (JOAS) 
1 hour 
4 15 May 2018 Mr Albert Bansa JOAS 0.5 hour 
5 16 May 2018 Mr Jok Jau Evong Sahabat Alam Malaysia [Friends of the Earth, 
Malaysia] (SAM) 
1 hour 
6 16 May 2018 Ms Christina Jelin SAM 0.5 hour 
7 18 May 2018 Mr Michael Jok Society for Rights of Indigenous People Sarawak 
(SCRIPS) 
2.5 hours 
8 18 May 2018 Mantan Pahang  SCRIPS 0.5 hour 
9 22 May 2018 YB See Chee How Sarawakian Access (SACCESS) 1.5 hours 
10 22 May 2018 Mr Wee Aik Pang SACCESS 2.5 hours 
11 24 May 2018 Mr Wong Meng 
Chuo 
Integrated Development for Eco-friendly and 
Appropriate Lifestyle (IDEAL) 
1 hour 
12 26 May 2018 Mr Philip Jau Baram Protection Action Committee (BPAC) 1.5 hours 
13 26 May 2018 Ms Susanna 
Mariam Dom 
Institut Pribumi Malaysia, Sarawak (IPIMAS) 1.5 hours 
14 27 May 2018 Mr Charles Liew BaramKini 2.5 hours 





16 6 June 2018 Ms Vincy Usun BaramKini 2.5 hours 
17 23 & 27 June 
2018 
Mr Anil Netto Aliran Kesedaran Negara [National 
Consciousness Movement Society] (ALIRAN) 
2 hours 
 
5.2.3 Interview Questions 
Questions constructed to achieve RO2 aimed to find out how the CBOs get involved with 
content creation and how much of those are utilising new media.  
RO2) To explore the utilisation of new media platforms by NCR land CBOs in creating contents and 
literacy training to promote their causes. 
Media strategy 
• Media strategy to promote your organisation’s causes and activities. Please describe the 
range and proportion of contents (genres, issues, purpose) provided. 
• How has your CBO’s media strategy changed across time? 
• Who are your past and current media audiences? How has the demography changed?   
• How has the current new media [over-the-top (OTT) video streaming (YouTube), social media 
and multi-devices benefitted your organisation? 
 
RO3 examines the CBOs’ perspectives on Malaysia’s overall media environment. The 
questions ask about their relationship with media organisations especially national 
broadcaster RTM (television and radio), mainstream and alternative media outlet. 
RO3) To establish NCR land CBOs’ perspectives toward Malaysian mainstream and alternative 
media organisations’ performance in representing their advocacy. 
Media representation and reform 
• As far as NCR land is concerned, what do you think of the mainstream television 
broadcasting organisations (RTM, TV3, ntv7, TV8, Astro)? What are the media that you work 
closely with?  
• How have mainstream news reporting portrayed your organisation? 
• How have the overall mainstream and alternative Malaysian media fared as civil society 
actors?  
• Do you believe that media reform should be part of your CBO’s advocacy?  
• Has your CBO participated in any media reform advocacy? How has it fared? 
• What do you think of media’s role in influencing policy?  
 
RO4 aims to explore the extent to which new media play a pivotal role in their internal 
(organisational) operations. The questions also ask about the CBO’s activities with the 
communities in terms of literacy trainings and workshops and the extent that new media 
contribute to them. 
RO4) To determine the extent to which the NCR land CBOs’ organisational processes improved 




• Can you describe your organisational structure? Who are the personnel? How are they 
recruited? 
• What is the membership rate? Are they keen to take up leadership positions? What are the 
recruitment and retention strategies? Is the new media an advantage in that? 
• How do you rate your CBO in grassroots engagement? 
• Who are the people you hope to engage more with? Why? 
Media skills 
• Is there any training offered to your personnel and communities on media literacy skills? 
How has it fared?  
• How has the new media benefitted the empowerment of those skills? 
Nature and governance of organisation 
• How would you describe the nature of leadership and coordination within your CBO? What 
is the level of transparency and accountability within? 
• What are the key internal challenges faced by your organisation? How do you resolve them? 
• What is the strength of your organisation?  
 
Questions designed to achieve RO5 investigate if new media contributed to networking with 
other CBOs (local and foreign) and with other institutional actors including donors and the 
public. 
RO5) To investigate if the new media enhanced the NCR land CBOs’ networking strategies. 
Inter-CSO relations 
• Which are the national / international CSOs that your organisation works closely with? What 
is the nature of this relation? Has the new media any part to play? 
State-civil society 
• Which are the state actors that you work closely with? In which areas? 
• Has new media any role to play in policy influence? 
• What is the level of autonomy from state interference? 
• Any challenges from regulatory bodies? What are the strategies to counter and to avoid 
them?  
• Which other CBOs offered support when your CBO faced legislative challenges? In what 
ways? 
Donor-CSO relations 
• What are the key financial sources? 
• What is the level of autonomy from donor or sponsor interference? 
• Any fundraising? What are the strategies like? How have you utilised media to promote 
fundraising activities? 
 
5.2.4 Advantages and Challenges of the Interviewing Processes 
The key advantage of securing interviews in Sarawak was the background of one of my 
informants, Mr Wan Jau. He is a local and of Kayan descent, part of the Orang Ulu group. He 
shares cultural proximity with many of the interview subjects who are Orang Ulu. He provided 
assistance to establish contacts, some of whom he knew personally. With wife Madam Ledang 
Ngau, he graciously took the researcher to Marudi, a remote town for an interview with 
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Sahabat Alam Malaysia (SAM, Friends of the Earth). Marudi also connects villages and Miri by 
river and road. The road condition required at least a night’s stay before leaving for Miri again. 
Figure 25 Forms of transportation to Marudi 
 
Photo: Private collection 
Due to the community-based operation of the interview subjects, they showed no sign 
of awkwardness or high-power distance with Mr Wan Jau and wife sitting through the 
interviews. The interviewees were very friendly and some even thanked me for interviewing 
them. Mr Wan Jau also provided explanations for any Sarawakian terms that the researcher 
was not familiar of. 
The major constraints were transportation and timing that limited the scope of 
interviews. Due to transportation challenges, the researcher could not make any trip to rural 
longhouses to visit the communities affected by logging or mobilised by the CBOs. A single trip 
in would take an average of eight hours with a skilled driver because the road is primarily used 
by logging trucks. 
Figure 26 Logging road in northern Sarawak 
 
Photo: Sidney Wee (Curtin Sarawak) 
Another challenge is the timing of the interview period where it was close to Harvest 
Festival in early June 2018. Several interviewees rejected the invitation because they would 
travel to celebrate the festival.  
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5.2.5 Data Processing: Thematic Analysis 
All interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. According to Gillham 
(2005), transcription is a form of translation – processing a valid written record of an interview. 
It is legitimate to omit most speech hesitations and paralinguistic features of speech unless 
they qualify meaning. Inaudible speech in the interviews was attributed to background noise, 
thick accent of Sarawakian national language and Kayan dialect. They were marked by square 
brackets in transcription.  
The data were processed using thematic analysis. Clarke and Braun (2017, p. 297) 
defined thematic analysis as “a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns of 
meaning (‘themes’) within qualitative data”. It is a tool unbounded by research paradigms 
useful for capturing both manifest and latent meaning from semi-structured interviews 
(qualitative) and web content analysis (quantitative). The following steps by Braun and Clarke 
(2006, p. 86) are as follow:  
5.2.5.1 Become familiar with the data 
The researcher familiarised herself with the data by reading and re-reading the transcripts. 
The purpose was to identify possible codes. Codes are the smallest units of analysis that build 
themes provide a framework for organising and reporting what the researcher see as 
important in relation to the research question (Clarke and Braun, 2017). The transcriptions 
were cross-checked by Mr Royer Wan who is more familiar with the indigenous languages and 
names of Sarawak rural areas. King and Horrocks (2010) called this stage descriptive rather 
than an interpretative one. Overlapping codes are identified and merged or redefined if 
necessary. 
5.2.5.1 Generate initial codes 
Stage two is interpretive where initial codes are generated by research questions (Maguire & 
Delahunt, 2017). This stage does not require specific theoretical application yet (King and 
Horrocks, 2010). The initial codes after Step 1 are highlighted and numbered for convenience 
purpose. 
Table 15 Initial Codes 
(1) Involved in media 
(2) Media training, youth 
(3) Media training to 
people facing the 
issues directly 
(4) Maintain website 
(14) Approach 
(15) Foreign NGOs 
(16) Pressure to 
government 
(17) Fund application 
(28) Lawyers 
(29) Demography of 
member 
(30) Likes and follows 





(6) Target (to engage 
with) 
(7) Facebook page 
(creating) 
(8) Creating awareness 
among Internet-
connected people 
(9) Resources to maintain 
websites, Facebook, 
Twitter 
(10) Offline participation 
(11) New media and other 
NGOs 
(12) Lead to stronger 
network 
(13) Independence 
(18) New media in joint 
advocacy 
(19) Funding 
(20) New media and fund 
raising 
(21) Press release and 
funding 
(22) Politician and funding 
(23) Political parties 
(24) State challenges 
(25) Strategy 
(26) Assistance from other 
NGOs 
(27) Changes in state 
administration 
(32) Mobilization of 
grassroots 
(33) Challenges in 
mobilizing grassroots 
(34) Organization structure 
(35) Transparency 
(36) Joint press statement 
(37) Other NGOs 
(38) Penan 
(39) Schools and awareness 
(40) Young people 
(41) Leadership training 
(42) Church relationship 
(43) Direction 
5.2.5.3 Search for themes 
Stage three identifies a number of overarching themes that characterise key concepts 
in the analysis. The ‘keyness’ of a theme is on the “recurrent and distinctive features of 
participants’ accounts, characterizing perceptions and/or experiences” (Braun and Clarke, 
2006; King and Horrocks, 2010 p. 150). This stage also requires “thinking about the 
relationship between codes, between themes and between different levels of themes” (Braun 
and Clarke, 2006, p. 89). The researcher identified and highlighted recurring patterns of the 
codes and cluster them by commonality.  
Table 16 Preliminary themes and codes 
1. Communication prior to new media 
2. Media related job scope 
- Content creation 
- Media training 
3. New media 
- Website, blog 
- Facebook page 
- Email, WhatsApp 
- Maintenance of new media 
4. Target of awareness through new 
media 
5. Organisation structure 
- Registration 
- Organisation structure 
- Leadership and transparency 
- Demography of 
members/volunteers/grassroots 
- Leadership training/Capacity 
building 
- Direction  
11. Foreign NGOs 
- Foreign NGOs 
- Fund application 
- Approach/Independence 
- Pressure to government 
12. Other countries and indigenous 
communities 
13. New media in joint advocacy 
14. State challenges 
- State challenges 
- Strategy 
- Assistance from other NGOs 
15. Laws  
16. Other civil society actors 
- Community leaders 
- Political parties/politicians 
- Church  
- Lawyers  
- MTCC 
- SUARAM, SUHAKAM 
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6. Offline and online participation 
- Likes and follows 
- Mobilisation of 
grassroots/Community outreach 
- Challenges in mobilising grassroots 
7. Youth  
- Youth 
- Education as empowerment 
- Schools and universities 
8. Influencing policy 
9. Financial resources/funding 
- Financial resources/funding 
- New media and fundraising   
- Politician and funding 
- Press release and funding 
10. Local NGOs 
- Nature of relations/networking 
- Approach  
- Peninsular NGOs 
- Independence 
- Joint press statement 
 
- Government 
- Changes in state administration 
17. Relationship with Malaysian media 
organisations  
- Representation  
- Media ownership 
- Relationship with media 
organisations 
18. Television 
19. Radio  
20. International media 




- Other issues 
- Civil society 
23. Hopes 
- Hopes in midst of changes 
- Room for improvement  
- Concluding remarks 
 
5.2.5.4 Review themes 
Stage four requires refining the themes by clustering and reducing overlapping themes. A 
common way to organise and present the themes is by linking them in the form of mind map 
diagram. This method is useful to develop a conceptual model of the phenomenon under 
investigation (King and Horrocks, 2010). 




Figure 28 Theme 2: Organisation 
 
 
Figure 29 Theme 3: Institutions 
 
 
5.2.5.5 Define themes 
By defining themes mean “identifying the ‘essence’ of what each theme is about (as well 
as the themes overall), and determining what aspect of the data each theme captures” (Braun 
and Clarke, 2006: p. 92). After another round of reviewing, four themes are finalised. In Theme 
1 Media, respondents gave account of their encounter with mainstream media, new media 
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and international media. Theme 2 Organisation clusters the respondents’ experience running 
or working for a community-based organisation (CBO). Theme 3 Institutions is defined as 
respondents’ encounter with other civil society actors in their CBO operation. Theme 4 Civil 
Society concludes respondents’ vision of what constitutes civil society and their hope.  
Table 17 Final themes and sub-themes 
Media Organisation Institution 
‘Old’ media 
New media 
Content creation and 
media training 












Political parties / politicians 






5.2.5.6 Writing up a thematic analysis 
The themes, sub-themes and codes are discussed and exemplified using direct quotes. The 
link within and between themes will be elaborated in Chapter 6.  
5.3 Online Content Analysis 
To complement the semi-structured interviews undertaken in this research, web 
content analysis was applied to assess the CBOs’ efforts at creating their online presence 
through official platforms. Generally, content analysis method is useful for three types of 
research problems. First, those involving a large volume of text (Neuman, 2003), which refers 
to the web-based platforms from available CBOs. Second, it is helpful when a topic must be 
studied ‘at a distance’ (Neuman, 2003) since the researcher was not present during the CBOs’ 
advocacy activities. Third, content analysis is useful to assess the representation of particular 
groups in society (Wimmer and Dominick, 1994; in Gunter, 2000). This research investigated 
how the CBOs represent themselves through the user-generated and interactive platforms.  
Although by definition a quantitative method, the purpose of content analysis is to 
identify and count the occurrence of specified characteristics or dimensions of texts, and 
through this, to be able to say something about the representations of such texts and their 
wider social significance (Hansen, 1998). For the analytical part, the web content analysis data 
will be triangulated with semi-structured interviews. The web content is chosen based on the 
availability of CBO personnel to be interviewed. This is because content analysis alone cannot 
give all answers to the research questions, but this limitation can be lessened if combined with 
other methods such as surveys and interviews (Kim and Kuljis, 2010).  
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The gap that this research wanted to address is the relationships between web-based 
activities and the CBOs’ organising processes. Semi-structured interviews involved CBOs 
personnel who were hands-on in empowerment and organising activities. Their web-based 
platforms, being open to public, provided hard facts on how the CBOs arranged the 
information in reaching out to a wider range of audiences. The data collected were used to 
assess the CBOs’ user-generated contents in establishing their image, networking and level of 
interactivity with their sites’ visitors. These are complementary with the interviews with CBOs 
personnel. Through interviews, the personnel could express their social experiences from 
their organising work and give opinions regarding the new media environment. This is because 
since CBOs run on a small scale and limited funding, the interviewees might not be the ones 
directly involved with the new media content creation, and vice versa. Therefore, the data 
from both methods complement each other to be triangulated in achieving the research 
objectives (see 5.4). 
The contents of Web-based platforms utilised by NCR land CBOs in advocating their 
mission to the public were analysed to address the following objectives: 
Units of Analysis Research Objectives Purpose 
User Interface Design 
(graphic design, 
information design, 
navigation design) of 
Websites and Blogs  
 
RO2) To explore the utilisation of 
new media platforms by NCR land 
CBOs in creating contents and 
literacy training to promote their 
causes. 
To assess how the overall design, 
contribute coherence toward 




and Facebook posts 
RO3) To establish NCR land CBOs’ 
perspectives toward Malaysian 
mainstream and alternative media 
organisations’ performance in 
representing their advocacy. 
 
RO4) To determine the extent to 
which the NCR land CBOs’ 
organisational processes improved 
using the new media. 
 
RO5) To investigate if the new 
media enhanced the NCR land 
CBOs’ networking strategies. 
To examine if the CBOs utilize the 
new media platforms to be critical 
of mainstream media performance 
and to push for media reform. 
 
To examine the extent to which 
functions in new media encourage 




5.3.1 Website and Blog  
The World Wide Web (WWW) consists of Internet-connected computers called Web 
servers that store electronic documents called Web pages, a significant source of cultural 
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information (Pauwels, 2005). A website is a collection of published pages and sections that 
offer the visitor a variety of experiences or information. Institutional websites particularly of 
political parties or governmental bodies have been studied as “forms and vehicles of self-
presentation, or to assess their democratic or propagandistic character respectively” (Sabin-
Wilson, 2017: pp. 607-608; see Parajuli, 2007).  
A blog is differentiated from websites by its reverse chronological display of content, 
usually short articles called posts (Houghton, 2012; White and Biggs, 2014). They are organised 
by topic where visitor sees the most recent post first. Readers can leave their feedback or 
comments to which the blog post author can respond. Such interactivity is one of the most 
exciting features of blog (Houghton, 2012; Sabin-Wilson, 2017). There are many ready-made 
platforms offering service to host blog accounts with two most popular being Blogspot.com 
and WordPress.com (Houghton, 2012). For example, JOAS and SAVE Rivers used Blogspot 
while BaramKini used WordPress. Most hosting platforms offer unique “themes” and most 
are free. The appearance and usability of the blog can affect how readers will be able to 
interact with it (White and Biggs, 2014).  
5.3.1.1 Creating Coding Categories 
Analysing CBOs’ Website or blog aims to assess the interface design, which requires the 
designer to understand the end user’s habits (Miller, 2011). To achieve a balance between 
fashion and function, web sites and blogs should fulfil three most basic criteria – information 
design, graphic design and navigation design (Newman and Landay, 1999; Shneiderman and 
Plaisant, 2010).  








User Interface Design 
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5.3.1.2 Graphic Design 
Graphic design is how users feel comfortable with the site’s visual elements – colour, images, 
typography and layout. It functions as the first impression of the site. 
Colour Colour supplies feel to the site.  
Image Since users scan sites instead of read, images can replace words and elicit 
emotions from users.  
Animation / 
Multimedia 
Animation or moving icons, if used discreetly, can attract users’ attention. 
For examples, slideshow, audio, video, and live streaming (Gibson and Ward, 
2000) 
 
5.3.1.3 Navigation Design  
Navigation design is about finding one’s way around the information structure (Newman and 
Landay, 1999). Users should feel guided to look for information they wanted without feeling 
frustrated. 
Freshness Sites that are regularly updated will create more interest. 
Blog archives will help reader to navigate through blog posts by chronology. 
Header/Banner It is relatively consistent and establishes the brand of the CBO. 
Pages Menu It displays the main navigation for a site. Often below the header. 
Body/Content The more systematic the body is, the easier the information retrieval gets.  
Sidebar Either contains secondary or links.  
Footer Contains the copyright information or links. 
 
5.3.1.4 Information Design  
Information design refers to the coherence of how contents are structured. The direction of 
information and communication flow (ICF) on a website determines the site’s functionality 
and interactivity with users and external stakeholders (Gibson and Ward, 2000). 
Downward info 
flows  
Downward from the organisation to the individual user.  
Example: Organisational history, Documents, Policies, 
Values/ideology, Structure, Media Releases, Event calendar, 
Frequently asked questions 
Upward info flows  Downward from the user to the organisation. 
Example: Donation, Merchandise 
Horizontal info 
links  
Outward from the organisation to other groups 
Example: Links to alternative/mainstream news, national/ 




Interactive engagement between user and web author 
Example: Site search, Email contact/feedback, Join e-mail list, Join 
online/offline campaign, Membership, Volunteer 
 
As shown in Figures 31 and 32, websites and blogs have different anatomy or layout. The 






































5.3.2 Facebook page 
Facebook is a social networking site initially launched as Face Mash in 2003, before 
changing to The Facebook in 2004 (Phillips, 25 July 2007). Facebook is the most popular choice 
of social networking platform among Malaysians. As of 2018, 97.3% of 24.6 million Malaysians 
owned a Facebook account (MCMC, 2018). Facebook is the first social networking platform 
utilised to mobilise mass support and publicity for Malaysia’s prominent rallies dating back 
from 2007. Until most recently, Malaysia’s 14th general elections in May 2018 were anticipated 
as a Facebook election, considering the political impact of Facebook among Malaysians (Sara, 
28 February 2018).  
The anatomy of a Facebook page is quite standard because of the template. This 
research focuses on the Facebook posts by the CBOs to assess the contents by the genre, 
source and interactivity with users and external stakeholders. 
Figure 33 SAVE Rivers Official Facebook Page 
 
 
Source  Primary source means the post is created by the CBO. Secondary 
source means the post is shared from somewhere else, which can be 
news agency or other CBOs. This category is to assess CBO’s ability to 
create own primary content and inter-CBO relations as secondary 
source. 
Type of Post  The type of item posted can also indicate the literacy level of the 
content creator. For example, to post photos requires less cultural 
capacity than posting self-penned articles. 
Theme of Post 
and Date  
To post content on a Facebook page is fairly easy and can be done 
quite effortlessly multiple times within a day. 
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Due to the absence of issue sampling and the varied page freshness 
for each CBO, the researcher collected posts of 6 months, beginning 
from first day of data collection.  
Theme of post is collected from the titles of both Facebook status 
and post. For example, one may share a news article titled XYZ with 
or without saying anything while posting it, therefore reflecting the 
CBO’s self-representation on certain issues.  
Tagged  Since one can tag another user’s account in a post, to record any 
party tagged is to assess inter-CBO relations. 
Reaction   This function reflects the popularity of each post where users can 
give their reaction through the following actions – Like, Love, Sad, 
Surprised, Amused, Angry, Comment, Share, View. The more 
reactions, the more popular the post is.  
 
5.3.2.1 Sampling 
Convenience sampling was used where the web content was chosen based on the 
availability of CBOs to be interviewed for the purpose of triangulation. Only official websites, 
blogs and Facebook pages are selected as the platforms. Audio-visual materials were opted 
out as they require a different coding method, which is beyond the researcher’s ability.  
Table 18 List of Web-based Platforms for Analysis 
  Official 
Website 
Blog Facebook  
page 
1 BRIMAS /  / 
2 SAVE Rivers  / / 
3 JOAS  / / 
4 SAM /  / 
5 SCRIPS /   
6 SACCESS    
7 IDEAL    
8 BPAC    
9 IPIMAS /   
10 BaramKini  / 
 
11 TAHABAS   / 
There was no specific NCR issue that this research targeted to analyse. The abundance 
of Facebook posts led to the difficulty in determining when and what to analyse. From the 
pilot test, every CBO’s platform had different page ‘freshness’, hence difficult to sample the 
posts by issue. After a comparative study of 19 web content analyses, McMillan (2000) found 
that most studies conducted data collection in one to two months, with the longest being five 
months. For the purpose of data representational quality, the research analysed Facebook 
posts that spanned six months from the first day of data collection. The coding process of 4 
websites, 3 blogs and 5 Facebook pages took 3 weeks to complete. Data presentation and 
analysis were completed in 2 months. Pilot test was conducted to examine the usability of the 
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coding sheets. Categories of Chat Room, Cookies and Links to Research Sites were eliminated 
because of zero data validity.  
5.3.3 Data Processing: Thematic Analysis  
Themes were collected from the CBOs’ organisational details and Facebook posts for the 
following purposes: 
Research Objectives Purpose 
RO2) To explore the utilisation of new media platforms by 
NCR land CBOs in creating contents and literacy training to 
promote their causes. 
RO3) To establish NCR land CBOs’ perspectives toward 
Malaysian mainstream and alternative media 
organisations’ performance in representing their 
advocacy. 
RO4) To determine the extent to which new media 
improved the NCR land CBOs’ organising strategies. 
RO5) To explore how the new media influenced the NCR 
land CBOs’ external relations.  
• To examine the extent to which 
the functions in new media 
encouraged CBOs to reach out to 
internal and external stakeholders. 
• To examine if the CBOs utilise the 
new media platforms to be critical 
of Malaysia’s media environment. 
• To gauge the level of interactivity 
of the web-based platforms. 
 
 
Table 19 shows the initial codes identified after reading the data several times. The initial 
codes were then re-arranged and clustered under preliminary themes before reducing 
overlapping codes. 
Table 19 Initial Codes from CBOs' Web-Based Platforms 
Organisational Details Facebook Posts 
(1) Independence 
(2) Action alert 
(3) Legal assistance 
(4) Support 
(5) Community mapping 
(6) Cultural dignity 
(7) Residents’ Associations 
(8) Alliances 
(9) Land rights 
(10) Identity 
(11) Children’s future 
(12) Environmental justice 
(13) Sustainability 
(14) Awareness 
(15) Environmental reservation 
(16) Non-profit 
(17) Policy lobbying 
(18) Media 
(19) Research & Development 
(R&D) 
(20) Campaigns  
(1) Bill Kayong assassination 
(2) Gawai (Harvest Festival) 
(3) Beach Clean Up 
(4) Sarawak CSO-SDG Coalition 
(5) JOAS Annual General Meeting 
(6) International Women’s Day 
(7) International Day of Action for Rivers 
(8) National Conference on Indigenous Land Rights 
(9) Suing state government 
(10) Disputes 
(11) Protests 
(12) Timber licence 
(13) Native courts 
(14) Corruption 
(15) No to dams 
(16) Arrest of dam developer 
(17) Rally 
(18) Blockade 
(19) Clean water supply 
(20) Plantation 
(21) Land titles 
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(21) Democracy (22) UNDRIP  
(23) Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) 
(24) Party-hopping 
(25) Training  
‘Independence’ indicated the CBOs’ direction, institutionalisation and non-partisan 
approach. ‘Empowerment’ consisted of the CBOs’ activities in educating their subjects and 
also members of the public. ‘Alliances’ showed how well networked the CBOs are at different 
levels. Giving pressures to authority for a change was under ‘Lobbying’. ‘R&D’ referred to 
activities that required higher level of educational capacity to conduct documentation and 
written development proposals to the authority. ‘Media’ showed the CBOs’ relationship with 
media organisations and how they utilise media in their advocacy. The codes are then re-
arranged as shown in Table 20. 
Table 20 Themes from CBOs’ Organisational Details and Facebook Posts 







• Indigenous rights 




• Local, regional, international) 
• Parliamentarians 
• CBOs, NGOs 






• Development model 
• History 




• Media organisations 
• Social media 
Event 
• Workshop, seminar, training 
• Indigenous celebration 
Land 
• Blockades 
• Court hearing 
Rights 
• Voting 
• Water, electricity 
• Road 
Politics 
• Federal government 







From the CBOs’ primary and secondary Facebook posts, five themes were identified. 
‘Event’ signified occasion or celebration with specific purpose. The theme ‘Land’ encompassed 
conflicts related to land directly and involves multiple stakeholders such as the state 
government, timber companies, police and NGOs. ‘Rights-related’ posts concern not only of 
native rights but also of citizenry.  Posts related to ‘Politics’ concerned of expectations toward 
the state government and their transparency.  Posts clustered under the theme ‘Dam’ were 
about objections toward mega dam building, suggestions of hydro dams and news reports 
about the arrest of dam developer. 
5.4 Data Triangulation  
Semi-structured interviews and web content analysis permitted the collection of data 
from different sources for triangulation. In social science, triangulation is defined as “the 
mixing of data or methods” to validate claims or hypotheses (Olsen, 2004; p. 3). For Creswell 
(2003), evidence gathered from triangulation is ‘to build a coherent justification for themes’, 
besides to guarantee the validity and reliability of the ‘findings generated by different data-
collection methods’ and/or of diverse ‘data sources within the same method’ (Burns, 2000; p. 
419). Triangulation is more than validating but to also to deepen and widen one’s 
understanding of the research design and aim (Olsen, 2004). Therefore, data triangulation 
contributes rich and complex conceptualisation of civil society to achieve the following 
research objectives. 
Research Objectives Semi-structured 
interviews 
Web Content Analysis 
RO2) To explore the utilisation of 
new media platforms by NCR land 
CBOs in creating contents and 
literacy training to promote their 
causes.  
Theme 1: New media 
use 
• Graphic design 
• Navigation design 
RO3) To establish NCR land CBOs’ 
perspectives toward Malaysian 
mainstream and alternative media 
organisations’ performance in 
representing their advocacy.  
Theme 1: Media 
training & Media reform 
• Organisational details 
(media training, media 
reform) 
• Source (primary), items & 
themes of Facebook 
posts 
RO4) To determine the extent to 
which the NCR land CBOs’ 
organisational processes improved 
using the new media.  
Theme 2: Organisation • Information design 
(Downward, upward, 
interactive) 
• Organisational details  
• Facebook Reactions 
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RO5) To investigate if the new 
media enhanced the NCR land 
CBOs’ networking strategies. 
  
Theme 3: Institutions • Information design 
(Horizontal) 
• Source (secondary) and 
tags of Facebook posts 
 
The data triangulated will be discussed to fulfil the sixth objective, to draw on the Gramscian 
framework to provide a systematic understanding of the nature of CBOs’ use of new media. 
The explanatory framework to analyse the data is built from the literature reviews in Chapter 
2. 
Research Objectives Semi-structured 
interviews 
Web Content Analysis 
RO6) From the empirical data, to 
provide a systematic 
understanding of the nature of 
CBOs’ use of new media within 
the Gramscian framework.  
Theme 1: Media 
Theme 2: Organisation 
Theme 3: Institutions 
Theme 4: Civil Society 
Literature Reviews 
Theory 
• User interface design 
(coherence) 
• Organisational background 
• Facebook posts (Tag, Source, 
Item, Reaction, Theme) 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter outlines how the research was designed to achieve the second to fifth 
objectives, which in turn addresses the identified research gap. The researcher conducted 
semi-structured interviews with the CBOs personnel as social actors to explore how their 
organising processes have improved using the new media and what potential the new media 
have in their community-based operations. The interview questions were also designed to 
gauge the CBOs’ opinions toward the media industry in Malaysia and the possibility of reform 
for a more realistic and fair portrayal of the indigenous people. Semi-structured interview 
provided an advantage over content analysis where the researcher could probe into areas not 
displayed in the web-based platforms. On the other hand, web-based analysis complemented 
the interviewing method by providing empirical data on how the CBOs represented 
themselves and interacted with users and networked with NGOs of similar movement. 
Thematic analysis was chosen to construct themes from the interviews and the CBOs’ 
organisational details, activities and posts on their official pages. The theoretical analysis is 
supplied by the analytical framework constructed from Gramsci’s notion of civil society and 
literature reviews on the Malaysian media systems, separation of powers and Sarawak’s 
background as an equal partner of the Federation of Malaysia. Overall, the purpose of this 
chapter is to show how the research design provides coherence to the research direction by 
concepts and operationalisation. 
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Chapter 6: User-generated Contents by the CBOs and Their Views on 
the Malaysian Media Systems 
6.1 Introduction 
The media environment in the 1980s and 1990s, during which the land advocacy gained 
momentum, was restrictive. Chapter 2 and 4 have detailed how the development and 
culturalist paradigms conditioned Malaysia’s civil society through, on the one hand, strict 
regulations of private (political) organisations and media; on the other, the normalisation of 
the Malay-Muslim culture to the extent of marginalising others. Chapter 3 outlined the politics 
of Sarawak native customary land that revolved around the federal government’s intervention 
and the indigenous people’s interpretation of their customs. These 3 chapters provided the 
basics of enquiry into the CBOs’ new media uses for land advocacy and how they have 
improved as compared to the time of ‘old’ media. This chapter locates the CBOs’ organising 
activities within the media systems – with available platforms for user-generated content and 
the mainstream media organisations. The purpose is to explore the relationship between new 
media and civil society beyond the deterministic view that media technology is the key factor 
that bring about changes in society (see Chapter 1). 
The presentation and discussion of data gathered in the empirical phase of this research 
project in this chapter aims to meet the following objectives:  
RO2) To explore the utilisation of new media platforms by NCR land CBOs in creating contents 
and literacy training to promote their causes. 
RO3) To establish NCR land CBOs’ perspectives toward Malaysian mainstream and alternative 
media organisations’ performance in representing their advocacy. 
6.2 CBOs’ Encounter with ‘Old’ Media 
Several interviewees, who initiated land advocacy in the 1980s and 1990s, gave 
elaborate answer about ‘old’ media. The most used channels at the time were letter writing, 
fax and telephone, which were limited in transmitting information at a larger scale. As the 
technology advanced, CBOs were able to record audio visual content on CD and VCD, then 
deliver them through anyone from town going to rural kampong (village). Due to the 




Communication sometimes you have to pass through mouths… through 
somebody from…coming to the village to town, then you have a phone in town, 
phone contact, can pass message. [Wong] 
You want to call for a meeting, you actually required the guys to go and 
disseminate information and food. If you are talking about Baram, some guys 
really have to walk a few days to actually try to get people. [YB See] 
These older ways of communication – costly, slow, and an easy target for authority 
surveillance – had implications for the CBOs’ operations. Pang remembered camera roll films 
containing sensitive information could be easily confiscated because they were not as small 
as an SD card. Wong lamented that “the Bakun campaign in the eighties…didn’t get very far 
because of difficulty in communication and transportation.” For Pang, “the remoteness, the 
ruralness of Sarawak benefit the government, the previous government, benefits the loggers 
as well because communication is difficult”. YB See added that SACCESS started off with 
satellite phone, which was donated by a benefactor. Even with that, coverage was limited to 
make a call. They had to “climb some mountains” to minimise obstruction or arrange for time 
to enable synchronisation of reception. Radio call was useful for areas that were really remote. 
Phone calls and fax were tapped by the authority. Wong recalled that IPK invited experts from 
Germany and China to talk on the Bakun issue but both were stopped at the Sibu airport. 
6.3 New Media and User-Generated Contents 
6.3.1 Website and Blog 
Before the Internet became popular in Malaysia in the late 1990s, YB See recalled “[t]he 
Internet then was you have to wait for the satellite to go across your country, then you get 
some access.” Most interviewees (Thomas, YB See, Wong, Anil, Lawai, Vincy, Pang, Mark and 
Peter) agreed new media platforms such as website, Facebook, blog and WhatsApp provide 
great potential to create awareness and to enhance inter-CSO relations. However, they 
admitted they lacked the capacity to maintain the platforms. Some would rather empower 
land-affected communities than to educate the general public. To Wong, new media are useful 
to target younger, more affluent people in urban areas. Smart phones enabled the CBOs to 
reach out to wider range of audiences.  
Thomas noticed his own children are adept at using smart gadgets for school work 
purposes because they were exposed to digital literacy. To Peter, young people need more 
exposure because they are detached from their community, origin and culture. The usual 
caveat, however, is conscientiousness. According to Mark, while some felt angry, some were 
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indifferent and said it was useless to fight because the government was too strong. Ramould 
lamented that youths were no guarantee to being TAHABAS’ future leaders. If they were not 
interested in TAHABAS programmes, despite being announced online, they would think of 
many “excuses” to be absent. As for the older generation, Peter emphasised different 
materials were important for them to understand easily, such as animation and short videos. 
Similarly, Albert said that JOAS cannot only focus on news but to produce other contents like 
songs. 
Lawai and Vincy aimed to reach out to Chinese-speaking audiences through BaramKini 
blogs. Lawai explained that he is more confident in the Chinese language. Furthermore, he 
realised that his friends, mostly Chinese, knew little about Sarawak indigenous groups. Vincy 
added that BaramKini blogs, one of them in the Malay language, can widen the range of 
audiences as there are many English-language informational sites about Sarawak indigenous 
people. 
When Mark joined BRIMAS in 1998, the Internet and email were not fully utilised. Until 
he saw their potential, he started BRIMAS website using free blogsite. Mark admitted BRIMAS 
did not have someone to monitor current issues, upload them to the website and handle 
public enquiry. The website was last updated in 2011.  
For this reason, the BRIMAS website design can be easily distinguished from 
contemporary ones (see Figure 34). Its Header displayed BRIMAS slogan in Malay and English 
languages – “Our Land Our Life Our Heritage”. The website was created using 50MEGS, a free 
web host. The icons ‘Sign In’ required password from BRIMAS members while ‘Sign Up’ led to 
choosing a new domain name either by purchase or free. The website did not have Pages 
Menu, Sidebar and Footer. The welcome note briefly introduced BRIMAS while the next line 
invited users to click on any images for more details. However, a comic depicting a group of 
indigenous people (Image I) did not lead to pointer for link select. Similarly, the list of updates 
and publications was inaccessible. The only interactive information was Email Contact and 
BRIMAS’s address.     
The overall page has more weight on the left with a total of three text boxes. On the 
right, three images were aligned at the centre and far apart from each other. The first was the 
BRIMAS logo. A click on it automatically downloaded 15 presentation slides about BRIMAS 
background and activities. The second image led to a download of an eight-page document 
on Dayak’s Interpretation of Native Customary Rights Land (1999). The third icon was a link to 
alternative news blog, Sebana Menoa, last updated in 2012. 
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Figure 34 Screenshot of BRIMAS Web Page 
    
For IPIMAS, website was visually attractive due to its wooden texture and depth. The 
header was garnished by spotlights to metaphorically focus users’ attention to it. The 6 photos 
on the homepage had no caption to help users understand them. Out of the 4 items on 
Navigation – Home, About, Projects and Contact – none was complete except for Email 
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but they led to blank pages. According to the founder, Susanna, IPIMAS has only 2 full-time 
staff including herself. They hire contract-based employee to manage media contents if there 
is any project. 
Figure 35 Screenshot of IPIMAS Web Page  
 
BaramKini blogs were maintained by volunteers from different backgrounds – 
salesperson, photographer, animator, and graphic designer. Vincy said that BaramKini treated 
blogs as information sharing platforms because they preferred face-to-face interaction so that 













Figure 36 Screenshot of BaramKini Web Page (Malay-language) 
 
BaramKini’s Malay-language blog showed a contemporary design and organised layout. 
An image of traditional Kenyah (a minority Orang Ulu group) wood carving was placed as the 
Header against the white background without cluttering the page. The Navigation bar offered 









and Indigenous People. The Search Box, Categories, Recent Posts, Archives and article tags 
enabled better identification of information. 
For Peter, internet access is like a double-edged sword. Those who migrated from village 
to town would have more access to the internet. This is attributed to deforestation where the 
communities’ livelihood was affected. Peter said it is lucky to find 30 to 40 per cent of the 
population still residing at his village, which in turn has no internet access. Wong opined that 
migration may not be a bad thing after all. There are more than 30,000 Iban working in Johor 
and Kuala Lumpur. Those who are better informed can spread the awareness to their village 
communities each time they return for Harvest Festival. Ramould believed that sharing 
information through the Internet enhances relationships between like-minded organisations. 
According to Thomas, JOAS blog and Facebook page are not only targeting the public, 
but also decision makers. With more coverage from alternative media like Malaysiakini, the 
awareness toward the plight of NCR land increased. In the 1980s and 1990s, Peter said that 
people were even afraid to talk about land issues, let alone attend forum or seminar. Now 
Peter has a group of youths who maintain SAVE Rivers blog and Facebook page. Though 
working on a voluntary basis, they are very enthusiastic nevertheless.  
Browsing the SAVE Rivers blog required scrolling down a long stretch, which is 
discouraging to user attention. The blog was more on SAVE Rivers empowerment activities 
than its organisational background, which served as the Header. The blog posted a collage of 
trees and waterfall images as the Header background. The main colour is white. The blog was 
last updated in April 2018, four months apart from data collection period in August 2018. The 
blog articles are posted in full, interchangeably display images. Users can comment at the end 
of article and can share it via platforms such as Gmail and Facebook. The blog allows 
interaction with, and information sharing by, the public. Widgets displayed are Gmail, 
Blogspot, Twitter, Facebook, Pinterest and Google+.  
SAVE Rivers was established in 2012, which is also reflected in their highest number of 
articles in the same year, at 192. Blog Archive is in the Sidebar. The number of blog posts 
dwindled drastically from 2012 (192), 2013 (42) and then less than 10 each following year. The 




Figure 37 Screenshot of SAVE Rivers Blog 
 
 
JOAS, as a network of over 100 CBOs, has a media team dedicated to updating their 
website, Facebook account and Twitter. Despite that, JOAS’s new media management is 
rather limited. From the interview with Mr Thomas Jalong, it was evident that he is also the 
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about the connection between CICOM’s role and JOAS’ online presence, he answered that 
CICOM is only documenting information for communities’ use, not for public display and had 
nothing to do with the JOAS blog. From the interview and the blog analysis, there is lack of 
coherence between similar roles that each platform can interchange.  
It is understandable that JOAS’ main colour is green to associate the network with 
environment. Three shades of green were used to differentiate between Background, Body 
and Contributors. For a contemporary user, freshness plays an important role to decide his or 
her surfing activity. Using light olive green as the Background colour without texture or 
maximising the horizontal space lacks vibrancy to user experience. The JOAS blog was last 
updated as far back as 2012. The blog archive shows that from 2008 to 2012, the highest 
number of posts was in 2010 with 27 posts. 
Like SAVE Rivers, JOAS also posts its Organisational Background in the Header. There is 
no Pages Menu below the Header. On the Sidebar, one can click into the four Contributors 
profiles; followed by a song’s lyrics, called the Struggle of Original Peoples and its video. Other 
icons are Mail Circulation and Official Media Release. The Body features articles in full but with 
inconsistent font type, margin and spacing, making the readability hard. It indicates that the 
text is copied directly from Word Document and pasted to the blog without much adjustment. 
JOAS blog lacks functions to allow interaction or calls for action from the public. The only 
interactive feature in the blog is where users can post comment at the end of each article. At 
the end of the page, there are links to 4 similar NGOs – BRIMAS, Centre for Orang Asli (COAC), 
Partners of Community Organisations (PACOS Trust) and Sarawak Dayak Iban Association 
(SADIA). However, only links to BRIMAS and COAC are accessible.  
For TAHABAS, as part of the JOAS network, Ramould claimed that the website is useful 
for those who have no physical office. He added that TAHABAS does not have their own 
website because they are not skilled enough to handle it and they think that it is better to 




Figure 38 Screenshot of BRIMAS Blog 
 
The Marudi branch of Sahabat Alam Malaysia (SAM) also practised information 
standardisation where they only supply information to the head office in Penang for further 
processing before being put up to the SAM official website. However, Jok Jau admitted that 
they have sent less and less materials over due to lack of funding to run programmes and the 
fact that SAM is responsible for environmental issues all over Malaysia.  
SAM is a pro-environmental organisation formed in 1977. SAM is among the earliest 
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personalities who had worked with SAM are lawyer activist Mr Harrison Ngau and Mr Thomas 
Jalong. SAM is also a member of Friends of the Earth International (FOEI). 
The website layout gave an impression that SAM is a well-established organisation. 
White background and clear spacing contribute to its contemporary and minimalistic look. The 
Header, Navigation and Feature give a consistent and united identification to users about 
SAM. Using moving images as Feature attracts users’ attention. The number of colours is kept 
at 4 with green and white being the main ones, followed by burgundy and black as text colour. 
Burgundy is associated with maturity while black can be stimulating and enhance surrounding 
colours when used in limited quantities (Chapman, 2014 p. 38). 
SAM website fulfilled all criteria in the coding categories of Graphic and Navigation 
Design. A click on the Header led to the Media page, listing news releases like press statement 
and letter to the Editor. As a matter of fact, contents under Media and Home pages were the 
same. 
On the Sidebar, five functions are listed. The first is to key in an email address to Join 
their updates list. Next are the Join and Donate icons. Join leads to SAM’s About Us page while 
on the Donate page, one can key in personal details and amount to donate. The second half 
of the Sidebar displays social media links – to Like SAM Facebook page and to read Tweets by 
@SahabatAlamMsia. One can also view them on Twitter or embed them on one’s own Twitter 
Timeline. 
Vertically, up to twelve articles are arranged before users reach the bottom page before 
continuing to the next 40 pages of information. Each article is featured in the first or second 
paragraphs and if interested, users can click the Read More button. The user can add their 
reaction (Like) or share it via Facebook, Tweet and Google Plus. 
An area of improvement is in the arrangement and layout of articles on the Home page. 
Since users scan more than read webpages, it is useful to only post the headlines and images 
by symmetrical 3-grid layout. The sharing functions can be more immediate and 
straightforward without navigating users to a new page of the full article. Similarly, the Search 
function can be a permanent figure on the sidebar without having it on Navigation that leads 
user to another page. 
While it is wise to place Join and Donate on the right sidebar, SAM website seems to be 
less empathetic toward where users can be directed to next. Clicking Join leads to About Us 




Figure 39 Screenshot of SAM Web Page (About Us) 
 
On the other hand, the Donate icon appears on both Sidebar and Navigation. The first 
line of the Donate page writes “No bank account: This page will not work until you add a bank 
account”. SAM fixes the dollar currency for donation and a dropdown lists a wide range of 
countries, targeting people from all over the world. However, the more international the 
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in bank account details and disclaimer on the extent to which the contributions are tax 
deductible by country. Overall, the SAM website has issues in need of resolution, especially 
related to supplying users with concise information.  
As Jok Jau the Marudi branch coordinator noted at interview, SAM covers entire 
Malaysia’s environmental matters. The coverage of Sarawak news depends much on the 
delivery of materials from Marudi to the headquarter in Penang to be processed before being 
uploaded to the website. Without much budget to run activities, materials from the Marudi 
branch declined recently. While information centralisation standardises an NGO’s image, it 
cannot be fully beneficial to the Marudi branch unless they have equal funding for their 
operation.  
There are three observations that can be made from this arrangement between Penang 
and Marudi offices. First, members in the Marudi office are not well-versed in media literacy 
like composing articles, hence their raw materials only consist of photos. Second, the Marudi 
office has lower resources to go about Sarawak where they are confined to areas close by, 
such as Baram and Miri. Third, from the interview, it was apparent that, raw materials are 
subject to approval by the Penang head office before being posted on the website or 
Facebook. Therefore, it is unknown what type of materials have already been edited or 
disapproved.  
Nevertheless, new media platforms, to Jok Jau, are important to provide information 
and increase awareness among non-natives, especially those living urban lifestyle in 
Peninsular Malaysia. In Kuala Lumpur, Lawai conducted sharing sessions through talk and 
photography exhibition to encourage trips to longhouses.  
Vincy was the Editor for BaramKini blogs and Tweeter. Besides that, Vincy used to write 
for TaipanRainforest.com, which along with one of the BaramKini blogs, was in the Chinese-
language. Vincy added that another reason for targeting Chinese-speaking audiences is to 
include those of Taiwan and China because these countries, including Japan, are the key 
buyers of logs from Sarawak. Wong also used to write for TaipanRainforest.com and they did 
a lot of translation work, mainly on reports and articles by the Bruno Manser Fund (BMF) and 
Sarawak Report into the Chinese language.      
Several interviewees perceived the Website, blog or Facebook post as a form of self-
pride, on the one hand, or an institutionalisation burden, on the other. Founder of SCRIPS, 
Michael said that they do not really go through the media. He believed in his personal network 
as a former priest. Nevertheless, they are committed in engaging with people outside Sarawak 
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like BERSIH, Asian Indigenous People Pact (AIPP), Human Right Commission of Malaysia 
(SUHAKAM) and the United Nations (UN). They also presented their work to the European 
Union and managed to get projects from foreign countries like Germany and the United 
States.  
Figure 40 Screenshot of SCRIPS Home Page 
 
The main colour of SCRIPS website was olive green, in dark and light shades. The Pages 
Menu was above the Header. The Menu consisted of Home, About Us, Programmes, Meetings, 
Representations and Contact. 
On the Home Page, the text boxes were clearly defined by black and white outline. 
Moving images were put to visualise Vision. There was no Feature and no Sidebar. The website 
concentrated on downward information such as organisational activities and values. There 
was only one feature of interactive information flow, which was email contact. There were 









three social media icons on the Footer – Facebook, Twitter and Google Plus. However, they 
did not lead to any other SCRIPS’ accounts but to Wix, the website template provider.  
The website was last updated as far back as 2014. Michael, the coordinator, said that 
the purpose of setting up the website was to apply for funds as a proof of SCRIPS’ activities. 
The website was done by a fellow Malaysian residing in Singapore. Michael opined that 
SCRIPS’ undertake 30 to 50 offline actions, per year, yet there was little time to update the 
website. They were also less than keen to keep publishing what they have done, giving answer 
like “there is nobody to do it”. Furthermore, Michael did not have much confidence in new 
media to reach out to the grassroots. With the current Sarawak Chief Minister, Abang Johari’s 
plan to digitise Sarawak’s economy, Michael said that Abang Johari will most likely lose the 
coming state election in the year 2021. This is because a lot of the villagers are aged and 
illiterate. Although they at least know how to use the hand phone, they still prefer to consult 
the village headman whenever they faced difficulties.  
This opinion coincided with that of Wong, the founder of IDEAL. He said that capitalising 
on the Internet mainly occured among the NGOs, not the community. Wong attributed former 
government’s election success in rural areas to the lack of digital access to and literacy of 
alternative information. Another CBO that had no online platform is SACCESS, which YB See 
explained: 
Yeah. We don’t. Because we want it to be a loose organisation, it’s just a name 
and then we get all the others to be involved, but not really using SACCESS as an 
entity to them to carry out all this because that is not necessary. So, …. that’s how 
we function.  
Figure 41 Screenshot of Hornbill Unleashed website 
 
However, SACCESS did capitalise on the digital evolution by starting Keluan and Hornbill 
Unleashed websites. They worked it with the late Mr Sim Kwang Yang (former Opposition 
146 
 
Member of Parliament for Kuching, Sarawak) and treated the websites as additional tools. 
Still, the principle of not promoting SACCESS stayed. Hornbill Unleashed was used more as an 
archive for legal cases. Because SACCESS realised that to fight for all these land rights, they 
had to do it locally. That was the time where the BMF was really strong with advocacy outside 
Malaysia and SACCESS felt that the movement should be from the communities themselves 
rather than using a foreign platform. Furthermore, it would expose SACCESS and other CBOs 
to more government suppression and accusation that they got paid by a foreign entity to 
smear government’s reputation. 
Among all interviewees, Pang gave an extensive account on his first hand involvement 
dabbling with newer forms of communication during his studies in Australia. He got to know 
about Pactok, a group of people who provided email service to “Pacific Islanders, NGOs and 
communities, who were mainly involved in social justice issues as well.” Pactok was linked 
with Pegasus, one of the very few global internets like Green Net in the United Kingdom.  
However, Pang pointed out that only elite NGOs like the World Wide Fund for Nature 
(WWF) Malaysia and Malaysian Nature Society (MNS) had the privilege to link up with Pegasus 
or the Green Net. Only NGOs with resources were able to send out information and become 
known internationally. Smaller groups like IDEAL were less well known for their advocacy 
cause and subject.  
With information technology coupled with outsiders’ awareness, the Penan mass 
protest in the 1980s got to break into the international spotlight that subsequently pressurised 
the Malaysian government. Pang strongly believed that information is power.  
I think at that time, we were in a very oppressive environment, yah, politically, 
socially. So, you are talking about an era where in terms of State Assembly 
Sarawak, State Assembly, there were hardly any Opposition. And then of course 
in West Malaysia, you also have limited Opposition, and we only have one MP who 
is from Bandar Kuching, who was the only one, who take up this issue in public. 
So, you have a situation whereby if you are known internationally, and so you get 
to be known because you have the resources and you have the link up with 
technology … So, one of the first thing to do was to provide a better 
communication…and secured, security was a big issue. So, you have the political 
atmosphere, you have the social environment and then you have the issues of 
control, so technology was one of the ways to break a little bit of the hole. 
The initial stage to utilising information technology was not easy either, added Pang. To 
link with Pegasus, one had to call TELEKOM, which Pang described as “very clumsy, very 
expensive, very inefficient.” However, with TELEKOM being the sole telecommunication 
service provider in Malaysia, they had not much choice. Modem price at the time was also 
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very expensive, making it a luxury to own one despite the slow speed. Pang recalled that he 
has a rock star-cum-producer friend in Australia who helped raise fund through his concerts 
and short films about Sarawak land rights so that they could buy a modem. 
Email and then news group not only allowed higher capacity of communication flow, but 
also linked similar NGOs in Malaysia such as some Orang Asli groups in Sabah. They soon 
enjoyed faster and cheaper technology with internet provider service, TMNet system by 
TELEKOM. They stopped Pactok because there was no need for it. Furthermore, 
communication became more secured with encryption where authorities no longer could spy 
on it. Pang then worked with IDEAL, the first group to set up a website called Rengah Sarawak 
with the purpose of sending larger scale of information to wider audiences. He was in charge 
of organising the information contributed by IDEAL. Some friends helped with the backroom 
elements and template design. Pang recalled how much easier it was to cut-and-paste articles 
to Rengah Sarawak.  
Similar with Hornbill Unleashed, Pang clarified that Rengah mentioned little of SACCESS 
because they were only the facilitator, bridging the community with other forms of support. 
Since SACCESS is not a big NGO, there is no need to promote themselves, which Pang named 
it the “bandwagon of popularism”. SACCESS may occasionally provide information to 
researcher groups from the University of Sarawak, Malaysia (UNIMAS). Otherwise, they think 
that it is best to approach the community directly. SACCESS is after “specific target, specific 
support and specific action to assist the community” like providing legal assistance to 
communities arrested for setting up blockades. For them, the effort of maintaining website to 
let the public know what is happening does not lead to their aim. Citing an example,  
“If you are WWF, you need to promote yourself, you are doing goodies and so on, 
you have an institution that are so big, then you need to craft this, you have a team 
of social media people and so on and so forth.” [Pang] 
Depending on the contexts, Pang thought that a change in the Malaysian media 
environment has already allowed more output in land issues, like reporting on court cases. 
Unlike now, mainstream media in the 1990s were very much oppressed with strong self-
regulation. After careful consideration, it was concluded that the pros to close down the 
Rengah website outweighed the cons. Since there were “more and more groups coming up 




6.3.2 Email, Facebook and WhatsApp 
Among all platforms, email was least spoken about by respondents. Except for Aliran, 
Anil said that they have a mailing list to email newsletter. However, he admitted that people 
now prefer to receive news via phones using WhatsApp. Although they continue with their 
website, they also share their Website articles through WhatsApp, Facebook, Twitter and “a 
bit of Instagram”. Creating WhatsApp groups is useful to link up people, as also noted by Philip, 
Susanna and Ramould. 
Peter added that social media apps made it convenient and effective for them to contact 
reporters. WhatsApp is secured and can be easily installed to smart phones even by villagers. 
The best part is that they could converse in their own dialect: 
I think practically all the villagers in Baram, that I come to contact with, they have 
their own WhatsApp group, like my village Long Ikang, we have a WhatsApp group. 
We even have a WhatsApp group based on our dialect, like Lubo’ Tau. Yeah. Lubo’ 
Tau group, and of coz my mother is half Lubo’ Tau. Lubo’ Tau is Kenyah dialect 
from Bammoh, you can find them in Indonesia and all that. So, in our Lubo’Tau 
group group, we have Indonesians as well. [Peter] 
Mark encouraged BRIMAS to set up a Facebook page although he was not in charge of 
it. Facebook made it a lot easier to upload short videos.  
Figure 42 Screenshot of BRIMAS Facebook Page 
 
BRIMAS Facebook page was last updated in 2016 with 5 posts between 22 December 
2015 and 22 June 2016. The earliest 3 posts had 4 to 5 months’ gap in between. The 5 posts 
consist of 2 press statements, 1 photo, 1 news article and 1 feature article. All the 5 posts were 
from secondary sources – a national political party, local news service, a photographer and 
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UK-based newspaper, The Guardian. The most 2 recent posts were for the same cause, to 
show solidarity toward the assassination of a native rights activist, Mr Bill Kayong. 
Comparatively with their website, SAM Facebook page has more active posting with few 
posts in a day on a daily basis. The page freshness and background of SAM may be a 
contributor to the number of likes and follows at 5,763 and 5,825 respectively, which was 
about 4 times higher than those of BRIMAS. SAM Facebook established its responsiveness to 
messages by stating they typically reply within a day, which encouraged interactivity. SAM also 
pinned a disclaimer post to state its policy regarding the posting of unacceptable comments 
on its page.  
Figure 43 Screenshot of SAM Facebook Page 
 
The data collected spanned 6 months from 25 February 2018 to 25 August 2018, with a total 
of 251 posts. Only 9 posts (3.6%) are about Sarawak. The number of posts from primary 
sources was 4, in the form of photos. They were regarding plantation encroachment on NCR 
land in Baram, New Malaysia, workshop and community nurseries. The New Malaysia photo 
garnered most responses with 45 Likes and 31 shares. 
SAVE Rivers Facebook page was also more active in posting items and interactive with 
users than their blog.  With the Reviews function, visitors could recommend and review the 
page, which would add rating to SAVE Rivers. As of August 2018, the rating was 5.0 based on 




Figure 44 Screenshot of SAVE Rivers Facebook Page 
 
From 9 March to 26 August 2018, there were 81 posts from a variety of sources. Only 
23 posts were about Sarawak, with 12 of them were from primary sources. Similar with SAM, 
primary sources consist of a majority photo (75%). This pattern could be attributed to SAVE 
Rivers’ lack of resources such as research skills, finance and human capital. On the other hand, 
SAVE Rivers shared articles from a variety of secondary sources, which included news 
organisation and similar NGOs such as Free Malaysia Today, Malaysiakini, Borneo Post and 
Borneo Project. 
For JOAS Facebook, an impressive 52 posts were about Sarawak, out of 128 in total 
collected from 22 February to 24 August 2018. Like other CBOs, JOAS was more active through 
Facebook than website or blog. 




The duration of data collection covered an annual event, International Day for the World’s 
Indigenous Peoples (PHOAS). In the 6 months, 31 posts were on PHOAS, mainly in the form of 
pictures. National broadcaster RTM also covered the event by video, the only involvement by 
RTM as the primary source among all samples’ Facebook posts. This concurred with the 
interview data where RTM has always been conservative to broadcast any matters regarding 
NCR land, regardless of television or radio channels. Similar with other CBOs’ form of primary 
expression, all JOAS’ 42 primary posts consisted of photos (85.7%) and videos (1.43%). 
Figure 46 Figure: Screenshot of TAHABAS Facebook Page 
 
TAHABAS had only one Facebook page as their web-based platform. Their organisational 
information was written under the heading ‘Mission’ but provided no contact details. 
TAHABAS posted 7 times between 19 April 2016 and 1 September 2016. Out of the 7 posts, 4 
were motivated by the assassination of Mr Bill Kayong. TAHABAS shared an obituary message 
from the Sarawak Indigenous Youth Network on 22 June 2018, which gained the highest 
numbers of responses – 100 ‘Likes’ and 9 ‘Sads’.   
Philip, Susanna and Ramould opined that the number of Likes did not translate to the 
number of people in offline activities. For Susanna, conservation needs time, not only a day 
or two, like voting. With social media, Pang thought that “the information has been drastically 
democratised. Previously, it was in the hands of very few, the educated, the well income.” 
Wong and Anil believed that WhatsApp and WeChat played important role in influencing 
public opinion before the general elections in May 2018.  
…even if [the villagers] can’t write, they can use photographs, you know, to use 
smart phones. Or if they don’t have internet access, they can get in the 
photographs first, giving the natives that own phones….one of the representatives 
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that own phones. Erm and using that to spread photographs, at least, what’s 
happening. [Anil] 
And more, more for the other community, more urban community, more info 
about the indigenous people problem. In the beginning, when I went around, 
nobody bothers about this. We get pressured from both sides, from the 
community leaders, as well as from the outside, the urban area. “They are not 
worth our support”, the Chinese are saying this. And later on, more and more 
people began to understand this why is this being prayed in church. Now we go 
around, they will still show some sympathy. [Wong] 
Susanna said she will look into the possibility of IPIMAS setting up own Facebook page. 
This is because the community they were working with was still learning to use smart phones.  
Vincy, a former journalist offered a very interesting view regarding social media. She 
lamented that there is lack of community media in Malaysia instead, and how they are not 
equivalent to Facebook and WhatsApp. To her, although now the number of platforms has 
increased, the CBOs only know how to use them for announcements or to get something 
done, which really restricts the reach of people they want to educate or inspire. They do not 
know how to highlight certain issues, or at least enlighten the readers on why such issues are 
important. The focus has been on their organisation or supporters. Even for that, the 
supporters are a duplicate. Although Facebook is popular, it takes effort to boost a post. 
Hence, to Vincy, the CBOs are the platform, not the media they use: 
 “... Because there’s no really the media people in their organisation, they run their 
media not by media way, they run their organisation by the activist way. Like you 
want to pop up some issues, other than press release, you just go to rally, that’s 
the activist way. Your information is not sharing among yourselves, the 
information what you want to bring up, voice out to those authority or public. But 
it is like one way. Press release. You are not…so this is kind of activist way.” 
Vincy added that the convenience of setting WhatsApp groups lead to a mushroom of 
similar groups. Among groups that she is a member of are Polling and Counting Agents (PACA), 
PKR DUN (State Assembly), Suara Keadilan [Voice of Justice, PKR’s official newspaper], and 
Stop Baram Dam. Although they are useful to spread information, members are also 
bombarded by “not very helpful feedback” like “I agree”, “OK” and “Good”. Others who have 
not checked the messages regularly would miss out and have to scroll up again for the context 
of responses. When this happens too many times, she does not bother to read anything with 
interest but only remains in the groups. Same goes with Peter who got annoyed when certain 
NGOs keep including him as a member although he left their groups many times. During the 
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election, he received about 6,000 messages; he had to delete them all. On average, he receives 
700 to 800 messages from NGOs that he thinks are bogus.  
6.3.3 Miscellaneous Content Creation and Media Training 
Facebook is part of the user-generated platforms besides blogs and Websites. Although 
the interface and template are convenient to user, the five CBOs’ official Facebook pages 
indicated their facing internal constraints in fully utilising social networking sites. Both BRIMAS 
and TAHABAS Facebook pages respectively had less than 10 posts in 6 months. On the other 
hand, the type and theme of posts show that content creation skills among the CBOs are 
imbalanced in targeting audiences of low and high literacy level. Posts in the form of videos 
and photos garnered the highest number of responses while event-based posts are most 
popular for both primary and secondary sources. The events include Bill Kayong’s assasination, 
Gawai (Harvest festival), workshops, conferences, meetings and announcements. Posts 
directly related to land are mostly from secondary source such as news agencies.  They 
concern of suing state government, disputes, protest, plantation, timber company, rally, 
blockade, Land Code, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIP), Sarawak Timber Industry Development Corporation (STIDC), timber license, and 
NCR land titles. Posts that require higher literacy skills to produce and to comprehend like 
feature articles or interviews are mostly from secondary source; news organisations or foreign 
NGOs. 
Several CBOs mentioned in the interviews that their research and documentation 
activities involved community mapping (BRIMAS), oral history (SCRIPS) and proposing dam 
alternatives (SAVE Rivers). The websites of BRIMAS, SAM and SCRIPS stated ‘research and 
development’ in terms of development model, oral history, and state laws. However, the 
themes lobbying, media and research and development (R&D) were least mentioned in 
Organisational Background. These three areas required higher resources. Only SAM and SAVE 
Rivers conducted lobbying in law, policy and reforms. From the web-based platforms, none of 
the CBOs mentioned media training provided for the communities or volunteers. Only two 
CBOs mentioned media in their Organisational Background. SAM “work closely with media” 
while BaramKini encouraged their blog visitors to share their articles via social media. 
When Mark joined BRIMAS, he was in charge of researching palm oil biopiracy. He later 
proceeded to land rights issues and conducted community mapping as a geologist graduate. 
BRIMAS also trained their youths in video documentation and photography. Videos that were 
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not too heavy could be uploaded and understood easily. In terms of training affected 
communities, they were taught the basics of taking photos and videos. The communities sent 
those materials to someone in town to edit and write captions before being posted to social 
media.  
Albert would call up JOAS Youth group and get them involved to take pictures at events. 
Thomas added that the villagers were also taught the basics of citizen journalism. They should 
at least know the details to document – the location of trespass and name of plantations or 
logging companies. However, Thomas was well aware of JOAS’ limitation in terms of 
consistency and location coverage. Thomas said that it also depended on how much the young 
ones from town could really witness any critical situation every time they return to their 
villages. The Communities’ Information and Communication Centre (CICOM), also headed by 
Thomas, assisted in documentation of issues faced by the communities although in the Baram 
and Belaga areas. CICOM also disseminated relevant information to the affected communities.  
  
Albert showing some of the publications done by JOAS where he contributed in taking photos and writing. 
According to Jok Jau, organisations like United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
trained the SAM staff to manage media platforms. For Philip and Lawai, it was harder to 
conduct training in villages with limited power and coverage. BaramKini faced difficulty each 
time they wanted to show videos through projector at remote villages.  
Michael from SCRIPS did a more extensive form of documentation; oral history. Those 
contributing are all above sixty years of age and they still had strong memory of, for example, 
the Japanese occupation era in the 1940s. SCRIPS double-checked their accounts before 
finalising the facts. Michael is currently writing a book on Orang Asli and offered community 




Community mapping from SCRIPS’ oral history data 
Ramould lamented that communities should also be taught on national administration 
matters related to the judiciary, the executive and legislation to reduce dependency on 
politicians. He thought that media should educate citizens to be knowledgeable about their 
constitutional rights.  
A common content produced by respondents for public distribution was press release. 
Mark, Peter, and Philip managed media relations; wrote press statements, letters and memos. 
JOAS, SAM, SCRIPS, and IPIMAS still publish information in the form of printed brochures, 
books, reports and maps. They were more for internal distribution, due to lack of funds. 
Wong and Vincy contributed articles to Malaysiakini and column in a mainstream daily. 
Vincy also had two years experience of special reporting in Chinese-language daily, Nanyang 
Siang Pau and on a Buddhist magazine, which was distributed to Taiwan. On the other hand, 
IDEAL tried to reflect the opinion of the communities as close as possible. IDEAL tape recorded 
any information collected from the communities to be included to their articles. 
According to Pang, Wong’s first organisation, IPK tried to publish newsletter but could 
not get the permit. They had to get lawyers to define the term newsletter – basically “taking 
up newspaper from different sources, we re-produced it. And then send it to a select group of 
people.” However, the Registrar of Societies (RoS) claimed that IPK as a Sibu-based 
organisation, should not hold any talk in Kuala Lumpur and de-registered IPK. Pang added that 
now the Penans knew how to video themselves facing the loggers and the police. In the past, 
the loggers were able to commit heinous crimes such as rape and nobody would know. To 
Pang, communication technology liberated the control of information. Once, SACCESS trained 
the villagers to write basic facts but lacked success because of the villagers’ low literacy level. 
They were also provided with laptops and taught basic computing like Word Processing and 
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Spreadsheet use. While media training was indeed important for citizen journalism, Pang 
stressed that being practical and realistic about the villagers’ capacity was equally important.  
Although BaramKini did not provide any media training to the villagers, Vincy hoped to 
accomplish this through community media projects. She recently attended a community 
media workshop organised by the French government. She was the only representative from 
BaramKini and Malaysia. She stressed that NGOs should only assist the communities in 
teaching them the skills while the content should be run in a systematic media style. The rural 
people need to empower themselves by their own way, unlike attending a campaign or 
seminar organised by an NGO only few times a year. 
Anil from Aliran provided media training through a Young Writers’ Workshop. He was 
also aware that such a workshop attracted the same market; the urban dwellers. He estimated 
the retention rate to be one-third of workshop participants who stayed on to contribute 
articles to Aliran website. Aliran also encouraged their readers who constantly voiced their 
opinions to write them as short articles. He thought that the recent election in 2018 
encouraged more people to write as agents of change.   
6.4 Mainstream and alternative media organisations in Malaysia 
6.4.1 Media Relations  
Only SAM mentioned in their Organisational Background that “media” were one of the 
parties they worked with besides the rural and minority communities. It was also the least 
popular theme in CBOs’ websites besides lobbying. 
Mark said that BRIMAS’ relationship with alternative media such as Malaysiakini and 
Free Malaysia Today (FMT) was closer. BRIMAS also kept contact with mainstream press such 
as the Borneo Post, The Star and Chinese-language press like Sin Chew Daily. Overall, Mark 
said that the relationship between both mainstream and alternative media was almost the 
same, only a matter of gatekeeping: 
When we mix together with the journalists, it’s the same, they understand the 
issue, they are also, are, sympathetic toward the issue, but the difference is, for 
alternative media, once we released something to the press, they will 
straightaway publish it, what you release. For mainstream media, they will take 
your statement but it is subject to editing by the editor. So, when it comes up, 
maybe half of your story already just a small paragraph only comes out, or it’s total 
blackout. 
The main reason for censorship was the Borneo Post’s ownership by a diversified timber 
company, KTS Group. If the Borneo Post had stories like KTS was involved in land-grabbing or 
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environmental destruction, those stories were subject to censorship. Thomas, YB See and 
Wong argued that media ownership affected journalistic independence as KTS owned not only 
the Borneo Post, but the Chinese-language newspaper, See Hua Daily. However, over the 
years, Peter felt that the Borneo Post had become more open. 
Before de-registration, Wong said that in the 1980s, IPK did send information to 
mainstream newspapers, but the editors were being selective as they did not want to get 
involved with dam and plantation issues. Thomas and Wong similarly opined that the Borneo 
Post and See Hua Daily used to twist the facts but now more willing to visit rural sites affected 
by land issues. Peter thought the change of direction was because the mainstream dailies 
finally realised that people got turned off by their whitewash reporting.  
Alternative media like Malaysiakini was labelled as “friendly” to CBOs’ activities or 
events by as many as 9 respondents – Peter, Thomas, Albert, Michael, Pang, Wong, Philip, 
Ramould and Vincy. Peter elaborated that Malaysiakini was very helpful to upload videos from 
SAVE Rivers like Empty Promise and Damning Our Future to their own video-sharing site called 
KiniTV. SAVE Rivers also sent press statements to Free Malaysia Today and The Malaysian 
Insider before the latter closed down. 
Pang knew the founders of Malaysiakini, Premesh Chandran and Steven Gan, before the 
media’s establishment. 
I think initially, we, Prem and Steven are all fellow student activists before in 
Australia. So, it was quite easy. We needed outlet, so Malaysiakini provided a lot 
of it. And last time we used…we could…Malaysiakini allowed us to use pseudo 
name, at that time, but now there is no need [chuckled], for example. [Pang] 
However, Pang elaborated that SACCESS was getting less involved with Malaysiakini 
because of the availability of local stringers. Malaysiakini no longer needed to contact the local 
people directly to exchange materials. Aliran, on the other hand, had one or two writers based 
in Sarawak to send them materials directly, sometimes through the NGOs.  
In the case of BaramKini, Vincy said that Malaysiakini provided the space for their events 
that no mainstream media wanted to. Malaysiakini also co-organised their fundraising lunch 
in 2014. Some interviewees added that Peninsular-based mainstream media were less friendly 
to their advocacy events. When SAVE Rivers went to the Peninsula to promote their functions 
like the Green Walk, talks, dancing troupe and roadshows, the journalists hardly attended 
them. Vincy, a former journalist with Chinese-language Oriental Daily recalled that if she 
invited her colleagues to cover BaramKini’s event, they came up with very small columns.  
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JOAS had relationship with The Star by sending youth for internships under the Bright 
Roving Annoying Teens (BRATs) programme where they learned to publish few videos. Any 
project that JOAS has, Albert is in charge of contacting them. He personally is close with The 
Star and Malaysiakini.  
For Pang and Susanna, the nature of media coverage varied by the type of guests in 
presence. IPIMAS events were covered if there was any Yang Berhormat (YB), referring to 
elected representatives. Pang thought that such media coverage was without much 
independence. Nevertheless, Susanna emphasised that IPIMAS had no specific relationship 
with any press or media.  
Ramould recalled how he chastised a Borneo Post manager for appearing in a TAHABAS 
event but dared not report it in full. The manager responded that he was under pressure of 
censorship. Jok Jau from SAM Marudi said that although he was aware the local papers twist 
the stories, there was nothing much they can do. To sue the newspapers would waste 
resources like time, money and lawyers while there were more than 200 NCR cases stacked 
up in court. 
Both Pang and Philip despised the Borneo Post for being unethical in their profession. In 
the late 2000s, news of Penan girls raped by loggers broke out. According to Pang,  
Borneo Post was taken on a guided tour to come out and report a very, very 
ridiculous glossed over of the event, projecting the rapists as caring [chuckled] -
expletive-. Even they had no qualms to use media for that, cannot…no ethical, 
credible, professional journalist would do that kind of story, but they had [the 
news] front page. The cover, they covered the face of the rapist, you know the 
rapist, we know him as the rapist, cover him as the picture on the side, but the 
article was about how caring he was and looking after the survival of the victim. 
And it’s front page! So, it’s ridiculous. 
Philip from BPAC recalled he once read the Borneo Post quoting a minister who warned 
the community leaders not to get too close to Opposition parties. He felt that this form of 
reporting sounded like a threat and reflected both the newspaper and Minister badly. On the 
other hand, he felt baffled that Chinese-language newspapers seemed to be more open to 
reporting indigenous land issues. He added perhaps the editors assumed that the indigenous 
people were illiterate in the Chinese language, therefore less mobilisation effect and less 
censorship pressure. Lawai probably gave an answer to Philip’s question where there were 
indeed conscientious Chinese reporters who tried to create more awareness about the 
indigenous people among Chinese readers.  
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Vincy and YB See provided deeper insights into how journalism can make a difference. 
Vincy’s job scope as a Radio Free Sarawak (RFS) producer included reading news to the 
indigenous communities collected from alternative, mainstream and international media. It 
was useful to convince them that they were not alone as their matter is a worldly issue. To 
Vincy, the CBOs should be less defensive and suspicious toward media coverage about their 
advocacy. 
That’s the problem. They don’t want sympathy but the message always come up 
is sympathy, that you want to get the attraction from the people, is sympathy. 
[Vincy] 
 Vincy added that the CBOs could not be over dependent on media organisations 
because the reporters might be inconsistent or restricted to report everything in full. 
Therefore, CBOs should know how to operate like media and curate messages like 
professional media practitioners.  
 YB See, under his capacity as assemblyman, brought many reporters to affected 
communities for more coverage. In his opinion, ever, he thinks that investigative journalism is 
still inadequate in Malaysia. To him, journalists should go beyond only reporting the 
development of indigenous people’s struggles. 
6.4.2 Television and Radio Broadcasting 
In general, interviewees lacked confidence in the Malaysian FTA broadcasting’s integrity, 
especially concerning the RTM and TV3. They said that the broadcasters hardly responded to 
cover their events or activities. This coincided with the findings from all the CBOs’ Facebook 
posts where RTM only became a secondary source once. JOAS posted a video from RTM that 
covered the officiating ceremony of the International Day for the World’s Indigenous Peoples 
(PHOAS) where a minister was giving his speech. Despite that, Thomas suspected the video 
might be a brief one. 
Over time, the CBOs chose not to invite the broadcasters. Mark and Wong claimed that 
although they were interviewed by RTM before, it was a five-second footage without sound. 
They became the background, always reported as protesting while the minister was being 
interviewed. They concluded such coverage is meaningless because the audience would not 
understand their advocacy. 
Mark, Peter, Philip, and Susanna said they had not watched the national television 
channels for “10 to 20 years”, as well as not reading the Borneo Post. Pang claimed that there 
were people who got paid by RTM and companies to “glorify oil palm plantations”. Susanna 
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had no confidence in RTM to cover IPIMAS events. To her, RTM did not give priority to 
Sarawak, especially regarding environmental issues. Ramould also expressed his 
disappointment toward private broadcaster, TV3 in broadcasting “sensationalised” stories. 
Similarly, Philip strongly felt that RTM was “corrupt”. To him, it was a pity because those rural 
longhouse residents could only receive RTM channels. He was confident that educated people 
would not watch RTM and get ‘brainwashed’ by it. 
Jok Jau claimed that RTM only reported court verdict when the government won the 
case. Both Michael and YB See said that NCR news blackout was subject more to federal 
control than individual motive.  
I mean that point of time, you approach them also, they might not even come up 
with what you said, they might even edit what you said. [Michael] 
[RTM, Bernama] are federal-controlled, so of course they are very important tools 
for the Federal Government until this fine line lah [a Malaysian slang of 
exasperation]. They are used to propagate government’s view, so that’s the only 
thing they get in the kampong [village]. [YB See] 
Philip, Lawai and Vincy had a more extensive account on how a broadcasting crew and 
producer were sacked over land-related programmes. A Kayan-Kenyah radio announcer was 
transferred immediately to Bintulu after he publicised a SAVE Rivers’ meeting.  
Another incident was the making of a series of documentary to highlight 60,000 stateless 
Sarawakians without official documents like birth certificates. Philip wanted to propose the 
case to RTM through his programmer friend and managed to secure a ten-day slot in the 
Mandarin section of RTM2. On the second day of airing, Philip received a call from the 
programmer where there was an instruction to remove the documentary from air. The 
programmer’s work contract was then terminated. In a separate case, Philip claimed that an 
RTM documentary director was fired for filming a documentary on Bakun Dam.  
Regarding the Chinese section of RTM, Lawai was invited once to the station and 
managed to tell the story of Sarawak. Therefore, he could not generalise RTM’s approach 
toward Sarawak problems. Overall, he opined that the BN government had never been honest 
and transparent to look into people’s problems, let alone the government-run broadcaster. 
For example, the indigenous people in Peninsular Malaysia (Orang Asli) are also neglected. 
In the midst of government change, Peter felt there was a long way ahead to build 
integrity as broadcaster. Anil, a media-savvy activist from Aliran, added that RTM needed to 
be receptive toward public needs and go beyond being a propaganda tool. Since government-
controlled television and radio broadcasting had no regard for public service credibility, YB 
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See assumed that was why RFS became immensely popular among the communities. 
Ramould, on the other hand, claimed that RFS was so biased that he became frustrated 
listening to it. To him, RFS condemned others as if they could commit no wrongdoing. 
Vincy was the only interviewee with direct experience working for RFS as a producer. 
During her ten-month stint in 2014, she learned a lot on how the founder, Clare Rewcastle-
Brown, operated the radio. For security purpose, Clare often changed producers and allowed 
them the flexibility to work from any country. RFS’s frequency at times was disrupted by the 
government. The RFS team resorted to changing frequency every two weeks and relied on 
listeners’ feedback on the reception quality. The frequency used was of short-wave type 
because they could not apply for any from the government. The main programme was to read 
news to listeners in their indigenous languages. They did special reporting on NCR land 
supported by interviews with land-grabbing victims. Each news slot was aired from 7 to 
8.30pm every day. The news re-run could be obtained from online streaming where some 
youth in town downloaded the news for the village folks. Vincy argued that radio was a useful 
tool as long as the village headman had one and shared listening opportunities with other 
longhouse tenants. Unfortunately, Radio Free Sarawak stopped operating in 2016 due to lack 
of funding. 
Figure 47 Screenshot of Radio Free Sarawak website (2016) 
 
 
6.4.3 International media 
International channels like Al Jazeera and Channel News Asia (CNA), to Mark and Peter, 
had more credibility because they watched those channels as the source of news. They used 
to bring Reuters and AFP reporters to the interior like Long Sayan and Long Lunan.  
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When asked if SACCESS would use Sarawak Report to highlight land issues, Pang 
answered with logical scepticism. To him, personally, local sources were more valuable: 
We don’t need to send all the way to England to do it, so my own reference is, 
always keep it to the local. But only if the local don’t dare then maybe we can 
consider. Otherwise, there is no reason. So, I think Sarawak Report is just one of 
many – so, nothing, nothing specific or nothing extraordinary. They focused more 
on so called big news, so they have their own audience, we have specific target 
groups, so…  
Philip and Susanna, on the other hand, had never contacted any international media for 
their advocacy.  
The advantage of web-based platforms is the sharing ability of contents. International 
media was not a popular source of information on the CBOs’ Facebook pages, blogs and 
websites. The most common international news source was The Guardian. 
6.5 Outlook on Media/Television Reform in Malaysia 
 While all interviewees thought that a reform in the Malaysian mainstream media was 
important, they somehow equated such movement with West or Peninsular Malaysia or more 
specifically, Kuala Lumpur the capital. Mark, Thomas, Jok Jau and Wong, argued that NGOs in 
West Malaysia were more familiar with lobbying for media reform. Therefore, getting support 
and assistance from the West can help the Sarawakian CBOs to do the same. Among the 
initiatives they heard of and joined were Media Rakyat [The People’s Media], Aliran’s 
Charter2000, and Centre for Independent Journalism (CIJ). The Asian political and financial 
crises in the late 1990s prompted critical questions of transparency in governance and 
journalism. The Malaysian government bailed out government-linked corporations (GLC) and 
mega lawsuits were filed against journalists who reported on government nepotism and 
cronyism (Rodan, 2004). Initiatives for media reform were advocated strongly by human rights 
and media activists, pushing for activist journalism and media freedom.  
Philip opined that media reform could only happen when there is a change in 
government. Peter and Ramould hoped that the new government is more willing to listen to 
the people and not as arrogant as their predecessor. Television is supposed to empower and 
educate the people, not telling lies, emphasised Peter. According to YB See, the media should 
be allowed to self-regulate, like some models in the US and Europe. Government should 
liberate media from many regulations and laws. He recalled that media enjoyed a brief phase 
of freedom during the late Adenan’s time as Sarawak Chief Minister, but went backwards after 
163 
 
a take over by Abang Jo in 2017. He now hoped that the new government would deliver their 
promises to have a more open media environment. Vincy added that changing the mind set 
of rural people is more important than changing government or media. Vincy recalled 
encountering several women from the rural longhouses who opined that “begging Taib to stop 
taking their lands” would be more effective from participating in land protests. Therefore, 
Vincy argued that empowering the indigenous people is important for grassroots advocacy.  
Anil, who initiated Aliran’s Charter2000, recalled that it was first set up in 2000 following 
government crackdown on independent media. The initiative aimed to get people to endorse 
press freedom. While it was not Aliran’s priority to revive Charter2000, he thought that 
community radio is useful to reach out to rural communities. Besides that, widening digital 
access to them could enhance community empowerment. 
Pang strongly believed that the whole system of political ownership of media has to be 
overhauled instead of reformed. 
… unless … you change the legislative or regulatory requirement, then in Sarawak, 
so you talk about the main, Borneo Post, it’s owned by loggers, you talk about 
Sarawak Tribune, the new Sarawak Tribune, the old Sarawak Tribune, it’s owned 
by PBB [Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu/United Bumiputera Heritage Party]. 
What else is there? The Chinese paper no need to say again, See Hua Daily, the 
same with Borneo Post. Sin Chew is logger’s, the International Times, politically 
connected. What else? What else is there? So, the opposition only one we know 
is Malaysiakini, owned by the pioneers and the staff. So, I think if you at it from 
that perspective, definitely there is a need to overhaul rather than reform. 
Overhaul the whole thing.  
6.6 Summary of Findings 
The new media discussed in this chapter were websites, blogs, email, and the social 
network platforms Facebook and WhatsApp. The interviewees generally opined that the new 
media had advantages in becoming a space not provided by mainstream media. The following 
section summarises findings that aimed  
RO2) To explore the utilisation of new media platforms by NCR land CBOs in creating contents 
and literacy training to promote their causes. 
New media offered better outreach potentials than old media such as newspapers, 
letters and fax. The latter were costly, slow, an easy target for authority surveillance and had 
limited capacity in terms of information and audience. Therefore, mass protests in the 1980s 
and early 1990s did not succeed much. Given the oppressive political, media and social 
environment then, new media technology was seen as a form of information democratisation.  
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Website and blogs could create awareness among non-indigenous public, key buyers of 
Sarawak logs and policymakers. They were also popular with the younger generation who 
were better equipped with digital access and literacy.  
From the four websites and three blogs sampled, green and white were the most 
popular colours, followed by wooden brown. The colour combination was conservative as the 
samples were environmental sites.  According to Chapman (2014), non-profit sites need to 
portray reliability, trust, and responsibility. The main purposes are to educate the public and 
to solicit donations or contributions. SAM website had the cleanest look with white 
background and green as titles. BaramKini blog exuded contemporary style, which also used 
white as the background. BRIMAS website was the only one using a combination of yellow and 
baby blue. Using a bright sunny colour with a baby blue background effectively creates 
contrast and attracts attention. However, the yellow parts were overwhelming to the extent 
of causing visual discomfort. News Archives and Community’s Resolutions & Campaigns could 
have been put in Navigation bar to direct users and to distinguish them from the bulletin 
items. 
Visual aids help capture attention. All samples used images – of nature, indigenous 
people, cultural products, events and logos. Only SAM and SCRIPS used multimedia in the form 
of moving images for the same purpose, to enhance the audiovisual impact of the website. 
JOAS embedded a video of a song about indigenous peoples’ struggle to their blog. 
There were several CBOs that perceived maintaining new media was an institutional 
burden. BPAC, SACCESS and IDEAL had no Web-based platform with limited resources being 
the main reason. For SCRIPS, their website had no other function than being an evidence to 
potential funder. SCRIPS had the same opinion with SACCESS where grassroots empowerment 
is the most important matter, not maintaining website. Although SACCESS believed that 
information is power and they used to contribute by editing materials for the now-defunct 
website, Rengah Sarawak, Pang thought there is no need to have another that carries the 
name of SACCESS. 
SAVE Rivers has a youth group dedicated to compose contents for the blog on voluntary 
basis. JOAS is a network of about 100 NGOs and has a special media team headed by Albert. 
Part of the network, Ramould claimed that TAHABAS is more than happy with JOAS taking care 
of the information standardisation.  
Most CBOs’ websites and blogs suffered from the aspects of freshness and pages menu. 
BRIMAS website had not been updated since 2011 and the news links were inaccessible. 
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IPIMAS website had no dated items to allow the researcher to track its ‘freshness’. It was also 
the most run down. Only the SAM website was most updated followed by SAVE Rivers blog. 
JOAS blog was also outdated in terms of design and freshness. It was last updated in 2012 and 
did not utilise sidebar. Posting articles in full, users had to scroll all the way down for the 
contents. Light olive-green added dullness to the blog. All samples used their own logo and 
slogan as the header. SAVE Rivers and JOAS cluttered their header with Organisational 
Background. Although other samples provided link select for the header, they led back to the 
same Home page, which was rather pointless.  
SAVE Rivers’ horizontal space could be utilised to prevent such issue and be user-friendly 
for a quick scan. Images coupled with Article title and simple captions arranged by symmetrical 
grid gives a neater outlook and a choice to users to click to Read More.  Adding Search Site 
would help users navigating around the pages. 
Navigation design indicates how a page assists user to navigate around for information 
they wish to seek. SAM website was the only sample that used all features of Navigation – 
Pages Menu, Sidebar and Footer. On the contrary, BRIMAS did not utilise any of them. After 
the publication bulletin items, the email contact and office address again can be made clearer 
as another segment of information instead of being placed in the same text box. This non-
symmetrical 2-grid layout affected user experience in navigating about for information as 
efficiently as possible, besides the disproportionate spacing and imagery. For more effective 
downward information flow, BRIMAS could upload the Organisational Background and NCR 
as part of the website, name them in Pages Menu or Sidebar. As for now, they are in the form 
of downloadable documents, which may not suit the reading habit of contemporary users who 
want information more instantaneously. 
The evidence of this research suggests that WhatsApp has now become a preferred 
platform to receive news. Any issue can be made viral within seconds through pictures, videos 
and simple captions, benefitting the masses even with low literacy level. For the CBOs, 
WhatsApp not only has an encryption feature, it also allows them to communicate in their 
own dialects. Yet, WhatsApp can turn into an overstatement of civil societal communication 
due to the nature of continuous threading of messages, which included non-substantial input 
from group chat members – this can be off-putting to users. Furthermore, the group 
administrator can include anyone in the group without prior permission. The convenience to 
set up WhatsApp groups that leads to an abundance of them without a clear direction may, 
ironically, reduce the impact and incisiveness of land issues advocacy.  
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Compared with websites or blogs, the CBOs were relatively more active in maintaining 
their Facebook pages. However, that varied by a CBO’s resources and priorities. BRIMAS last 
updated their Facebook page in 2016. Within the 6 months of data collection, they only had 5 
posts where 2 were motivated by the assassination of activist politician Bill Kayong. TAHABAS 
Facebook had the similar trend of motivating occasion. TAHABAS had 7 posts between March 
and September 2016 and last updated in 2016.  
SAM displayed ability in creating primary contents like articles and media statements 
due to their well-established background. Although SAM Facebook page was the most active 
of all, the number of posts on Sarawak in general and on NCR land specifically is less than 10%. 
This is because SAM covers the entire Malaysia’s environmental issues. Another reason was 
that the SAM office in Marudi did not have sufficient funds to run their own activities hence 
less raw materials to the headquarters in Penang. Furthermore, the coordinator, Mr Jok Jau 
Evong, said that they were not in charge of writing their own materials for their website and 
Facebook.  
The type of item posted on Facebook indicated the lack of media strategy among CBOs. 
Primary sources consisted mostly of photo, a pattern attributed to their lack of resources such 
as research skills, finance and human capital. From the SAM Facebook posts, 100% of their 
primary posts (4) were in the form of photos. Items that required higher literacy to understand 
to and create such as articles were sourced from news portal and international NGOs.  At the 
time of data collection, SAVE Rivers blog was the most updated compared to those of JOAS 
and BaramKini. The blog posts were inconsistent with the peak being in 2012, which was the 
year of SAVE Rivers establishment.  
Only BRIMAS, SAM and SCRIPS mentioned Research & Development as part of their 
Organisational Background. Despite the lacklustre online activities, the semi-structured 
interviews found that several CBOs have extensive and ongoing media documentation and 
literacy training with indigenous communities. Michael from SCRIPS has regular trips to rural 
longhouses to conduct interviews and documented them as oral history to be presented to 
the government as a validation to their NCR land. SACCESS, at the time of interview, was 
providing assistance to decipher The Penan Custom released by the government. Pang 
mentioned that the Penans now know how to record any unlikely incidents and use them as 
evidence when lodging police report. SACCESS had tried to train the Penans writing basic facts 
but did not succeed due to their low literacy level. The JOAS media team headed by Albert did 
simple media training for rural youths in terms of basic photography and composing simple 
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captions. Similar with SACCESS, JOAS also taught basic citizen journalism to villagers – 
recording basic facts of critical issues. Thomas headed the Communities’ Information and 
Communication Centre (CICOM) to document the communities’ reports although not on an 
active basis. Mark from BRIMAS is a trained geologist, therefore he was capable to do 
community mapping. On the other hand, Wong (IDEAL) and Vincy (BaramKini) contributed 
articles to Taiwan-based website that targets Chinese-speaking audiences. Aliran conducted 
Young Writers’ Workshops to encourage the young to have critical views on current issues and 
turn them into articles. Ramould from TAHABAS argued that the communities should also be 
taught political and citizenry knowledge so that they do not rely solely on politicians.  
 
The second section summarises findings that aimed 
RO3) To establish NCR land CBOs’ perspectives toward Malaysian mainstream and alternative 
media organisations’ performance in representing their advocacy. 
Almost all CBOs opined that it was difficult to get fair coverage or any coverage for that 
matter from the mainstream media during the height of NCR land advocacy in the 1980s. The 
reports were either subject to fact twisting, heavy editing, total blackout or no-show by 
reporters. JOAS, SACCESS and IDEAL believed that since the Sarawak main dailies, the Borneo 
Post and See Hua Daily, are owned by timber tycoon; there is no credibility in them. TAHABAS, 
SACCESS and BPAC despised the Borneo Post for being unethical for whitewashing the Penan 
rape cases and demonising the Opposition party. Certain events were covered only in the 
presence of some important public figures or when the government had won land court case. 
Malaysiakini was the most popular alternative media as mentioned by interviewees for their 
supportive approach to providing space for land-related articles. Malaysiakini not only took 
up their stories without much hesitation but offered them space to contribute articles. Once, 
Malaysiakini co-organised BaramKini’s exhibition. Mark and Peter were more open toward 
international media such as Al-Jazeera, Reuter and AFP where they took the journalists to visit 
sites affected by logging. IPIMAS and BPAC had not been approached by international media 
and they currently have no intention to establish contact with them. Pang from SACCESS 
opined that Malaysian alternative media were sufficient without bringing the indigenous 
people’s plights to foreign media’s attention. 
Compared to the 1980s and 1990s, the interviewees felt that the Sarawak mainstream 
media are less restrictive in covering native land stories, especially Chinese-language 
newspapers. Peninsular-based media, according to SAVE Rivers, were not friendly in covering 
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their events in Kuala Lumpur. However, SACCESS thought that investigative journalism is still 
a long way to go in Malaysia while BaramKini urged the CBOs to operate like established media 
organisation. Only BRIMAS website had links to external news sources although they are 
inaccessible now. In the CBOs’ Facebook posts, news about NCR land were popularly sourced 
from The Star, Borneo Post, Malaysiakini and Free Malaysia Today. Facebook has also enabled 
the CBOs to frequently share news and articles from foreign sources such as The Guardian, 
Mongabay and Forest Watch.  
All CBOs had no confidence in national broadcaster, RTM, which have always been 
conservative to broadcast any matters regarding NCR land, be they television or radio 
channels. Peter, Mark, Philip and Susanna themselves had not watched any RTM television 
channels for “10, 20 years”. BaramKini, SAVE Rivers, and BPAC shared their encounter with 
RTM where programmes related to NCR land and Sarawak’s stateless people were abruptly 
removed with the director and producer being terminated. BRIMAS and IDEAL recalled 
appearing in a five-second footage of RTM interview without audio. Wong claimed that the 
footage might be intended to depict the land owners as ‘protesters’ instead of highlighting 
how their land rights were encroached. SAVE Rivers and SACCESS opined that RTM owes the 
Sarawak public their responsibility as national broadcaster. RTM is the only media that could 
reach rural longhouses. Yet, unfortunately its contents are brainwashing the residents, as 
lamented by Peter. Out of all the CBOs’ Facebook posts, only once RTM was the source of 
news in the form of video. It was recorded on 10 August 2018 during the National Indigenous 
celebration organised by JOAS where a minister was delivering his guest speech. 
Ramould from TAHABAS argued that private broadcasters like TV3, is only good at 
sensationalism. To hope for RTM to have national broadcaster integrity, according to SAVE 
Rivers, is a wishful thinking. Despite being in the new media age, they believed that media 
reform is significant and possible given the change of federal government after the 2018 
general elections. The interviewees’ opinions or expectations toward the Malaysian 
mainstream media were not reflected in their CBOs’ websites, blogs and Facebook pages. Only 
SAM and BaramKini mentioned “media” in their organisational details but pertaining to having 
close media relations with practitioners. Through the interviews, media reform to the CBOs 
was in the form of liberation from media regulations, encourage the setup of community radio 
and to ban political ownership of media. Within the media environment where both 
government and private broadcasters were not very open to the NCR land issues, Radio Free 
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Sarawak was highly popular among the Sarawakians before closing down in 2016 due to fund 
insufficiency.  
6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed findings from both interviews and web-based analysis 
regarding new media, media literacy and media reform to achieve RO2 and RO3. 
From the empirical data, this research summarises three main factors that determined 
the nature of CBOs’ self-representation on websites, blogs and Facebook. The first was 
resources. SAVE Rivers, BaramKini and IPIMAS relied on volunteers to update their web-based 
platforms. The volunteers might or might not have specific web design or journalistic 
background. Therefore, posting events on Facebook was the easiest to produce. More 
established organisations, SAM and JOAS assign specific personnel to create media contents. 
The second factor is priority. Out of 11 CBOs, SACCESS, IDEAL and BPAC had no web-based 
platform. To them, it is a form of liability that needs constant maintenance. SACCESS voiced 
the most vehement opposition to ‘self-promoting’ on websites although they contributed 
articles and layout design to Rengah Sarawak and Hornbill Unleashed websites as “archives” 
because there were not many such websites back then. As much as they believed websites 
offered democratisation, they argued that the real “battleground” is within the communities, 
not media or CBOs. TAHABAS, IPIMAS and BRIMAS were sceptical with too much ‘noise’ on 
the online media. Furthermore, they thought it is farcical having to make a topic interesting 
enough to attract online response while the communities themselves, mostly elderly, had no 
digital access and literacy. SCRIPS created their website only for funding purpose and added 
that no matter how advanced the communication technology is, the communities prefer to 
go to their leaders instead of seeking help online. SACCESS and IPIMAS stressed that CBOs 
should know what to train the communities based on their capacity. Teaching basic skills like 
taking photos and remembering the details of police or logger intervention are more realistic 
to achieve. The last factor is establishment. TAHABAS had a slow-moving Facebook page 
because as part of JOAS, sharing the latter’s online platform was deemed sufficient. SAM 
Marudi admitted that, due to lack of funding, they did not send much materials from Sarawak 
to head office for web updates. SAM website was the most updated, reflecting its capacity to 
maintain it as one of the oldest environmental-based organisations in Malaysia. Although all 
interviewees agreed that online platforms benefited information sharing, not many had 
specific and clear targets to reach out to. Vincy from Baramkini, claimed that most of the CBOs’ 
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websites and Facebook had duplicate supporters, which to her, lacked diversity in 
mobilisation. She stressed that the CBOs should learn to run community media instead of 
treating media platform as a ‘bulletin board’. As a former journalist, she said that mainstream 
or alternative media organisations have their own limitation on reporting native stories due 
to space and censorship restrictions. To her, CBOs should be the media to educate and inform 
the general public. She expressed her personal interest to run a community radio like Radio 
Free Sarawak but yet to be realised due to family obligations.  
The three factors influencing the CBOs’ online self-representation shed light on how 
they perceived the outlook on Malaysia’s media systems. None of the CBOs’ web-based 
platforms mentioned media-related rights as their advocacy. From the interviews, the CBOs 
tended to treat media systems discretely from their empowerment activities. Jok Jau argued 
that compared to hundreds of land cases backlogged in court, the nature of media coverage 
is insignificant. In fact, Peter and Vincy assumed that matters regarding media reform are 
associated with Peninsular Malaysia (particularly Kuala Lumpur) NGOs. Overall, the CBOs’ 
perspectives toward the Malaysian media industries came from their experiences facing unfair 
and unfriendly NCR land coverage from the RTM and mainstream newspaper especially the 
Borneo Post. Reciprocally, they have no confidence in the mainstream media’s integrity due 
to the ownership link with political parties and timber company.  Nevertheless, they expressed 
hope that RTM and other mainstream media could reform for the betterment of the natives 
and their media integrity. SACCESS believed that the meaning of reform lies in the liberation 
from political ownership and regulation, which will encourage investigative journalism. Aliran 
argued that RTM as government influenced broadcaster should perform based on what 
people hope for from any government, which is transparency and a people-centric agenda.  
In conclusion, new media platforms have yet to serve as a well-integrated means of 
communication for the CBOs. During the interviews, the CBOs showed the researcher their 
hard copy publications and ongoing efforts in documenting oral history. Their offline 
empowerment and media literacy activities were not displayed consistently through their 
online channels. Similarly, the CBOs harboured low expectations toward the educational and 




Chapter 7: CBOs as the ‘Modern Prince’ and their Masses 
7.1 Introduction 
In the Gramscian sense, organic intellectuals who lead the CBOs, ought to educate the 
indigenous people to resist their marginalisation through creating own hegemony in civil 
society. Chapter 6 has discussed the extent to which the CBOs utilised new media platforms 
to generate their own contents and their thoughts on the significance of maintaining their 
web-based platforms. This chapter displays the CBOs’ empowerment activities and their 
outlook on the future of NCR land advocacy in terms of funding, new leadership and policy 
influence. The purpose is beyond finding out whether or not the CBOs use the new media for 
the above; it seeks the relation between online activities and offline strategies to meet RO4: 
To determine the extent to which the NCR land CBOs’ organisational processes improved using 
the new media. 
Chapter 6, 7 and 8 are parts that make up Gramsci’s integral relationship between the state 
and civil society. For the purpose of clarity, Chapter 6 is on the CBOs’ media literacy skills; 
Chapter 7 is about the ‘internal’ organising activities and issues while the next chapter 
discusses the CBOs’ ‘external’ relations that influenced their operations. For Gramsci, they can 
be viewed in separate ways but organically they are one and the same that contribute to the 
legitimisation of the ruling classes and subalterns. This will be discussed further in Chapter 9.  
7.2 Organisational Structure 
7.2.1 Formal Registration 
Out of 11 CBOs, 9 were registered as enterprises under the Registrar of Business (ROB). 
Due to the political nature of land issues, it is a tactic to avoid gatekeeping from the Registrar 
of Societies (ROS). From their web-based platforms, 4 CBOs summarised their direction and 
structure by highlighting that they are financially and politically independent. BRIMAS 
introduced themselves as “the foremost indigenous non-profit organisation working at the 
grassroots level in Sarawak”, an orientation similarly adopted by SAM.  SCRIPS, JOAS and 
IPIMAS identified themselves as community-based organisations. SCRIPS website also stated 
they were officially registered in 2012. 
One of the popular reasons for registration is to solicit funds and makes it more credible 
to have a bank account. For Peter, being registered is a reflection of how organised a CBO is. 
Registration helps to define the objectives, visions and missions of an organisation. He cited 
Sarawak for Sarawakians (S4S) as a very suspicious entity because they have their own agenda. 
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SCRIPS was the only CBO registered under the ROS. According to Michael, they obtained 
the approval within the same day of application. Michael himself was surprised because with 
the name Society for Rights of Indigenous People of Sarawak, it would not sound friendly to 
ROS. He was asked by some friends if he bribed the ROS officer. 
Only BPAC is not registered. According to Philip, BPAC was set up in 2008 and started 
from “gathering a few people of the same opinion and struggle”. BPAC only wanted to play “a 
supporting role to campaign against the Baram dam”. With the new government, Philip would 
consider registering BPAC. He used to worry about the application getting rejected because of 
the name “Baram Protection Action Committee”.  
JOAS was registered the second time, with the ROB. The first time was disapproved by 
ROS because of the name Network. Similarly, IDEAL was the second organisation led by Wong 
and registered as business entity. The first, IPK, was de-registered by ROS. ROS claimed that 
IPK, as a Sibu-based organisation, should not organise any seminar in Kuala Lumpur. According 
to Wong, too much energy was lost to fight the deregistration, so they counter-strategised to 
register IDEAL: “They use a technical reason to de-register us, we use a technical reason to 
continue.”  
7.2.2 Organisation Hierarchy, Direction and Leadership  
BRIMAS board consisted of Director, Executive Director and Secretary, who usually are 
with groundwork experiences. The board only advises on which programmes to undertake but 
it is the executive director who makes the final decision. BRIMAS has no members since it is 
business entity. Since 1998, Mark recalled that a lot of land issues were taken up by the elderly, 
either retired or old folks from village. They were the first to join BRIMAS as they directly 
“faced the bulldozer back home”. 
SAVE Rivers has 3 directors and project coordinators. Their volunteers are skilled at 
writing standard operating procedures (SOPs), publicity materials and newsletters. Most of 
them are retirees like Peter, with some from the government sector. SAVE Rivers has an active 
youth group that helped a lot in roadshows, workshops and projects. For Peter, SOPs are 
crucial to sustain the organisation regardless of staff turnover: 
… More systematic lah, we are trying to work on that because that is one of the 
reasons why a lot of NGOs died on natural death, yeah [laughed]. They don’t have 
proper procedure and all, everybody doing their own thing. So that’s what we are 




Organisation Chart of JOAS Sarawak 
There are two full-time staff in JOAS Sarawak – Albert and Lina, besides several interns. 
Albert is part of the media team that requires travelling to other regions – Peninsular Malaysia 
and Sabah. The national coordination of JOAS committee elects three positions by region – 
the President, Secretary-General and Treasurer. Regional committee members communicate 
mainly through WhatsApp. Thomas is a volunteer but he was elected to hold the principle of 
office work. He divides his time between JOAS and a paying job. Thomas said that sometimes 
the staff members are sent to in-house leadership workshop, regional or international. They 
are trained on human right advocacy and diplomacy matters. 
  
SAM Marudi Office 
For SAM Marudi, every year they have a meeting with the head office to discuss annual 
programmes. SAM Marudi has five full-time staff – research officer, assistant clerk, community 
officer, community mapping technician and coordinator. SAM headquarter in Penang provides 
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training to all staff. The coordinator also collaborates with residents’ associations. Certain 
communities have already accepted plantation companies to their areas, which Jok Jau 
believed is breaking up the people. Hence, it really depends on how strong a residents’ 
association is. Residents’ associations can be defined as voluntary associations that pursue 
common interests on behalf of residents by their residential territories. For example, Uma 
Bawang Residents’ Association (UBRA) represented the remote Kayan community at Uma 
Bawang, located in the tropical rainforests of northern Sarawak (Equator Initiative, 2012). 
IPIMAS has two full-time staff members, including the founder. For IDEAL, at first there 
were three to four full-timers. After a series of intimidation, they left because of the 
controversial Bakun dam issue. Wong lamented that he did not get his staff good training at 
the time. He himself learned along the way how to organise community except for law matters 
where he would consult lawyers.  
Several CBOs choose not to have full-time staff to minimise expenses. SCRIPS consists of 
the founder and a staff member who does mapping. Although SCRIPS has many programmes 
as stated in their website, they relied on volunteers and public-interest lawyers. Since Michael 
is a former priest, he has a wide network of friends paying for his lodging whenever he travels. 
Michael said that their organisation is “just like a family, nobody competes for position”. 
Michael regularly goes for training in West Malaysia and some were conducted by the 
European Union (EU). SCRIPS is the only CBO that displays their organisation chart on their 
website. 





BaramKini and SACCESS have no full-time staff because they are self-funded. BaramKini 
observed that most in villages now are 50 years old and above, minding their grandchildren. 
BaramKini admitted they did not have the time to reach out to town-residing natives as 
potential leaders.  Vincy added that it is a weakness where in Sarawak, “you can get different 
NGOs but the same person in charge.”  
SACCESS, according to YB See and Pang, is a “loose organisation”. They have a small 
office with lawyers and a research team. YB See pointed out that the Internet and social media 
has opened up the platform for volunteerism from professional groups like doctors and nurses 
to serve in rural areas. SACCESS does not intentionally recruit but wishes to keep the system 
open where “anybody can come and do something”. For Pang, another reason is that “the 
battleground is alive in the rural area, not in the town area, not in the public sphere, not in 
the media.” So, they would rather build the capacity among those facing the NCR issues. After 
conducting empowerment activities at longhouses, BPAC experienced an increase of 
volunteers, be they professional or villagers. 
Pang gave a very strong distinction between CSO as a vehicle and as an institution. 
SACCESS’ belief is to empower the community first and foremost. An institution inevitably 
needs to promote itself, involving maintenance, funding and employment. For any research 
interview, Pang felt that communities as the primary source is more important than the CBO. 
From the 1990s to 2000s, SACCESS was approached by various indigenous ethnic groups 
because there were not many land rights CBOs. Now that YB See does not take up land cases 
anymore, the communities go to other lawyers, who also conduct paralegal training. SACCESS 
does not do any capacity building because Pang believed experience has to be gained from 
learning on the go.  
TAHABAS added an interesting point that gender equality is important in NCR advocacy. 
Ramould noticed how only men attended meetings at any longhouse. Women, to him, have 
equal right to ancestral land where they should learn how to empower themselves and not 
only be confined to kitchen. As for youth, TAHABAS still needs to find ways to attract them as 
volunteers. 
7.2.3 Empowerment, Education and Youth 
A community-based organisation’s core mission is to empower (Ariel, 2010). Consistently, 
the most popular theme in the CBOs’ organisational background is empowerment. The CBOs 
displayed their empowerment activities in their Organisational Background. Their target 
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includes the indigenous communities and the public at large. This theme also generates the 
highest number of sub-themes. The most popular sub-theme is indigenous rights concerning 
customary land and citizenry: 
• Support – action alert; address situations, legal assistance; community mapping 
• Indigenous rights – dignity, Residents’ Associations, customary land rights; 
fundamental constitutional rights, individual participation, freedom of religion; 
freedom of information; empowerment governance, capacity building, democracy; 
social justice 
• Cultural preservation – practice; tradition; identity; visiting from cities to rural areas 
• Sustainability – resource management; harmony with nature; environmental 
reservation (forest, river); children’s future; economic prosperity; environmental 
justice 
• Awareness – campaigns, workshops, seminars 
The Downward Information Flow of the CBOs’ web-based platforms indicates the types of 
content they wish to communicate from the organisation to the public. Following 
Organisational Background, the most common piece of information is the organisation’s 
values or ideology and media releases. Only BRIMAS attached an educational document about 
NCR land. The IPIMAS site is the most run down and it only stated Organisational Background 
in a brief sentence. 
The demography of people SACCESS wants to empower, according to YB See, is very 
hard to generalise. The communities are dependent on the elderly. Philip had the same 
opinion where he felt sad to see the elderly lose their land, migrate to town and worked as 
garbage collector or sweeper. Because of their low education level and lack of modern job 
skills, they could not secure better employment. Those in town, who are more educated, 
hardly return to their village. YB See and Philip argued that a lot of educated indigenous 
themselves are “part of the oppressive system”. 
 And you have the cream of the communities sitting in the government. And they 
are the persons who are actually coming up with all these policies that are 
oppressing their own people. [YB See] 
I believe this education awareness is like a double-edged sword. Some who are 
educated and the professionals, they don’t see their role, they might be like you 
said, content with life, you know, “why should I care?” While some would say 
education is the only way to liberate yourself from any kind of oppression. [Philip] 
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YB See, a leader of an Opposition party, had not faced much resistance from the 
villagers. SACCESS does not mind to be the last resort. As far as Sarawak is concerned, there 
are too many land cases even for the ruling party representatives to handle. 
To Ramould, what keeps TAHABAS going is the fighting spirit. Although they faced 
challenges in the form of law enforcement, lackadaisical attitude among the young and 
community politics, TAHABAS does not give up because they know their right to their ancestral 
land. Michael, the current coordinator for SCRIPS was once the President of TAHABAS. He used 
to bring lawyers to villages to educate them on their political, constitutional and land rights. 
To all CBOs, community initiative is most important. Lawai stressed that if the locals 
themselves do not fight, there is nothing much BaramKini can do. Depending on cases, 
TAHABAS would go to a village by invitation because they fear resistance at best or physical 
assault at worst. Ramould expressed his disappointment that after some villagers won their 
land cases, they refused to empower others. They also ignored TAHABAS’ invitation for further 
training. 
SAM Marudi’s strategy is to unite communities through residents’ association (RA). To 
date, they have helped to register 10 RAs with the ROS. Jok Jau added that the older 
generation knew they had to fight. But due to illiteracy and lack of organising skills, they 
become frustrated and subsequently surrendered the land. Jok Jau established the Uma 
Bawang Residents’ Association (UBRA) after a major political crackdown in 1987 called Operasi 
Lalang (Weed Operation). More than 100 individuals (activists, journalists, politicians, 
academics) were detained under the Internal Security Act (ISA) (see Means, 1991). Harrison 
Ngau, one of the founders of SAM Sarawak, was put under house arrest for almost two years 
and detained for 60 days under the ISA (The Goldman Environmental Prize, 2020). According 
to Jok Jau, RAs create a sense of belonging among the villagers and make them less afraid to 
fight. It also ensures the continuity of empowerment and conservation efforts after SAM 
Marudi trained the RAs. At the national level, SAM website is the only platform that has a 
Membership function, which represents Upward Information Flow. In fact, SAM website also 
had the most comprehensive features of Interactive Information Flow – Volunteer, Site 
Search, Email contact, and Join e-mail list. Interactive Information Flows (Asynchronous) allow 
users and site administrator to communicate. On the other hand, SAVE Rivers and JOAS blogs 
offered none of those. 
Facebook allows better interaction flow where visitors can give a variety of reactions to 
what they encounter – Share, Like, Love, Amused, Surprised, Sad, View and Comment. 
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However, Mark stressed that it depends very much on the issue; if it is popular, “suddenly 
there’s a spike in the Likes.” After that, the interest would fade. Their most popular post with 
9 Likes and 10 Shares was about a small indigenous minority group who sued the Sarawak 
state government and timber firms. They filed a claim of encroachment of their NCR land in 
Belaga district, Kapit.  
Regarding conservation and sustainability, IPIMAS strongly encourages the villagers to 
take care of their surroundings. They need to be taught not to dump rubbish into rivers, how 
to catch fish responsibly and build watersheds. Better transportation modes to town has 
enabled villagers to buy groceries in bulk, packaged in plastic. With no awareness on how to 
deal with garbage disposal, they dumped it into the river, polluting it in addition to logging 
waste.  For IPIMAS, it is important to be practical and impart environmental awareness 
according to age group and educational capacity.  
According to Vincy, BaramKini was established to challenge the Baram dam and 
currently has no long-term plan. From 2013 to 2016, BaramKini conducted many Stop Baram 
Dam campaigns. After Adenan ordered the work to halt, BaramKini did a voters awareness 
campaign to prepare for the 2016 state election. Lawai commented that the indigenous 
people are fast learners and pick up Malaysia’s national language easily. BaramKini did not 
advocate for any political orientation but emphasised the right to choose. Their next plan is to 
build a mini hydro in Long San. BaramKini blog provided three functions to allow Interactive 
Information Flows – Site Search, Email contact and Email feedback. Both BaramKini blog and 
SAM website invited their visitors to Like their Facebook pages and view their Tweets. 
Philip worked along with the late Raymond Abin, founder of Sarawak Conservation 
Alliance for Natural Environment (SCANE), to alert the villagers the effects of mega dams. 
Philip expressed his regret that BPAC could not stop the Murum and Baram dams due to the 
villagers’ difficulty in understanding the issues at hand. To make matters worse, the 
compensation that the Murum villagers demanded for was not met by the government. 
Ramould stressed that being literate on land laws is crucial to understand how land 
survey works, the meaning of provisional leases (PL) and compensation details. The unity of 
residents and leaders is a big factor in determining the success of CBO empowerment 
activities. While some were lured by promises, those with better awareness resisted the 
overtures of the would-be purchasers. Wong recalled he could not hold the Long Gan 
communities together due to differences in them. One leader had a sit-in protest by himself 
against Bakun Dam. After a few months, with no support from other villagers, he eventually 
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gave in. Those who moved, did not end up at government resettlement area either because 
there was no clinic and school provided. 
Sarawak indigenous people obey their leaders since time immemorial. Community 
leaders are now appointed by state government instead of through inheritance. The 
instigation of political differences is a new mechanism to break up the communities, as 
admitted by Philip, Susanna, Ramould and Vincy. Longhouse villagers are usually divided 
between BN (government) and Opposition, as happened in Vincy’s village.  To Philip, media 
literacy is important to counter politically interested influence or ignorance among villagers. 
That’s why we need to educate [those in the longhouse against mainstream media 
content]. We, when we do these roadshows, we bring our projector … we did 
PowerPoints, we did films, documentaries. So, it is very good and I think very 
effective. 
All this presentation was done using a generator set. Philip said it was an irony that the 
villagers did not have electric supply despite being affected by mega dams. 
Albert and Christina, both in their 20s, believed that young people should get involved 
in fighting for land rights because they will be taking over from the older generation. Christina 
hoped to take up more leadership roles in SAM as her contribution for the nature. Albert said 
a number of youths from JOAS participated in the Baram protests. They helped to conduct 
paralegal training in the form of sketch illustration for the elderly to understand better. Due 
to similar age group, Albert managed to persuade youths in his village join JOAS. He raised 
some funds to buy a camera and teach them how to use it as part of media training. Albert 
really likes his job because he gets to visit the Orang Asli village and “widen his horizon”.  
Besides JOAS, SAVE Rivers has an active youth group reaching out to the community on 
river awareness. As Peter described: 
They have their own programmes as well, like programme for the river, they go to 
the beach there, cleaning the beach, and then they go out to the resettlement 
area like Sungai Asap, Mentalur, and visit the people there and talk to the people, 
asking how they are going on, so they are damn good. 
Based on their Facebook page reactions, the most popular post was a photo on the 21st 
International Day of Action for Rivers, which gained 2,300 Likes.  
Susanna from IPIMAS opined that youths are responsible for keeping their ancestral land 
intact. They need to keep themselves updated in any conservation programme. Otherwise, it 
will be too late for them to realise their land is gone after they completed university. She also 
expressed her fear that urban social ills like smoking and taking drugs have started to affect 
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the interior youths. Therefore, she always reminds parents to ensure their children to at least 
complete secondary years education. It is very heart breaking for her to see villagers losing 
their land to companies due to illiteracy. Education is empowerment, which is one of IPIMAS’ 
targets. IPIMAS has no plan yet to set up their own Facebook page. 
To attract youth attention, Anil proposed CBOs to start from “simple tools at their 
disposal”: 
…use a combination of them all, these tools, get different people, one person to 
do Facebook. In a group, one person can do Facebook, one person can do 
photographs, one person could share the Whataspp, one person can be trained to 
start a simple website. Hmmm, if they have access to IT. Otherwise, camera phone 
and maybe WhatsApp can also go a long way, you know. Coz with WhatsApp, you 
can set up ar, your own list, build up your contacts as that way, you know. 
Ramould pointed out that youths displayed inconsistent interest in TAHABAS’ 
programmes. Ramould felt frustrated having to persuade and guide them throughout the 
organising process. Besides the attraction of leisure and luxury living in town, he observed 
that youths are more concerned with pay when asked to work at family palm oil plantation. 
He concluded that family pressure to graduate and get a comfortably paying job is common 
among youths. 
Lawai looked at this issue from a more structural angle. He claimed that the Federal 
government has not allocated enough funds to Sabah and Sarawak, which is inequivalent to 
the resources contributed. Secondly, the state government has failed to take care of people’s 
welfare by providing provisional leases (PL) to close associates in palm oil and logging 
companies.  This is a bread-and-butter issue where Vincy argued with no land and no 
employment, the villagers cannot buy essential items or send their children to school. There 
is also lack of entrepreneurial skills to expand fishing and farming to be more than self-
sustained activities. She lamented that while the state government shirked this responsibility, 
not many NGOs including BaramKini, have such capacity. In her knowledge, only one 
representative from PKR, Roland Engah conducted entrepreneurial workshops for rural 
farmers.  
Another interviewee, Philip noted that school infrastructure in the interior is in a poor 
state. To him, the squatter houses the teachers are staying are dilapidated and it would affect 
their morale to teach. He also knew that the dropout rate in Baram is high and indigenous 
people make up most of these statistics. He suggested parents and teachers should enter 
dialogue to ameliorate this situation.  
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Several CBOs linked up with universities and schools for networking and resource 
sharing. BRIMAS used to get invitations from Curtin University Malaysia, Universiti Malaysia 
Sarawak (UNIMAS) and Universiti Malaya (UM) to spread land awareness among their 
students. They had no such opportunity with schools because of the sensitivity of the issue. 
IPIMAS organised camping, jungle trekking and tree-planting with school students as 
environment educational programmes. Although IPIMAS has not gone to the university level 
for that purpose, Susanna took in university interns to design and distribute publicity materials 
during major events like the World Rainforest Festival. 
SCRIPS currently has three to four interns. Michael hoped that they will continue to 
contribute in any way possible to SCRIPS. SCRIPS provides a paid service in return for 
contacting villagers for academic interviews. He recalled several post-graduate students 
interviewed these people but no subsequent application to improve the indigenous people’s 
situation.  
SAVE Rivers have a more productive experience with postgraduate research. SAVE 
Rivers worked with an expert from the University of Berkeley in California, Professor Dan 
Kammen, who capitalised on his student’s PhD thesis to conduct a comprehensive study of 
alternatives to dams, which later was presented to the state government.   
The University of Nottingham Malaysia, through their outreach programme, 
collaborated with SACCESS and sponsors two Penan students for tertiary education. They 
were selected because they were the only Form Five school leavers, which is the minimum 
requirement. They made an unofficial pledge to the community that they will study hard and 
return to serve the communities.  
Nottingham waived the fees, give them free accommodation, then we got a 
foundation to give them monthly stipend. So, the intention is basically, you know, 
the capacity, to be exposed. So when they have holidays, we send them to PKR 
YBs, service centre, they go and work with the community, how do they serve the 
community and so on and so forth. [Pang] 
Initially, the University of Nottingham Malaysia was involved in a rural water piping 
project. One of the communities’ piping was destroyed by loggers. The Nottingham 
representatives were taken by SACCESS to meet government district officers and loggers to 
ask for new pipe. The loggers agreed upon exchanging for the community area’s logs but the 
villagers persisted to defend their area. The loggers then dumped oil, chemicals and rubbish 
from upstream where the timber camp was based. From this incident, the University wanted 
to conduct an outreach programme through education. Pang explained SACCESS agreed to 
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collaborate with them because “unlike [others], Nottingham does not try to curry favour with 
the government”. It is a pilot project where the students were sent to Kuching to complete a 
Foundation course, then contribute to Penan pre-schools upon graduation. SACCESS pays 
attention to pre-school because there is none in the Penan areas. YB See and Pang stressed 
that while the government wants the Penans to leave their forest lifestyle, there is also lack 
of understanding of their different ability to adapt to schooling. Due to their nomadic 
background, they could not concentrate in classroom.  
Education was this process of lifting their capacity. So, what is happening is that 
many of the Penan kids, they even dropped out of primary school. Some very basic 
reason but it’s more a reflection more in questioning our education system then. 
In a sense that our education system, we must all fit in. You don’t allow for 
diversity and so on. [Pang] 
Vincy added that some parents asked their children to skip classes because they needed 
help to collect fruits and other harvest. This subsequently contributed to high school drop out 
among them.  
7.3 Policy Influence Ability 
Lobbying is the least popular theme in the CBOs’ organisational background – featured 
only by SAM and SAVE Rivers. SAM described that they have a dedicated team in research to 
“lobby law and policy makers both at national and international levels”. On the other hand, 
SAVE Rivers aimed to “mobilise the public at large to speak up against the plans of the Sarawak 
State Government” to build destructive dams.  
To YB See, the late Adenan was really supportive in reviewing NCR cases by setting up a 
special committee. He designated an Iban deputy to look into land issues. Although YB See 
was able to approach the Chief Minister through his position as a PKR assemblyman, he only 
viewed “political party as a vehicle”. To him, political parties may seize to exist, but land issues 
remain. Therefore, it is very important for the community to empower themselves.  
SCRIPS regularly meets up with YBs, politicians and lawyers to push for policy change in 
NCR. Documentation of oral history is crucial to be presented to land survey department as 
evidence of NCR legitimacy. BPAC admitted that their effort had not resulted in policy change. 
They submitted memorandum and petition through a Member of Parliament, Baru Bian but 
was rejected in the State Assembly.  
IDEAL was keen in influencing policy. They aimed to influence timber buyers and 
equipment suppliers to be more environmentally and socially conscious. They “did not go very 
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far” because of Wong’s deteriorating health. TAHABAS’ policy influence initiatives included 
getting manifesto endorsed by state election candidates. However, Ramould revealed that 
none from the BN parties agreed to sign, only those from the Opposition did. JOAS worked 
closely with BERSIH to influence any resource distribution policy that is unfair toward the 
indigenous people. Many are deprived from basic amenities such as access road and school. 
Thomas disclosed that some schools were promised to be built upon conversion to Islam.  
7.4 Funding Sources and Strategies 
Only SAM website and BaramKini blog called for Donation, which is categorised as 
Upward Information Flows.  
BRIMAS and JOAS used to get funding from foreign agencies like Rainforest Norway. 
They stopped giving because they assumed Malaysia is now a developed country. The funding 
priority has shifted to other developing countries such as Indonesia, Laos, Cambodia, Africa 
and several Latin American countries.  To Mark and Thomas, it is a huge disparity to include 
Sarawak as the big picture of Malaysia’s economic state.  
As far as government funding is concerned, NGOs that promoted government policy are 
heavily favoured, said Mark. They are called the GONGOs, Government Organised NGOs like 
Angkatan Zaman Mansang [Movement for Progress, AZAM]. JOAS applied funding from the 
International Tropical Timber Organisation (ITTO) through the Forestry Department. Thomas 
felt that the handling of the fund is not very transparent. Jok Jau explained that funding for 
resident associations (RAs) is allocated through the ROS. They need to submit a proper report 
to the ROS detailing their activities before getting the fund. 
Mark explained that now most CBOs get funding by projects, not for supporting 
overhead expenses. Support in cash or miscellaneous from personal contacts is another 
platform. A friend of Michael’s donated a piece of land to SCRIPS to build a training centre. 
For Lawai to conduct mini sharing sessions in Kuala Lumpur, a café owner sponsored the 
venue. Assemblywoman Elizabeth Wong helped BaramKini to get free space from a shopping 
mall provided to organise an exhibition. Philip relied on some good Samaritans to fund BPAC 
to send people for training.  
In the early 1980s, Wong used Society of Christian Service (SCS) to raise funds via choir 
group where his wife was the conductor. They did not face much resistance as IPK ran socio-
economic programmes. Wong also solicited funds from his contacts under his capacity as a 
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trained regional pastor. The World Council Church lent him support by connecting him with 
funding agencies in Europe such as Bradford. 
On the other hand, YB See and Pang perceived donation and fund application as “a form 
of dependency”. SACCESS has been self-funding and they are fortunate enough to have a 
landlord who never raised their office rent for the past 20 years. Pang stressed that since 
SACCESS needs not constantly look for fund, they can focus on the people’s priorities. 
When asked if new media provide a resourceful platform to solicit funds, several CBOs 
answered that crowdsourcing has the potential although they themselves have not explored 
it. Peter is doubtful because people in Sarawak are “suspicious” if crowdsourcing is a scam. 
Although Michael attended a workshop on social media management for NGOs, he has yet to 
practise it.  
Facebook is quite effective to get funding as SAVE Rivers once received a donation of as 
much as RM5000. JOAS managed to get a huge sum of donation for a flood disaster in 
Kelantan. BaramKini used their blog to raise funds for their voters education programme in 
2014 and collected up to RM100,000. Mark emailed his friends for donation purposes. Mark 
believed that as long as it is an unconditional relationship, funding from politicians is not an 
issue. JOAS used press release to solicit funds for their annual indigenous celebration.  
7.4 Summary of Findings 
This chapter has outlined the findings to discuss the extent to which new media contribute to 
the CBOs’ internal operations.  
RO4) To determine the extent to which the NCR land CBOs’ organisational processes improved 
using the new media. 
The CBOs were either registered as business entity or non-profit organisation. Peter 
from SAVE Rivers particularly disliked unregistered organisation because it indicates 
inconsistency and non-systematic leadership. Some CBOs resented certain individuals who are 
active in demonstrations, but less involved with the day-to-day operations.   
The CBOs currently faced difficulty in attracting and retaining the younger generation. 
The researcher observed that those operating the CBOs in the 1980s and 1990s remained the 
same and they are involved with more than one organisation. Some are now inactive due to 
financial and health constraints. Indigenous people’s migration to town either creates more 
awareness due to Internet access or ignorance because of the detachment from their origins. 
Some CBO personnel felt used after being interviewed by post-graduate students because 
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there is no follow-up for the betterment of the Sarawak natives. The CBOs need talents and 
conscientiousness from the young because education and empowerment of the affected 
natives come hand in hand.  From the structural angle, the consciousness of the public at large 
is very much shaped by mainstream education system that is less on critical pedagogy. From 
the CBOs’ Facebook posts, none was about recruitment. SAVE Rivers only posted once on their 
blog announcing vacancy in their organisation while SAM website had a Volunteer function. 
SACCESS is working with the Nottingham University of Malaysia to send 2 Penan school 
leavers for their Foundation studies in town with the hope that they could contribute to their 
communities’ pre-school education. IPIMAS targets school students to teach them about 
conservation through outdoor activities. IPIMAS emphasised that education is empowerment. 
SAVE Rivers, on the other hand, utilised a postgraduate thesis to propose dam alternatives to 
the state government.  
When communication technology has become too convenient, other issues arise. 
Facebook Shares, Likes and Tags are insignificant for some CBO personnel. While they are very 
easy to use, they hardly have any impact on policymaking, legislation or CBO manpower 
resources. Mark and Ramould revealed that the Facebook Likes depended very much on the 
sensational level of an issue, which is not sustainable for empowerment. Susanna argued that 
anyone can like a post whether or not he or she understands the issue or is truly literate on 
conservation efforts. While JOAS, SAM and SAVE Rivers were relatively active with Facebook 
posting, the items were overwhelmingly event-based and in the form of photos. Those with 
the highest number of responses were in the form of photos and videos. 
The most common information displayed top-down from the web-based platforms was 
Organisational Background, with ‘empowerment’ as the main theme. SAM’s organisational 
details were the most comprehensive, covering all 6 themes – independence, empowerment, 
alliances, lobbying, R&D and media. From TAHABAS Facebook page, their only web-based 
platform, they aimed to empower the indigenous people of their “legal, social and human 
rights”. Overall, the CBOs’ web-based platforms lacked bottom-up communication flow that 
would allow site visitors to send enquiries or to make commitment such as volunteering or 
donation. 
Lobbying is the least practised activity by the CBOs as indicated from their web-based 
platforms. This could be attributed to the limited resources in higher capacity to influence 




Utilising web-based platforms to solicit funding is unpopular among the CBOs. Only SAM 
and BaramKini called for Donation. None of the CBOs posted online petition or actions to join 
their campaign. The CBO personnel were convinced it is more convenient and effective to get 
donation from their personal contacts. Albert from JOAS claimed that crowdsourcing from 
Facebook is effective in times of natural disaster. International funding bodies have shifted 
their attention to less developed countries like Indonesia and Myanmar, assuming that 
Malaysia is now a developed country.  
 
7.5 Conclusion 
 Similar with the findings in Chapter 6, new media technologies had no major 
contribution in the CBOs’ offline organisational processes. This research thinks that with or 
without the use of new media by NGOs in Malaysia, the CBOs lacked clear, wider strategy for 
the sustenance of their advocacy. BaramKini and BPAC admitted they are more like “one-man 
show” and have no further activities after the Baram dam construction was halted. IDEAL and 
BRIMAS are no longer active due to personal reasons. CBOs that are still operating expressed 
the difficulty in getting younger people to be interested in their activities. One advantage that 
is clear, being CBOs, the organisational hierarchy serves only as a formal structure for the 
purpose of registration. In practice, the CBOs are hands on with empowering the communities. 
Nevertheless, the interviewees have split views in terms of getting registered. Peter stressed 
that registration gives a CBO a sense of direction while Pang said it is an institutional burden. 
The interviews further showed that the CBOs were not too keen in utilising new media 
to recruit the younger generation, to raise funds and to influence policy. Their priority is 
empowerment of the grassroots, which they think need not involve new media publicity. To 
them, recruitment is a structural matter that involves migration, employment, education and 
conscientious toward native plights. They admitted that the CBOs in Sarawak are weak 
without strong coalition and leadership. The overall sentiment toward what the future holds 
for the CBOs is reflected in their web-based platforms – they either lack vitality in 
communicating their purpose to the users or dependent on circumstances such as events and 
conflicts to gain responses.   
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Chapter 8: The State and Other Trenches of Civil Society 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the ‘external’ factors that influence the CBOs’ organising activities, 
namely government, donors, regulatory bodies, churches and police. As discussed in Chapter 
2, civil society is an arena of actors and processes that involves not only an ‘antagonistic’ state 
but actors that have educative roles in managing consent. This chapter aims to discuss how 
the CBOs managed their relations with other civil society actors and to what extent new media 
have a part in it.  
RO5) To investigate if the new media enhanced the NCR land CBOs’ networking strategies. 
 
8.2 Government 
Thomas and Philip expressed their disappointment toward the state government under 
Chief Minister Taib’s administration, which they thought was a betrayal to the people by giving 
away provisional leases (PLs) to companies without their consent. Jok Jau argued that the state 
government was very defensive to land CBOs and labelled them as anti-government or 
Opposition Parties’ allies. The CBOs took the communities’ land plights to the Forest 
Department but to no avail. 
In YB See’s opinion, the land conflicts originated from the contentious overlapping 
between politics and economy, or rather private wealth accumulation in Malaysia: 
The government legislate, the government formulate agencies, and all these, they 
actually taking away the rights of the people, give it to the company. You talk about 
any land agencies, there’s no way that anyone of them actually lived up to their 
principles or their mission set up to be, but to serve the interests of these people 
who have political connection in the ruling party. I mean that’s the BN model, all 
the while. So, it’s natural for them to label those NGOs who are trying to help the 
people who are fighting all these policies to label them as opposition. Even though 
they are not! They are not members of the opposition, but they will still get the 
labelling.  
Peter would agree to this most as SAVE Rivers was more than happy to work with the 
government, provided that they “[d]on’t destroy the forest, don’t grab people’s land, make a 
proper study of what’s pulau galau [reserved virgin forests] and pemakai menoa [territorial 
domain].” Peter said that SAVE Rivers worked with the Adenan government by taking the 
officers to remaining forests areas and showed them extensive studies of forest sustainability. 
The government agreed to SAVE Rivers’ approach and sponsored them workshops and 
roadshows to educate the villagers.  
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Ramould and Thomas thought that the government should be doing more than just 
ratifying the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). 
Thomas complained that even for national celebration, there is no funding for them. In certain 
ways, after the peak of land disputes in the 1980s, Thomas felt that the federal government 
slowly opened up. He said that at least now ministers included them in consultations, like the 
Conservation of Biological Diversity (CBD), which so far, he had not seen such initiative from 
the state government.  
Mantan Pahang was a former Temenggong (Head of Division) from 1994 to 2014. He 
was sacked after he grew critical of the government’s land administration. The government 
abolished the power of Penghulu (Village Head) and Ketua Kampung (Community Chief) to 
have a say over Adat (Custom) (SACCESS, 2008). These positions are government elect, not 
through Adat. Mantan Pahang claimed that his land with ancestral graves now belonged to 
the government because he could not produce a grant. To him, going to the Native Court is a 
dead end because the court would in turn penalise him for encroaching state land.    
When asked about changes in the state administration, most interviewees identified 
‘state’ with the position ‘Chief Minister’. They opined that the late Adenan Satem was far more 
lenient than Taib and Abang Jo. Peter said that the transition from Taib to Adenan was like “a 
180-degree change”, citing an example where Adenan was willing to meet the Penans even 
during his overseas work trip. Within his first three months, Adenan promised to look into 
native land issues. He also ordered to stop the Baram dam project and put in effort to study 
micro hydro as an alternative. Adenan was confident enough to allow YB See to write a column 
in the government-linked newspaper Borneo Post. When Abang Jo took over, the space was 
closed again. Mantan Pahang said that Abang Jo is only loud in talk but no concrete action. For 
Wong, however, there had not been many changes in terms of policy regardless of Adenan’s 
or Abang Jo’s administration.  
8.2.1 Challenges from the State 
The most common state mechanism used to impede CBO advocacy was passport 
confiscation, as experienced by Mark, Thomas, Jok Jau, Wong and the late Raymond Abin 
(coordinator of Sarawak Conservation Alliance for Natural Environment, SCANE). Thomas’ 
passport was taken away for 13 years from 1992 to 2005. He still managed to attend Japan’s 
ITTO meeting in 1991 before the confiscation while Jok Jau did not get to fly to Rio de Janeiro 
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for the Earth Summit in 1994. After 8 years of court case and appeal, Jok Jau finally got his 
passport back in 2002. 
Mark, Peter, Jok Jau, Wong and Ramould had a first-hand encounter with police 
intervention during their advocacy. At the height of logging, palm oil and blockade issues, 
Mark said they were intimidated by plain clothes police called the Special Branch (SB). The SB 
monitored BRIMAS from everywhere – car, shop and café. They purposely delayed Mark’s 
flights by interrogating him. Wong added that because of the SB’s intimidation, his IPK staff 
quit and subsequently he decided to dissociate IPK from the church. Ramould’s experience 
was more challenging as he was arrested over alleged gun possession. He claimed it was an 
act of sabotage because his arrest intertwined with an incident where several villagers were 
beaten up by the police and accused of stealing palm oil fruits from a plantation company. 
Ramould was very surprised that a top police officer asked him to surrender the land, knowing 
that TAHABAS had certain influence on the villagers. To a certain extent, gangster was also 
sent to force dismantling of blockade set up by the villagers.  
Thomas and Jok Jau witnessed mass arrests from the late 1980s to early 1990s. In 1992, 
up to 700 people were arrested over a logging dispute. Although there were no charges, Jok 
Jau said that by locking them up was enough to intimidate others not to protest.  
Unfortunately, the police sided with the companies. Once he helped the Limbang residents to 
file summons over wrongful arrest and they won the case. Michael was less fortunate where 
he lost his court appeal and ended up landless.  
Wong’s IPK in the 1980s experienced tapped communication and subsequently got 
deregistered for holding a seminar in Kuala Lumpur. They were asked to go to court and 
produce show-cause letter. At organisational level, so far, SCRIPS, SACCESS, BPAC, IPIMAS and 
BaramKini faced no state challenges. Pang said that SACCESS was always ready to counter any 
form of trouble.  
8.2.2 Counter-Strategies by the CBOs 
Mark said that highlighting land issues through a press conference was the only strategy. 
I mean some people want us to challenge the action of the government, but then 
again, if all the government machinery has been used against you, you challenge 




Nevertheless, Mark thought that the policing of the CBOs and communities who resisted 
land-grabbing reduced after Taib Mahmud stepped down and SUHAKAM did a report on 
human right abuse.  
For Ramould and Thomas, it was best to record any incident of violence and lodge a 
police report. The villagers should stand firm and insist that they did not want to resort to 
violence either. Ramould said that putting women dressed in shabby clothes at the front line 
of blockades is a good strategy. If anything happened, they could accuse the police of 
molestation. Ramould elaborated how being vocal could knock some sense to the plantation 
company and police. In a dialogue session, he chastised the company representative for 
lacking moral: 
Your company is worth millions, yet you want to grab people’s lands. Shame on 
you! We are not animals, we are not foreigners, why chase us away from our land? 
WE HAVE DIGNITY! If you want to compensate, make sure your company 
compensate my future generations too, because that is what our land is for.    
IPIMAS and SCRIPS, on the other hand, thought that staying low profile is best to avoid 
getting into any trouble. IPIMAS would show support to other CBOs without interfering their 
actions. For Ramould, foreign NGOs showed more solidarity than the local ones. During the 
1980s, Pang and Wong recalled that there were not many NGOs or lawyers, let alone to offer 
support of any kind. Pang added that now they are more prepared as they have lawyers as the 
first line of defence. It increased the villagers’ fighting spirit when SACCESS was able to send 
over lawyers the following day upon any distress call. Because of a clumsy prosecutor, it is 
very easy for experienced lawyers like YB See and Baru Bian to win the case. For Uma Bawang 
Resident Association (UBRA), Jok Jau said that being awarded Equator Prize 2002 helped build 
trust among the villagers to register themselves with resident associations and be more 
participative. The Equator Prize is a biennial award initiated within the UNDP that recognises 
nature-based sustainable efforts from local communities and indigenous people (Equator 
Initiative, 2019). 
8.3 Political parties / Politicians 
CBOs gave mixed answers regarding the extent to which they wanted to work with 
politicians or political parties. Pang said that since Malaysia did not offer a level playing field, 
no doubt involving the political side is important. To Wong, Philip and Peter, politicians served 
as a messenger to voice CBOs’ plight through the House of Representatives in Parliament. 
Although the CBOs were not selective on the party, none from the BN coalition offered 
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support to them. Democratic Action Party (DAP) was the only Opposition then, and they paid 
attention to the CBOs. Therefore, DAP became the last resort. Thomas made it clear that JOAS 
only asked for help from like-minded individual politicians without compromising its own 
principles. 
Michael added that some politicians were not courageous enough to stand up for the 
people yet wanted to use NGOs to polish their image. He cited Telang Usan assemblyman YB 
Dennis Ngau as an example. YB Dennis might look holy with his “church-going image” but 
evaded the core issues that native faced. Michael thought it is unethical for native politicians 
themselves to divide their own people.  
BPAC had not tried approaching politicians but might want to, with the new 
government. For Vincy, BaramKini never drew the line too clear; they just did what they 
thought was right. IPIMAS asserted that they only invited politicians to launch their 
programmes, “no more than that”.  
YB See, an assemblyman and Sarawak PKR vice-chairman, said that getting politicians 
involved does have certain impact but in a limited way. It is the state leadership that matters. 
For example, more space is open for them to make changes during Adenan’s time as compared 
to that of Abang Jo.    
Ramould paved himself a clear direction when he quit his political party to join the NGO 
sphere. He said that his former party failed to look out for his community’s plight due to 
conflict of interests. This resulted in “discussion after discussion” without any concrete action. 
From over 10 years with the party, he claimed he had never seen any representative showed 
up at court as a form of support. Similarly, none of the BN lawyers helped them. To him, it was 
very frustrating each time organising empowerment activity in village as TAHABAS, he was 
asked if he came from the Opposition party. 
8.4 Legislation and Judiciary 
Most interviewees thought that the fluidity of powers between excecutive and judiciary 
posed a great challenge for CBOs to seek justice for the communities. For a 13-year case 
pending at the Appeal Court, the government lawyer suddenly called JOAS to settle out of 
court. Thomas knew it quite well that court delay is a strategy to kill CBOs’ fighting spirit 
although the government never had good grounds in the first place.  
Michael argued that laws were made of BN politicians’ own interpretation, which is 
against the Constitution. He gave an example where the former Selangor government lost a 
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court case over a vast area intended for building a new airport. After a change of Chief 
Minister, the verdict was reversed and the area was declared as state land. Michael lost his 
land at the Appeal Court because of the ambiguous force that Adat has in law. He claimed that 
the government amended the Land Survey Code in the name of development, but they want 
to “steal the natives’ land.” 
 
 
Boundary book worked on by SCRIPS to challenge the official interpretation of NCR law 
 
Next amendment the government did is the community leaders’ ordinance. Where 
community posts Penghulu [cheiftain], Pemanca [district leader] and Temenggong [division 
leader] used to be chosen through Adat, they are now government-elect. They no longer have 
power over land and subsequently no say by law. Michael also claimed that the evidence of 
customary land boundary is now kept in the museum, away from general knowledge. He was 
working on de-classifying the Boundary Book through oral history documentation and 
challenge the government.  
In the 1980s, not many lawyers were available to offer legal assistance or training to the 
community. Since “the laws were oppressive”, YB See, from an accounting background, took 
up law and practised it. SAM has an annual meeting with all lawmakers, but none from the 
government turned up. Although now CBOs have more lawyers willing to help and they charge 
minimally or nothing at all, Wong and Ramould thought that court appeals are a waste of time 
if there is no change of government. For Ramould, the only defence is the fighting spirit.   
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8.5 Local NGOs 
Networking is the second most popular theme in the CBOs’ organisational background. 
The alliance is multi-level (local, regional, international) and among parliamentarians, CBOs, 
NGOs, and public interest lawyers.  
To Mark and Wong who pioneered own CBOs in the 1980s and 1990s, they saw a good 
development of NGOs. Newer communication technologies also have made their operation 
easier with Skype meetings, WhatsApp groups and sharing larger files through Google Docs.  
Joint press statement is another platform to give voice in solidarity. Lawai thought it is a 
good way to pressure the government. If the intention is genuine, a joint press statement 
really has an impact, said Mark. SAVE Rivers produced press statements “as and when 
needed” and they tried to collect feedback from the grassroots each time. For Susanna, 
IPIMAS took part in joint press statement as a sign of group solidarity. 
Networking is important for sharing resources. JOAS and TAHABAS are part of the 
Malaysian Environmental Non-Governmental Organisations (MENGO). JOAS, BRIMAS and 
Sarawak Dayak Iban Association (SADIA) worked together to protest against dams under 
Sarawak Corridor of Renewable Energy (SCORE) in Baram. Peter, a retiree, was appointed the 
Chairman of SAVE Rivers, which started out as a network of 8 NGOs. He added how SAVE 
Rivers collaborated with others: 
We have another group called Damn the Dam [chuckled]. These are the people 
who support us. And then we have a group, this BaramKini, they are very, very 
active, they bring people for, tourist groups, you know, not only from within 
Malaysia, but Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, you know even the Malaysian 
immigrant to, they brought in American, you know Malaysians who have migrated 
to US? They were groups of them who came in, not only come with tourists, but 
they come in with doctors and go to the Ulu, to give their free professional service 
to the people upriver there. 
JOAS is a network of about 100 CBOs across three regions, including Wanita Desa 
Sarawak [Sarawak Village Women] (WADESA) that IPIMAS works closely with. Besides 
the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG), JOAS works with SUHAKAM by inviting them 
to give talks on human rights. Thomas said building alliance takes time because it also 
means building trust. For Jok Jau, they feel safe to be under the Penang headquarter 
because “their group is quite national, and also quite experienced and quite close to 
some of the political groups”, so it feels like “under a big umbrella”. Through the head 
office, the Marudi branch has the opportunity to approach the Federal government 
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because “the villagers are rather weak in voicing their problem.” Jok Jau added that 
Persatuan Kaum Penan Sarawak [Penan Sarawak Association] was under SAM Marudi 
until the fund dried up. Similarly, Vincy said that the now defunct Penan Support Group 
used to co-operate with Suara Rakyat Malaysia (Voice of the Malaysian People, 
SUARAM) to get funding. 
 
The logo of JOAS 
 
Jok Jau wanted SAM Marudi to be as neutral as possible and not operating by the ethnic 
line, an attribute also aimed by IPIMAS. On the other hand, Mantan Pahang opined that to 
work beyond the boundary of ethnicity is challenging because in itself, the network of CBOs is 
weak. For Lawai, ethnicity can be a focus point for CBOs. Mantan Pahang and Lawai argued 
that once ethnic-based CBOs get stronger, ethnicity can be put aside. 
In terms of strength, Michael, Lawai, Philip and YB See thought the network is still rather 
loose. Because the issues worked on are the same, SACCESS tried hard to fill the void. Lacking 
variety among CBO personalities is a big issue to Philip and Vincy. For example, the late 
Raymond Abin was involved with forming SAVE Rivers before pioneering SCANE. Raymond 
was with SAM and then he established BRIMAS with Harrison Ngau. Mark stressed that smaller 
NGOs want to retain their autonomy because they do not like to be told what to do by larger 
counterpart. Another reason is that the network lacks a strong leader. Mantan Pahang said 
NGOs have to be strong especially if the government is oppressive.  
Despite the growing number of NGOs, not all CBOs agreed with the quality and 
approach. Mark and Thomas chided that some claimed to be NGO, but were only seen making 
noise during demonstrations. The effectiveness of demonstration itself, Thomas said is 
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questionable. Peter had strong dislike toward groups that did not register themselves as 
organisations like the Sarawak Dayak Association (PEDAS). To Peter, to be registered means 
to have proper standard operating procedures (SOP) for the stability of an organisation. 
Furthermore, being “noisy” in demonstrations without media coverage is useless especially 
when villagers did not have the capacity to create their own content. Likewise, being “noisy” 
on social media to Ramould is pointless without going on the ground. 
Despite that, not all interviewees were on the same page with several established 
organisations. Malaysian Nature Society (MNS), for Peter, is the ‘soft’ type that viewed SAVE 
Rivers as ‘militant’. Most ethnic-based associations are social clubs to YB See, Mark and 
Ramould where no land issues were discussed or raised collectively. Ramould regretted to see 
such disparity between land and culture because to him, land is Adat, and Adat is culture. Adat 
is their culture. Pang argued that even intellectuals and professionals are willingly co-opted as 
the “extended arm of the state” like the Dayak Bidayuh National Association (DBNA), which is 
involved in surveying Bidayuh land. Such role is a “joke” to him because only Land and Survey 
has the authority in that matter. The villagers nevertheless entrusted DBNA to survey their 
land in hope for a title.  
When asked about Peninsular NGOs, interviewees were unsure or doubtful on how 
Sarawak CBOs can exchange resources with them. The most mentioned was the Sarawak 
chapter of electoral reform group, BERSIH, which originated from Kuala Lumpur. SAVE Rivers, 
JOAS and BaramKini worked with BERSIH Sarawak before. SCRIPS also trained Polling and 
Counting Agents (PACA) to stop electoral cheating. Pang questioned if there is a need to learn 
“a thing or two” from the Peninsular counterparts. The target of CBOs is the communities 
where they must be at the front line of defence of their rights. Equipping them with 
information is ongoing because human rights institutions failed to do so: 
Unlike in Western country, you have the institution that defending the societal 
rights in…and so the community there, the general public there, you don’t need 
to have paralegal training among the UK resident, for example. They just have to 
go to the media and bombed out, then those police who abused the rights will get 
into trouble. But for us here, we know it doesn’t happen. And so, then the other 
way apart from not doing anything is you try to raise the capacity of the population 
to understand their rights. [Pang] 
Similarly, YB See said that unlike other countries, we do not have specialised systems of 
electoral, judiciary and media.  
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Michael argued that the quality of Sarawak transportation poses great challenge for 
mass mobilisation. When there is no mass transit system, rally participants get cut off easily. 
Jok Jau responded that that their form of protest is raising blockades. However, Ramould 
warned that NGOs in Peninsula are more aggressive, which Sarawak CBOs cannot afford to do 
the same. He cited Bill Kayong as an example for being too vocal about native rights. Within a 
month, he was assassinated. From Vincy’s interview with some villagers, they were hopeful 
that Kuala Lumpur NGOs can help them out.  
8.6 Foreign NGOs 
Mark named a few that BRIMAS worked with before – Rainforest Foundation Norway, 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Canadian Embassy and US Embassy. Uma 
Bawang Resident Association (UBRA) has built a relationship with Berkeley Sister City when 
they first came to Sarawak for a visit. They brought back the land issues to Berkeley and 
formed another group called the Borneo Project. 
 
 
Peter awarded with Bruno Manser Prize Peter showing the proportion of virgin 
forests left in Sarawak 
 
Having a link with foreign NGOs brings in both advantages and disadvantages. For SAVE 
Rivers, Peter saw such relationships as effective in pressuring the government and loggers. 
They presented an opportunity to apply for funding, although the process is getting harder 
now. Mark added that in the past, everybody wanted to help the Penans, a trending word in 
Sarawak land issues. Now the foreign NGOs fund other developing countries and they are 
more to project-based funding. IPIMAS’ projects got funding from Danish International 
Development Agency (DANIDA), UN, and Ford Foundation. Bruno Manser Fund (BMF) gave 
funding to TAHABAS before whereas IDEAL only maintained a working relationship with BMF.  
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For smaller CBOs like BPAC and BaramKini, they had never approached any foreign 
funder. Pang remained sceptical toward what he called as elite NGOs like Bill Gates 
Foundation and WWF. SACCESS is very particular who they want to work with since they are 
non-dependent on any funding source. WWF took the middle approach but work with loggers 
and Sarawak Energy Berhad (SEB), as Pang and Michael claimed. Such whitewash approach is 
detested by Mark because once dams are built and flood the area, the after effect is 
irreversible, hence rendering the word ‘sustainable’ useless. In addition, any relationship with 
foreign NGOs would make CBOs an easy target to be labelled as anti-government. 
Several CBOs looked forward to learning from other countries. SCRIPS had an 
opportunity to send a member to Brazil regarding a land issue. Because of the month-long 
duration, they did not send anyone. SCRIPS and IDEAL had participated in trainings from 
Thailand, Indonesia, India and Australia. 
8.7 Other Actors 
For 20 years, Mantan Pahang was a Temenggong, the highest position among 
community leaders. His main job was to take care of anything non-written such as land 
without grant. He was removed in 2014 for being critical of government management of 
native land. He claimed that the state government twisted the land law. During his ancestors’ 
time, they guarded their own lands without current legislation. Any encroachment would be 
served with the blowpipe penalty without warning. Blowpipe, with poisoned darts, is a 
Sarawak ancestral tool for hunting and a weapon of warfare (Vanes, 23 November 2013). 
Figure 49 Blowpipe demonstration by an Iban in his traditional costume 
 
Photo: Jess Cheng 
Since the state government acquired the power to elect community leaders, Philip and 
Lawai perceived such positions as politically motivated. Nevertheless, Michael never gave up 
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on training the community leaders and let them make their own decisions. SCRIPS trained 
them on Global Positioning System (GPS), oral history documentation and community 
mapping. 
Wong and Michael first had a close encounter with natives around Sarawak when they 
were with their respective church ministry. Wong was a regional priest; Michael was a church 
lawyer and also a qualified canonist. Wong was with the Sarawak Christian Society (SCS) under 
Sibu Methodist Church helping to supply water to villages. The church focused on socio-
economic issues but he wanted to do more. Pressured with police harassment, he decided to 
leave the church to commit fully to land rights advocacy through IPK. Similarly feeling sorry 
for all the problems natives faced, Michael decided he needed more space to speak to people 
about rights, laws, policies and government land administration.  
Michael opined that now churches slowly are more understanding since church 
members themselves cannot escape from being exposed to land issues. YB See, who was 
Wong’s protégé, thought that now a church like Borneo Evangelical Church (SIB) is very 
supportive in Baram. At first Wong was accused of being anti-government but now his church 
is proud of him. He also regretted the fact that “[s]ome of the church leaders have been using 
[his] work as Christian work.” Wong denied it because he has never used Christianity as the 
reason or platform to help the natives. 
Pang warned that we should not think of church-associated activities as void of own 
agenda. To him, even churches are competing to be the champion of Penans.  
Why Penans? Because they are seen as weakest, more susceptible to conversion. 
Before this the institutions were worried about them being converted to Islam but 
now l know of competition between Methodist and SIB. Methodist setup 
preschools in Penan villages and SIB must have felt threatened that they have 
since been in full swings on setting up and operating rural preschools. Pathetic. 
So, SIB send their pastors into active mode as if to wade off the entry of Methodist 
and others. Such is their priorities, than loss of rights, loss of forests and lands. I 
said how can God be scared of white-hair mortal chief minister when SIB even 
sacked pastors for raising the issue of land rights in their institutional meetings. Of 
course, Methodist is no different in Sarawak as preacher is prevented from talking 
on land rights and rights as per bible. Other religions in Sarawak must keep quiet 
about "sensitive" issues if they wanted to cosy up to Sarawak government, so they 
keep quiet. [Pang] 
Such competition overshadowed any sincere intention to stand up for land rights. Pang 
believed it is ironic to penalise preachers who talked about land rights.  
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Suara Rakyat Malaysia (SUARAM), according to Michael, hardly existed in Sarawak, 
unlike in the 1980s. SUARAM, a human rights organisation in Malaysia, was established in 
1987 after Operasi Lalang. Ramould opined that SUARAM is more responsive to CBOs. 
Comparatively, Michael felt that the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM) has 
“no fangs” to take concrete action because they are “under the government.” Michael added 
that SUHAKAM once asked SCRIPS to organise a talk but provided no fund for them.  
As for the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC), Michael asserted that they 
are no different from the government. Even when TAHABAS lodged a report to the MACC 
against the former Chief Minister Taib’s involvement with illegal logging, nothing was done. 
Pang argued that the Malaysian Timber Certification Council (MTCC) is a “classic 
example of co-optation to government agenda”. In the 1990s, SACCESS, with a coalition of 
NGOs, discredited the MTCC because their main agenda was not to reach out to as many 
stakeholders as possible. MTCC blatantly supported the state government whenever SACCESS 
brought up the Adat issue. The whole process was an impasse because the Sarawak state 
government said they needed no timber certification from the MTCC. Land taken illegally 
turned out to be legal because “the state government is the government.” Other groups in 
the council like WWF and MNS, Pang chastised, did nothing because “they cared more about 
animals than human rights.” They worked with loggers and set up community council made 
of “state yes men and yes women.” Wong and Ramould similarly shared the opinion that the 
MTCC does not prioritise the social aspect of logging and they have been boycotted by many 
NGOs. They may look good on paper but the membership is very dubious. Just like the Jabatan 
Kemajuan Orang Asli [Department of Orang Asli Development] (JAKOA), the top management 
is not made up by Orang Asli [indigenous people in Peninsular Malaysia] themselves.     
8.8 Issues Arising from NCR Land 
8.8.1 “Over-romanticisation” of the Penans  
There were mixed reactions toward the Penan group, which became the centre of 
international attention in the 1980s. Mark was the first to use the word “over-romanticised”. 
There were both good and bad sides to it, although the hype died down after the 1990s. It 
was a free publicity for Sarawak land issues but only highlighting the Penans, which Mark 
argued was unjustifiable to other indigenous groups. The Penans were always perceived as 
people who want to stay in the jungle and wear loincloths, which he rebutted:   
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The Penan, they also want to be like us, but what they are asking is, they want 
their land to be respected, so that they can live with honours and decide what they 
want to have. They don’t wanna stay in the jungle just like their fathers. [Mark] 
Michael questioned the things BMF had really done for the Penans. Unless the Penans 
could benefit from mega plantation projects, international publicity was insufficient. 
Furthermore, he believed the BMF is “very secretive.” 
Another point of view was that the Penans ought to be publicised because they are the 
last ones standing to defend the forests. As Pang elaborated, other natives should have some 
“self-reflection on why it took a foreigner to highlight the issue.” He rubbished the term “over-
romanticising” because the Penans were really marginalised. He had worked with them and 
knew their issues first-hand. They faced difficulty accessing citizenry facilities because they 
have no money and official documents like birth certificates. Those hospital and government 
office registration have become the “gatekeeper”, which is ridiculous to Pang. He recalled the 
time when he was forced to quit his post-graduate studies because of emergency rape cases 
among Penan teenage girls. He had to mobilise moving them to a safe house in Kuala Lumpur. 
Vincy added that other ethnic groups looked down on the Penans because they are not head 
hunters and living an idle life in forest for their own subsistence.  
Both Vincy and Pang agreed that those who claimed the Penans are over-romanticised, 
had a hand in it.  
I think those who project that image are the one who romanticised, not the people 
who are struggling and choosing to work with them. [Pang] 
Penan actually, ya, they need attention, erm, it’s not the problem of Penan 
themselves. But it’s the NGO, it’s the overreaction. [Vincy] 
To Peter, Penans’ shy nature is a weakness as far as advocacy is concerned. Whenever 
they raised a blockade, they often changed their names and office location to avoid 
harassment. Peter met a few of them before and they complimented him for being vocal 
about land issues, which was politically sensitive in the 1990s. Peter responded: 
You know what ar [a Malaysian slang], my friend, Harrison Ngau, he was arrested, 
put in jail, and he was threatened and all this other stuff, at that time his name 
was Harrison Ngau, today his name is still Harrison Ngau. How come you keep on 
changing your name? 
He urged his Penan friends to step it up and show leadership. To work with the 
grassroots, they inevitably need to expose themselves and cannot be hiding all the time. 
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An informant told the researcher that he knew of a Penan couple who travelled from 
their forest to Miri town to seek medical services. They paid a high sum for the transportation 
fee, which the informant believed they were duped. Once in town, they did not know anything 
about crossing the streets; the heavily pregnant wife was run down by a bus and got killed on 
the spot. A year later, the husband met the same fate. Pang felt very sorry for the Penans 
being widely discriminated as “sakai” [a derogatory term that denotes barbarians]. He added 
that “if you ever go to [their] forest …it’s the reverse. We are the one sakai…We are at their 
mercy.” 
8.8.2 Social Impact of NCR Land Grabbing 
Peter summarised the impact into two intertwined parts – human rights and 
environmental. The former included how the livelihood of the people has been severely 
affected. It is to the extent that not only the living ones are affected, but also the dead where 
there is no log to make coffins. The destruction brought about by deforestation has 
encroached into the people’s heritage.  
Relationship that natives have with the environment, as YB See explained, is not the 
same with urban people. Urbanites are taught the 3Rs (reduce, reuse, recycle) and the 
biodiversity aspect. Whereas the natives have a truly direct link with their forests – clothes, 
water, food, shelter and ancestors. To Philip, the river in Baram used to be clear where he 
could see fish swimming and drink directly from. While the water now is murky, the river bank 
burst easily because of its shallowness. The river and soil have been polluted by fertiliser and 
chemicals from logging and plantations. This poses health risks to people who use the river 
and rain water. 
Thomas and Ramould lamented that the natives are always at the losing end as far as 
NCR is concerned. They neither can retain their land nor win the compensation negotiation, 
let alone reaping benefit from the timber or plantation industries. Worse still, they are labelled 
as anti-development. Michael called it a “BN propaganda” to strip the natives off their dignity. 
The natives similarly want clean water, school, clinic and electricity, which also have not been 
provided by the government. It is a mockery to bargain their human rights in a zero-sum game 
with land heritage.    
 Peter added that the socio-environmental impact assessment is a “scam”. If people do 
not want the dam, that should be respected. Peter found out that the villagers were still 
approached with a set of about sixty survey questions, asked to tick them with pencil but to 
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sign with pen. He and his team managed to chase away those geologists who claimed to be 
doing a preliminary study. He further reminded the people to be firm and not to cooperate in 
acknowledging any document they are unsure of. This is because once a dam is built, there is 
no return.  
Ramould and Mantan Pahang opined that the scope of NCR has always excluded land. 
There is no reason why land rights should be treated separately from their custom. They added 
that the state government has no respect and recognition toward the natives’ century old 
custom. Before the presence of modern form of government, the natives had no problem 
governing their own lands. The natives were the government, the police force, the firefighters, 
and the doctors.  
8.9 Civil Society and Concluding Remarks 
Several interviewees believed that civil society is a platform empowered by the people 
themselves to stand against marginalisation. To create such platform, Peter stressed that laws 
should be people- and environment-friendly: “What is suitable for the people, that is civil 
society.” For Philip and Vincy, civil society involves voluntary participation for the betterment 
of human rights. To Thomas, as much as civil society organisations should be independent and 
non-political, they have to take sides according to the context. Pang agreed that choosing to 
stand together with the marginalised is a form of principle. Anil believed civil society should 
provide more space for economic and social inclusion in terms of development. He also 
stressed the importance of state decentralisation to improve civil society. 
Michael distinguished NGO from association where the latter always apple-polishes YBs 
for donation. For Ramould, working together with any political party is not an issue but CSOs 
should not compromise their principles. Anil added that CSOs should act fast to prevent the 
new government from getting too close to business interests to the extent of jeopardising the 
dispossessed.  
Conceptually, civil society to Pang is such a debatable term because there is also uncivil 
society in Sarawak. Similarly, to Susanna, there is no ideal type of civil society. Empowerment 
through education to defend native rights is the way.  
Peter was proud that SAVE Rivers have impressive achievements despite the challenges 
they faced – tight budget, state restrictions and other resource limitations. Peter confessed 
that SAVE Rivers wanted to work with the new government as CSO, not NGO, which has 
negative connotation. He hoped that the new administration is less hostile to them and will 
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listen to the people, which in turn could get them more votes. Comparatively, CSOs in 
countries like Norway and Switzerland were given ample support by the state to run their 
activities. He looked forward to such a working relationship in Malaysia.  
YB See believed that the space now is more open for law reform, which he recently 
proposed through the Bar Council. Only with more credible judiciary that Malaysia can catch 
up with other countries like Australia, Canada and South Africa in recognising native rights. 
Philip really hoped the government can legalise NCR and survey as many lands as possible.  
Pang strongly believed that the Penans should have access to constitutional rights 
without being ridiculed or hampered by gatekeepers like the National Registration 
Department. In that case, Lawai pointed out that many Sarawakians do not even have a birth 
certificate because they were born in the jungle, for the past few generations. He also hoped 
for a more egalitarian return for Sarawak’s resources.  
Thomas, Michael and Jok Jau wished to reach out to more people. According to Vincy, 
Ramould and Wong, the young should be more involved with community-based work and 
infuse new energy to CBOs’ operations. Although Jok Jau felt that people in Sarawak are “quiet 
and weak”, he is glad that the communities so far appreciate what SAM Marudi has done for 
them through organising RAs. Michael lamented that other organisations are piggybacking on 
SCRIPS’ hard work. 
 
Philip in BPAC’s T-shirt with distinctive slogan 
 
Philip hoped for a friendlier ROS under the new government. He wanted the government 
to scrap all dam projects and replace them with micro hydro power. The current dams in 
Bakun, Murum and Batang Ai are not fully utilised, costly and harmful to the environment.   
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To Mantan Pahang, Assemblyman or woman, with their capacity, should have a stand to 
raise land issues. Party democracy is no guarantee of people’s democracy. For Anil, a credible 
coalition of Opposition is needed to watch the new government. Susanna wished for a specific 
Ministry to oversee environmental issues. Lawai, on the other hand, argued that the 
Malaysian education needs a reform so that the young is taught to empathise with other 
communities and the environment, not only pursuing individual dream. 
Media, to Anil, Thomas and Wong, play a crucial role in raising awareness and 
empowerment. Anil believed that the Malaysian media should be more critical of any 
development plans or models. In the name of equality, media should not be urban-centric and 
should cover more on rural and marginalised communities. Thomas opined that the 
government should be more liberal on the media for them to exercise their social 
responsibility. Wong hoped for more opportunity to operate community media in Malaysia. 
Jok Jau, Philip and Ramould expressed gratitude for the interview because they see it as 
another channel to make their plight and advocacy known. They hoped that this research will 
be useful for application.   
8.10 Summary of Findings 
This chapter has discussed findings that aimed   
RO5: To investigate if the new media enhanced the NCR land CBOs’ networking strategies. 
Government is the overarching theme that permeates the CBOs’ operations, media use 
and expectations toward the future of NCR land advocacy for Sarawakian natives. The CBOs 
opined that challenging the state openly proved to be fatal when state mechanisms are 
already being used against an activist or organisation. For example, organisation de-
registration, assassination, confiscation of passport, tapped phone, arrest and policing. They 
argued that resistance through highlighting the harassment in press conference and stay low 
profile is more practical. The CBOs’ main job is to empower, not to speak on behalf of the 
affected communities. 
Co-optation is one tactic used by the government, knowing community leaders hold an 
important position among the indigenous people to seek advice. Now the community leaders 
are government-elect. Other institutions like the MACC, SUARAM, SUHAKAM and MTCC are 
deemed useless in standing up for the indigenous rights. 
Due to the influence of Christian missions during the Brooke administrations (see Tan, 
2012), Sarawak contributed the highest number of Christianity to the national make up. 
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According to the 2010 census, Christians formed about 40% of Sarawak’s population. Michael 
and Pang chided church-going politicians and priests for evading land issues in the name of 
separating religion from politics. 
Although it was a common tactic for the government to liken the CBOs as anti-
development and Opposition, the interviewees did not view their relationships in a zero-sum 
way. They instead hoped the government could be less defensive and they expressed they 
could help in reaching out to the communities as long as the government took care of their 
welfare. However, they were sceptical of the Malaysian judiciary because of the ineffective 
separation of powers. Michael from SCRIPS said that the court verdict varied by the 
government. SAM Marudi added that there were currently more than 200 NCR cases 
backlogged to be heard in court. 
Joint press statement was a form of solidarity as evidenced by BRIMAS and TAHABAS 
Facebook posts. According to IPIMAS, joint press statement is no more than group solidarity 
and it does not represent individual position. For BRIMAS, press statement is a good way to 
highlight their issues when all state mechanisms are used against CBOs.  
Horizontal links to similar NGO movements, local or international, is uncommon. Only 
JOAS blog provided links to 4 similar local NGOs, 2 of them were dead links. However, in their 
organisational background, BRIMAS, SAM, SAVE Rivers, JOAS and TAHABAS emphasised 
“networking”. SAM website fulfilled all the user interface design coding categories except for 
horizontal information links, which refer to links to similar NGOs or news portals. SAM was 
established in 1977; in the 6 months of Facebook posts about Sarawak, no similar 
organisations were tagged. Facebook tagging as a show of solidarity is unpopular among the 
CBOs. Out of 81 primary and secondary posts on Sarawak, SAVE Rivers only used the function 
once in a job vacancy announcement by tagging similar CBOs and universities in Sarawak.  
The CBOs had mixed reactions toward the Penans who became the symbol of NCR 
advocacy in the 1980s. Some thought it was an overstatement therefore unfair to other ethnic 
groups that similarly had land issues. SACCESS defended the Penans as the last tribe who 
defend their forests. Peter from SAVE Rivers, admonished some Penan activists whom he 
knew for being too shy to the extent of changing names and locations constantly in fear of 
arrest. To him, someone has to be the “bad guy”. 
From the interviews, the CBOs viewed civil society within the normative paradigm where 
civil society organisations should empower the natives to stand up against marginalisation and 
equip them with knowledge regarding their constitutional rights. Civil society to them is a 
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platform by the people and for the people in pursuit of equality. Although they maintained 
that CBOs should be independent, they are willing to work with the government as long as 
their principles are not compromised.  
8.11 Conclusion 
In practice, the CBOs are well aware of which external actors are antagonistic to the NCR 
land advocacy; and which are sympathetic and supportive. Due to their direct involvement 
with the communities, the CBOs are well-versed in defence strategies against law 
enforcement officers, lawyers, logging companies and the press. They also have much dislike 
for cultural associations, churches and politicians that have not stood up to land injustice. The 
CBOs then discussed their perceptions toward more established environmental NGOs – those 
that “worked with loggers”, “cared for wildlife more than the people”, “elite” or “soft”. They 
admitted that CBOs in Sarawak are weak without a strong coalition and leadership. 
Furthermore, the ascriptive nature of the Sarawak communities is a hindrance, which has 
been maintained by the state government in electing communal leaders. The CBOs could still 
be feeling the after effect of strong state retaliation against the advocacy during its peak in 
the 1980s and 1990s. The hype of anti-logging in Sarawak fizzled out after Bruno Manser’s 
high profile publicity and the subsequent depletion of virgin forests. Nevertheless, the CBOs 
have high expectation over the new government and anticipated constructive co-operation 
with them. 
Based on the interviews and web evidences, new media have not contributed much to 
the CBOs’ external relations. The strategies of establishing external relations are not evident 
in the CBOs’ web-based platforms. None of the CBOs posted online petition to join their offline 
and online campaigns. There are no links to international NGOs of similar movement. New 
media aside, this research thinks that a number of issues need to be addressed as part of the 
organising strategies – friction between NGOs, ethnic groups and distrust toward state 
apparatuses (executive, legislative and judiciary). Chapter 6, 7 and 8 have shown that the 
relationship between new media and civil society for the NCR land CBOs is fragmented, 
disorganised and has much room to be bridged, in the Gramscian term, for a cohesive 




Chapter 9: Discussion 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter draws together the results of the empirical research and analyses them through 
application of the Gramscian underpinned framework for analysis of civil society developed in 
the literature review chapter of this thesis. It aims to meet:  
RO6 From the empirical data, to provide a systematic understanding of the nature of CBOs’ 
use of new media within the Gramscian framework. 
The empirical results from interviews and web-based analyses will be discussed using the 
following framework for analysis summarised from Chapter 2: 
• The state is, for Gramsci, one and the same as civil society. The state is not to be 
confused with government apparatuses such as the judiciary, legislation and executive. 
In the context of Malaysia, however, they appeared to be similar because 1) the same 
government had ruled Malaysia from 1957 to 2018; and 2) the separation of powers 
was unclear especially during times of political and economic crises (see Means, 1991; 
Rodan, 2004). 
• Civil society is the real defence system of the state. The sphere and mechanism of civil 
society – education, religion, mass media, private clubs, and propaganda – produce 
common sense about civilisation where the state can play an educative and formative 
role. This Gramscian view of civil society displayed similarity with evidence of reaction 
to the raising of Sarawak land issues where the indigenous people’s culture and 
resistance to land grabbing met criticisms of ‘anti-development’, as perpetuated by 
both government-owned and private media (Mustafa, 1994).  
• Intellectuals are divided into two main types – organic and traditional. The former 
embraces their social role to lead and educate the masses toward ending their own 
subalternity. On the other hand, the latter is part of the oppressive systems who 
pursue own economic-corporate interests. The counter-hegemonic CBOs personnel 
displayed characteristics of organic intellectuals – their vision and strategies of 
leadership in the new media era – was explored in the semi-structured interviews. 
• Subalterns refer to classes of people at the lower rung of society in terms of economy 
and culture. They need to be educated and rise from their positions through moral and 
economic reform. The characteristics of subalterns leading their own people are 
208 
 
reflected in the nature of CBOs – 10 out of the 16 interviewees are indigenous people 
who experienced land grabbing effects at a personal level. 
• Political parties or the Modern Prince, is the platform for intellectuals to lead the 
subalterns using a war of position, meaning consensual ways to create own hegemony. 
The ways the CBOs utilise the new media platforms and how they perceived the 
current media environment (Chapter 6) are discussed here along with their organising 
processes (Chapter 7, 8, 9). 
The chapter begins by analysing the intellectual role of the personnel of Sarawak NCR land 
CBOs – their overall advocacy strategies through leadership and organisational activities. The 
extent to which the CBOs performed, in the Gramscian language, their revolutionary role is 
discussed using their perspectives of the current situations and future plans of the land rights 
movement in Sarawak. The next section is dedicated to the superstructural mechanisms of 
civil society – media and education in relation to empowering the indigenous people from 
different backgrounds and the public in general. It discusses the ways and the purposes the 
CBOs use the new media, as evidenced from the interviews and web-based analyses. Religion, 
another aspect of civil society, is interesting to discuss amidst the debates between achieving 
eternal peace and struggles in defending customary lands. The chapter then locates the term 
‘state’ within Sarawak nationalism and relationships with the Federal state. It discusses 
Gramsci’s Caesarism based on the CBOs’ opinions of the leadership styles of three Sarawak 
Chief Ministers from 1981 until present and their expectations towards the Federal state. This 
is followed by issues that arise from the Gramscian perspective in achieving the conceptual 
understanding of the empirical data and in addressing the research gap. The chapter 
concludes by giving suggestions of new media strategies to the CBOs as counter-hegemonic 
actions. 
9.2 The Organic Role of CBOs and Indigenous People 
Gramsci put heavy emphasis on organising the masses systematically. Based on the 
literature reviews of the CBOs’ roles in mobilising the affected indigenous people in Sarawak 
in the 1980s and 1990s, they fit Gramsci’s ‘Modern Prince’ – an organism with the role of 
bringing cultural and moral reform among the subalterns.  The background of the interviewees 
showed an impressive and diverse range of areas – law practice, geology, church ministry, 




The strength of CBOs lies in their core mission where engaging the affected indigenous 
communities is their top and utmost priority. This is a form of cultural preparation through 
resident associations (RAs), workshops, seminars and training. From the web-based analyses, 
the most popular theme in the CBOs’ organisational activities is empowerment. The CBOs 
empower the communities and educate them on their land rights, conservation efforts and 
paralegal procedures. In the Gramscian terms, the CBOs reduced the possibility of 
bureaucratic centralism – referring to organisations are centralised at the top and detached 
from the members’ aspirations. The organic centralism of the CBOs is enhanced through 
62.5% of the personnel interviewed who are of indigenous ethnicity and have personally 
experienced the effects of land grabbing and excessive logging. Five interviewees are of 
Chinese ethnicity (YB See, Pang, Wong, Vincy and Lawai) – middle class, educated and 
sympathetic toward native land issues. Ethnic relations between indigenous and non-
indigenous people, in the view of this thesis, is not as contentious as the Muslim-Christian 
relations in Sarawak. According to the last national census in 2010, 44.2% of the Sarawak 
population was Christian, followed by the second largest faith, Islam, at 30.2% (Department 
of Statistics, Malaysia, 2010). Chin (2014) argued that although by the Malaysia Agreement 
1963 (MA63), Islam’s status as a national religion was not applicable to Sarawak, the Islamic 
influence heightened in Sarawak through religious bodies and non-religious entities such as 
education, marriage and employment (see Hew, 2010). To Chin (2014), the BN government, 
in specific UMNO, was trying to spread the Malay/Muslim supremacy to Sarawak by 
politicising Islam. The tensions between Islam and Christianity worsened after the Malaysia’s 
top court ruled that Catholics could not use the word ‘Allah’ in their newspaper publication, 
which aimed the Malay-speaking Christians in Sabah and Sarawak (Manirajan and Chong, 21 
January 2015; Chin, 2015). Malaysia’s Home Ministry first banned the Malay-language weekly 
newspaper Herald Malaysia’s use of the word Allah in 2008 for fear it would offend the 
Muslims in Malaysia (Manirajan and Chong, 21 January 2015). In the context of land rights 
advocacy, therefore, it may not be an issue to have non-indigenous persons to lead any 
indigenous-centric organisation. Leadership is the most important element in running an 
organisation that balances itself between leading and preparing the masses for, in the 
Gramscian terms, a counter-hegemonic cultural mind set and activities. 
However, this thesis argues that to lead an organisation is not the same as leading the 
masses. With a variety of CBOs, there is no systematic way of staying united against the 
background of weak Dayak unity. Unlike their international counterparts who essentialise 
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images of native peoples (Brosius, 1999), Fadzillah-Cooke (2003, p. 169) pointed out 
“[p]recisely because of the diversity and complexity and diversity of the Dayak identity/ies, 
NGOs’ efforts at emphasising the commonality of experience across communities across 
communities have their limits, as do the efforts at scaling up in general.” It is important to 
identify what divides the indigenous people in the first place to overcome the ‘internal 
prejudice and strata’, then incorporate that knowledge into the organising skills (Gramsci, 
2000). The ‘internal prejudice’ displayed by several interviewees revolved around the 
attention toward the Penans in the 1980s, which symbolised indigenous land struggles. Mark 
and Michael claimed that the Penans had been over romanticised since land is a problem faced 
by all indigenous people regardless of their ethnic background. Pang counter-argued that it 
was indeed the Penans who were the last ones standing in terms of defending their lands 
against unscrupulous land compensation and environmental impact assessment. Vincy said 
that the party who over romanticised the Penan issue was the NGOs, not the Penans. An 
informant expressed to the researcher that the Orang Ulus are the ones helming the CBOs; 
the ones working hard as compared to others willingly being co-opted to the mainstream. 
When asked if CBOs should be run along the ethnic lines, the answer from the interviewees 
was a unanimous ‘No’. They also added that their organisation provides assistance to any 
ethnic group who faced land issues. However, from Pang, Vincy, Mark, Peter, Jok Jau and 
Thomas, it is inevitable that their interviews demonstrated ‘internal prejudice and strata’. This 
reflected a similar situation during the early formation of political parties in Sarawak in the 
1960s. While the parties claimed to be multi-ethnic, the structure and agenda showed 
otherwise. Only the former Temenggong, Mr Mantan Pahang answered ‘yes’ because in his 
opinion, the Dayaks are weak and therefore can only be united by own ethnic group.  
The operations of the CBOs, in the view of this thesis, further magnified the internal 
strata. Each CBO operates by their own organisational identity, yet their missions and visions 
are on inter-related areas – rivers, dams, forests, and lands. From the empirical findings, 
sharing resources are in the form of being part of a larger network. TAHABAS is part of JOAS, 
“the umbrella network for 21 community-based non-governmental organisations that have 
indigenous peoples’ issues as the focus” (JOAS, 2012). Ramould from TAHABAS said that 
besides sharing office, any content creation matters was managed by JOAS. In describing the 
SAM head quarter-branch relations, Jok Jau answered that the Marudi branch is happy to be 
“under a big umbrella”. This research argues that their understanding of sharing resources 
refers to information, photos, and joint statements, not on an overall networking strategy. 
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However, their web-based contents showed otherwise. None of the Facebook posts displayed 
tagging or sharing articles among each other. Only SAVE Rivers had tagged Sarawak 
universities in their job vacancy post (28 March 2018) and tagged TONIBUNG and JOAS as the 
primary source for a video on the potential for micro hydro power in Sarawak (5 August 2018). 
The CBOs also expressed difficulty in getting commitment from the younger generation to be 
prepared for the next leadership. Ms Vincy argued that the faces for land CBOs have been the 
same since the 1980s and still are. This is true from the researcher’s observation where, from 
the first interviewee Mr Mark Bujang, a complete list of personnel from other CBOs was gained 
due to the small circle they work in.   
Thus, the evidence of this research leads to the conclusion that it is a big hurdle for the 
indigenous people to develop their own leading class of intellectuals. The CBOs lacked a 
systematic direction in strategising leadership takeover, creating public awareness of their 
purposes in the online sphere and forming a strong network. These combined, in the 
Gramscian standard, would pose challenge to the organic intellectuals to build a system of 
class alliances with the wretched indigenous people. The framing of ‘rights’ is from the 
indigeneity characteristics. In their organisational background, JOAS, SAVE Rivers, SAM, 
SCRIPS, BRIMAS, IPIMAS and TAHABAS mentioned ‘indigenous rights’ while only BaramKini 
identified their subject by urban-rural residents. Although Malaysia is an ethnically divided 
nation, which posed difficulty to mobilise social movements (Höller-Fam, 2015), this thesis 
argues that it is time for the CBOs to add in the class perspective in their advocacy. The CBOs 
should explain themselves against the official rhetoric that “the indigenous people did not 
want development”, which was popular in the government’s defence against international 
criticisms at illegal logging and mega dams in Sarawak (Majid-Cooke, 1999; Brosius, 1999):  
What kemudahan [utilities] we have? Nothing. They don’t help us get water, 
provide us electricity, gives us better housing material, nothing. All over the place. 
So, what the natives want is, as far as anti-development; that is the gimmicks of 
the BN propaganda. So, they go and say we are anti-development because we put 
up blockade against the timber. But we put up blockade because they are 
encroaching into our land, out territory, that’s all … You build Bakun, for what? We 
are near Bakun, the one underneath Bakun dam also not yet have electricity… 
[Michael] 
Michael added that to worsen the case of indigenous people losing their own lands, they did 
not get “a fair share” from the corporations that developed the lands. This thesis argues that 
the role the CBOs should consider adding to their advocacy is more than getting the 
indigenous people electricity, roads, clean running water, employment or ‘fair’ compensation 
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land deals. Ramould from TAHABAS reflected on the direction of the indigenous people when 
they won back their land, asking “what is next?”. He also recalled a case where TAHABAS had 
successfully helped several indigenous people regaining their lands. However, they then 
detached themselves from TAHABAS and no longer showed interest in TAHABAS’ activities or 
helping other affected indigenous people. 
In the long run, it is the economic and cultural status of the indigenous people that needs 
a consistent, systematic uplifting. Vincy was right in addressing the reason the indigenous 
youth rarely get involved in CBOs’ activities. The question of survival was prioritised where the 
indigenous family could no longer depend on their land for self-subsistence because they 
would need the money to pay for education, medical services and transportation. The void in 
class analysis for the indigenous people demonstrated Gramsci’s (1978/1926, pp. 2-3) 
criticism toward the lack of strategising between the proletariat and peasants to become ‘the 
leading class’:  
The economic and political regeneration of the peasants should not be sought in 
a division of uncultivated or poorly cultivated lands, but in the solidarity of the 
peasantry and has an “interest” in ensuring that capitalism is not reborn 
economically from landed property; that Southern Italy and the Islands do not 
become a military base for capitalist counterrevolution … We were still for the very 
realistic and in no way ‘magical’ formula of land to the peasants. But we wanted it 
to be incorporated in a general revolutionary action of the two allied classes, 
under the leadership of the industrial proletariat.” 
This research argues in fact the CBOs are treading between syndicalism and culturalism. 
By essentialising the native status without emphasising class consciousness, the CBOs might 
think that resistant empowerment is sufficient to challenge the status quo. According to 
Minority Rights Group (2018), nearly 70% of the highland Kelabit tribe in Sarawak has migrated 
to urban areas for work and educational opportunities, especially indigenous youths. 
Economist analyst Associate Prof Dr Madeline Berma revealed that Sarawak was among the 
top three richest states in Malaysia by the performance of commodity-based sectors but had 
7 out of 10 poorest districts in the country (Abdul Hakim, 1 February 2019). According to a 
United Nations report on extreme poverty, 15.5% of Sarawak households had a total family 
monthly income of less than RM2,000 (Then, 28 August 2019). That aside, many families in 
rural Sarawak faced human rights issues such as education, statelessness and land rights issues 
(Then, 28 August 2019). 
Gramsci is well aware that cultural preparation is a difficult process, “very slowly, very 
painfully” (1978/1926, p. 21). However, if the leader is unprepared to embark on national-
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popular counter-hegemony strategies, in the Gramscian perspective, it will only amount to 
rebelliousness where problems are solved within its own circle (7 September 1918, II Grido 
del Popolo). Therefore, action such as “pleading for help” as portrayed in Figure 50 only 
highlights the subalternity of the indigenous group within the allowed space.  
Figure 50 Screenshot of news related to NCR land 
 
Source: DayakDaily, 19 December 2019 
The interviewees claimed that after Chief Minister Taib Mahmud stepped down in 2014, 
the environment was less oppressive to advocate for indigenous land rights. Pang and YB See 
mentioned that more and more educated and young professionals like doctors and lawyers 
volunteered to provide their services to rural indigenous communities. Gramsci envisioned it 
further where the roles of intellectuals are to formulate clear ideas and be able to defend 
them on the need to change the current system, how to go about it and what to replace it 
with. The interpretation of Gramsci’s point of view is that a leader has to balance between 
articulating long-term strategies and engaging with the masses, with the hope to educate 
them to end their own subalternity. Leadership, to Gramsci, contributes to the success of a 
counter-hegemonic organisation. From the interviews, there are two different views – anti-
institutionalisation and ‘bogus’ NGOs. For the former, Pang argued that a CBO should only be 
empowering the natives instead of having a proper structure, which is a burden to maintain. 
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To him, CBO is a vehicle where through and through, the indigenous people have to stand up 
for themselves. Pang particularly differentiated SACCESS and IDEAL from elite NGOs like the 
WWF that worked with loggers. On the other hand, Peter maintained that an organisation 
should have a clear direction and more formally, standard operating procedures (SOPs). Both 
Peter and Mark think that groups who called themselves NGOs but without a proper 
framework were usually ‘bogus’; ineffective in advocacy; only appeared for street protests 
and usually ended up with “unnatural death”. Peter also despised individuals who work on 
their own and on inconsistent frequency. This thesis argues in favour of CBOs having an 
organised structure for mass empowerment and to influence policy. The thought of having a 
CBO as an institutional burden dampens the movement and demotivates the leader and it 
eventually peters out.   
The divided view on how a CBO should be run may contribute to policy influence being 
the least popular theme as evidenced from the CBOs’ organisational activities in their online 
platforms. In addition to the interviews conducted, the CBO personnel admitted that this is 
the hardest stage but they would keep on trying through like-minded assemblymen, lawyers, 
geologists, environmental scholars and individual politicians. Gramsci has warned that the 
construction of a revolutionary party is futile without the following basics: “(a) the party’s 
ideology; (b) its form or organisation and degree of cohesion; (c) its capacity to operate in 
contact with the masses; (d) its strategy and tactical capacity” (2000/1926, p. 154). 
The CBOs also have had financial limitations especially after foreign funders shifted their 
priority to other developing nations. Overall, the CBOs relied more on individual large donors 
than soliciting funds from the public or through a systematic channel. Only JOAS and 
BaramKini had utilised their social media platforms for fundraising purposes and agreed that 
it is effective. In the opinion of this thesis, it is the image of an organisation that lends 
credibility to any fundraising programmes. Only SAM website and BaramKini blog enabled 
visitors to contribute through Donation. Pang from SACCESS opined that fundraising is a 
dependency syndrome among NGOs. This thesis endorses the Gramscian view that the 
advantage of the middle or upper classes can and should be utilised in good faith: while the 
English bourgeosie clashed between the Liberals and Conservatives, the proletariat gained “a 
substantial  series of rights guaranteed by law and custom: the right to assemble, the right to 
strike, an individual security…” (Gramsci, 2000/1918: p. 44). The whole point for the CBOs is 
to incorporate fundraising to the totality of image management in public arena, or the 
creation of common sense in the Gramscian term. If the images of the indigenous people have 
215 
 
been normalised, to ask for donation and public support need not be at the expense of 
reinstating their subalternity.  
Gramsci’s Southern Question has striking similarity with the current situation of the 
dispossessed natives from their lands, the intellectuals and the CBOs. Within capitalism, the 
Southerners in Gramsci’s Italy – were not only subject to underdevelopment but also cultural 
marginalisation, propagated by a system of bourgeoisie propagandist means – education, 
press and traditions: “the South is the ball and chain which prevents the social development 
of Italy from progressing more rapidly; the Southerners are biologically inferior beings; semi-
barbarians, by natural destiny; if the South is backward, the fault does not lie with the 
capitalist system or with any other historical cause, but with Nature, which has made the 
Southerners lazy, incapable, criminal and barbaric …” (2000/1926, p. 173).  
The history of land management, the divide-and-rule policy and the rise of the Taib 
dynasty at the expense of the people’s land lead to the crucial point that hegemony has to be 
economic, besides being ethical-political. Since the pursuit for own gains cannot be overly 
blatant, civil society as the platform of hegemony functions to ‘lead’ the subalterns into 
thinking that their needs have been represented. The leadership, however, did not culminate 
in modifying the structure of the state or sacrificing the essential of the hegemonic group’s 
economic activity (Gramsci, 2000, Q13§18). Gramsci’s idea of the working class leading and 
having political alliances with the peasants provides insights to the CBOs that cultural reform 
is as important as economic reform.  An understanding of classes is crucial in search for a 
proletarian-peasant workers alliance against the bourgeois-peasant alliance (Gündoğan, 
2008). It is an uphill task as classes have been overlooked in Malaysia. Moreover, working class 
movement in Malaysia had been severely circumscribed by government’s move against the 
formation of a national trade union in the 1980s. The economic policies in the 1980s and 1990s 
aimed to establish Malaysia’s competitiveness in the world market. This, however, was at the 
expense of working-class welfare as government encouragement of in-house unions for the 
private sector was intended to replace existing national (industry-wide) unions, which further 
eroded the already weak trade union movement in the country (Jomo and Todd, 1994). For 
instance, the arbitrary Registrar of Trade Unions procrastinated for 11 years before rejecting 
the Malaysian Trades Union Congress (MTUC)’s 1978 application to register the National 
Union of Electronics Workers (NEW) (Jomo and Todd, 1994). 
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9.3 Media, religion and education 
Long before Gramsci refined his concept of hegemony, he was convinced that the 
revolutionary party had to exercise its leadership role first and foremost in civil society 
(Buttigieg, 1995). Gramsci envisioned that prior to assuming government power, the 
subalterns are politically conscious and active participants in steering their new cultural life 
instead of just joining a party; they must first learn to become themselves a leading force. It is 
through the cultural activities and self-regulated autonomous organisations that the subaltern 
masses can acquire their independence from the ruling classes and their allied intellectuals. 
The site of hegemony is civil society where the ruling classes extend and secure their power 
through non-violent means (Seymour, 10 February 2011). To Gramsci, hegemony and civil 
society form a dynamic part of the ideological structure through among others, the press, 
libraries, schools, Church that constitute the “formidable complex of trenches and 
fortifications of the ruling class” (2011b, Q3§49: p. 53).   
Overall, the CBO personnel agreed that the space in media now is less oppressive than 
those days in the 1980s and 1990s. The new media provide a great opportunity to reach out 
to more audiences using the function of widgets and sharing to make posts viral among social 
media users. Pang opined that this is a form of democratisation where the information no 
longer belongs to the upper class of society. Among the CBOs, BaramKini had a wider and 
more strategic use of blogs and websites, targeting Chinese-speaking urban dwellers, 
policymakers and timber companies in Taiwan and China. The CBOs’ involvement with the 
new media from the late 1990s until now showed the significant social role of organic 
intellectuals. They either pioneered setting up websites, blogs or creating content to be sent 
to alternative media organisations. SAVE Rivers and JOAS relied on their youth groups to 
maintain their blogs and content creations while SCRIPS is actively documenting oral history 
as evidence of the indigenous land parameter. Similarly, the lack of consideration of civil 
societal matters by mainstream media was filled by organic intellectuals who established 
Malaysiakini and Radio Free Sarawak. The use of WhatsApp allows the CBOs to communicate 
in their indigenous languages. This shows that the indigenous cultural needs have been 
deprived by the mainstream media through lack of diversity and social inclusion. Within the 
era of user-generated contents, the opportunity for creating their own common sense may be 
of higher chances and efficiency.  
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There is another side of the CBOs’ views on the new media. Despite the convenient 
approach of WhatsApp groups and messages, many of them were trivial and inconvenient for 
users. Responses from the websites, blogs and Facebook pages are artificial and inconsistent. 
To them, it is tiresome having to think about how to attract the public’s attention. From the 
interviews, the CBOs put really heavy emphasis on empowering the indigenous people and 
encouraging them to be leaders of their own fate. Such emphasis is one of the factors that the 
CBOs’ empowerment activities are made less known as their web-based platforms are not up-
to-date. Pang claimed that tt is an “institutionalisation burden” because the advocacy focus is 
the indigenous people, not the CBOs. Therefore, they do not see the need to show off the 
activities done by the CBOs.  
From the Gramscian point of view, the CBOs have yet to see the importance to invest in 
a war of position, meaning to create and maintain the images of the relationships between 
natives, lands and culture. Their perception of culture is more to everyday way of life or 
viewed in a zero-sum perspective of controversial and non-controversial activities. 
Associations that practised the latter like basket weaving, dancing and beauty pageants were 
despised by the CBOs for getting ‘friendlier’ treatment from politicians and government 
officials who graced their events or even provided sponsorship. It is indeed such legitimisation 
of natives’ culture through mediated images that the CBOs should incorporate to their rhetoric 
as a way to normalise their advocacy in a ‘wholesome’ way. Only one respondent gave an 
opinion that bridged the CBOs’ activities and their media use. Ms Vincy Usun, a former 
journalist, argued that the CBOs’ use of new media is event-based or occurs when tension 
arises. In her words, the new media should be operated like a media organisation, not the 
activist way that treats media as a “bulletin board”. This opinion coincides with the empirical 
findings where most of the CBOs’ Facebook output is event-based and in the form of photos 
and videos. On the other hand, articles that could contribute more to public understanding of 
their advocacy are sourced from national and international organisations. 
The CBO personnel are also aware of the nature of the national broadcaster, RTM – 
heavy with government propaganda and unfriendly to their advocacy. Peter Kallang from 
SAVE Rivers thinks that it is such a pity, not to mention a deep irony, that RTM failed to educate 
the natives on their rights and yet RTM is the most commonly consumed media among rural 
longhouse communities. He, with Susan and Michael, has personally not watched RTM 
television channels over two decades. In general, they have no confidence in RTM for any civil 
societal role, regardless of the era of media technologies. This is evident that from the CBOs’ 
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Facebook posts, only once RTM content was sourced, which was a video filming a minister 
giving opening speech for a JOAS event. From the interviews, some personnel also chastised 
the local press for whitewashing the injustice toward the Penans because the major dailies 
are owned by some timber tycoons. The respondents are generally aware of the 
consequences that political ownership and control have over the indigenous people’s 
awareness of their rights. However, the empirical data showed no consistent effort or 
perspective from the CBOs in articulating the role that media could play through their web-
based platforms or to lobby for media reform.  
Although the indigenous people are categorised as the original people with 
constitutional privileges, the common sense is otherwise with a single cultural domination – 
Malay Muslim – through fictional and non-fictional media output. Therefore, even when the 
subalterns were standing up for their rights, they did not look natural. They were more often 
than not depicted as ‘protesting’ and in constant anxiety with modernisation (Mustafa, 1994). 
Given the sensitive nature of political cronies in logging and land grabbing, mainstream media 
especially broadcasting gave either minimum or negative coverage to NCR land cases. The 
totality of the portrayal has to be understood in everyday media artefacts that build national-
popular ideas of whose culture matters, something which does not always have to involve law 
enforcement.  
The domination over the space for civil discussion against marginalisation is executed 
through the state’s educative and formative role that defined ‘civilisation’ and ‘national 
culture’. The establishment of the national broadcaster, RTM in 1963 was meant to serve the 
government of the day (Zaharom, 2000). With the inception of Channel Two by RTM in 1969, 
there was a steady increase of local programmes including Malay-language dramas. They 
served as a platform to convey the Malay community’s culture, while programmes other than 
the Malay language were sidestepped (Khartigesu, 1994; in Juliana, 2006). Khartigesu further 
observed that television dramas were identified by the government to promote national 
harmony and entrepreneurship among Malays (1994, in Zaharom and Mustafa, 2000; see also 
Said Halim, 1988). For Malay dramas, the surrounding theme is about the Malay community. 
Hence it is not surprising to have “a 100 per cent Malay cast with the location of the shooting 
in, say, a Malay village, a Malay neighbourhood or a Malay business premise” (Zaharom and 
Mustafa, 2000 p. 269). The regular issues include (p. 270): 
…the socio-cultural implications of modernisation upon certain members of the 
Malay community; over-zealous material pursuit that is portrayed as conflicting 
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with religious (i.e. Islamic) and traditional values; love affairs involving Malay 
couples; family and marital problems within a Malay family; the trials and 
tribulations of successful Malay entrepreneurs in the context of industrial 
development of the country; and a re-enactment of certain ‘historically and 
culturally significant’ incidents during the glorious Malacca Sultanate, etc. 
In this regard, another television critic puts it quite bluntly in Zaharom (1996: p. 173): 
Tired themes about only the Malay community are constantly rehashed in these 
productions, as if the remaining 50 per cent of the Malaysian population didn’t 
exist and didn’t matter. And even when other ethnic communities are included in 
the storylines, their roles are more often than not peripheral ones (New Straits 
Times, 25 January 1992). 
Zaharom (2000, p. 247) wrote that unlike ‘factual’ media artefacts, narrative structures 
in television dramas “like many other genres that are ‘fictional’, tend to be more ‘open’, where 
the range of options for resolution are greater”. M. Bowes (1990) put it that the ways drama 
“present us with ‘real’ people in ‘real’ situations can help us understand how they fit into our 
perception of the society we live in” (in Mustafa and Wang, 1996: p. 269). 
Like a vicious circle, the CBOs personnel had low confidence toward RTM for their 
cultural and information biases. Besides the state-run broadcaster, private media 
organisations before the Internet era made it clear that they would still toe the government’s 
line of cultural and political sensitivity (Zaharom, 1996). In fact, they did not intend to rock the 
boat since they were owned by investment arms of the ruling political parties. RTM would 
have fitted the requirements as a public service broadcaster given their capacity in 
technological and cultural provision. RTM remains the only organisation that provides 
channels for Sarawak and Sabah affairs in native languages.  
To YB See and Lawai, education is another double-edged sword. Many educated natives 
are “part of the oppressed system” while the young might be concerned with getting a job 
with private interests at heart. The CBOs lamented that the young are hardly interested in the 
NCR land affairs. The search for a takeover by the young confirms Gramsci’s fear of 
syndicalism, which prevents a subaltern group “from ever becoming dominant, or from 
developing beyond the economic-corporate stage and rising to the phase of ethico-political 
hegemony in civil society, and of domination in the state” (2000, Q13§18: pp. 210-211). 
Gramsci also chastised how the education system has produced intellectuals who are 
apolitical and detached from national life and forma mentis. Lawai from BaramKini shared 
similar view where no textbook is about life injustice or love for environment and socially 
disadvantaged groups. The examination-oriented Malaysian education system has inculcated 
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the economic-corporate priority in academic results as the guarantee of securing a good job 
and hence a good life. Furthermore, tertiary institution students and academic staff alike are 
forbidden to participate or even show sympathy to any political activities as stipulated in the 
Universities and University Colleges Act (UUCA) 1971. Nevertheless, the CBOs generally opine 
that education is the tool for empowerment. SAVE Rivers utilised a doctoral thesis to propose 
dam alternatives to the government while IPIMAS spreads conversation efforts among school 
children. SACCESS linked up with the University of Nottingham Malaysia to sponsor two Penan 
students to further their studies in town. Instead of binding them with contracts, which is 
“meaningless”, SACCESS made them pledge will return and contribute to their community 
instead of settling down in town. This action coincides with Gramsci’s view that subalterns 
need to be educated to be long-term oriented and rise above their own economic-corporate 
interests. Otherwise, it is “only tempering this harsh fate with the purely individual explosion 
of a few great geniuses, like isolated palm-trees in an arid and barren desert” (Gramsci, 
2000/1926: p. 173).   
Similar to politicians, the CBOs despise church pastors who preached about religious life 
without daring to touch on land issues. Although claiming to be non-political, they made their 
stand by inviting politicians to their church for ‘cultural’ events. According to Pang, there are 
even churches fighting with each other to “champion the well-being of Penans”. To the CBOs, 
any detachment from issues faced by natives in keeping their lands is façade, regardless of the 
religious image of a pastor or politician. This view can be understood from Gramsci’s own 
criticism about the disconnection between religion (Catholicism) and the real-life struggles of 
subalterns. To Gramsci, the church reinforces the poor-rich gap through activities like 
distributing alms. Referring to The Betrothed, Manzoni’s character showed ‘aristocratic’ 
sympathy to the people, equivalent with “benevolence of a Catholic society for the protection 
of animals” (2011c, Q7§50: p. 196). Instead of being national-popular with the people, it is of 
high culture and caste attitude. Being poor is natural and should be accepted by the common, 
‘simple’ and sincere beings (Green, 2018). The strategy is to keep a relationship with the poor 
but at the same time did not address their poor living conditions or subalternity. This coincided 
with Wong and Michael who left their own church because of the apparent clash between 
religion and the natives’ land cases. They are an exemplification of Gramsci’s opposition to 
the fourth point in his Notebooks about the doctrine of the Church and the poor: “the social 
question is primarily moral and religious, not economic, and it must be resolved through 
Christian charity, the dictates of morality, and the decree of religion” (2011a, Q1§1, p. 100). 
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Both Wong and Michael realised that land issues cannot be addressed in the literal and 
uncritical sense of Christianity but from the aspects of policy and laws.  
9.4 Federalism and the Sarawak state  
Gramsci’s writings aim to expose how domination of political society and leadership of 
civil society actually reinforce each other and form an integral modern bourgeois-liberal state 
(Buttigieg, 1995). Gramsci places civil society and political society onto the level of 
superstructure – both are one and the same, although they can be methodologically divided 
(Gündoğan, 2008 p. 52).  
Three separate apparatuses of power (legislative, executive and jurisdictive), for 
Gramsci, form the organs of political hegemony (Gündoğan, 2008 p. 53). The state has not 
only political or public organs but also private organisms like parties and associations. In other 
words, nearly everything belongs to the state. The dialectical relationship displays the unity 
and also the conflict between one another under the same totality, to the extent that “[n]one 
of the rights of the citizens under the bourgeois parliamentary regime is untouchable” 
(Gündoğan, 2008 p. 56). The Gramscian state in many ways coincides with those of the 
Malaysian state.  
It may be useful to stress that the state should not be viewed in a crude manner as a 
mere instrument of a few individuals in power. It is more adequate to view the state as both 
the object of particular individual interests and the outcome of its integration into the world 
economic system (Jomo, 1986). The concept of the state is wider than that of the government. 
For some Western countries, the government is only a part of the state yet influential and able 
to exercise some direction over the state (Zaharom, 1992). As Sparks elaborates to illustrate 
the situation in Britain: 
The government is a small and transitory body of the people; the state, on the 
other hand, is large and permanent … (Besides the government), the state is 
represented by those who owe their position not to any election but to the 
bureaucratic sectors of the state’s organisation … Indeed, there are substantial 
sections of the state machine, for example the judiciary, which are even formally 
independent of the government, and others, like the social services, whose first 
responsibility is to local rather than national government. [Hence in the context of 
Britain] there is plenty of scope of differences of strategy or opinion between the 
state and the government (1986; in Zaharom, 1992: p. 149). 
Although Gramsci warns not to confuse the term ‘state’ with ‘government’, it is a 
different case for Malaysia. The same ruling coalition of political parties has formed the 
Malaysian government for close to six decades. The concentration of power in the political 
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executive (vested in the cabinet led by the Prime Minister) gathered momentum from the 
1980s (Gomez, 2002; in Rodan, 2004). During the administration of Malaysia’s longest serving 
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad (1981-2003), the BN government encroached more 
extensively into the other two branches of federal government – the Judiciary and the 
Parliament (Means, 1991). This led to the erosion of effective checks and balances within the 
state on how that executive power is exercised (Lee, 1995).  
From time immemorial, the natives are the government through the Adat (customs) – 
they guard own land and lead the communities. Their system of legal values and principles 
existed long before the Brooke era or the advent of the modern State that we know of today 
(Hong, 1987). When James Brooke first ruled Sarawak in 1841, he recognised the existing non-
written native customary laws as an initial tactic to gain local support (Empeni, 1998). When 
Sarawak became part of the Malaysian Federation in 1963, native courts and the enforcement 
of native customary laws remain as state matters to be regulated by state laws. From the 
Brooke era to the post-colonial administration, the Adat has been severely modified resulting 
in change to its original meanings. The posts of community leaders – Penghulu (Headman), 
Pemanca and Temenggong (Commander-in-Chief) were created to incorporate the natives to 
state government control (Empeni, 1998). Collectively, they are referred to as “Chief” while 
Headman leads a community by ethnic group as stipulated in Section 2 of the Community 
Chiefs and Headmen Ordinance (2004). The Governor of Sarawak designates any person to be 
the appointing authority for a Chief or Headman based on any appropriate recommendation 
from the Resident of a Division or the District Officer of a District. Their duties include assisting 
the Government in looking after the welfare of respective communities and to preside over 
any Native Court. They are prohibited to hold any post in a political party, appoint a councillor 
or engage in any trade that may have conflict of interests with their posts. The community 
posts, therefore, are no longer elected by the communities themselves as practised by the 
natives before the institutionalisation of their customary way of life. As Empeni (1998, p. 110) 
elaborated: 
Nevertheless, major breaches of the Adat and disputes are brought to Native 
Courts. The administration and enforcement of the adat of the Dayak 
communities today are more complex. They are no longer the exclusive affairs of 
the Dayak themselves but involve outside authorities and agencies at the vortex 
of their administration and enforcement, for the Dayaks represent one 
component of a large and complex Native Court system.    
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From the interviews conducted in this research, government is the overarching theme 
that influences or dictates the CBOs’ operations, media use and expectations toward the 
future of NCR land advocacy for Sarawakian natives. The respondents used the term ‘state’ 
interchangeably with that of ‘government’. The sense of unitaryness between the concepts 
can be understood from the intervention in the three apparatuses of the state. The extent to 
which the Federal state played a part in the governance of Sarawak through the Abdul Rahman 
and Taib Mahmud dynasty is an example to begin with. Most of the interviewees branded the 
government as ‘defensive’ and ‘unfriendly’ as a product of the treatment received through 
the anti-development rhetoric from the post-colonial national policies. In fact, Peter and Jok 
Jau opined that it is their intention to work with the government because the CBOs could 
contribute input from their close interaction with the indigenous people. The interviewees 
also placed the police and the judiciary system on the same side as the government because 
they failed to be impartial. Mark, Ramould and Wong recalled those days when they were 
subject to close surveillance from the Special Branch (SB). Their sentiment coincided with 
Gramsci’s question on why the basic right of a citizen can be criminalised. The tedious and 
costly process of court hearings is another method to dampen the fighting spirit among the 
affected indigenous communities. Furthermore, Michael doubted the transparency of the 
judiciary system from his own experience where the verdict was overruled once the Selangor 
state government changed. The channel to express their dissent is further circumscribed by 
the government’s intervention in the media industries through legal and economic means. 
The New Economic Policy (NEP) launched in 1971 by the federal government not only 
catapulted a group of Malays into business; “it gave rise to a qualitatively new integration of 
economic and political power” (Rodan, 2004: p. 114). This situation reflects Gramsci’s 
perspective where hegemony not only involves leading from an ethical position but also 
conquering the economic activities, including the media industries. 
With the integral state between force and coercion, civil society for Gramsci is best 
described as the sphere of hegemony. Mark opined that the press conference is the way to 
counter the coercive state mechanisms. To let the public know about their situation is better 
than to react in a head-on collision with the government, which would result in a vicious circle. 
Ramould thought that lodging police reports is another method. In general, the CBOs think 
that awareness through education is the best prevention from being duped by unfair land 
compensation deals and sweet promises before elections. Again, the personnel said that their 
task is only to channel the constitutional rights and available support during crisis and 
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elections because ultimately, the choice lies with the indigenous people. The interviewees 
expressed hope for a friendlier government – be it federal or state – toward the plight of the 
indigenous people. There is much to unpack from this philosophy of the CBOs in Gramsci’s 
view. What is the long-term objective of their empowerment strategies? How sustainable is it 
for a painstaking process toward a moral and cultural reform? Gramsci believed that Italy was 
a prime candidate for a socialist revolution because the ruling classes pursued their interests 
blatantly at the expense of the proletariat (Buttigieg, 1995). Since the formation of Malaysia, 
the Sarawak state was ruled by two Melanau Muslim elites (see Chapter 3), one of which was 
Taib Mahmud. The height of Sarawak land rights advocacy took place during the 
administration of Taib as the Chief Minister from 1981 to 2014. Activists exposed that the 
dislocation of thousands of Orang Ulu from their lands to make way for mega-dams and palm 
oil plantations involved rampant corruption and nepotism among state officials, including Taib 
(Minority Rights Group, 2018; Straumann, 2015; Chin, 2015). 
The Taib administration had successfully balanced its power through apparatuses of the 
state – media, judiciary, legislation and executive. Any talk of cessation is put down by law 
enforcement means. The hype of the NCR land advocacy dwindled due to a number of factors 
– the mysterious disappearance of Bruno Manser, the depletion of Sarawak’s rainforest from 
over logging, a change of Sarawak chief minister and the shifting priorities of CBO personnel. 
Since the separation of powers is executed poorly in Malaysia, Pang and YB See concluded 
that the indigenous people did not feel protected by autonomous institutions. Pang 
mentioned that government agencies like the National Registration Department are less 
emphatic to the Penans. He said even clerks can be the ‘gatekeeper’ or ‘little Napoleons’ for 
turning the Penans away for having no birth certificate, which resulted in a ripple effect that 
denied them constitutional rights to vote, get education or public healthcare. Pang, Michael 
and Ramould also doubted the independence of the Human Rights of Commission of Malaysia 
(SUHAKAM), Malaysian Timber Certification Council (MTCC) and Malaysian Anti-Corruption 
Commission (MACC) in safeguarding the people instead of the government. Peter recalled that 
he lodged many reports to the MACC regarding Taib’s wrongdoing yet no action was taken.  
Adenan Satem became the fifth Chief Minister in 2014. Several interviewees claimed 
that he was more open to solving their land plights. YB See said that he was given a column in 
the Borneo Post to write on indigenous people’s issues, which never happened before during 
Taib administration. The former Temenggong, Mr Mantan Pahang expressed sympathy over 
Adenan’s passing in 2017, asking “why such a kind person’s life was cut short by God?”. Philip 
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praised Adenan for stopping the Baram dam construction. Abang Johari Tun Openg, more 
popularly known as Abang Jo (literally Brother Jo), became the sixth Chief Minister in 2017 
and was perceived by Mr Mantan Pahang as ‘all-talk-no-action’ about continuing Adenan’s 
effort. YB See added that Abang Jo ‘closed up the space again’ by retracting his column in the 
Borneo Post. 
From the interviews, any expectation of capacity to discuss the possibility of crisis of 
authority or Caesarism (in Gramsci’s terms) has proven absent. Among the three Chief 
Ministers, none of the interviewees presented information that might allow the 
characterisation of the transitional period from Taib to Adenan as one of conjunctural or 
organic crisis. This thesis argues that while the actions taken by Adenan were attentive in part 
to the indigenous people’s land woes, they were insufficient to challenge the established 
institutions of civil society institutions that contributed to the Dayak subalternity.   
9.5 A Review of the Gramscian approach 
This last section presents critiques of the Gramscian approach to analysing the Southeast 
Asian state-civil society relationships. The critiques are then discussed within the feasibility of 
the Gramscian framework to envisioning how the CBOs (Modern Prince), led by indigenous 
people (subalterns), can rise to building their own hegemony and end their subordination. 
A number of scholars use the Gramscian conception to analyse Southeast Asian state-
civil society. Based on the Vietnamese and Cambodian contexts, Landau (2008) writes that the 
utility of Gramsci’s civil society is limited. The fuzziness of the state-civil society dichotomy 
highlights Gramsci’s weakness in describing the nature and limits of the boundaries 
(Ehrenberg, 1999; in Landau, 2008). Landau (2008, p. 254) further wrote that particularly in 
states like Vietnam, “where the boundaries between state and society are associatively, as 
well as conceptually, ill-defined and elusive and the most important contestations often occur 
within the state, Gramsci’s theory is of limited relevance.” Landau (2008, p. 254) claimed that 
the approach for Vietnam and Cambodia is limited to “Western-style liberal democratic 
regimes where there is clear institutional, legal and conceptual space for civil society.” It is in 
fact such fuzziness that renders hegemony effective in Malaysia. State intervention in the 
Malaysian economy generally and in the media industries specifically have been documented 
by various scholars. It is an environment as described by Zaharom (2000, p. 242) “where the 
ownership and control of the media are in the hands of a few who are closely aligned to the 
government and who also wish to profit from the situation.” The logic that mass media are 
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both economic and ideological fits Gramsci’s view that hegemony is ethical-political, but 
exercised from those leading economic activities.  
O’Shannassy (2008, p. 92) defended the complexity of the state-civil society 
interrelationships where any analysis on post-colonial states should reject “a simple, 
dominative or instrumental model of state power.” Furthermore, the separation between 
political society and civil society is purely instrumental (Tok, 2003). In concrete life, they are 
both existent and is the same thing; “the public and governmental institutions of political 
society exist alongside private organisations of civil society [which] constitute an organic 
unity” (Green, 2002: p. 6).    
O’Shannassy (2008), in understanding the surprising outcome of Malaysia’s 12th general 
elections, wrote that the strength of a Gramscian conceptual framework lies in the complex 
working of hegemony and the critical role of popular consent in maintaining it. Miles and 
Croucher (2013, p. 415), on the other hand, criticised Landau (2008) and O’Shannassy (2008) 
for ignoring “a central Gramscian issue, which is how far workers and their organisations have 
been able to forge links with other subaltern groupings.” 
The motivating occasions for both O’Shannassy (2008) and Miles and Croucher’s (2013) 
work are general elections. O’Shannassy (2008) questioned if the 2008 general elections 
outcome is a short-term or an organic moment. O’Shannassy (2008, p. 93) was aware of 
Gramsci’s point that “any particular crisis needs to be understood not only in terms of the 
immediate economic and/or political concerns but also in the ‘incessant and persistent efforts’ 
made by the ruling stratum in order to defend and maintain the existing system.” This thesis 
argues that O’Shannassy (2008) did not point out the operations of an important hegemonic 
tool, which is the mediated dominant ideology over time. Similarly, although Miles and 
Croucher (2013) attempted to highlight the coalition status of working class and unions, they 
failed to stress how they have been represented by mainstream media in Malaysia.  
This weakness relates to the failure in exploring the dynamism that gives legitimated 
authoritarianism its meaning – popular perception and consent (Sim, 2006). Gramsci’s theory 
of hegemony addresses the question of consent and legitimacy, which is now mediated 
through communication systems that are far from being neutral in its own. Green (2002, p. 
14) quoted the case of David Lazzaretti as an instance where although this commoner led a 




The point that interests Gramsci, however, is the way in which Lazzaretti and his 
movement are portrayed and represented by Italian intellectuals…. viewed 
Lazzaretti as a psychologically abnormal “madman”, not as a member of a 
marginalised group …. not consider[ing] the socioeconomic, political, or historical 
conditions Lazzaretti and his movement confronted.   
Green (2002, p. 15) further stressed the significance of Gramsci’s focus on literature, or media 
in the contemporary sense that  
depicts the subaltern in passive, humble, or subordinated positions is to show that 
such work actually reinforces the positions of the subaltern and contributes to 
their further subordination. The dissemination of such views contributes to the 
consciousness and common sense of the masses to an extent that they do not 
question such views and accept them as facts rather than opinions….subaltern 
groups are faced with an ensemble of political, social, cultural, and economic 
relations that produce marginalisation and prevent group autonomy. 
In other words, dominant portrayal of the subalterns not only contains themselves within their 
subordination but also shapes public consciousness to thinking the same. Therefore, a 
consistent image of CBOs is crucial to bring together the single aim, which is mobilise the 
natives against unfairness in NCR land matters and at the same time create a unitary common 
sense about them. It may be a huge hurdle to overcome given the Dayak political disunity, co-
optation by the government and distrust among each ethnic group especially toward the 
Penans. Gramsci is right in cautioning us against a party’s bureaucratic centralism. Gramsci 
admited that it is a norm to have a leader and the led. At the same time, he put heavy emphasis 
on the creative leadership of the political party to bring subalterns from passivity to activity.  
This thesis argues that the Gramscian expectation toward the revolutionary role of a 
political party (organism) raises doubts about its feasibility, at least within Sarawak-Malaysia 
relations. On the one hand, Gramsci’s vision of a revolutionary leader is appropriate and useful 
because the Sarawak indigenous people have been community-based since time immemorial. 
Revolutionary activity is a painstaking process, especially one that has to tackle high resistance 
and attitude change as part of Gramsci’s cultural preparation. It has to start somewhere with 
someone leading the masses beyond economic-corporate interests or committing 
syndicalism. Gramsci further argued that counter-hegemony struggles can only take place in 
civil society – it requires the creation and extension of new spaces, which matches the 
advancement of user-generated content in the age of new media.  
On the other hand, Gramsci stressed that such strategy for a war of position needs to 
be developed to target “a more ‘interventionist’ government…with controls of every kind, 
political, administrative, etc., reinforcement of the ‘hegemonic’ positions of the dominant 
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group ….” (2011c, Q6§138: p. 109). It may not be feasible by conquering the military field that 
the indigenous people will rise to be the hegemonic group. Such aim defies Gramsci’s own 
critique toward Rosa Luxemburg and the Bolshevik leader Trotsky for their idea of war of 
manoeuvre, which refers to the frontal attack on the state. Furthermore, it is a dangerous 
task, one that Gramsci is well aware of. It is from this point that this research agrees with 
Landau’s (2008) argument about Gramsci’s unclear boundaries of the state. If civil society is 
the State itself, does it mean that ending the state will also end the civil society elements? 
How then will the next leader establish his or her hegemony? By envisaging the end of the 
state, what will happen to the CBOs? Who will lead? Such questions defy Gramsci’s 
expectation of a movement toward a catharsis government to uplift the economy that 
benefits the poor as well. Contextually, disabling the apparatuses of the state might lead to a 
bloodbath in Malaysia. After the New Economic Policy (NEP) was launched in 1971, the BN 
government elevated the economic and political positions of the Malays by placing them in 
the civil service including the law enforcement sectors to solidify BN’s position as the protector 
of Malay supremacy through electoral votes (Jomo and Todd, 1994). 
9.6 Suggestions for the CBOs 
Based on the empirical findings and theoretical discussion, this thesis gives several 
suggestions for the future operations of Sarawakian CBOs. To run an effective CBO, the organic 
intellectual may or may not be from the subalterns. It is unnecessary to set a culturalist 
boundary where the agent of change must be from the natives, although ideally the natives 
understand the subject matter at hand better than ‘outsider’. Ms Vincy (BaramKini), a 
Malaysian Chinese, recalled how she was confronted by some longhouse residents to reveal 
her ‘true’ intention for helping the natives. They feared that she was “a BN spy” because it is 
rare to them for a non-native expressed interest in their problems. This thesis thinks that if 
the leader is sympathetic toward the land dispossessed natives and their overall cultural 
positioning, wouldn’t the leader’s organisational skills matter more than his or her ethnic 
belonging? In fact, an ‘outsider’ may have a clearer view to position the advocacy beyond 
ethnicity, which indeed as shown in this research has a dividing effect toward the land issue 
regarding social classes. 
It is because of such suspicion that the CBOs have yet to understand the essence of 
winning the hegemony through more than one type of audience. Rhetorically speaking, as 
Campbell and Huxley wrote (2009, p. 192):  
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“There are at least four ways to understand what is meant by an “audience”. An 
audience can be (1) those exposed to the rhetorical act, the empirical audience; 
(2) the target audience, the ideal audience at whom the act is aimed’ (3) the agents 
of change, or VIP audience, those who have the capacity to do as the rhetor 
wishes, who can make changes; and (4) the role the audience is invited to play by 
the rhetor, the created audience”.  
It is right that the CBOs want to empower the natives through village visits, resident 
associations and literacy training. It is equally important to naturalise the natives among 
especially urban dwellers instead of often being portrayed as outcast or anti-development. 
The masses need creative leadership to pave way for systematic creation of content to create 
subaltern ‘common sense’, connect with the masses and eventually lift the subalterns from 
their current underprivileged status. The only interviewee that has such opinion is Ms Vincy 
who despises the use of new media as bulletin board instead of creating everyday image of 
the natives to make others understand why the NCR land matters as their rights. To her, the 
leadership pattern in Sarawak lacks focus because most CBOs do their own thing despite the 
similarity of each advocacy. The totality of NCR land involves not only customary rights but 
also educational and economic statuses. To be able to participate in the interpretation and 
discourse of customary rights in the modern setting, one has to look beyond crises or 
conjunctural events.  
This thesis agrees with Gramsci that party bureaucracy is detrimental to the CBO 
operations. This is observed through the Sahabat Alam Malaysia (SAM), from their media 
output to the procedure of securing an interview. The researcher first approached Mr Jok Jau 
Evong from the Marudi branch for an appointment. He personally agreed but he had to ask 
for the headquarters’ permission. No response recieved after three weeks and a few phone 
calls were made to the headquarter. They were passed around and nobody knew about the 
researcher’s enquiry to have an interview with the Marudi branch. SAM was established in 
1977 and was a fierce advocate in the 1970s. It was headed by Mr Harrison Ngau who later 
was detained under the Internal Security Act. As SAM’s operations expanded over the years – 
Pang called it an elite NGO – this thesis thinks that SAM should decentralise in terms of budget, 
training and literacy. This will also maximise the community-based role that the Marudi office 
can play. If the officers in Marudi are trained to construct and edit own materials then 
subsequently offer training of media literacy skills to the communities, SAM website can 
display expression from the grassroots and spread more awareness regarding their plight. 
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Among the CBOs, they have resources in their own ways. SAVE Rivers has a strong youth 
group in managing its online media; SCRIPS has skills in oral history documentation; JOAS is a 
network of about 100 indigenous-centric organisations; BaramKini is keen in creating Sarawak 
environmental awareness among non-indigenous urban residents; SAM is part of the Friends 
of the Earth International; IPIMAS specialises in conservation efforts and SACCESS is led by a 
politician-cum-lawyer. It would be better if they share those resources to form a stronger 
network and push for cultural and economic changes. The post-colonial government has 
continued the divide-and-rule policy from the Brooke administrations where the posts 
community leaders and ethnic leaders [ketua kaum] are preserved and paid for by the state 
government. Hence, the CBOs should discontinue such act of disunity. To quote Gramsci 
(2000/1926, p. 174): 
No mass action is possible, if the masses in question are not convinced of the ends 
they wish to attain and the methods to be applied. The proletariat, in order to 
become a capable as a class of governing, must strip itself of every residue of 
corporatism, every syndicalist prejudice and incrustation.  
9.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the empirical findings with Gramsci’s concepts of civil society to fulfil  
RO6 From the empirical data, to provide a systematic understanding of the nature of CBOs’ 
use of new media within the Gramscian framework. 
The empirical findings from interviews and web-based platforms are discussed by 
applying Gramsci’s notion of civil society and inter-related terms. The reason for applying a 
Gramscian framework is the totality of his terms that sets out to understand why in the first 
place there were disadvantaged people. He went on to analyse how they are perceived as 
natural and willingly consented to their condition. His perspective allows us to understand 
why certain social revolution didn’t work or how certain states retained their power without 
resorting to military means. He rejects the liberal notion that the state consists solely in a legal 
and bureaucratic order, which remains neutral and indifferent to class interests. From 
Gramsci’s point of view, the liberal state’s notion of rights benefits a particular class – the 
bourgeoisie (Buttigieg, 1995). Gramsci also offers strategies for intellectuals to play a 
conscientious role in leading the subalterns through civil society. 
From the discussion, the CBOs are very much aware of the obstacles to a more 
egalitarian society. It is argued that while the CBOs are working closely with the affected 
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indigenous communities, they need a more systematic strategy as a way forward from the 
Bruno Manser hype in the 1980s and 1990s. This thesis agrees with Gramsci that the struggles 
begin in civil society to win hegemony by creating and maintaining the spaces available 
through new media. It is also crucial to push for a reform in Malaysia’s government 
broadcaster to serve citizenry interests genuinely. Currently the interviewees are less 
enthusiastic toward utilising the new media. This is evident from their web-based platforms, 
which are either outdated or lacking in crafting contents. Most did not see such need because 
empowering the indigenous people is of the utmost priority. This thesis argues that because 
the CBOs concentrate in fighting against land injustice, it magnifies the subordinate status of 
the indigenous people. There is an urgency to find and train the younger generation to take 
over the leadership. Some interviewees expressed that they are quite burnt out by executing 
the empowerment tasks on their own. It is argued that there is a whole structure to 
understand this phenomenon, which can be related to Gramsci’s conceptualisation of 
economic-corporate interests, intellectuals, religion (Church) and education.  
Both liberal and Marxist paradigms of civil society share a common point of the 
juxtaposition of repressive state against liberal civil society, despite taking a different route 
(Rodan, 1997). They similarly maintain the normative role that civil society could play and 
bring transformation to society (Mitlin, Hickey and Bebbington, 2007). Again, the common 
premise is that “the state is inherently predisposed to oppression, whereas civil society is the 
natural domain of liberty” (Rodan, 1997: p. 160). Buttigieg (1995) highlighted how the liberal 
view misleadingly portrays the autonomy of civil society from the state. Gramsci actually 
envisaged the end of the state with the Modern Prince successfully having disabled the 
coercive apparatus of the state. The limitation in this aim is where it seems a dangerous move 
to paralyse the state’s stronghold of the law enforcement without resorting to force. While 
strengthening the subaltern’s hegemony through civil society, there is no guarantee that the 
state remains static in their image dissemination. It is advised that the CBOs unite to select a 
leader and strategist in managing the inner and outer trenches of operations for cultural 





Chapter 10: Conclusion 
10.1 New Media and Sarawak’s Community-Based Organisations (CBOs): A Gramscian 
Analysis 
This thesis has set out to study the development of CBOs in Sarawak within the advances 
of communication technologies. In a previously politically and socially restrictive media 
environment, new media has been identified as the catalyst to a more open and democratic 
civil society. With such excitement of a ‘virtual civil society’, this thesis questions if the CBOs 
shared similar sentiment and benefit in their operations. CBOs in Sarawak operate small-scale, 
people-centric activity and their main advocacy revolved around native customary rights 
(NCR) on land (Aeria, 2010). The height of this issue was during the 1980s and 1990s when a 
Swiss environmentalist brought to international attention the social and environment 
repercussions of land grabbing and logging on the Penans, a minority indigenous group in 
Sarawak. The Malaysian government retaliated with an anti-imperialist argument and also 
accused the CBOs for betraying their own nation’s development agenda. The research gap is 
two-fold. First, studies on how media influenced civil society movements rarely discussed the 
sustainability of new media in enhancing CBOs’ organising processes. Second, researches 
about Sarawak’s indigenous people, land issues and the environmental movement were 
mostly technical on land laws and geographical mapping. This research aimed to address the 
gap by placing the potential of new media in advocacy processes and how they could 
propagate a desired representation of the indigenous people of Sarawak, their cultures, 
including their ancestral lands, and rights. Semi-structured interviews were conducted among 
CBOs’ key personnel to obtain their outlook on new media, their current organising agenda 
and other actors, such as the federal and state governments, the indigenous people, other 
NGOs, education, political parties, churches and regulatory bodies. The interview data were 
triangulated with the analyses of the CBOs’ official websites, blogs and Facebook pages. The 
content analyses evidenced how the CBOs managed their images through web-based 
platforms. The data triangulation contributed to the understanding of the relationship 
between changes in media platforms and counter-hegemonic strategies by the NCR land 
CBOs. The data also enabled the researcher to understand not just the CBOs’ perspectives 
toward the appropriateness of user-generated media technologies for their advocacy, but 
their overall outlook on the media environment and civil society in Malaysia. This section 
discusses the key findings that have answered the research questions, followed by suggestions 




RQ1) How did the NCR land CBOs represent themselves using new media platforms?  
The NCR land CBOs’ representation user-generated website, blogs and Facebook pages 
were content analysed using the categories of graphic and navigation design. To represent 
their environmental-based advocacy, green was the key colour in 2 websites (SAM and SCRIPS) 
and 2 blogs (SCRIPS and SAVE Rivers). The SAM website had the most complete and organised 
set of organisational background and activities, which can be attributed to SAM’s 
establishment in Malaysia since 1977. For the blog category, BaramKini used white that gave 
a minimalist look and utilised the sidebar, Tags and Archives for better navigation of 
information. BaramKini had the advantage of time where blog template designs have evolved 
(as compared to the BRIMAS blog) and Vincy, a former journalist, as the blog coordinator. Five 
CBOs had their own official Facebook page. When data collection was undertaken in August 
2018, BRIMAS and TAHABAS Facebook pages had not been updated since 2016. On the other 
hand, SAM, SAVE Rivers and JOAS were more active in posting items on Facebook. The nature 
of contents, however, was event-based and in the form of photo or video; those gained the 
highest number of Facebook responses as well. News and feature articles about Sarawak NCR 
land were sourced from national and international media organisations. 
 
RQ2) What did the CBOs think of the current media environment in Malaysia pertaining to 
their land rights advocacy? 
The interviewees were asked about their CBO’s media relations at the state and 
international levels. They disclosed that their land advocacy stories in the 1980s and 1990s 
were rarely broadcast and published in a consistent and objective manner by government 
broadcaster, RTM, and private media organisations. Subsequently, they grew reluctant to call 
the mainstream journalists to cover their events. They believed that government regulations, 
political ownership and commercial pressures affected journalistic independence. 
Malaysiakini, established in 1999, is Malaysia’s first alternative media organisation that is fully 
online. A majority of interviewees (56.3%) admitted that Malaysiakini was ‘friendlier’ to their 
cause and published their stories as they were. All interviewees expressed their 
disappointment toward RTM because they were not accountable as a national broadcaster. 
They believed that media reform is important to have more socially responsible media that 
“inform and educate” the audiences, not “brainwashing” them. This was evident through all 
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5 CBOs’ Facebook posts; RTM was sourced only once. The answer to this research question 
came mainly from the interviews to understand their perspectives and expectations toward 
mainstream and alternative media organisations in Malaysia. The theme ‘media’ was the 
second least mentioned in the CBOs’ web-based platforms. The web findings evidenced that 
the CBOs’ thoughts on media are not part of their organisational advocacy.   
 
RQ3) How have the CBOs’ internal and external organising processes improved using the new 
media?  
The CBOs’ web-based platforms did not encourage upward information flow as in calling 
for action from the users. Only SAM website and BaramKini blog had ‘Donation’ and 
‘Volunteer’ functions. None of them provided links to organisations of similar movement.  
Thematic analysis was conducted on the CBOs’ organisational details to gauge the range 
of their activities. “Empowerment” shaped the identity of CBOs where their focus is to educate 
the communities of their “indigenous and human rights” through workshops and trainings. 
The interviewees said that the communities were taught the basics of citizen journalism like 
taking photos and videos, composing simple captions and using Word Document. According 
to Susanna and Pang, the effectiveness of media literacy training depended on the 
communities’ capacity by age, literacy level and location. The communities’ stories were 
either uploaded to the Facebook page by themselves or sent to the CBO personnel first. From 
the Facebook posts, the functions of Sharing and Tagging among the CBOs were rarely used. 
A display of their solidarity was shown once through a joint press statement that condemned 
the assassination of Bill Kayong. Overall, the content analyses showed that the CBOs’ internal 
and organising strategies were almost non-existent. 
From the interviews, the CBOs personnel gave mixed answers to the extent new media 
have enhanced their day-to-day operations. Overall, they agreed that the utilisation of new 
media by civil society organisations have opened up the sphere in terms of creating 
awareness. The interview data further revealed that the CBOs’ use of new media was 
influenced not just by their resources but how they perceived new media as a non-priority. 
For the first factor, the CBOs run on a small budget and they utilise it to mobilise the 
communities, especially during crisis. This leads to the second factor where to maintain any 
web-based platforms is a burden to SACCESS, IPIMAS, TAHABAS and SCRIPS. Michael claimed 
that those who remain in remote areas are the elderly and they rely on their community head 
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as the opinion leader, not the media. Those who migrated to town for employment and 
education, they are either indifferent to land issues or show scepticism toward the role that 
they can play as individuals. The CBOs believed that targeting the indigenous communities is 
more important than educating the general public. To attract and to retain the interest of 
youths, they argued, is a structural issue and cannot be addressed through attractive official 
sites and popular posts. Furthermore, division among the indigenous people by ethnic groups 
and political orientation are deep-seated issues. The CBOs personnel stressed that their role 
to solve this, is to educate the communities of their rights without instigating the divisions 
further.  
 
RQ4. How would the Gramscian framework assist in understanding new media and civil society 
based on the NCR land CBOs’ organising processes? 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Malaysian civil society organisations operate within the 
boundaries set by the state, not grown out organically (J. Saravanamuttu, 1997; Rodan, 2014). 
This is evident for the NCR land CBOs where they started as resistant groups toward the 
Sarawak state’s institutionalisation of native customs (including land) and the subsequent 
development of related industries, which upset the indigenous people’s relationships with 
their lands since time immemorial. The CBOs’ non-governmental stand refers to being 
different from the state in appreciating the NCR land, not in the autonomous sphere as 
defined by the liberal paradigm. In many instances, the CBOs saw themselves as the watchdog 
to curb state despotism. SACCESS is “selective” in networking because they do not liaise with 
loggers and government-friendly environmental NGOs. To Pang, being non-governmental 
does not mean ‘neutral’ and ‘apolitical’. Jok Jau argued that the state government was too 
“defensive” by pitting the indigenous people’s rights against national development agenda. 
Ramould used to be a ruling party’s member and he grew frustrated when the party was 
reluctant in solving his community’s land issues. He claimed that he initially had no idea about 
what NGO was. Out of desperation, he drove 12 hours from Kuching to Miri to look for an NGO 
that he heard represent indigenous people’s land rights, referring to BRIMAS. Peter from SAVE 
Rivers stressed that he disliked the name NGO because they actually are more than happy in 
assisting the government in preserving the Sarawak forests and rivers. In the Gramscian point 
of view, the CBOs had the advantage in grassroots empowerment but lacked the strategy of a 
revolutionary party that include the complex fabric of actors and institutions of civil society.     
236 
 
The divide-and-rule policy practised by both colonial and post-colonial governments has 
rendered the Dayak unity weak. The indigenous way of life and their self-governance through 
Adat (custom) were deemed inappropriate by the dominant definition of civilisation. Their 
status was further downgraded when their most prized possession, land, is administered by 
state apparatuses – executive, legislation and judiciary – that vanquished their interpretation 
of Adat. The indigenous people and activists alike were criminalised for their retaliation 
through blockades and foreign parties. Their struggles took place when this topic was shunned 
by the mainstream media and there were no user-centric communication technologies as 
advanced as today. Several interviewees had parts of their lives sacrificed in offering support 
to the affected communities – confiscated passports, abandoned studies, police intimidation 
and using up own savings. Their organising skills exemplified the conscientious roles of organic 
intellectuals. If not because of their lone struggles, they would have reacted differently to the 
potentials of new media in publicising their advocacy to establish new hegemony. The purpose 
is to normalise the indigenous existence without highlighting their subalternity through 
constant ‘pleading’ for help and demanding for justice.  
As argued by Gramsci, civil society is indeed a critical site for hegemonic (re)production. 
After the hype of anti-logging in Sarawak fizzled out, interviewees admitted to an extent that 
the network is still rather loose and the CBOs lack direction on figuring out what is next.  The 
biggest internal challenge is getting fresh faces to take over their advocacy. SAVE Rivers has 
the advantage of having an active youth group as volunteers mainly because of Peter Kallang’s 
involvement with church. Factors such as migration, education, career priority and forest 
depletion drove the young to be more and more detached from their ancestral land. This 
situation fits Gramsci’s “problem of the younger generation” where “the old is dying and the 
new cannot be born” (1999, p. 556). Susanna from IPIMAS strongly believed that education is 
empowerment. It may be partially correct if she was meaning ‘literacy’ because education 
systems in Malaysia are examination-oriented and developmentalist that helped preserves 
the status quo (Zaharom, 2003). The interviewees were aware that some educated natives 
themselves are part of the oppressive system. Education is no guarantee to Gramsci’s ideal of 
(organic) intellectuals in putting an end to subalternity.  
Gramsci is right in arguing that subalterns have to be studied in totality. In this NCR case 
study, co-optation is not only limited to electing community leaders as government positions; 
it encapsulates civil society as a contested arena. Churches have their own agenda in 
competing to champion Penan’s cause through socio-economic needs but leave out the 
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contentious law interpretation of customary land and the powers behind it. The communal 
nature of natives in Sarawak further poses a hindrance to forming a coalition of subalterns. 
BRIMAS and SCRIPS expressed their bitterness over the international attention given to the 
Penans in the 1980s. With CBOs still running by ethnic lines or ‘internal prejudice and strata’, 
it may pose grim outlook toward bridging the differences to share counter-hegemonic 
ideology.  
The fundamental tasks of a revolutionary party for Gramsci are: 1) the creation of a 
counter-hegemonic ‘historic bloc’ (a united front); 2) development of political consciousness 
(shared counter-hegemonic ideology by different subaltern groups: 3) to guide the masses 
politically and materially toward the solution of their subalternity (Gramsci, 2000/1926: pp. 
153-154). The CBOs have accomplished the third criterion, which is to empower the grassroots 
to rise from their subaltern positions. The CBOs have done it right by documenting oral history 
to counter the official interpretation of natives’ values and origins, among other 
empowerment activities. They have an advantage over middle-class NGOs described by Rodan 
(2014, p. 838) where “the [latter] appeared not to countenance the linking of their preferred 
reforms to the substantive needs and aspirations of the masses, or to engage and enlist active 
support from representative organisations beyond the middle class.” This thesis argues that 
even if the middle-class activists “relied heavily on the power of argument and maintained a 
sense of entitlement to shape reform” (Rodan, 2014, p. 838), they may well complement the 
CBOs by offering media management strategies.  
The CBOs had toiled hard in an oppressive environment about three decades ago and 
much can be learned and picked as lesson for future direction. This is not to sanitise their 
mission and the real injustices faced by the indigenous people in losing their land. It has to be 
understood that their subalternity is also sustained by other seemingly unrelated and 
harmless aspects – education, religion, entertainment and cultural associations. They did not 
win the war of manoeuvre in the 1980s and 1990s largely because of law enforcement 
mechanisms such as police and judiciary; and second, state ideology of modernity defined 
them “anti-development”. In the new media era, they are fading out from the war of position 
despite the more liberal space for generating own content.  
This research argues that the CBOs should move beyond empowerment at the subaltern 
level to break into the user-generated online sphere and lobby for a reform in the broadcaster 
RTM to create the natives’ common sense. CBOs, especially SACCESS, do not want their 
advocacy to be institutionalised. It is in fact these institutions of civil society that build their 
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“powerful system of fortresses and earthworks” (Gramsci, 1999, p. 494) over time – media, 
ROS, MTCC, MACC, religion and education. Brosuis (1999, p. 51) argued that scholars might 
be “missing the mark” by focusing on ethnographic resistance in environmental movement 
without considering how “[i]nstitutions are both enabling and limiting. A process common to 
virtually all environmental issues today: the process by which the discursive and institutional 
contours of such issues are simultaneously shifted away from the moral/politic domain and 
toward the domain of governmentality, managerialism, and bureaucratisation.” 
With the new political alliance taking over Malaysian administration, the CBOs ought to 
‘test the waters’ within the five-year window before the next general elections and push for a 
redefinition of native rights in totality. To quote Green (2002, p. 21):   
Because subaltern groups exist in varying degrees of political organisation, more 
organised groups have to become intellectual and moral leaders and attempt to 
create a subaltern class alliance that would be capable of presenting a new set of 
cultural values, social relations, and a new conception of the state. Therefore, 
prior to creating a new state, subaltern groups first have to become a 
counterhegemonic force capable of challenging dominant cultural values and 
winning control over civil society.  
Fann (2018) urged grassroots civil society to engage with the elected representatives 
after collecting feedback from the people. In a more open media environment, the CSOs 
should seize the opportunity by ensuring the PH government accountable in fulfilling their 
election promises (Fann, 2018). This research argues that grassroots organisations now need 
to play a whole new ball game toward creating national popular culture. The challenge lies in 
the practical aspect of how to create organic intellectuals who understand subaltern ‘struggle’ 
and rights and at the same time harmonised to be something natural, common and worth 
public sympathy. The discomfort in this organic unity is currently reflected in the answers 
given by some interviewees where “the indigenous people do not need sympathy” [Pang], 
“[publicity] is self-promoting” [Pang] and “[SCRIPS] are different from those associations 
organising dancing and basket weaving activities” [Michael]. The CBOs and communities have 
a long way more to go in creating popular consciousness that they matter culturally, referring 
to more than arts and literary but “a coherent, integral and nationwide conception of life and 
man” (Merli, 2013c p. 441). 
10.2 Contribution to Knowledge 
If this research is a piece of organic intellectual work, it has to contribute to the CBOs 
and indigenous people of Sarawak. It would be farcical to only benefit the researcher in terms 
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of personal achievement. Several interviewees – Peter, Michael and YB See expressed their 
disappointment where there was no follow-up after they had on another occasion contributed 
to some academic research and interviews. With the community-based nature of the 
organisations, it is also less helpful to give them suggestions from afar. From the interview 
data, Mark and Michael voiced dissatisfaction over larger or international NGOs for “telling 
them what to do”. The best method to apply the suggestions for the CBOs (see 9.6) is through 
a full-time, physical involvement, which most likely means taking the road less travelled, based 
on the odds faced by the CBOs. This is where the researcher agrees with Gramsci’s philosophy 
of praxis, where the link between theory and practice is inseparable. To educate the 
subalterns that their economic and cultural status needs a consistent, systematic uplifting, is 
a long, painstaking process of war of position. Therefore, the indigenous people need to be 
taught, based on their capacity, the complex trenches of civil society such as education, media 
literacy and political systems. For different levels of audiences, the researcher can further 
contribute through writing feature articles about Sarawak, update the CBOs’ online platforms 
and get involved with policy influence tasks. Therefore, to learn at least one of the indigenous 
languages and get familiar with land laws will increase organic centralism and minimise 
prejudice toward the researcher. 
The research undertaken makes a significant contribution to the conceptualisation of 
civil society through the dynamics of the CBOs’ NCR land advocacy and new media. It rejects 
the liberal paradigm of civil society (see Chapter 2) because in the Gramscian view, civil society 
is the platform of hegemony that displays the necessary fiction of moral leadership and 
connectedness with the masses without changing the status quo. The existence of CBOs and 
the space allowed in new media has to be analysed beyond their face value. The empirical 
data interviews and web-based design analysis provides insights to the Sarawak land CBOs’ 
definition of civil society through their relationships with custom, leadership, new media and 
aspirations in land movement. The application of a Gramscian analytical framework displayed 
a fragmented and contradictory arena of interests based on the hegemonic common good by 
the state, which is development. It helps the researcher to understand civil society beyond 
the idealised conceptions that NGOs and new media have expanded the realm through online 
activism and public opinion. Normative expectations toward civil society in the form of a realm 
and associations should be analysed along with the dynamics of contradictions within and 
between. While a strong state has been the main actor, the CBOs showed different ‘internal 
strata and prejudice’ toward environmental NGOs, cultural associations, churches, individual 
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activists, the Penans, and new media. The theoretical contribution is the synthesis of 
systematic ideological dissemination to the conception of civil society. It leads to the 
understanding of ongoing, uncritical perception of society that normalises inequality of 
participation and images in ‘civil society’. In the Gramscian perspective, common sense is 
disseminated not only through media, but further enforced through state institutions, directly 
and indirectly related to NCR land and indigenous people. It contributes to future research on 
Sarawak land to incorporate culture to analysing conjunctural events such as elections and 
dam alternatives. The application of Gramsci’s notion of culture extends beyond popularised 
‘ways of life’, but refers to a site of struggles to compete for integrated national image, both 
culturally and economically.   
This thesis agrees with Majid-Cooke’s (1999) call for a more holistic understanding of 
civil society in Sarawak with regard to environmental protests. The author quoted Feldman 
(1997) in her argument that “NGOs do not exhaust the whole of civil society, neither does the 
strengthening of the NGO movement necessarily reinforces civil society” (Majid-Cooke, 1999: 
p. 121). However, to de-centre the CBOs completely might be like throwing the baby out with 
the bathwater. First, it was indeed the CBOs that provided assistance in many ways when 
ruling political parties, churches, mainstream journalists and police shut out the affected 
indigenous people. Second, it would be clearer to distinguish hegemonic NGOs from those 
which are counter-hegemonic. While CBOs in Sarawak have long had contentious 
relationships with government institutions, this thesis believes that it is time for them to 
consider reaching out to multi-layered audiences to attempt to establish their hegemony. The 
new media nevertheless has pushed the boundary for counter-hegemonic discourses, which 
can be taken up by the CBOs. They can create more non-contentious images of the indigenous 
people instead of typecasting them with struggles. At the same time, they build the inner 
trenches like pushing for policy changes in RTM, NCR land and Sarawak development agenda. 
This can be achieved by coming together as a stronger and more systematic party of organic 
intellectuals, regardless of their ethnic background and classes as long as they have the single 
aim to raise the indigenous people from their subaltern status.      
This thesis aimed to address the gap between uses of new media and the operations of 
civil society organisations against the NCR land issue. On the one hand, one cannot study the 
struggles in land movement without considering how their ‘common sense’ have been 
perpetuated through mainstream media. On the other, it is futile to sing praises for the 
contribution of new media in civil society without analysing both online and offline impact to 
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an organisation’s ongoing advocacy. The thesis’s contribution in totality, it is hoped, may be 
taken up by policymakers and CBO leaders who would critically and conscientiously rethink 
the impact of ‘modern’ cultural and economic components on the indigenous people.   
10.3 Recommendations for Further Research 
As for limitations, the research interviewed CBO personnel who reside in towns. To 
undertake empirical work in the urban and rural indigenous grassroots would add more 
discussions to the topic. Furthermore, the research design prioritised CBOs that advocated for 
NCR land rights; to include stakeholders holding opposing views would have added a different 
dynamic to the discussion. A different method can also be considered like ethnography to 
allow a richer understanding of the CBOs’ day-to-day operations.  
Research on the public service broadcasting elements that RTM can adopt to reach out 
to the Sarawak indigenous people will contribute to reinventing RTM’s status as a national 
broadcaster and their responsibilities to minority citizens.  Further research to propose an 
independent media council in Malaysia will contribute to establishing a fairer environment 
that encourages community media, prevents media buy-outs and concentration and 
promotes diverse cultural productions. Thus far, initiatives by the government for a media 
council in Malaysia since the 1970s coincided with political and economic crises.22 For many 
sceptical parties, however, those suggestions, although in the name of protecting Malaysians 
from unethical media practices, would appear to be yet another (state imposed) control on 
Malaysia’s mediascape. With today’s increasing media convergence, questions of changing 
employment trends in the media sector, copyright and digital gap are also crucial issues 
concerning labour and consumption rights that can be discussed through the proposed 
council.   
This research started from personal curiosity regarding a sphere called the ‘virtual civil 
society’: Is it exclusive to the urban population? Where do the Sarawak indigenous people see 
themselves in the sphere? The inquiry evolved to encompassing a wider scope of mobilisation 
beyond media consumption patterns – the CBOs’ aspirations for the land dispossessed 
communities, indigenous cultures and development. In the course of preparing this thesis, the 
researcher encountered questions like “why bother researching the indigenous people when 
they have nothing to do with you?”. Although asked in a seemingly casual way, it reflects the 
common sense perspective related to minority culture in Malaysia. This is a Malaysian issue 
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that the researcher aimed to contribute insights to – in Gramsci’s (2011b, Q3§119, p. 106) 
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Appendix 1 Interviewing Documents  




Title of Study: New Media and Civil Society: A Study of Native Customary Rights (NCR) Land and Community-
based Organisations (CBOs) in Sarawak, Malaysia 
Study Level: As requirement for doctoral degree 
Researcher: Yap Pao Sium (University of Salford, Manchester, UK) 
Supervisor: Prof Seamus Simpson (University of Salford, Manchester, UK) 
 
I would like to invite you to take part in the research above through face-to-face semi-structured interview.  
The purpose of study is to explore the relationship between new media and civil society organisations in 
advocating for Native Customary Rights over land among indigenous in Sarawak.   
Your participation will contribute to the understanding of new media potentials toward the processes of 
land rights advocacy within the context of native marginalisation.  
The expected duration of each interview is 2 hours. 
If you have any concerns or queries about the research, you can contact the following: 
 
1. The researcher Yap Pao Sium (P.S.Yap@edu.salford.ac.uk) 
2. Main supervisor Professor Seamus Simpson (S.Simpson@salford.ac.uk)  
3. Local advisor Dr Tang Mui Joo (tangmj@tarc.edu.my)  
 
Thank you. 
*This study has obtained ethical approval from the University of Salford Ethics Panel. 
 
Consent Form for Semi-Structured Interview 
 
I am a postgraduate research student of the University of Salford, Manchester, UK. This interview intends 
to gain perspectives on land rights civil society organisations and new media. 
 
1. If you want, you can remain anonymous.  
2. All information provided is for the use of the research only.  
3. You may withdraw your participation anytime during the research.  
4. You can have a copy of any published articles where you have contributed information; 






I hereby agree to take part in this interview for the research above. I understand that all information 
provided will be used for research purposes only. I give consent for the information to be stored and used in 
any published results. 
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Participant Info Sheet for Semi-Structured Interview 
Study Title 
Civil Society and New Media: A Study of Native Customary Rights (NCR) Land and 
Community-based Organisations (CBOs) in Sarawak, Malaysia  
 
Invitation paragraph 
I would like to invite you to take part in a research as titled above. Please read the 
purpose of the research and your role as a participant. Ask if you feel unclear or would 
like elaboration. Take time to decide if to take part. 
 
The purpose of the study 
The research is to fulfil the requirement for a doctoral degree.  
The purpose is to explore the relationship between new media and civil society 
organisations in advocating for Native Customary Rights over land among Sarawak’s 
indigenous people.   
 
Why have you been invited? 
You are chosen due to your role as civil society actor, either in organising land rights 
advocacy or in reporting them through alternative media organisation. 
 
Do you have to take part? 
Participation is entirely voluntary. Besides the information sheet, you will be given a 
consent form to sign to show you agreed to take part. You may withdraw your 
participation at any time. 
 
What will happen to you if you take part? 
A semi-structured interview will be conducted face-to-face where each session lasts for 
approximately 2 hours.  
All interviews will be recorded, stored and used only for the research purposes. 
  
Expenses and payments 
None. 
 
What will you have to do? 
You will be asked about your perspectives on land rights advocacy activities using new 
media.  
Possible disadvantages and risks of taking part 
None. 
 
Possible benefits of taking part 
Your participation will contribute to the understanding of new media potentials 
toward the processes of land rights advocacy within the context of native 
marginalisation.  
 
What if there is a problem? 
If you have any concerns or queries about the research, you can contact the following: 
4. The researcher Yap Pao Sium 
P.S.Yap@edu.salford.ac.uk 
5. Main supervisor Professor Seamus Simpson 
S.Simpson@salford.ac.uk  
6. Local advisor Dr Tang Mui Joo 
tangmj@tarc.edu.my  
 
Will your taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
1. If you wish, you can remain anonymous;  
2. All information that you provide is collected, used and stored for research 
purposes only; 
3. Identity of informants and all information provided will be stored on the 
university secure network and removable storage password-protected media. 
 
What will happen if I don’t carry on with the study? 
If you withdraw from the research, your personal data will be destroyed.  
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
As a participant, 
1. You can have a copy of any published articles where you have contributed 
information; 
2. You will be contacted on publication of the thesis to be offered to read a 
copy; 
3. You will not be identified in any report/publication unless you have given 
your consent. 
 
Who is organising or sponsoring the research? 
The research is self-funded. 
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Appendix 2 List and Background of Interviewees 
 
1. Mr Mark Bujang (Mark) is a degree holder in geology from the University of Otago, New Zealand. He 
returned to Miri in 1997 during the Asian economic crisis and was unemployed for a year. A friend invited 
him to volunteer in community work with BRIMAS. 
2. Mr Peter Kallang (Peter) is a retiree. He used to work with oil company, Shell and the President of Shell 
union. He is actively involved with his church. 
3. Mr Thomas Jalong (Thomas) joined Sahabat Alam Malaysia (SAM) in 1986 and worked with lawyer activist, 
Mr Harrison Ngau. They were stationed in Baram and received many issues regarding land from villagers.  
4. Mr Albert Bansa (Albert) is a 24-year old university graduate in tourism management. He was inspired by 
his cousin to join JOAS as his village was facing land issues from palm oil plantation companies. He is now 
a media person for JOAS. 
5. Mr Jok Jau Evong (Jok Jau) started SAM Marudi in 1986. He formed the Uma Bawang Residents’ 
Association (UBRA). He is also a skilled sape (Kayan guitar) player with his band on Spotify. 
6. Mr Michael Mering Jok (Michael) used to be a canonist trained in Rome. He realised that land issues are 
beyond the question of religion. He quit the ministry and formed SCRIPS in 2012. 
7. Mr Mantan Pahang (Mantan Pahang) was elected as Temenggong (the highest position in community 
leader) in 1994 by the government. He was sacked in 2014 for being critical regarding native lands. 
8. YB See Chee How (YB See) is the vice chairman of Peoples Justice and an Assemblyman. He started career 
in chartered accountancy. He then took external exam and became a lawyer to take up land cases. 
9. Mr Wee Aik Pang [Pang] was exposed to NGO use of internet while studying in Australia. When he 
returned to Sarawak, he started SACCESS with YB See.   
10. Mr Wong Meng Chuo (Wong) used to be a regional pastor. He left church to start IPK in 1987, then 
formed IDEAL after IPK was deregistered in the 1990s. He has since slowed down due to health issue. 
11. Mr Philip Jau (Philip) formed BPAC in 2008 to protest against the Baram dam. He runs BPAC mostly on his 
own saving. 
12. Ms Susanna Mariam Dom (Susanna) founded IPIMAS is 1994. She witnessed how her own people 
struggled for food and clean water in depleted and polluted forest. 
13. Mr Charles Liew (Lawai) was inspired by YB Sim Kwang Yang’s lectures about native rights. He was an 
insurance agent for 20 years before fully committing to BaramKini. He engages more with Chinese-
speaking public in Kuala Lumpur. 
14. Mr Ramould Siew (Ramould) was a member with a political party. He was disappointed with the party’s 
inaction in helping villagers to get back their land. He quit the party and joined BRIMAS, then TAHABAS. 
15. Ms Vincy Usun (Vincy) is a Media Studies graduate. She was a journalist with a mainstream Chinese-
language newspaper. She worked as a producer for Free Sarawak Radio for 10 months in 2015. 
16. Mr Anil Netto (Anil) used to be a chartered accountant in England and Malaysia. He found himself more 









1 Malay, Indian and Dayak names are cited and arranged alphabetically in the Reference list by the first name 
because they are without family names. For example, Mohd. Azizuddin Mohd. Sani is cited as Mohd. Azizuddin 
because Mohd. Sani is the father’s name, not the family or last name. 
2 In Malaysia, the middle-class group refers to middle-income households with earnings between RM2,614 and 
RM10,456, with the national median monthly household income stood at RM5,228 (Lee, 24 February 2020). 
3 See Johan Saravanamuttu (2006, pp. 6-7) for his compilation of most prominent Islamic issues in the 2000s. 
They involved the complexity of Syariah and civil court jurisdiction for non-Muslim and Muslim in Malaysia.  
4 Following the GE13 results, politically-owned Malay-language paper, Utusan Malaysia headlined “Apa Lagi Cina 
Mau? [What More do the Chinese Want?]” on the front page. It implied that the Chinese caused such shocking 
defeat among the National Front (BN) candidates, especially those from the Chinese-based party, Malaysian 
Chinese Association (MCA) (Chin, 3 May 2018).  The Malay supremacy ideology claims that the Chinese should 
be grateful to be given Malaysian citizenship (Joseph, 27 October 2013). The British colonial government brought 
migrant workers from China to Malaya between the 18th and 19th centuries to work in tin mines (Gomez, 1999).  
5 The transparency of the EC was most recently challenged by BERSIH (literally means clean in the Malay 
language), a coalition of non-governmental organisations formed in 2006. It seeks to campaign for free, clean 
and fair elections in Malaysia. 
6 The expansion of Sarawak during the Brooke administration is as follows (Faisal, 2013 pp. 23-24): 
1. Batang Sadong, Batang Lupar, Saribas and Kalaka in 1853; 
2. Lower Rajang River in 1853; 
3. Upper Rajang River, Oya, Tatau, Mukah and Bintulu in 1861; 
4. Baram in 1883; 
5. Trusan in 1885; 
6. Limbang in 1890; and 
7. Lawas in 1905 
7 Politics in Sarawak, Lockard (1967) wrote, was marred by competing nationalisms among and within the Dayaks, 
Malays and Chinese. Federal intervention in the Bumiputera status and Sarawak’s resources further complicated 
Sarawakians’ nationalist sentiment toward Malaysia. Communal disunity and political crises in the early years of 
Sarawak as part of Malaysia posed challenge for any parties that claimed to be pan-communal. The following 
describes the early party formation in Sarawak. 
The First Six Political Parties in Sarawak 
1. The Sarawak United Peoples Party (SUPP) (1959) 
2. Parti Negara Sarawak (PANAS) (1960) 
3. The Sarawak National Party (SNAP) (1961) 
4. The Barisan Ra’ayat Jati Sarawak (BARJASA) (1961) 
5. The Sarawak Chinese Association (SCA) (1962) 
6. Parti Pesaka Anak Sarawak (PESAKA) (1962) 
 
In 1959, the first political party, the Sarawak United Peoples Party (SUPP) was formed in Sarawak. Ong Kee Hui 
and Stephen Yong were the party’s most prominent leaders. The party was always predominantly Chinese in 
membership and leadership, but generally more multi-racial than other subsequent parties (Roff 1974). 
Nevertheless, Lockard (1967) argued that SUPP was most probably Sarawak’s best organised political machine 
at the time that engaged the grassroots. Parti Negara Sarawak (PANAS) was a direct Malay response to the 
establishment of SUPP. Political division among the Malays following Sarawak’s cession to Britain was rife at the 
time. The party under Abang Haji Mustapha who was also the Datu Bandar, advocated for constitutional 
privileges to cover not only the Malays, but the ‘indigenous people of Sarawak’. He also proposed that Malay 
should be the national language of the new federation, and Islam as the state religion. The ethnic advocacy of 
both SUPP and PANAS prompted the Ibans to organise themselves politically too where the Sarawak National 
Party (SNAP) was formed. Led by Stephen Kalong Ningkan, SNAP mainly consisted of English-speaking employees 
or former employees of multinational oil and gas corporations. They were sociologically and economically more 
privileged. Both Ningkan and Tawi Sli came from prominent Iban families (Lockard, 1967). SNAP agreed with the 
Malaysia federation proposal to uplift the natives. Although SNAP claimed to be multi-ethnic, the party 
composition was mainly Iban. The Barisan Ra’ayat Jati Sarawak (BARJASA, Sarawak Native Association) was led 
by younger, less privileged anti-cessionist Malays and Melanaus. The foundation of PANAS by their rival the Datu 




ethnic and it specifically excluded the Chinese as their subjects. Under considerable pressure from the peninsular 
United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and from Malay Federal Ministers, PANAS and BARJASA finally 
merged in 1967 (Roff, 1974). The Sarawak Chinese Association (SCA) was founded in July 1962, by a group of 
Chinese businessmen which was almost a replica of the Malayan Chinese Association. As compared to SUPP, 
SCA’s concern was more to business than politics (Roff, 1974). Parti Pesaka Anak Sarawak (PESAKA)’s 
membership was limited to Dayaks and was established in response to SNAP’s predominant composition of Ibans 
from the Second Division. Because the Ibans of Third Division was politically less experienced and less educated, 
they did not have very coherent ideological unity in preserving Sarawak heritage.  Despite that, the Third Division 
was valuable by electoral votes as it was the most populous area (Roff, 1974). 
8 As recent as 2016, a group of protesters claimed that Astro side-lined the Malaysian Indian content for 20 years, 
which was detrimental to the culture preservation and development of local artistes (Lau, 2 September 2016). 
9 Rukunegara has the following Declaration:  
- to achieving a greater unity of all her peoples; to maintaining a democratic way of life;  
- to creating a just society in which the wealth of the nation shall be equitably shared;  
- to ensuring a liberal approach to her rich and diverse cultural traditions;  
- to building a progressive which shall be oriented to modern science and technology. 
The five principles of the Rukunegara are: 
- Belief in God  
- Loyalty to King and Country 
- Upholding the Constitution 
- Rule of Law 
- Good Behaviour and Morality. 
10 The table below shows the pattern and connection between Malaysian television organisations and political 
elites. 
Development of Television Ownership in Malaysia (1963-2014) 
Year Channel* Type Ownership/Operator/Remarks 
1963 RTM1 FTA Government – Ministry of Information 
1969 RTM2 FTA Government – Ministry of Information 
1984 TV3 FTA Private - Sistem Television Malaysia Bhd (STMB) 
TV3 was under the control of Realmild Sdn. Bhd., a private 
limited company, which in turn was fully owned by a publicly 
listed company, Malaysian Resources Corporation Bhd (MRCB) 
(Zaharom, 1994). MRCB was controlled by close associates of the 
then Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim. This deal was 
described as “the biggest management buy-out (MBO) in the 
local corporate sector” (Corporate World, February 1993; in 
Zaharom, 1994: pp. 183-184). 
1994 Metrovision FTA MetroVision’s parent company was City TV, which was part of 
Tunku Abdullah’s Melewar Corporation. Tunku Abdullah of the 
Negeri Sembilan royal house was also a “long time close 
associate of Prime Minister Mahathir” (Zaharom, 2002a: p. 120). 
Tunku Abdullah was the chairman of City Television, while 
daughter Tunku Soraya Dakhlah held the post of general 
manager of Programming and son Tunku Yahaya as the 
managing director of MetroVision (TV Trade Media, 1996). 
Utusan Melayu, the largest Malay-language media integrated 
company, had a 26% stake in City TV (TV Trade Media, 1996). 
Melewar Corporation, besides owning City TV, ventured into 
insurance, travel, advertising, securities and property (TV Trade 
Media, 1996).  
1996 Astro Pay (satellite) Binariang Sdn Bhd; associated with prominent Malaysians – one 
of them being the ‘manufacturing and horse racing tycoon, 
Ananda Krishnan … has been politely referred to … as ‘a 
businessman who enjoys the confidence of Prime Minister, 
Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamad’ (The Star, 9 January 1996; in 
Wang and Zaharom, 2001: p. 5). The chairman of Binariang’s 




force, Hanif Mohamed Omar…” (The Star, 9 January 1996; in 
Wang and Zaharom, 2001: p. 5). 
1998 NTV7 FTA Owned by its original chairman Mohd. Effendi Nawawi, who was 
appointed Minister of Agriculture after the 1999 general election 
(Wang and Zaharom, 2001) 
1999 Mega TV Pay (cable) Cableview Services Sdn. Bhd with the following shareholders 
(Wang and Zaharom, 2001: p. 4): 
a) STMB (TV3) – 40% 
b) Malaysian Ministry of Finance – 30% 
c) Sri Utara (wholly owned subsidiary of Maika Holdings 
Bhd – the investment arm of component ruling political 
party MIC) – 5% 
2000 Kristal-Astro Pay (satellite) Begins transmission in Brunei 
2001   Metrovision was re-launched by a new owner. 
Mega TV ceased operation – due to economic recession and 
strong competition from Astro (Wang and Zaharom, 2001). 
2004 Channel 9 FTA Private - Medanmas Sdn. Bhd. 
8TV FTA Metrovision bought over by Media Prima and rebranded as 8TV 
2005   Acquisitions by Media Prima of NTV7 and TV9 
Fine TV IPTV Licensed content application service 
2007   Launch of Measat 3, paved way for capacity of at least 130 
channels on Astro 
2008 Bernama TV News Channel Synergy Sdn. Bhd. 
2009 Al-Hijrah FTA Government (Al-Hijrah Media Corporation) 






Worldview Broadcasting Channel (M) Sdn. Bhd., is 31.67% 
controlled by Wan Johan Wan Ismail; 31.67% owned by 
Kamarudin Yusoff; 26.67% held by Izman Ismail and 10% by Rita 
Sarbanom Ismail (The Editor, 15 August 2012). 
ABN xcess Digital Cable ABN Media Group (Transmission coverage within Klang Valley 
only) 
2013/14   In 2012, Media Prima Bhd held preliminary talks with WBC with 
the view of taking up a stake, with The Star Publications Bhd also 
allegedly eyeing control of the company (The Editor, 15 August 
2012).  
WBC eventually ceased operations. 
2014 Bloomberg TV News channel 
– Cable and 
Satellite 
Malaysia’s first business news channel – partnership of 
Bloomberg Television and Malaysia’s Encorp Group (ABU, 2014). 
The chairman of Bloomberg TV Malaysia is Tan Sri Mohd Effendi 
Norwawi (Haikal, 11 April 2015), former Minister of Agriculture 
and former chairman of NTV7. 
Mohd Effendi Norwawi was previously the chairman of Encorp 
Bhd, with his daughter as an executive director. Both of them 
resigned from their posts after selling their stake in Lavista Sdn. 
Bhd., a private vehicle that owns a 30.55% stake in Encorp 
(theSundaily, 24 July 2013). 
*Chronology of television taken from Media Planning Guide (2014) 
11 Malaysia’s first satellite broadcasting company, All Asian Television and Radio Company (Astro) is operated by 
Malaysia East Asia Satellites (Measat) Broadcast Network Systems Sdn. Bhd. (Tai, 1997). Astro began services in 
1996, broadcasting via Measat-1 (launched from Kourou, French Guiana), offering twenty television and eight 
radio channels to 36,000 subscribers by the end of 1996 (Zaharom, 2002a, Tai, 1997). 
12 To realise these objectives, the NVP will encompass the following thrusts: 
- Building a resilient nation by fostering unity, inculcating the spirit of patriotism, nurturing political 
maturity, cultivating a more tolerant and caring society with positive values, and raising the quality of 
life as well as increasing economic resilience; 
- Promoting an equitable society by eradicating poverty and reducing imbalances among and within 




- Sustaining high economic growth by strengthening the sources of growth, the financial and corporate 
institutions as well as macroeconomic management; 
- Enhancing competitiveness to meet the challenges of globalization and liberalization; 
- Developing a knowledge-based economy as a strategic move to raise the value added of all economic 
sectors and optimizing the brain power of the nation; 
- Strengthening human resource development to produce a competent, productive and knowledgeable 
workforce; and 
- Pursuing environmentally sustainable development to reinforce long-term growth.  
13 Abdullah outlined ten fundamental principles of Islam Hadhari (Ahmad Fauzi, 2006: p. 116): 
1. Faith and piety in God; 
2. A just and trustworthy government; 
3. A free and independent people; 
4. A vigorous mastery of knowledge; 
5. A balanced and comprehensive economic development; 
6. A good quality of life; 
7. Protection of the rights of minority groups and women; 
8. Cultural and moral integrity; 
9. Conservation of the environment; and 
10. Strong defence capabilities. 
14 Media Prima Berhad’s (2014) conglomerate include all four private FTA television stations, three FTA radio 
stations, major English and Bahasa Malaysia-language newspaper publications, production companies, digital 
media and outdoor media. 
The Corporate Structure of Media Prima Berhad (2014) 
 
15 The Ten National Policy Objectives by the MCMC (2015b): 
1. Establish Malaysia as a major global centre and hub for communications and multimedia information 
and content services; 
2. Promote a civil society where information-based services will provide the basis of continuing 
enhancements to quality of work and life; 
3. Grow and nurture local information resources and cultural representation that facilitate the national 
identity and global diversity; 
4. Regulate for the long-term benefit of the end user; 
5. Promote a high level of consumer confidence in service delivery from the industry; 
6. Ensure an equitable provision of affordable services over ubiquitous national infrastructure; 
7. Create a robust applications environment for end users; 
8. Facilitate the efficient allocation of resources such as skilled labour, capital, knowledge and national 
assets; 
9. Promote the development of capabilities and skills within Malaysia’s convergence industries; and 




16 Creative industries are categorised by the Ministry of Information Communications and Culture as follow 
(KPKK, 2012): 
1. Audio Visual & New Media  Animation, Interactive, ‘Mobile’, Internet Content, ‘On-line 
Publishing’/’Multimedia Exhibits’, Film Production, Publications TV, Music 
2. Fiction Product Design, Fashion, Accessories, Design/Architecture 
3. Arts & Crafts Performing Arts, Art Gallery/Museum, Handicraft, Art Sculpture, Archives, 
Heritage/Antiquity, Traditional Art 
4. Print Media Publication, Writing 
 
17 The Malaysian government similarly has caught up with the creativity hype for the purpose of 
commercialisation. The purpose of financing, as stated by the Ministry of Information Communications and 
Culture, is to “provide some funding for loan needed for publication, asset purchases and other activities related 
to creative industries for commercialisation. Commercialisation hereby refers to any participation or effort to 
market products in and outside the country for profit” (KPKK, 2012; translated). 
In 2006, the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) Malaysia Creative Multimedia Initiative was launched with 
the main objective “to develop the Malaysian creative multimedia industry into becoming a key growth for the 
nation” (Kamarulzaman, 2011). Since 2010, an initiative fund of RM200 million has been allocated for this 
purpose, as announced through national budget (KPKK, 2012). Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib recently launched 
MyCreative Ventures Sdn. Bhd., a government investment arm, “to spur Malaysia’s creative industry via strategic 
and innovative funding” (Bernama, 12 September 2012). According to MyCreative Ventures chief executive 
officer Johan Ishak, Malaysia’s gross domestic production (GDP) contribution from the creative industry is 
expected to triple from currently RM9.4 billion or 1.27% to RM33 billion by 2020 (Ho L. C., 2012). Said Najib at 
the launch, “If India can be known for its Bollywood films, Italy for its fashion industry and Korea for its K-pop 
music, why can’t Malaysia have its own creative identity?” (Ho L. C., 2012).  
18 Another survey by Merdeka Centre showed that Najib’s popularity dropped from the highest of 79 per cent in 
May 2011 to 59 per cent that August, attributed to rising living costs and the government’s handling of the BERSIH 
2.0 rally (Ding et al, 2013). The government’s pledge for reforms in freedom of expression claimed to do away 
with several laws through amendments and repeal; at the same time new ones were introduced. For example, 
referring to the PPPA, the print media are still subject to show-cause letters from the Home Minister that can 
result in licence suspension and losing permits (Ding, 2012). More contradictions can also be seen in the Evidence 
Act amendment and the replacement of ISA with Security Offences (Special Measures) Act (Sosma) (ibid.). 
19 The modernisation approach to development is based on the assumptions that (Rogers, 1976; in Md Salleh & 
Saiful, 2009: p. 197): 
1. Economic growth through industrialisation is the key to development. 
2. Third World countries need capital and technology from the developed countries. 
3. Government central planning is necessary to execute the plan for growth.  
20 Scholars like Schramm (1964; in Md Salleh & Saiful, 2009: p. 198) described the roles of mass media in national 
development as watchmen, assisting decision process, and as teachers. Ultimately, mass media function as the 
catalyst to transform from developing to developed countries through attitudinal change among mass audiences. 
21 A programme breakdown was done on the TVi schedule available from Astro (14 September 2015) online 
portal:  
Time Programme Description 
1200 Self Resilience Documentary 
1230 Sedap Bah Cooking show 
0100 Wayang Xtravaganza *Unknown 
0200 Telemovie: Kampung 
Semerah Padi 
Movie 
0400 Kitra *Unknown 
0430 You TV Featuring a popular singer from Sarawak 
0530 Persona Fashion talk show 
0600 Lagu Negaraku National anthem 
0605 Kilp Video: Ketuhanan Religious videos 
0630 Celik Sihat Health talk show 
0700 Muzik i-Urban Urban music video clips 
0730 (Live) i-U Sarawak News 




0800 Muzik i-Pop Pop music video clips 
0830 I-Mode Fashion talk show 
0900 Gaya R Beauty talk show 
0930 Siapa Kata Tak Boleh? Reality show featuring disabled community and their achievements 
1000 Muzik i-Urban Urban music video clips 
1030 Animasi Lagenda 
Tambuakai 
Animation 
1100 Kraf Kreatif Craft work show 
1130 Muzik i-Urban Urban music video clips 
1200 Diari 3G Drama 
1230 Muzik i-Pelbagai Assorted music video clips 
1300 Download Upload Featuring individual profiles and their successes  
1330 Muzik i-Pelbagai Assorted music video clips 
1400 I-Plugged Local musical show 
1430 Garis Waktu Historical show featuring pre-independence stories 
1500 Sifu *Unknown 
1530 Muzik i-Pelbagai Assorted music video clips 
1600 Ex-Trem A show on youths and extreme sports 
1630 Trek Motoring sport 
1700 Pulang Sayang Drama series 
1800 Uni Challenge 1957 Reality TV show that promotes patriotism among tertiary students 
1830 Kembara 5 Travelogue 
1900 i-Kadazan Dusun News in Kadazan language 
1915 i-Iban News in Iban language 
1930 Dream Races Animation (foreign) 
2000 I-Plugged Local musical show 
2030 Kembara 5 Travelogue 
2100 Titian Nyawa Drama series 
2200 Pilihan I Musical show upon fans’ dedication of songs 
2230 Jom Redah *Unknown 
2300 Trek Motoring sport 
2330 Muzik i-Urban Urban music video clips 
 
TVi: Genre and Programming Hour Breakdown on a 24-hour weekday (14 September 2015, Monday) 
 
Genre Hour % 
Magazine-style Talk Show Sub-total: 8.5 35.4 
- Environmental documentary 0.5  
- Cooking 0.5  
- Entertainment/Music 1.5  
- Fashion/Beauty/Craft 2  
- Travelogue/Extreme Sport 2.5  
- Health 0.5  
- Individual stories of success 0.5  
- Pre-independence stories 0.5  
Reality TV show Sub-total: 1 4.2 
- Disabled community 0.5  
- Patrotism among Tertiary Students 0.5  
News 1 4.2 
Music video clips 5 20.8 
Drama series/Movie 4.5 18.8 
Animation 1 4.2 
National anthem/Religious clips 0.5 2 
Unknown 2.5 10.4 





22 The major chronology and contexts of media council (1974-2012) initiatives are as follow. Unless otherwise 
stated, the initiatives up until the year 1999 are taken from Mohd. Safar (2006). 
Initiatives Contexts 
1974 
Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak 
mooted the idea of a press council to 
allow the press to operate in parallel 
with national aspirations (Berita Harian, 
19 June 1974). 
A committee made up of 10 senior 
journalists was set up. 
 
 
The May 1969 racial riots had resulted in:  
- The declaration of a state of emergency and the 
formation of a National Operations Council (NOC) 
- The implementation of National Economic Policy in 1971; 
to restructure society and to eliminate poverty 
- The formulation of a national ideology 
Varsity students’ activism   
The 1974 election  
Malaysian majority ownership for all newspapers required 
(Means, 1991); amendments to the Sedition Ordinance (1948) 
and the Control of Imported Publications Act (1958); Official 
Secrets Act (1972) 
1983 
The idea of a press/media council was 
raised during a National 
Communication Policy Convention 
organised by the Ministry of 
Information. 
At about the same time, the 
government gave the National News 
Agency (Bernama) the exclusive rights 
to distribute news from foreign news 
agencies.  
 
Dr Mahathir became Prime Minister in 1981 – Privatisation, Look 
East policy, industrialisation, Malaysia Inc. 
Economic liberalisation worldwide 
Financial scandals and political crises in Malaysia 
Printing Presses and Publications (Amendment) Act 1984, OSA 
1984 
1989 
In April, the chairman of the Malaysian 
Press Institute (MPI) suggested a 
council to be set up to ensure that 
newspaper organisations adhere to the 
Journalism Code of Ethics. 
The Code was initiated by several 
veteran journalists, including the late 
Tan Sri Abdul Samad Ismail. 
In October, a new body called 
Organisation of Newspaper Editors 
(ONE) “because it was aware of 
newspapers responsibility to the 
people” (p. 42). 
 
Post Operasi Lalang (October 1987) 
arrests and detentions under the Internal Security Act  
three newspapers banned 
Media commercialisation (Loh and Mustafa, 1996) 
1993-1994 
Minister of Information Datuk 
Mohamed Rahmat announced the 
proposal for a media council and a 
National Information Policy. 
The Policy was to ensure that the 
media play their roles effectively and 
responsibly towards making Malaysia a 
developed nation by 2020. 
 
Vision 2020 introduced – it aims to achieve the status of a 
developed country not only in the economic sense but according 
to Mahathir, Malaysia should be “a nation that is fully developed 
along all dimensions: economically, politically, socially, spiritually, 
psychologically and culturally” (1991; in Okposin, A. Halim and 
Ong, 1999: p. 242). 
1999-2000 
Initiatives from civil society groups to 
push for media law reforms  
MPI secretly drafted a media council 
proposal (Pathmawathy, 2008). 
 
 
Post-Reformasi; the 1999 election 
Questions on government transparency in time of the 1997/1998 
Asian economic meltdown (Rodan, 2004) 
Mega-defamation suits to intimidate journalists (Rodan, 2004) 





The Malaysian Chinese Organisation Election Appeals Committee 
(Suqiu) of Chinese lobbyists raised a 17-point appeal, which in 
general called for national unity and human rights protection.  
The Federation of Peninsular Malay Students (GPMS), however, 
claimed that this appeal was questioning Malay rights (Ooi, 2006). 
2002 
MPI released the draft of Malaysian 
Media Council Bill intended as Private 
Member’s Bill, but was rejected by 
Inisiatif Wartawan (Concerned 
Journalists from the traditional and 
new media, IW) (Pathmawathy, 2008; 
Rodan, 2004). 
 
Post-September 11 ‘terrorist attack’ and the UMNO-PAS struggle 
to champion Muslim rights in Malaysia (Ahmad Fauzi, 2006). 
2004 
The Human Rights Commission 
(Suhakam) hosted a consultative 
dialogue among journalists, editors and 
civil society groups (Pathmawathy, 
2008). 
The stakeholders, at minimum, wanted 
the repeal of the PPPA licensing clause 
before a council is created 
(Pathmawathy, 2008). 
 
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi took over the administration in end-2003 
The 2004 general election 
2006 
Information Minister Datuk Zainuddin 
Maidin said that a Media Council “is 
aimed at resolving disputes outside the 
court” (The Star, 7 November 2005). 
 
A spate of religious issues, the Mahathir-Abdullah spat, the 
aborted Article 11 Coalition’s road show, calls for an Independent 
Police Complaints and Misconduct Commission (IPCMC) (see 
Aliran Monthly 26(11)). 
2008 
In October, Home Minister Syed Hamid 
Albar said that a media council 
proposal is under discussion, alongside 




Street rallies of Hindu Rights Action Force (Hindraf), the Coalition 
for Free and Fair Elections (Bersih), lawyers’ march in Putrajaya 
for judicial reform. 




Perak constitutional crisis 
By-elections  
Cow-head protest in Shah Alam over the relocation of a Hindu 
temple 
Former Utusan Malaysia editor-in-chief Datuk Johan Jaafar 
appointed as the chairperson of Media Prima Berhad (Mustafa, 29 
April 2009). 
Information, Communication and Culture Minister Rais Yatim 
would “[meet] the management of private TV and radio stations 
to bring about changes as they failed to deliver the government’s 
aspirations resulting in the BN’s poor performance at the general 
election last year” (Mustafa, 3 May 2009). 
“[Arrest of] over 160 1BLACKMalaysia protesters, lawyers, 589 
Anti-ISA protesters and bystanders, the anti-PPSMI, Kampung 




In June 2010, UMNO Youth chief called 
for the abolishment of the PPPA, along 
with the setting up of a national media 
 
Datuk Seri Najib Abdul Razak appointed in April as the sixth 
Malaysian prime Minister in April. He introduced the 1Malaysia 




council to allow self-regulation without 
government interference (Ding, 2010). 
Information, Communication and 
Culture deputy minister Datuk Joseph 
Salang Gandum said that the setting up 
of the council would help monitor the 
alternative media (The Star, 14 June 
2010). 
New Economic Model (NEM), ministerial Key Performance 
Indicators (KPIs) and National Key Results Areas (NKRAs). 
Islamic bodies issued a directive that prohibits the use of a 
collection of ‘Islamic terms’ by non-Muslims in Malaysia (Mustafa, 
17 January 2010). 
The Malaysian government reportedly decided to set up a 
Committee of The Truth purportedly to stop the spread of false 
news by the media. The Committee would comprise of 
representatives from Home Ministry, Communications and 
Culture Ministry and the Prime Minister’s Department (Mustafa, 
10 July 2010). 
2011 
The Information, Communication and 
Culture Ministry proposed for a Media 
Consultative Council (MCC) to ensure 
its members share the responsibility of 
keeping their roles in tandem with 
national interests (Chooi, 2011).  
 
Selangor assembly passes Freedom of Information Act (Teoh, 
2011). 
The Bersih rally took place on 9 July at the Kuala Lumpur City 
Centre, with an estimated 50,000 protesters (Pragalath & Lee, 
2011). The organisers had mustered pre-event support from 
technology-savvy Malaysians largely through the popular social 
networking site, Facebook. Criticisms of police manhandling of 
protesters and skewed mainstream media reports on the event 
were also heavily expressed through Facebook. 
On Malaysia Day, the government announced major changes on 
communication regulations, which are referred to as ‘gifts’ (Teoh, 
2011): 
- The repeal of the Internal Security Act (ISA) 1960 & 
Banishment Act 1959. 
- The annual license renewal replaced by one-off permit. 
- Three emergency proclamations to be lifted. 
- More freedom to assemble – review Section 27 (Police Act 
1967). 
Malaysia’s Budget 2012 revealed on 7 October 2011, aiming to 
benefit all rakyat. 
Malaysia’s 13th General Election speculations (Bernama, 30 
December 2011). 
2012 
Malaysia’s Information, Communication 
and Culture Minister Rais Yatim has 
called for a social media to be set up. 
According to him, the council is 
important “in ensuring that the 
contents of the social media in the 
country reflected an industry that used 
local content instead of merely 
depending on other countries” 
(Bernama, 11 July 2012). 
 
Videos of the Bersih 2.0 and anti-Lynas rallies that took place on 
28 April went viral on social networking sites and Youtube; 
criticising the administration, police violence and inaccurate 
media reports. 
More speculations over the upcoming Malaysia’s 13th Genenal 
Election.   
 
